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# Queen's Gambit Accepted 

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## Introduction

| 1 | $d 4$ | $d 5$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 2 | c 4 | dxc 4 |



By capturing the c4 pawn, Black concedes ground in the centre, and after restoring material equality White gains a certain advantage in space. Is it worth affording him this superiority?

The present book is an attempt to answer this question.

Mention of the Queen's Gambit Accepted, including traps where Black tries to hold on to the gambit pawn, is made in the first works on reformed chess - the Göttingen Manuscript (late 15th century) and that of Damiano (1512), as well as later books by Lopez (1561) and Salvio (1604).

The second edition of Stamma's book (1745) indicates the possibility after 3 e 3 of the counter $3 \ldots$ e..e5, which was to occur nearly 100 years later (with the continuation 4 定xc4 exd4 5 exd4 Qf6) in games from the La Bourdonnais-McDonnell matches. Later, in order to prevent ...e7-e5, White began playing 3 ff 3 and only then e2-e3,
and Black would employ the other counter ...c7-c5. This gave rise to 3 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 c5 5 真xc4 e6, which became the Classical Variation.

In his World Championship Match with Zukertort (1886) Steinitz demonstrated a plan of action against the isolated d4 pawn. In this match positions from the Queen's Gambit Accepted were reached by transposition. For example, the 9th game went l d4 d5 2 c 4 e6 3 Qc3 Df6 4 Qf3 dxc4 5 e3 c5 6 exc4. Here and in other similar positions Steinitz would exchange 6...cxd4 7 exd4, opening the diagonal for the enemy bishop, but isolating the central pawn, which he would then put under siege.

Steinitz's plan was not taken up by his contemporaries, and the popularity of the Queen's Gambit Accepted, in comparison with other branches, remained insignificant. Normally White would gain the advantage.

By exchanging his d-pawn for the cpawn, Black voluntarily concedes his opponent superiority in the centre. Siegbert Tarrasch, the author of one of the first monographs on the Queen's Gambit, wrote: '...the Queen's Gambit Accepted is a strategic mistake. Without a fight Black concedes the attacking centre, instead of somehow defending it; as a result White gains absolute domination. Meanwhile the entire opening struggle should be concentrated on control of the centre. Whoever has a solid central pawn is the more strongly placed'. And later: '...by accepting the gambit, Black gives his opponent a tempo, allowing the
development of the king＇s bishop．The acceptance of the gambit could be jus－ tified only if Black were able to hold the gambit pawn by ．．．b7－b5．But，as is known，this is not in fact the case．．．＇

A crisis in the classical variations of the Queen＇s Gambit Declined forced players to think about improving the accepted gambit，in the development of which several stages can be traced．

In the early 1930s，along with im－ provements to Black＇s play in the Classical Variation（3 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 c5 5 定c4 e6 6 0－0 a6 followed by ．．．b7－b5 and ．．．．b7），new ideas were put for－ ward．Black＇s main concern is the development of his queen＇s bishop，an important diagonal of which is blocked by ．．．e7－e6．In his match with Bogoljubow（1934），instead of the tra－ ditional 3．．． Qf $^{2}$ Alekhine replied 3．a6， and after 4 e 3 developed his bishop at g4．This gave rise to a variation that was later modernised： 3 －f3 0 f6 4 e3 \＆g4 5 最xc4 e6．

In the same match after 3 Qf3 ©f6 Bogoljubow regained the pawn by 4 wa $4+$ and 5 寝xc4，which initiated a new branch of the accepted gambit．

The evaluation of the Steinitz
 $60-0 \mathrm{cxd} 47$ exd4 remained debatable． until in the 1930s Botvinnik demon－ strated a clear plan for using the semi－ open e－file and the e5 outpost．As a result many positions with an isolated central pawn began to be evaluated in favour of White．

Of the original ideas we should men－ tion Smyslov＇s plan introduced in the

1950s of 3 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 g6，which resembles the Grünfeld Defence．

The Classical Variation was modern－ ised in various ways；in particular，at－ tempts were made to carry out the stra－ tegically important move e3－e4 by forcible means，sacrificing if necessary （ $60-0 \mathrm{c} 67 \mathrm{e} 4$ ），and the plan of 6 䊓e2 followed by dxc5 and e3－e4 was also suggested．

The modern interpretation of the opening involves an early e2－e4（1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4； 3 乌f3 a6 4 e4； 3 Qf3 ©f6 4 Qc3 a6 5 e4）．In these variations the gambit becomes a real one．The old move 3 e 3 ，which since the time of La Bourdonnais and McDonnell used to be considered harmless on account of $3 \ldots$ ．．．5，has also gained many supporters．

Those who accept the gambit have also not been idle．In chess，as in war－ fare，an improvement in means of attack leads to an improvement in defensive measures．The development of an opening is a constant battle of ideas－a search for the new in practical play and in research．

The Queen＇s Gambit Accepted is employed in the most important events． The names of players who have en－ riched its theory will be found in the games and analyses．

The layout of this book is somewhat untraditional．The Classical Variation is regarded as the basic，and then devia－ tions from it are examined－first by Black，and then by White．Material up to the end of 1996 has been included．

## Classical Variation

## 7 粨e2 b5

| 1 | d 4 | d 5 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 2 | c 4 | dxc 4 |
| 3 | 0 f 3 |  |

White develops his king＇s knight and at the same time prevents $3 \ldots e 5$ ，which can follow after $3 \mathrm{e} 3,3 \mathrm{e} 4$ or 3 cc 3 ． Until recently it was thought that the counter $3 . . . e 5$ enabled Black to equalise without difficulty，but this opinion has now been shaken．

$$
3 \ldots \text {. } 066
$$

Black，in turn，takes measures against e2－e4．

$$
\begin{array}{llll}
4 & \text { e3 } & \text { e6 }
\end{array}
$$

Black prepares to develop his king＇s bishop and to attack the centre（4 ．．c5）． $4 \ldots . . c 5$ and then $5 \ldots$ ．．．e also occurs．

$$
5 \text { \&xc4 c5 }
$$

We also give a few old games that are still of practical interest．

5．．．莤e7（Black does not hurry to at－ tack the centre，but first completes his kingside development）60－0（6 Oc3 should also be considered，and if $6 \ldots 0-0$ 7 e4！）6．．．0－079c3：
（a） $7 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 68$ 曾e2 2 b 79 e4 c5（the evaluation of this line was not changed by the modern game Dimitrijevic－ S．Nikolic，Kragujevac 1974：9．．．Obd7 10 Еdl c5 11 dxc 5 \＆xc5 12 \＆g5） 10 Ed1 cxd4 11 Qxd4 毘c8 12 e5 with advantage to White（Lasker－Teichmann， Hastings 1895）；
（b） $7 \ldots$ ．．．bd7 8 b3（as in the main lines of the Classical Variation， 8 we2
 Qe4 110 g 3 ，and White＇s position is preferable（Teichmann－Blackburne， Hastings 1895）．

5．．． \＆$^{2}$ b4 +6 Qc3 0－0 $70-0$ b6 8 De5
 should also be considered）8．．．eb7 9岩b3 \＆xc3（9．．．\＆d6 is preferable） 10 bxc3 with some advantage to White （Steinitz－Gunsberg，New York 1890／1）．

5．．．a6（Black delays ．．．c7－c5，but with the idea of driving back the bishop from c4 and of developing his queenside） 6 Qc3 b5：

（a） 7 是e2（this was played a few times by Capablanca）7．．．皿b7 8 0－0 Qbd7 9 b 3 国d6 10 皿b2 0－0 11 Ёcl c5 （in Andersson－Belyavsky，Reykjavik 1988，11．．．${ }^{\text {Wene7 }}$ allowed White to gain the better chances by 12 a 4 ！b4 13 Qb 1 c5 14 Qbd2 cxd4 15 Qxd4 $\mathrm{Dc}_{\mathrm{c}} 16$分 4 \＆ c 717 f 4 Eac 818 \＆f3 Qfe4 19世 $\mathbf{W}$ 2） $11 \ldots \mathrm{c} 512 \mathrm{dxc} 5$ 分xc5 13 b 4 Qce4 14 Qxe4 ©xe4 15 a3 with an equal position；
（b） 7 是b3 显b7 and 7 金d3 ${ }^{2}$ b7 fol－ lowed by ．．．c7－c5 usually transpose into lines examined below．However，it should be emphasised that delaying ．．．c7－c5 for a long time can cost Black
dearly： 7 全d3 全b78009bd79 e4 b4 10 e5！bxc3 11 exf6 gxt6？（11．．． $0 x+6$ is the lesser evil，although even then after 12 bxc3 White has the advantage） 12 bxc3 c5 13 宸e 2 cxd4 14 cxd4 宣d6 15 $\stackrel{ \pm}{m} \mathrm{bl}$ ！，and in Kampenus－Klavins（Riga 1963）Black came under a very strong attack．


The basic position of the Classical Variation．

$$
6 \quad 0-0
$$

This is the main line．White can also begin play in the centre before castling， by playing 6 宸e2，then dxc5 and e3－e4 （the Furman Variation）－－see Chapter 6.

We should also mention 60 c 3 a 6 ：
（a） 7 a4 or $70-0$ usually leads to lines given below，although after $70-0$ b5 8 ㅇd3 0 bd 7 a transposition into the Meran Defence is possible；
（b） 7 \＆$b 3$（this gives the play an original direction）7．．．b5 8 a4 b4（8．．．c4 9 \＆c2 b4 leads to a clear advantage for White after 10 Qe4 \＆${ }^{2}$ b7 11 Qxf6＋
是d2 \＆xf3 15 当xf3 㟶xf3 16 gxf3，in view of the weakness of the far－ advanced pawns） 9 De2 \＆b7 10 Qf4 Qbd7 11 Qg5！Qd5（not $11 \ldots$ \＆d6？ 12 Qxf7！家xf7 13 包xe6，but 11．．．嶒e7！？
and $11 \ldots$ 曾a5 need testing） 125 5yxe6 fxe6 13 亿xe6 曾c8 14 食xd5 安xd5 15

曾a5，and with three pawns for the piece plus an active position，White has the better chances（Makarychev－Mitenkov， Russian Ch． 1995 －analysis by Makarychev）．

Another possible plan is the simplify－ ing dxc5（either immediately，or after the preparatory $\mathrm{a} 2-\mathrm{a} 3$ ）．


Black has two main plans：
I．Preparing to develop his queenside by ．．．a7－a6．retaining the tension in the centre or exchanging at a convenient moment on d4（Chapters 1－4）．

II．The immediate exchange on d 4 ，in order after exd4 to besiege the isolated pawn．This，the Steinitz Variation，is covered in Chapter 5.

White intends to exploit his central superiority by preparing e3－e4 and bringing his queen＇s bishop into play． Black，in turn，has to decide how to develop his queen＇s bishop．The usual way is by ．．．a7－a6，．．．b7－b5 and ．．．eb7． If White does not want to allow ．．．b7－ b5，he plays $\mathrm{a} 2-\mathrm{a} 4$ ，but in so doing the b4 square is weakened．

$$
\begin{array}{llll}
6 & \ldots & \text { a6 }
\end{array}
$$

Preparing for the development of the queenside．

If 6．．．定e7 White continues 7 孀e2， and answers the routine $7 \ldots 0-0$ with 8 dxc5！\＆xc5 9 e4 and then e4－e5．

6．．．0c6 7 㟶e2 a6 or $7 \ldots \mathrm{cxd} 4$ is ex－ amined under a different move order （6．．．a6 7 崽e2 9c6）and in the Steinitz Variation．


## 7 采e2

Apart from this move，which is the subject of Chapters 1 and 2 ，White also has：

7 a4（Chapter 3）；
Other 7th moves（Chapter 4）．
After defending his d－pawn with his rook，White plans e3－e4．

$$
7 \ldots \text { b5 }
$$

Black＇s other options of developing his queen＇s knight at c6 or d7 are con－ sidered in Chapter 2.

For lines with the exchange in the centre－7．．．cxd4 8 exd4 \＆e7 followed by 9 Dc3 or 9 Ed－cf．the Steinitz Variation（Chapter 5），and for 9 a 4 －cf． Chapter 3.

Now White has：
8 \＆b3（1．1）
8 \＆${ }^{2}$ d3（1．2）－p． 43
1.1 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 乌f6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 $60-0$ a6 7 崽e2 b5）

## 8 具b3

At b3 the bishop does not block the d－file and，more important，＇looks＇at d5 and e6，forcing Black to reckon with $\mathrm{d} 4-\mathrm{d} 5$ and possible sacrifices at e6 and f7．

$$
8 \quad \ldots \quad \text { §b7 }
$$

For 8．．．0c6 see the variation 7 We2
 （p．49）．

White can prepare e3－e4 by playing 9 mdl or else continue his development with 9 Dc3（1．11）．

The alternative is to try and exploit the drawback to ．．．b7－b5 by the under－ mining 9 a4（1．12）－p． 36 ．
> 1.11 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 0 f 6 4 e3 e6 5 全xc4 c5 6 0－0 a6 7 崽e2 b5 8 宜b3 酋b7）

## 9 di



This move and 9 © 3 are sometimes made in reverse order，although lines of independent significance are possible：
（a） $9 \ldots$ ．．．e7 10 dxc 5 ．White tries to exploit the time spent by Black on the
＇two－stage＇development of his bishop． Since $10 \ldots$ ．．．$x$ xc5？allows 11 Qxb5，be－ fore regaining his pawn Black has to play $10 \ldots$ ．．．bd7（or $10 \ldots$ 临c7 11 宣c2昷xc5 12 e 4 with the initiative for White） 11 c6 显xc6 12 Qd4 §b7． White＇s position is preferable，but it should be mentioned that the direct sacrifice on e6 is not dangerous：after 13 定xe6？！fxe6 14 Qxe6 曾b6 15
 a bishop，and the opponent＇s king is unable to castle，but there is no way of attacking it，all Black＇s pieces are in play，and he has the better chances；
（b） $9 \ldots . . . c x d 410$ exd4 昷e7 11 是g5 $0-0$ leads to a position from the Steinitz Variation．
 12 \＆$\times$ a4－ 0 bd 7 is weaker：
（a） 13 e 4 ，and Black is in difficulties：
（al）13．．．定xe4 14 ac3 and then 定g5 with a strong attack；
（a2）13．．．是c5 is more circumspect， but after 14 e5 ©d5 15 \＆xd7＋ 16 \＆e3 White still has the advantage；
（b） 13 宣d2 是e7（13．．．觜xb2？ 14

 Qc3，and Black cannot complete his mobilisation without losing material－ $15 . .0-0$ is met by $160 x e 6$ ．

Now let us see how events develop if Black，without determining the position of his queen＇s knight，completes his kingside development with $9 . .$. \＆e7：
（a） $100 \mathrm{c} 30-011 \mathrm{e} 4$ ，and now：
（al） $11 \ldots$ ．．．b4 12 d 5 （an interesting sac－ rifice suggested by Suetin；if 12 e5 12．．． bxc3 13 exf6 exf6 14 bxc3 cxd4 15 cxd4 idd5 16 \＆ e 4 with roughly equal chances，Pachman－Wade，Bucharest 1954）12．．．bxc3（after 12．．．exd5 13 Qxd5 ©xd5 14 气 $\mathbf{x d 5}$ White stands
better） 13 dxe6．Where should Black move his queen？
（all）13．．．鷩b6 14 e5 De4 15 exf7－
 possible，therefore it was more accurate for White to transpose moves： 14 exf7－， forcing $14 \ldots$ ．．．$h 8$ ，and only then 15 e5） 16 e6！\＆f6 17 Qe5 岩c7（17．．．食xe5 18 e7！） 18 Qg6＋！hxg6 19 』d3 0 g 520莤xg5 exg5 21 e 7 with decisive threats （Kir．Georgiev－Dlugy，Belfort 1983）：
（a12）13．．．皆c7 14 exf7＋楁h8 15 e5 Qg4（15．．．Dfd7 16 e6，or $15 \ldots$ ．． 16

 and $\Xi \mathrm{el}$ ，Vaiser－Donchev，Vrnjacka Banja 1984，both favour White）：


16 bxc3 c4 17 是xc4 是xf3 18 gxf3
 19．．．官6）18．．．⿹xe5 19 定d5 Qbc6 20皿f4 定d6（forced） 21 是xc6显xe5 是xe5 23 荘xe5 峟xf3（23．．． $\mathbf{E x f 7}$
 and Black had to seek a way of saving the heavy－piece ending（Toshkov－ E．Adamski，Warsaw 1985）；
（a2）11．．．cxd4 12 气xd4 菅c7 13 全g5 h6 14 宜h4 Qxe4？（the complications begun with this move favour White，but $14 \ldots$ ．．b4 is strongly met by 15 e 5 ．and declining the e 4 pawn by 14 ．．．2c6 15 Qxc6 是xc6 or $15 \ldots$ 曾xc6 16 玉acl－－
 leaves White with the better chances） 15 ©xe6！fxe6 16 良xe7 シxf2 17 寝g4！炭xe718＠xe4（Ftacnik－Zaltsman，New York 1987）；
（b） 10 a 4 ：


10．．．Qbd7 11 dxc5（after 11 axb5 axb5 12 日xa8 莦xa8 the chances are roughly equal） $11 \ldots$ 是xc5 12 Qe5 b4 （Lukov－Dlugy，Palma de Mallorca 1989；12．．． w b6 is also good），and now 13 Qxd7 $0 x d 714$ Qd2 leads to a position with equal chances；

After 9．．．${ }^{W}$ c7 10 Qc3（10 a4！－ Gligoric，e．g．10．．．c4 11 是c2 是e7 12 axb5 axb5 13 Exa8 © ex 814 e 4 ） $10 \ldots$
 to a position examined later） 11 Qbl Qbd7 12 Qbd2 是e7 13 ©c4 0－0 14 £d2 a5 chances are roughly equal （Rabar－Lesnik，Yugoslavia 1948）．

9．．．c4 10 皿c2 ©c6 11 Qc3 Qb4 12览bl is considered on p．53）．

And now：
10 © $\mathbf{c} 3$（1．111）
10 e4（1．112）－p． 33
1.111 （ 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 $60-0 \mathrm{a} 67$ 嘪e2



In this position Black has tried：
10．．．空d6（1．1111）
10．．．㟶b8（1．1112）－p． 18
10．．．8e7（1．1113）－p． 24
10．．．㟤c7（1．1114）－p． 25
10．．．嶒b6（1．1115）－p． 28
10．．．b4（1．1116）－p． 31
10．．．室a5（1．1117）－p． 33
1.1111 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 صf3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 这xc4 c5 $60-0 \mathrm{a} 67$
 Qc3）

$$
10 \ldots \text { \& }
$$

An invention of Smyslov，introduced in a game with Petrosian in the 1959 Candidates Tournament，after which the variation with the development of the bishop at d6（later after the preparatory 10．．．wb8）for some time became a topical problem．

Since White is intending to advance his e－pawn to e4（and if Black should allow it，to e5）， $10 \ldots$ ．．．d6 covers the e5 square and also establishes control of the h2－b8 diagonal．

## 11 e4

Other possibilities：
11 d5 exd5：

（a） 12 Qxd5 c4 13 Qxf6 $+\frac{\omega}{\omega} \times f 614$全c2 De5 15 公d4 0－0 16 b 3 （16 今d2 $\hat{\&} \mathrm{c} 5$ with the better prospects for Black， Meduna－Nogueiras，Cienfuegos 1984） 16．．．c3 17 Qf5 \＆c5 18 e4 g6 19 皿e3宣xe3 20 ©xe3 Ead8 21 b4 with chances for both sides（Gufeld）；
（b） 12 e 4 leads to great complications：
（b1） $12 \ldots \mathrm{~d} 4 \quad 13$ e5 \＆ eff 14 gxf 3是xe5 $15 \mathrm{f} 40-016$ fxe5
 （Liberzon－Klavins，USSR Team Ch ． 1961），and Black retains his pawn，since 21 exf6 is met by $21 \ldots$ ．．． 22 xf6 22 ©g4，regaining the piece．However， White is not obliged to take the knight， and his two bishops and strong central pawns more than compensate for the material deficit（Boleslavsky）；
（b2）12．．．0－0（Black returns the pawn，but completes his development） 13 Oxd5（or 13 e5 Ee8 14 §f4c4）
全c2 Qe5）14．．．©xd5 15 exd5 Ee8，in all cases with a sound position；
（b3） $12 \ldots \mathrm{c} 4$ is an interesting variation with a temporary piece sacrifice： 13 exd5＋（after 13 e5？！Qxe5 14 Qxe5 $0-0$ ！Black gains the advantage） $13 \ldots$ We7 14 Wxe7＋ d6） 15 Dd4 with double－edged play （Nogueiras）．

11 dxc5 显xc5 12 Qe5 炭c7 13 Qxd7 $\mathrm{Qxd}^{2} 14$ e4（most of Black＇s pieces are on the queenside，and White tries to launch an offensive） $14 \ldots 0-015$量g5：

（a） $15 \ldots \hat{1} \mathrm{~d} 616$ 玉acl 0 c 517 皆h5宸b8（17．．． $0 x b 318$ 乌d5！） 18 是c2 b4 19 国f6！，and Black came under a strong attack（Zavernaev－Radevich，Arkhan－ gelsk 1964）：
（b） $15 \ldots \mathrm{~h} 616$ 定ht idd 17 ing定xg 318 hxg 3 Dc 5 with equal chances （Euwe），but by 17 峟d2 or 17 Eacl White immediately gains an advantage；
（c） $15 \ldots$ ．．． w e5 can be recommended， and if $16 \Xi x d 7$ \＆$c 6$ ，attacking White＇s rook and bishop and restoring material equality，or 16 in4 0 f 617 \＆g 3 当g5．


（a） $13 \ldots 0 \cdots 14$ d5 e5 150 e 4 f5 16 Qg5 $\Xi f 6 \quad 17$ e4 with advantage to White（Ilivitsky－Tarasov．Russian Team Ch．1960），but Black can consider 14．．． c4 15 佥c2（ 15 dxe6 can be met by 15．．． fxe6 or 15．．．cxb3－Ravinsky）15．．．b4 16 dxe6 ©f6 with the initiative for the sacrificed pawn；
（b）13．．．cxd4 14 exd4 0－0 15 d 5 exd5 16 Oxd5 宣xd5 17 宣xd5 玉ae8，and White＇s advantage is merely symbolic．

The prophylactic 11 h 3 is not very promising：11．．．0－0 12 空c2 管c7 13 e 4 cxd4 14 乌xd4 Еac8 15 a3 Efd8 with equal chances（Partos－Radulescu，Rom－ ania 1962）． 11 ．．．cxd4
And now：
120 xd 4 （1．11111）
12 Exd4（1．11112）－p． 16

| 64 e3 e6 5 ＠xc4 c5 6000 a 7 <br> 2 b5 8 全b3 昷b79 9 d 1 Qbd7 10 <br> 3 \＆${ }^{2}$ d6 $11 \mathrm{e} 4 \mathrm{cxd4}$ ） |
| :---: |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |

12 Qxd4 崰b8


With gain of tempo the queen leaves the d－file，which had become danger－ ous．Note that this same position can
arise via a different move order in the variation 10．．．峟b8 11 e4 cxd4 12 分 xd 4令d6．

## 13 g3

Other continuations：
13 h 3 ．Can Black take the pawn？
（a）13．．．b4 14 乌a4 是xe4（14．．．分xe4 is dangerous in view of $15 \mathrm{\omega} \mathrm{w} 4$ or 15包xe6） 15 客g5（to 15 f 3 Black has the good reply $15 \ldots$ ．．e5！ 16 fxe4 exd4 17 ※xd4 茵e5）15．．．0－0 16 玉ac1 县h2＋17 chathl if4 and Black gained the advant－ age（Kampenus－V．Kirillov，Riga 1962）；
（b）with 13．．．0－0 14 a3 Ed8 Black declines the sacrifice：
（b1） 15 ㅇg5 h6？（the threat of 16 Qxe6 would have been most simply parried by $15 \ldots$ ．．．f 4 although $15 \ldots$ ．．．e5 was also possible） 16 亿xe6 fxe6（it was better not to take the knight，although after 16．．．』e8 17 \＆xf6 $0 x f 618$ Qd4恠 419 ©xe4 定xe4 20 wh5 White has the better chances） 17 \＆xe6－6 18 是xf6 $9 x f 619$ e5，and White re－ gained his piece，remaining a pawn up （Bannik－Suetin，Minsk 1962）；
（b2） 15 今c2 是h2＋ 16 客h 1 定f4 17
 20 Qxb7 当xb7 21 Exd8－Еxd8 22 Ed1 临c7 23 是b3 h6 with a satisfactory position for Black（Reshevsky－Portisch， Amsterdam 1964）．

13 ©f3 b4 has proved unsuccessful for White：
（a） 14 Qd5 exd5 15 e5 Qxe5 16 Qxe5 0－0！，and White has no compen－ sation for the sacrificed pawn（Petro－ sian－Smyslov，Zurich Candidates 1959）；
（b）in Mileika－Klovans（Riga 1961） White sacrificed the exchange by 14 Exd6 ${ }^{\boldsymbol{y}} \mathrm{xd6} 15$ e5，but after 15．．． $\mathrm{Qx}^{2} 5$ 16 Qxe5 bxc3 17 是a4＋\＆ 88 Black should be able to parry the attack．

13 \＆xe6 fxe6 14 Qxe6 is an interest－ ing sacrifice：

（a）14．．． 17 Qf3 b4 18 Qd5 是xd5 19 exd5崰e8？ 20 We6＋and White won（Beni－ Fichtl，Berlin 1962），but with 19．．．＠f8！ Black could have parried the threats and retained a material advantage；

 19 घxd7－$\Delta x d 720$ Ef1 峟xfl＋ 21
 enemy king gives White compensation for the sacrificed material． 22 罗 f 4 was probably more energetic，to which Black defends with 22．．．是c6．

13 f4？！全x4 14 全xf4 峟xf4 15食xe6？！leads to quite fantastic compli－ cations，but after 15．．fxe6 16 Qxe6

䒼g4 h5 21 暑g6 Eaf8 22 Ed1 Ehg8 23
米c5＋ 26 （Lhi（Leonidov－Margolit， Lipeck v．Razan 1960）26．．．ic6 or 26．．．昷c8 White has no compensation for his big material deficit．

It remains to consider one further sacrifice．Exploiting the remoteness of the enemy queen，with 13 e5 White opens the central file，an idea that proved justified in Kakageldiev－Reiman （USSR Team Ch．1969）：13．．．＠xe5 （13．．．Qxe5 is strongly met by 14 f 4

4． $\mathrm{c} 415 \mathrm{a4}) 14$ 2xe6 fxe6 $15 \mathrm{f4} 00$ ： （after 15．．．今全xc3 16 峟xe6• 17会e3 White threatens 18 全b6－and then Eacl with a strong attack） 16 fxe5 Qxe5 17 \＃̈d4 0 c6（defending against 18 §f4，but 17．．．2g6 came into consid－ eration，not allowing the enemy rook across to the kingside） 18 th4 19
 Material equality has been restored，and White has the more pleasant position．
13
b4

13．．．0－0 14 f3（Savon－Kots，29th USSR Ch，Baku 1961）and now 14．．． Ed8 can be recommended to those who prefer quiet play．

14 Da4


To take or not to take？

$$
14 \ldots \text { 是xe4 }
$$

$14 . .0 \mathrm{xe4}$ is very dangerous．White drives back the knight with 15 f 3 ，and then breaks up the enemy king＇s de－ fences：
（a）15．．．Def6 16 Qxe6 De5 17

 Exd6 with a winning position；
（b） $15 \ldots$ Dec5 16 \＆xe6 fxe6（ $16 \ldots$ $0-017$ \＆xd7 $0^{x d 7} 18$ 分5！） 17 Qxc5 Qxc5（White also develops a decisive

 20 宸c4 with irresistible threats．

With 14．．．0－0 15 요2 Black can decline the sacrifice：
（a） $15 \ldots$ a5 16 b3 Qc5 17 e5 \＆a6 18
 repetition（Prieditis－Circenis，corr．1963）；
（b） $15 \ldots \pm \mathrm{c} 816$ \＆g5 a5 17 是d3 \＆ e 5
 this forcing variation，the simple 19．．．当xe5 20 \＆xf6 gxf6 or 20 \＆f4 楼h5 should be considered） 20 Qxd7 ${ }^{\text {Q }}$ xdl 21 ．xf6＋gxf6（Gik－Schulte，Moscow 1962） 22 暑d2 fxg5（22．．．
 24 Exdl with a pawn for the exchange and attacking chances．

## 15 f3

15 罠g 5 can be met by $15 \ldots 0-0$ ，and if 16 亿xe6

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
15 & \ldots & \text { e5 } \\
16 & 0
\end{array}
$$

If 16 fxe4 exd4 17 ■xd4 0－0，when V．Sokolov－Janosevic（Yugoslavia 1962）
 Eadl 是b8！ 21 宸c2 宜a7 22 宣 $\times a 7$ Exa7 23 多g2 䒼h5 24 h3 Qe5，and Black took the initiative．

| 16 | $\ldots$ | fxe6 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 17 | fxe4 | \＆c5＋ |

17．．．0c5 18 粪c4 Oxb3 19 Wxe6＋色e7 20 当xb3 Og4 21 』f1 favours White（Safin－Nenashev，Tashkent 1989）．

$$
18 \text { Qxc5 }
$$

Against 18 蓖g2 Black has the good reply 18 ．．．宸b5．

If 18 \＆ e 粊b5！（the simplest；with 18．．．全xe3－19 宸xe3 气g4 20 皆f3郎 $7+$ Black wins the exchange，but
 Exdl he has to withstand an attack） 19

 up，although it is devalued，and White
retains drawing chances（Michaljcisin－ Ugrinovic，Yugoslavia 1962）．


```
19 然c4 娄b5
```

Black has parried the attack，and he is a pawn up，although it is too early to draw the line．This line，relating to the late fifties and early sixties，was tested in Maichrak－Fichtl（Czechoslovakia 1972）．With 20 \＆e3 White sacrificed a second pawn－20．．．当xc4 21 宣xc4 Qfxe4 22 \＆fl，and thanks to his two bishops gained enough compensation．
1.11112 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 亿．f3 4）f6 4 e3 e6 5 酉xc4 c5 60－0 a6 7
 4c3 今造6 11 e 4 cxd 4 ）

## $12 \stackrel{m}{E x d} 4$

This move was suggested in 1961 by Bondarevsky and Spassky．


12
\＆ C 5
 met by 13 Exd6 and 14 e5．

$$
13 \text { d3! }
$$

White intends to cramp the opponent by e4－e5，or to play ${ }^{\text {eg }} 5$ and adl with pressure on the d－file．

13．．．Og4 14 皿g5！wb6（14．．．宣xf2＋ 15 原fl 宸b6 16 h 3 Qge5 can be met by 17 コxd7！；Ribli suggests $16 \ldots$ ．．．de5） 15 Qd5！

（a）15．．．exd5（this allows White a very strong attack） 16 exd5＋ 6817 d6


 White has a won position） 19 宣e3 ©xe3 20 fxe3；
（b） $15 \ldots$ ．．．$x d 516$ exd5，and now：
（bl）16．．．e5 17 定h4 0－0 18 Og5（18 h3 e4！）18．．．⿹gf6 19 Qe6 fxe6 20 dxe6解h8 21 exd7 定d4！ 22 Eँh3 with $a$ highly promising position（Veresov－ Suetin，USSR Ch $1 / 2$－Final 1961）；
（b2）16．．． $0 x f 217$ dxe6！ $0 x d 3+18$客fl fxe6（if 18．．．0－0 19 兠xd3 乌f6 20是xf6 gxf6 21 定c2） 19 䍘xd3 皿e7 （Koblenz－Klovans，Riga 1962）and now White could have continued the offen－

（b3）16．．．exf2＋（an interesting inno－ vation in this thoroughly studied vari－
 18．．． $0 x \mathrm{xd} 319$ dxe6 fxe6 20 hxg 4 h 5 ！） 17．．．0c5（not 17．．．8de5 18 h 3 务xf3 19 gxf3），when in Levitt－Sadler（London 1988）White should have played 18 h 3. and if $18 \ldots$ 员xd 19 hxg 4 定g 20 全e3！ Qc5 21 Eacl 今d6 22 岩c2！（Sadler）．
（c） $15 \ldots$ 兠 a 516 mf ：


16．．．\＃c8（16．．．0－0 fails to 17 Eje 7 ．是xe7 18 色xe7 Qge5 19 Qxe5 乌xe5 20 定xf8 全xd3 21 全xg7，while if $16 \ldots$ Qde5 17 Qxe5 Qxe5 18 食f4！，and 18．．．9xd3 is not possible due to the loss of the queen after 19 全c7！） 17 乌f4！ （preventing castling and threatening 18 Qxe6）17．．．Qge5 18 Qxe5 Qxe5 19


 22 Ehd3，and White has an over－ whelming advantage（Petrosian－Bertok， Stockholm 1962）．

## Other alternatives：

13．．．当b6 14 h 3 （having taken meas－ ures against ．．．$\triangle g 4$ ，White plans e4－e5） 14．．．h6 15 e5 Og8 16 皿e3 \＆xe3 17 $\pm x e 3$ ．Black is behind in development （Rudenko－Schulte，Minsk 1962）．

13．．．0－0 14 是f4 b4 15 Da4 皆a5 16
 $19 \pm \mathrm{d} 4$ ，and the exchanging operation
 22 曾e7 定c6 23 全 $f 1$ merely high－ lighted Black＇s pawn weaknesses（Tal－ Georgadze．Georgian Ch．1970）．
$13 \ldots$ b4 is unjustified in view of 14 e5！Dg4（14 ．．．bxcう 15 exf6） 15 全a4令c816乌e4．

$$
14 \text { 㑒g5 } \quad 0-0
$$



Klüger－Colz（Sofia 1962）continued 15 a 3 ©g4 16 玉ad1 金e7 17 皿c2 2 c 5
 Qcd7 21 e5 0 d 5 ，and after further ex－ changes Black maintained the balance．

Serious consideration should be given to 15 玉adl，suggested more than 30 years ago by Ravinsky，and if $15 \ldots$ b4 16 Da4 是xe4 17 Exd7 是xf3 18 Exc7 气xe2 19 』d2，when both bishops are attacked，or 15 モcl，and if $15 \ldots$ ．．． w b 16 Ecdl．
1.1112 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 是xc4 c5 6 0－0 a6 7
 Qc3

## 10 <br> 虽b8

Now after 11 e4 cxd4 the capture with the rook is no longer so favourable for White．The bishop goes to c5 im－ mediately，not in two moves（．．．宣d6－ c5），and compared with the variation 10．．．定d6 11 e 4 cxd 412 Exd5 $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{I}} \mathrm{c} 512$ Exd4 black has made the useful move ．．．宸b8＇for free＇．These considerations were confirmed by Kaunas－Pohla （Daugavpils 1979）： 12 Exd4 \＆c5 13 $\Xi \mathrm{d} 30 \mathrm{~g} 414 \Omega \mathrm{~d} 1$（it will be recalled
that in the $10 \ldots$ ．．．sd6 variation the black queen was still at d 8 ，and White had good attacking chances，but here it is Black who launches an offensive） 14．．．©df6 15 h3 h5 16 是g5 ©xe4．

If after 10．．．菅b8 11 e4 cxd4 White prefers 12 Qxd4，then $12 \ldots$ ．．．d6 leads to a favourable position for Black from variation 1.11111 （p．14）．

Therefore after 10．．．逼b8 White usually employs some other plan．


11 d5
The queen has moved away to b8， and White hurries to exploit this by opening the centre．

The quiet 11 h 3 金d6（11．．．昷e7 is also played） 12 e4 cxd4 13 Exd4（13 Qxd4 leads to a position from 1．11111） gives Black time to prepare for defence：
（a）13．．＠e5（Titenko－Doroshkevich， USSR 1962）．Now 14 亩g5 is met by 14．．． $0 x f 3+15$ 当xf3 宣e5，while if 15 gxf3 i．c5，and the attacked rook cannot move in view of $16 \ldots$ ．．． $\mathrm{E} \mathrm{g} 3+$ ；
（b）after the standard 13．．．定c5 14 \＃̈dl b4 Black wins a pawn，but 15 Qa4公xe4 16 分xc5 分dxc5 17 显c2 0－0 18 Qg5 $0 x \mathrm{x} 519$ 定xg5 gives White com－ pensation－two active bishops plus better development，with the enemy
queen awkwardly placed（Torbergsson－ Drozd，Bucharest 1962）．

The slow 11 \＆c2 allows Black to complete his development unhindered： 11．．．今e7 12 b3 0－0 13 定b2 Ed8 14
 Qf3 0 g 6 ，with perhaps somewhat the more active position（Polugayevsky－ Volovich，Yalta 1962）．

A complicated situation arises after 11 Qe5．

（a） $11 \ldots$ ．．．xe5 12 dxe5，and now：
（al）12．．．${ }^{\mathbf{W}} \mathrm{xe} 5 \quad 13$ xb5 c4（as suggested by Simagin，Black tries to win a piece；after 13．．．定e7 14 a3 the knight comfortably establishes itself at c4） 14 是 $\times 4$ axb5 15 是 $\times b 5+$ ，and White develops a very strong attack （Boban－Savic，Yugoslavia 1981）；
（a2） $12 \ldots$ d 713 f 4 是c6（a develop－ ment of the author＇s analysis dating back to 1964，which considered 13．．．c4 14 全c2 © c 515 b 4 ！cxb3 16 axb 3 ， when $16 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 4$ fails to 17 Q b5！） 14 a 4 c 4 15 定c2 宸b7 16 axb5 axb5 17 玉xa8＋
 （Barczay－Brilla－Banfalvi，corr．1980／2）． Even so，after $20 \ldots$ 全xd5 21 峟xd5峟xd5 22 Exds 定e7 23 定xf5 $0-0$ Black maintains the balance；
（b）11．．．全d6（Black continues his development） 12 Qxd7 0xd7 13 d 5
exd5（13．．．空xh2＋14 管h1 is dangerous， while after 13．．．e5 14 a4 White＇s posi－ tion is the more promising）．This move looks risky，but if 14 g4（after 14公xd50－0，or 14 定xd5 食xd5 15 ※xd5 Qf6，or 15 Qxd5 0－0 the game is equal）Black can try 14．．．量xh2－15娩hl 定e5（analysis）．

$$
11 \ldots \text { 号xd5 }
$$

11．．．exd5 is more restrained：

（a） 12 e4，and now：
（al）12．．．d4（this leads to an ex－ tremely sharp situation） 13 e5（13 Qd5！？，with the threat of 14 （f4） $13 \ldots$
 f4 0－0 17 fxe5 \＆xe5 18 乌d5 ${ }^{\circ} \mathrm{e} 819$
 22 定d1 $\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{e}} \mathrm{xh} 2+$ ．and the four compact pawns are more than sufficient com－ pensation for the bishop（Cvetkovic－ Georgadze，Sukhumi 1966）；
（a2）12．．．dxe4，when：
（a21） $13 \Delta \mathrm{~g} 5 \mathrm{c} 414$ Dcxe4 is parried by $14 \ldots$ ．．©xe4 15 Qxe4 觜e5！ 16 食c2 0－0 0！（Ustinov－Tukmakov，Moscow 1972）．After 17 a4 Black＇s king may seem to be in danger，but he is a pawn up with good development．The position remains quite sharp，but White has insufficient compensation：


崰xb7 18 显d6 $19 \mathrm{a4}$ ，and White has compensation for the pawn（Ribli－ Marjanovic，Reggio Emilia 1985／6）；
（b） 12 ＠xd5，after which Black is not obliged to make further exchanges： 12．．．b4 13 是xb7（the piece sacrifice 13当c4 is incorrect，Gerusel－Zinn，Halle 1967）13．．．${ }^{( } \mathbf{} \times b 7$ ，when his position is somewhat preferable；
（c） 12 Qxd5，and now：

 Exd5，transposing into the main line；
（c2） $12 \ldots$ 显d6 13 W W 3 昆 714 㟶f5 c4 15 Qxc7＋监xc7 16 \＆c2 and White＇s position is preferable（Rossiter－ Sadler，Crewe 1993）；
（c3）12．．．c4 13 e4！（suggested by Taimanov；after 13 Qxf6＋Qxf6 14皿c2 \＆ e 5 chances are roughly equal）：


13．．．定d6（after 13．．．cxb3？ 14 是f4
 way of defending f7，Lerh－Koronowski， corr．1985） 14 \＆ 2 2 0－0 15 ©xf6＋ Dxf6 16 \＆g5 with advantage to White （Mirkovic）．

11．．．c4 12 dxe6 fxe6 13 血c2 莤d6 14 e4 $0-015 \mathrm{~h} 3$ 是f4（15．．．h6 would have prevented the next move；15．．．乌c5 16 Exd6 leads to unclear complications） 16 Qg5！Qc5 17 宜e3 曾xe3 18 楼xe3 with advantage to White（Gerusel－ Todorcevic，Monte Carlo 1968）．

If Black prevents the opening of the centre by $11 . . . \mathrm{e} 5$ ，White gains the better chances by 12 e 4 ©d6 13 Qh4！（even more promising than 13 a 4 b 414 Ob 1 followed by $\mathrm{Qb}_{\mathrm{bd}}$－c4－Ribli）13．．．0－0
盅c2 \＆ 2818 Qe2 b4 19 Qg3（Gil－ Sadler，Benidorm 1991）．

$$
12 \text { Qxd5 定xd5 }
$$

If $12 . . . e x d 5$ White has the usual ag－ gressive move in this type of position， 13 e4：

（a）13．．．dxe4 14 \＆ $\mathrm{exf7}+$（after 14 Qg5 c4 15 Qxf7 cxb3 16 Qxh8 Qf6 the position is unclear）14．．． 15
 Exb7 favours White） 16 gg5 \＆c6（17 wh5 was threatened） 17 （ivg ！If now 17．．．曾e5？ 18 \＆f4
 position，but of course．Black should not waste a tempo，and after the imme－ diate $17 . .$. 岩e8 White still has to dem－ onstrate the correctness of his attack；
（b） $13 \ldots \mathrm{~d} 414$ e5 皿xf3（14．．．Qb6？ 15宜f4！c4，and in K．Grigorian－Tukma－ kov，40th USSR Ch，Baku 1972，White could have gained a decisive advantage by 16 Qxd4！，and if $16 \ldots \mathrm{cxb} 317$ e6！） 15 宸xf3 c4 16 Exd4（16 是f4 峟c8） 16．．．Qxe5（16．．．cxb3？loses to 17 Exd7） 17 数e4 cxb3 18 \＆f4 f6 19 ＠xe5 fxe5
 and Black has no defence against the threats of $23 \pm \mathrm{f} 4+$ and 23 f 4 ．

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
13 & \text { §xd5 } & \text { exd5 } \\
14 & \text { Exd5 }
\end{array}
$$

In Geller－Korchnoi（Curacao Candi－ dates 1962），the source game of this variation，before capturing on d 5 White weakened the enemy queenside： 14 a4 bxa4 15 Exd5 ©e7 16 e4．Despite the apparent danger，Black found a sound defensive resource：16．．．皆b5！ 17 㟶dl Df6（17．．． 0 b 6 came into consideration，

 Wd3，with advantage to Black in the endgame） 18 巴d2 9 xe4 19 Ee2 f5 20 Qg5（here 20 显g5 should probably have been played，when 20．．．』d8！ 21当el ${ }^{ \pm .0} \mathrm{~d} 7$ leads to an equal heavy piece ending）and after 20．．． exg5 21 exg5 $0-0$ the initiative passed to Black．

The gambit 14 e4 is parried by $14 \ldots \mathrm{~d} 4$ ，and if 15 e 5 wb ．

## 14 ．．．最 7

Black must complete his develop－ ment as quickly as possible．14．．．Df6 is weaker in view of $15 \Xi$ e5＋© 716 e 4 followed by ${ }^{2} \mathrm{~g} 5$ or ©e3．

If $14 . . .0 b 6$ White has the promising 15 Eth5！－cf．the commentary to Black＇s next move．

14．．．㢼b7 transposes after 15 e 4 宣e7． 15 e4
15 b 3 is also played： $15 \ldots$ §b6 16
 De4 Uc8 20 Wf3 Sd5 21 givi and White created decisive threats（Mits－ kevich－Filippov，corr．1984）．

## 15 <br> 単 b 7

15．．．⿹b6 16 Hh5！is promising for White，whose plan includes advancing the e－pawn in combination with an at－ tack on the rook＇s file after Black cas－ tles．This old recommendation justifies itself after 16．．．0－0（or 16．．． 1 当d6 17
 Qf5） 17 e5：
（a）17．．．巴e8？，and in A．Geller－ Hermlin（corr．1972）Black was quickly crushed： 18 e6！f6 19 Qh4！荘d6 20 Qf5 耗c721 Exh7！Black resigns；
（b）17．．． $\mathrm{w}^{\mathrm{E}} \mathrm{b7}$（a final evaluation of this line will probably be given by a practical testing of Korchnoi＇s recom－ mendation of $17 \ldots \mathrm{wc} 18 \mathrm{w} / \mathrm{e} 4 \mathrm{~g} 6$ ，but not 18．．．h6？ 19 疋xh6！gxh6 20 むxh6f5
 18 e6！，and now：

（bl）18．．．g6 19 exf7＋ $\mathbf{\Xi x f 7} 20 ~ \# e 5$ ©c4 21 シe6 \＆f6 22 宜h6！シe7 $23 \Xi \mathrm{El}$ ． White has a menacing position，and af－ ter 23．．．Eae8 he sacrificed his queen－－

after including his knight in the attack he created decisive threats（Andersson－ Cifuentes，Thessaloniki Olympiad 1984）；
（b2）18．．．f6 19 亿．h4 品8 20 是h6！！ （20 ${ }^{\infty}$ xh7 allows the defence $20 \ldots$㟶d5！），and according to analysis by Nunn，White＇s threats are irresistible；
（b3）18．．．定f6 19 日g5 \＆xg5 20


 stored material equality，but the ending favours White（Cifuentes－Slipak，Mar del Plata 1990）．

If $15 . .9$ f6（attacking the rook from the other side） $16 \Xi g 5!0-017$ e5 Qd5 18 宸 4 ！Ed8（F．Olafsson－Balcerowski， Varna Olympiad 1962），and now 19 e6！ would have given White a decisive ad－ vantage．

After 15．．．暑c7 16 b3 0－0 17 宴b2 Efe8 18 Ecl Ead8 19 Dd4 White stands better（Timman－Van der Wiel， Holland 1980）．


As with $15 \ldots$ ．．．．．．．c7，Black defends his knight，preparing castling．At the same time the queen＇aims＇at e4．

$$
16 \text { 今g5 它b6 }
$$

First of all，why does not Black play $16 \ldots$ ．．． e x 5 ，exchanging bishops？

（a） $170 \times g 5$ ，and now：
（al）17．．．0－0 18 コadl，and by tacti－ cal means Black maintains the balance： 18．．．2f6！ 19 －xc5 h6 20 e5 当e7！ 21䔩c2 Ead8（Zilber－Klavins（Riga 1963）；
（a2）17．．．h6 $18 \cong$ adl（after $18 \triangleq \mathrm{f} 3$ 0.019 Eadl Black solves his problems by 19．．．Qf6 20 Exc5 Qxe4 21 Еe5 $\pm \mathrm{fe} 8$ ，with equality） $18 \ldots \mathrm{hxg} 5$（ $18 \ldots$ ．．．f6 19 Ee5＋，Ojanen－F．Olafsson，Varna OI－
绾xd7，and after a number of adventures Doroshkevich－Ostrovsky（Russian Ch． 1963）ended in a draw；
（b） 17 ad 1！This strong intermezzo was discovered by Vul：

（bl）17．．．』d8 $18 \quad \boxed{2 x g} 5$（threatening
 （if $18 \ldots 0-019$ Winning the knight）
 21 当g4） 21 㟶g3 and wins（l．Zaitsev）；
（b2） $17 \ldots$ ．．． $\mathrm{b} 6 \quad 18$ Exg5，and two black pawns are attacked；
（b3） $17 \ldots .0 \mathrm{f}$ ，and White gains an advantage by preventing the opponent

（b4）17．．．宣f6 18 シxd7 䊑xd7 19
 De5－with a winning attack；
（b5） $17 \ldots$ e．e 7 （relatively best） 18
飛e8（20．．． Black has two rooks，but，exploiting the fact that they are not connected，White gains an advantage： 21 wd5！${ }^{\boldsymbol{w}} \mathrm{d} 82$曾c6－宸f8 $23 \mathrm{~g} 3(\mathrm{Vul})$ ．

Thus 16．．．食xg5 leads to a difficult position for Black．

16．．．f6 can be answered not only by 17 定f4 0018 员h 4 ，but also by 17 Eadi Qb6，since it is unfavourable to take the bishop：17．．．fyg5 18 exd7
 Oxg5．After 17．．．Qb6 a position from the main line is reached．


## 17 Ead！

By sacrificing the exchange．White gains a strong passed pawn on the d－file．

Another exchange sacrifice， $17 \leqslant x \mathbf{x e}^{7}$ Oxd5 18 宜xc5，made in Donner－ Portisch（Varna Olympiad 1962） proved unjustified．After 18．．．乞f4 19

 wiwd Black parried the threats and re－ tained a material advantage．

The quiet $17 \Xi \mathrm{~d} 20-0 \quad 18 \Xi \mathrm{adl}$ re－ tains for White a slight initiative．His control of the d－file should not be un－ derestimated，but with careful defence Black can avoid the worst：
（a）18．．． $\mathrm{e} x \mathrm{x} 519$ 4．xg5 w e7！（Black should not concede the file），and now：
 $\stackrel{\otimes}{ \pm} \times \mathrm{d} 2$ ：
（a2） 20 类hs h6 21 E．f3 $\approx$ ad8，and Black equalises：
（a3） 20 当g4 h6（not 20．．．\＃ad8 in

 26 De6 ${ }^{+}$and 27 Oxd8） $21 \stackrel{\# y y}{*}$（ 21 Qf3 シad8）21．．．hxg5 22 ※xb6 皆e5， and Black holds on（analysis）；
（b）18．．．efe8（this is also acceptable）
 22 Exd7 $0 x \mathrm{xd} 723$ 曾e4 h6（Solmunds－ son－Garces，Tel Aviv Olympiad 1964）．

17
f6
The immediate acceptance of the sacrifice－17．．．0xd5 18 exd5 f6（18．．．皃f8 19 d6 首xg5 20 0xg5）allows White to build up a crushing attack by 19 d6！fxg5 20 玉el（Neronsky－Zhuk， corr．1966）．

Interposing 17．．．h6 also does not
 Qe7（19．．．Qf4 20 当e3 Qe6 21 定d6 is positionally hopeless） 20 De5！the deadly invasion of the rook at d 7 is threatened：
 eslavsky－Djindjihashvili，Minsk 1966. concluded with a spectacular
combination： 22 Ed8＋！xd8 23 Qxf7＋管d7（23．．．富e8 24 Qd6＋） 24䒼g4－皆c6 25 当e6＋，and Black resigned in view of mate in two moves；
（b）the more tenacious 20 ．．．筹c7 is strongly met by 21 Qd7！（21 \＆d6眇7），defending both minor pieces and also preventing castling．

$$
18 \text { 会 } 4
$$



18．．． $0 x$ xd5 19 exd5 0－0 20 d6 \＆d8

粕d5 looks stronger，but Black holds on with 24．．．घd8 25 真xc5 $\begin{gathered}\text { Mdxd7 } 26\end{gathered}$
 Eb7 with an equal ending）24．．．巴d8， and White probably has sufficient com－ pensation for the sacrificed exchange （Danner－Szimczak，Prievidsa 1980）；
（b） 23 b4！（an innovation，with the idea of controlling c5！）23．．．c4（after
 26 曾e4！White wins－Vaganian） 24

 advantage to White（Vaganian－Garcia Palermo，Reggio Emilia 1992／3）．

In Vrjola－Agzamov（Sochi 1984） Black preferred the quiet $18 . .0-0$ ，and after $19 \Xi 5 \mathrm{~d} 2 \Xi \mathrm{mad}$（ $19 \ldots \mathrm{fe} 8$ is worth
testing，to answer 20 e5 with $20 \ldots \mathrm{c} 4$ and ．．．\＆b4） 20 e5（ 20 h 4 玉xd2 21 ■xd2 घe8 or 21 ．．．莦c6 22 h 5 घe8 23 Qh4目f8） $20 \ldots \Xi x d 221 \Xi x d 2$ © 4 a draw was agreed．
1.1113 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 438 f 3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆xc4c5 6 0－0 a6 7
 4．c3


11 e4
By threatening to advance one of his central pawns，White forces the oppo－ nent to fix the position in the centre．

With 11 d5 his achievements are modest．After 11．．．exd5 12 食xd5 㑒xd5 13 Qxd5 2）xd5 14 Exd5 幽c7（14．．． we8 can also be tried，with the idea af－ ter ．．．©f6 of playing the queen to e6 Anand）compared with the 10．．．炭b8 variation Black is more soundly pre－ pared for defence（Gligoric－Wade， Bognor Regis 1957）．

$$
11 \ldots
$$

## cxd4

Events take on a forcing aspect after 11．．．b4 12 e5 bxc3 13 exf6：
（a）13．．．gxf6 is strongly met by 14 d5；
（b）13．．．0xf6 14 昷a4＋，and Black must give up the right to castle，since 14．．． $\mathrm{Dd}^{2} 15$ dxc5 is bad；after 14．．． 15 dxc5 峟c7（Szabo－Stoltz，Stockholm 1952） 16 b4！©g4 17 h 3 会xf3 18 甾xf3比h2＋19 क́afl Black loses material；
（c） $13 \ldots$ ．．．$\times$ xf 14 d5！，and now：
（cl）14．．．cxb2 15 是xb2（after 15 dxe6 bxal：＝亿！Black parries the attack） 15 䀂xb2，when Zilber－Roisman（Riga 1961）continued $15 \ldots$ ．． $\mathrm{e} \times \mathrm{x} 2$（ $15 \ldots \mathrm{e} 5$ is better） 16 dxe6！\＆xf3 17 exd7＋Black
看d5！is decisive；
（c2）14．．．e5．Black avoids the imme－ diate danger by closing the central files． Even so，after 15 bxc3 0－0 16 Qd2！ followed by 0c4 White gains the ad－ vantage（Smyslov－Keres，Zurich Candidates 1953）．
 a3 \＆a5 15 \＆ d 2 cannot be recommen－ ded for Black．To prevent e4－e5 and Dg5－e4 he must play $15 \ldots \mathrm{~h} 6$ ，remaining with an inferior position．Lutikov－ Tarasov（RSFSR Ch．1956）went $15 \ldots$ シd8？ 16 e 5 宣xc3 17 bxc 3 ＠d5 180 g 5 and White gained a strong attack．

$$
120 \mathrm{xd4}
$$

12 Exd4 安c5 leads to a position from the $10 \ldots$ ．．．d6 variation．

$$
12 \ldots \quad \text { \#ै7 }
$$

12．．．岩b8 is possible．The bishop sacrifice 13 \＆xe6 fxe6 14 分xe6 is un－
 あhd8 $17 \mathrm{f4}$ was 18 全e3 峟c4（Nik－ olac－Schulz．West Germany 1984／5）．

$$
13 \leqslant 95
$$

Or 13 a3 0－0 14 全g5 ，and now：
（a） $14 \ldots$ c5 $15 \pm \mathrm{acl}$ h6 16 宜h4 （Reshevsky－Najdorf，match，New York 1952），and now 16．．．efd8 was correct， when White still stands slightly better；
（b）14．．．تad8 15 Eacl 是c5 16 Qf3

roughly equal chances（Aleksandrov－ Shulskis，Minsk 1993）．

In the event of the bishop sacrifice 13 Sxe6 fxe6 14 Qxe6，apart from 14．．． $\mathbf{U}$ e5（given in the variation $12 \ldots$䒼b8）Black can offer the exchange of queens with 14．．．${ }^{\boldsymbol{6} / c 4 \text { ，but after } 15}$峟xc4 bxc4 16 Sc7＋and 17 8xa8 the chances are probably with White．

13 b4
$13 . .2 \mathrm{c} 5$ is strongly met by $14 \approx \mathrm{acl}$ ， and if $14 \ldots 0-0 \quad 15$ e5，14．．．0xb3 15 2． Cxb 5 ，or $14 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 415$ 是xf6 gxf6 16 Qa4 0－0 17 定xe6 and wins（Panno－ Keller，Moscow Olympiad 1956）．

Smyslov－Keres（Budapest Candid－ ates 1950），now continued 14 Da4 当e5 15 是xf6 ©xf6 16 Øb6 ジd8 17 食 $\mathrm{a} 4+$豦f8，when Black was unable to castle， but his position was not easy to break
 he gradually equalised．
1.1114 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 4．ff
Df6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆ $\mathrm{exc} 4 \mathrm{c} 560-0 \mathrm{a} 67$
0 c 3

10 ．．．龟c7


11 e4

11 d 5 is the main alternative：
（a） $11 \ldots$ 公xd5 12 Qxd5 全xd5 13食xd5 exd5 14 Ёxd5 是e7，transposing into the game Gligoric－Wade from the previous section．After the traditional moves 15 e4 $0-0$ ，compared with the 10．．．当b8 variation Black successfully completes his development：
（a1） 16 㟶c2 $\Delta \mathrm{fd} 817$ \＆d2 Qf6 with an equal game（Najdorf－R．Byrne，New York 1951）；
（a2） 16 e5（Black can parry this at－ tempt to take the initiative） 16 ．．．嶒c6 17 ジdl $20 \quad$ a4？bxa4 21 \＃d6 $\Xi \mathrm{e} 8$ with advantage to Black（Sajtar－Barcza， Bucharest 1953）；
（a3） 16 \＆g5，when compared with the $10 \ldots$ 峟b8 variation Black has already castled（cf．Timman－Van der Wiel，p．22）．Ilivitsky－Boleslavsky（Mos－ cow 1964）continued 16．．．exg5 17 シxg5 ＂h5 $\triangle$ ac 8 and ended in a draw；
 $\pm x d 1+19$ 玉xdl $\pm d 8$ with an equal game（Robatsch－Lehmann，Palma de Mallorca 1966）；
（b） $11 \ldots$ ．．c4 is also acceptable：

 （bl） 14 h3 0－0 15 e4 Еae8（if 15．．．0c5 Black has to reckon with 16

 with counterplay；
 e5 17 §g5 h6 18 定xf6 ぎxf6 19 气d5 ＠xd5 20 exd5 $\Xi a f 821$ b4 cxb3 22 axb3 ${ }^{\prime}$ e7 with the better position for Black（Granda Zuniga－Magem Badals， Pamplona 1991）．

If 11 a3 the simplest is 11 ．．． ed6（Fur－ man－Uusi，USSR Ch．1／2－Final，1954）．

## 11

cxd4
11．．．b4 is weak：
（a） 12 e5！bxc3 13 exf6，and if 13．．．Qxf6（or $13 \ldots$ ．．．gxf6） 14 d 5 ！；
（b） $12 \triangleq \mathrm{~d} 5$ is a piece sacrifice simi－ lar to that in Geller－Fuderer（cf．note to the next move），but in a more favour－ able situation．The dangers awaiting Black are illustrated by Adison－Berliner （USA 1962）：12．．．exd5 13 exd5＋安e7 14 dxc5 $0 x d 515$ 定xd5 宜xd5 16 Exd5 Qxc5 17 皿e3 ©d7 18 昷g5 f6 19 \＃e1
 シxc5 23 淠xe7＋Black resigns．

## 12 Qxd4

12 ©d5？！leads to interesting comp－ lications．In Geller－Fuderer（Gothen－ burg 1955）the acceptance of the sac－ rifice led to a win for White：12．．．exd5 13 exd5＋是e7 $14 \AA$ g 5 （if 14 Exd4 with the threat of 15 d 6 ，then $14 \ldots \mathrm{f} 8$ ，e．g． 15 是f4 \＆d6 16 Ell 觜b8 and Black parries the attack）14．．． C 5 ？ 15 d 6 ！ Wxd6 16 ©xd4 0 ce 417 De6！，but had Black played 14．．． 88 ！it is doubtful whether White would have won．

12 e5？！is another aggressive move． Spassky－Suetin（USSR Spartakiad 1963）continued 12．．．dxc3（also 12．．． Qg4！？） 13 exf6 Qxf6 14 Qe5 是c5 15是f4 峟b6（15．．．0－0 was the simplest， since if the knight moves Black has 16．．． $\begin{aligned} & \text { U．} \\ & \text { ch }\end{aligned}$ ，threatening mate） 16 Qxf7？！ （at first sight the sacrifice seems
justified．since if $16 \ldots$ ．$x+717$ Ed6！） 16．．．0－0！（a clever defence） 17 Qg5（17 Ad 6 probably offered better practical chances，when Black had the reply 17．．．食d5） $17 \ldots \mathrm{cxb} 218 \cong \mathrm{ab} 1$ Еae8 19 Exb2 $\begin{aligned} & \text { Wic6 } \\ & \text { ，and Black was a pawn up．}\end{aligned}$


12
Q 5
12．．．${ }^{\text {en }} 7$ transposes into the $10 \ldots$ 宣e 7 variation．

12．．．定d6 13 g 3 （the obvious sacrifice 13 Я．dxb5 axb5 $140 \times \mathrm{xb} 5$ does not work

 19 Qxb7 Qxe4）13．．．§e5 leads to a position typical of the $10 \ldots$ ed6 varia－ tion，with the difference that the black queen is at c 7 rather than b 8 ：
 yfd8 17 did2 with the better position for White（Reshevsky－Najdorf，match， New York 1952）；
（b） 14 昷g5 h6 15 合e3，when in Gil－ man－Romanov（corr．1966）Black was tempted by the win of a pawn：15．．．b4 16 乌a4 \＆xe4 17 Eacl 管b7 18 Qc5
 led to a clear advantage for White．

12．．．sc5，and now：
（a） 13 a3 0－0 14 皿e3 ${ }^{2}$ ad8（the pawn cannot be taken on account of

14．．．刀xe4？ 15 〇xe4 食xe4 16 2xe6） $15 \mathrm{f3}$ ，and White stands slightly better （Kakageldyev－Suetin，Tallinn 1980）：
（b） 13 狊g5 0－0 $14 \cong \mathrm{macl}$ is more energetic，but note that the attempt to gain an immediate advantage with 14宣xf6 ©xf6 15 e5 2 d 716 ©xe6 is re－ futed by 16 ．．．fxe6 17 全xe6－宫h8 18


12．．．b4 allows White excellent at－ tacking chances．Bolbochan－Najdorf （match，Buenos Aires 1952）continued 13 Qd5！（compared with the Geller－ Fuderer game on p．26，here the sacrifice is much stronger，since White＇s other knight is at $d 4$ ，and in a number of lines he can advantageously play Qf5） 13．．．exd5 14 exd5＋峟e5（Black returns the piece and exchanges queens，but due to his queenside pawn weaknesses he stands worse；if $14 \ldots$ e 2 e7 15 f5．or 14．．． 15 d8 5 and then，according to circumstances，$\pm \mathrm{acl}$ or $0 \mathrm{e} 6-$－） 15觜xe5＋©xe5 16 घel 0－0－0 17 ※xe5可d5 18 今d2 气c7 19 \＆e3 f6 $20 \cong \mathrm{a} 5$
 advantage to White．

## 13 §g5

13 e5 $Q \mathrm{fd} 7$（if 13．．． $5 x \mathrm{xb} 314$ exf6， and $14 \ldots$ ．．Qxal fails to 15 Qxe6 fxe6 16
 Qxe4 Qxe4 15 f ！also favours White） 14 \＆f4，and now：
宸b6 17 是e3 紫a5 $18 \mathrm{f4}$ ，and White gained a powerful position（Farago－ Dobosz，Lodz 1980）；
（b）14．．．b4！（Chernin），and after this simple reply Black has nothing to fear．

13 昷e3 完e7 14 』acl 0－0 15 f 3 （15 © e 2 ！？and then a2－a3）15．．．eac8 16定c2 Efd8 17 a3 皆b8 18 Qb3 公xb3 19全xb3 是d6 20 g 3 食e7 with roughly equal chances（Salov－Chernin，Wijk aan Zee 1991）．

## 13 ．．．定d6

13．．．Qfxe4 is very dangerous in view of 14 Qxe4 国xe4（if $14 \ldots$ ．．．$x$ e4？ 15
 Exa4 18 弊 $\times 6+$ ！，winning） 15 f 3 ！，and if $15 \ldots .0 \times 316$ 畄xe4（Christiansen）．

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
14 & \text { Əacl } & \text { §xh2+ } \\
15 & \text { Sibl } & \text { §e5 }
\end{array}
$$



In Christiansen－Anand（Las Palmas 1993）a sharp tactical battle developed： 16 §xf6 gxf6（if 16．．．exf6？ 17 Qcxb5！


 （18 Qc3 f5 favours Black）18．．．細xc5

 Wc5＋and wins） 20 wh5＋© 21


 with a draw by perpetual check （analysis by Anand）．
1.1115 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 是xc4 c5 $60-0 \mathrm{a} 67$
 Qc3


Black takes measures against e3－e4 （by putting pressure on d4），but com－ pared with the $10 \ldots$ ．．．${ }^{\boldsymbol{W}} \mathrm{c} 7$ variation，the position of the queen at b6 has its drawbacks．

## 11 a4

If 11 e4 cxd4 12 Qxd4 定c5（after 12．．．9c5 13 昷c2 تd8 14 最e3 White＇s position is preferable） 13 \＆e3 Qe5 （ $13 . .0-0$ is the simplest） 14 a 4 （ $14 \mathrm{f3}$ is better）14．．． $\mathrm{Qeg}^{2} 15$ e5（after 15 axb5

 pensation for the pawn，Burmakin－ Varga，Balatonbereny 1992）15．．．©xe3 （ $15 \ldots$ ．． 0 xe5 is also worth trying） 16 fxe 3
 Wivf Ehg8 with an extremely sharp position，where Black has attacking chances for the sacrificed pawns （Korchnoi－Pr．Nikolic，Reykjavik 1988）．

Other continuations：
 exd5 14 exd5＋色e7 15 Qxd4．This sac－ rifice occurs frequently in similar posi－ tions，but here in Artsukevich－Klovans （Riga 1964）the cool 15．．．df8 16 Qf5



gxf5 enabled Black to parry the threats and realise his material advantage．

11 d 5 ：

（a） $11 \ldots 0 \times 12$ 包xd5 是xd5 13㔬xd5 exd5 14 Exd5 是e7（a position typical of many variations；here the queen is not defending the knight at d7）
 transposing into the $10 \ldots$ 比b8 variation， or 15 ．．． $\mathrm{w}^{(16} 6$ ），and now：
（al） 16 \＆g5 是xg5 17 Qxg5 h6 18 Qf3 0－0，and Black solved his opening problems（Ree－Portisch，Wijk aan Zee 1985）；
（a2） 16 昷e3 燔b7！ 17 Mad1 0－0 18
 and here a draw was agreed in Salov－ Ivanchuk（Linares 1990）；
（a3） $16 \mathrm{a} 40-017 \mathrm{axb} 5 \mathrm{axb} 518$ 昷g5显xg5 19 日xg5 h6 20 Qf3 ©f6 21 Exd8 Exd8 22 b3 $\begin{aligned} & \text { wic6！and Black＇s }\end{aligned}$ chances are preferable（Fominykh－ Yakovich，USSR 1988）；
（a4） 16 e5 is weak in view of $16 \ldots$
 a good position（Ubilava－Yakovich， 54th USSR Ch．，Kuybyshev 1986）；
（b） $11 \ldots$ exd5 used to be considered dangerous in view of 12 e4：
（b1）in Ryzhkov－Tarasov（USSR 1972）Black declined the sacrifice with 12．．．0－0－0，but after 13 0xd5 $0 x d 514$
\＆xd5 f6 15 \＆f4 White gained the ad－ vantage；
（b2）but is the attack after $12 \ldots$ dxe4 13 g5 really so dangerous？Arencibia－ Valdes（Havana 1986）and analysis by the Cuban master Andres have not con－ firmed its correctness：13．．．c4 14 显c2 （if 14 Qcxe4 Qxe4 15 Dxe4 监e6！ 16皿c2 ©c5 with advantage to Black） 14．．．㑒b4（14．．．莤e7！？） 15 Qcxe4 0－0 16 a 3 ＠c5 17 Exd7？！（the attempt to regain the pawn by exploiting the ＇overloading＇of the knight at f6 17分xh7 ©xh7 18 Exd7－ends in failure after 18．．．』ae8！）．Now，instead of 17．．．Oxd7？ 18 匂x＝ae8 19 食xh7－宥h8 20 今e4！，after which White won， Black had the opportunity for a counter－
 Ed1 Dxe4 20 Qxe4 ${ }^{\boldsymbol{w}} \mathrm{c} 6$ ，regaining the piece and remaining a pawn up with the better position；
（c）11．．c4 12 dxe6，and now：
（c1） $12 \ldots$ fxe6 13 \＆ c 2 ，when at b6 the queen is less well placed than at c 7 ：
（c11）13．．．e2 14 e4 Qc5 15 \＆g5， and Black had to return his queen with 15．．． W ．c7（if $15 \ldots 0-016$ e5） 16 e5 Qd5 17 Qe4 Qxe4 18 显xe4 \＆c5 19 Qd4
 Efl with advantage to White（Porreca－ Lokvenc，Helsinki Olympiad 1952）；
（c12）13．．．\＃d8 14 Qg5 and in Nickoloff－Hamilton（Canada 1984） Black launched a dashing counterattack： 14．．．\＆c5！？ 15 是xh7 Eh5 17 e4 Edh8 18 h3 De5 with a sharp and unclear situation；
（c2） 30 years ago I suggested $12 \ldots$ Wxe6，and if 13 \＆c2 \＆ 55 or 13 Dd4学b6；
（d） $11 \ldots$ e5 leads to a closed position in the centre：
（dI） 12 a4 c4（12 ．．b4 13 a5） 13 全c2 シc8（after 13．．．
but Black retains defensive resources）


 White developed a very strong attack （Najdorf－Reshevsky，match，New York 1952）；
（d2） 12 Qg5 \＆ $\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{d} 6} 13$ \＆c2 $0-014$
 b3 金 1818 曾b2g619 全xd7 包xd720 g4 是g7 21 d6？（White should have prevented ．．．f7－f5 by 21 每hl $\underset{=}{m} \mathrm{~g} 1$ and then $\Xi \mathrm{mad} 1) 21 \ldots$ 炭a7！，and Black created decisive threats on the long diagonal（Nogueiras－Sisniega， Novi Sad 1990）；
 $0 \cdots 0$ with a perfectly satisfactory posi－ tion for Black；
（d4） 12 \＆c2 c4 13 ＠f5！？（in the previous line White includes the ex－ change of his passive bishop） $13 \ldots$ ． d 6 14 是xd7＋ $2 x d 715$ e4 \＆c5 16 Ebl $0-0 \quad 17$ b4 是d4（17．．．cxb3 18 区xb3
 with the better position for White （Lobron－Pr．Nikolic，Novi Sad Olym－ piad 1990）．

110 e 5 d 812 f 4 e e 7 （the attempt to regain the pawn by $12 \ldots$ ．．cxd 413 exd4 Qxe5 14 fxe5 $\Xi x d 4$ ？loses material af－ ter 15 昷e3 $\pm x d 1+16$ ©xdl） 13 a 4 b 4 14 a5，and now：
（a）14．．．觜c7 15 Qa4 㟶xa5（after 15．．．0－0 16 \＆${ }^{\text {d }} 2$ and $\Xi \mathrm{ac} 1$ White＇s position is preferable） $160 \times 55$ 莦xal 17 Qxb7 Eb8 18 崽c2 with the threat of官d2，or $17 \ldots \Xi c 818$ 』d3 with the same threat；
（b）14．．．觜a7 159a40－0（here too it is not good to win the d4 pawn：15．．． cxd4 16 exd4 Qxe5 17 fxe5 Еxd4？ 18定 3 ！Еe4 19 荹xa7！※xe2 20 exf6 Exg2－ 21 的 $\mathrm{gxf6} 22$ ©c5 with advantage to White，Ribli） 16 \＆c4 cxd4

17 exd4 $勹 \mathrm{~d} 518$ \＆e3 07 ff 6 with equal chances（Salov－Ribli，Barcelona 1989）．

11 ．．．b4
The recent game Høi－Sadler（Yere－ van Olympiad 1996）took an interesting course：11．．．c4 12 \＆ l c2 b4 13 a5 暑c7
 （if $15 \triangleq \mathrm{~b} 6$ ，then $15 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 316 \triangleq \mathrm{xd} 7 \mathrm{bxc} 2$ 17 包f6：gxf6 18 暑xc2 f5！ 19 断a4－金c6 20 曾xc4 Eg8 gives Black an attacking position for the sacrificed pawns）15．．．b3 16 各bl 道xa5 17 e5 Qd5（17．．．今xf3 18 誈xf3 G）d5 merits attention） 18 Og5 全b4（18．．．今e7 is
 （an original idea；after 20．．．c3 21 食xh7 c2 22 gifl the play favours White）．

$210 x f 7+$（after the complicated 21 Sc5 崾xal 22 Qcxe6＋fxe6 23 Qxe6＋ the position is still unclear） 21 ．．． 22 Qd6（22 Qg5 unclear）22．．．宣xd6 23 exd6－守b8 24
 シxf8（26．．．世xbl 27 ©xe6 favours White） 27 是e 4 c3！ 28 bxc3（to the more tenacious 28 是xd5 Black coolly replies $28 \ldots$ ．．exd5！，Speelman，and after 29 曾e2 he wins by $29 \ldots$ 芭e8！ 30 当xe8 cxb2 31 曹el bl＝曾 $32 \mathrm{~d} 7 \mathrm{~b} 2!33 \mathrm{~d} 8=$ 凿
 Qf4 31 精el（if 31 宣xf4 是xe4）

£xf4 $34 \mathrm{~d} 7 \pm \mathrm{f8}$ White resigns，as 35 d 5 would be met by the simple 35 ．．．e5 （analysis by Sadler）．

## 12 Qbl

I recommended this move more than 30 years ago．The knight changes route， heading for c 4 via d 2 ．

12 a5 w

（a）13．．．数 $\times 5$ a 5 ，and now：
（a1） 14 定d2 ${ }^{\omega} \mathrm{E}$ c 715 ac 1 with pres－ sure on the queenside for the sacrificed pawn；
（a2） 14 dxc5 $0 x \mathrm{xc} 515$ Qxc5 峟xc5

 18 Exa4 毞c8 19 h3 空e7 20 是xb4，and White regained his pawn with the better position（Dittmann－Plater，Moscow Olympiad 1956）：
（b）13．．．cxd4 14 exd4 是d5 15 Qb6 （15 全xd5 0 xd 516 企d2 is possible）

 Qxd5（Radchenko－Antoshin，RSFSR Ch．\％－Final 1959），and it transpired that
是g5 Black still had to defend，but in the end his material advantage told：





| 12 |  | cxd4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 13 | exd4 | 食d5 |
| 14 | Qbd2 | 全e7 |
| 15 | 全xd5 |  |

In isolated d－pawn positions White usually aims for an attack on the king－ side，and Black，after blockading the d－ pawn or in some other way preventing its advance，tries to simplify．But in this case the weakening by Black of the c4 square suggests to White a plan of action of the queenside．

Suetin－Yakovich（Leipzig 1986）con－ tinued 16 Sc4 wa7（Suetin recom－
 Qxg5 18 Oxg5 0－0 19 Gid6 with the threat of 20 Egxf7 and 21 专xe6． Suetin） 18 定xe7 Oxe7 19 美acl 占b6 20 a5 Qbd5 21 菅c2 with a slight ad－ vantage to White．
1.1116 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌．f3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆ exc 4 c5 6 0－0 a6 7
 Qc3

$$
10
$$



Disregarding the weakening of his queenside，Black drives the knight away from c3 and thereby hinders e3－e4．

## 11 Qa4

11 Qb1 会e712 Qbd200 is quieter：
（a） 13 Q）c4 㟶c7 14 气d2 a5！ 15 0 ce 5 （after $15 \pm \mathrm{acl}$ the pin $15 \ldots \mathrm{O}$ a6 is unpleasant，e．g． 16 峟el a4！ 17 显xa4宣xc4 18 是xd7 是xa2 19 定b5 家b3， winning the exchange） $15 \ldots$ ©xe5 16 ©xe5 §d6！ $17 \mathrm{f4}$ a4 18 昷c4 fd 8 with an excellent game for Black（Filip－ Keres，Curacao Candidates 1962）． Without the undermining of the opponent＇s queenside by a2－a4，White＇s control of c4 does not set Black any se－ rious problems；
（b） 13 e 4 cxd 414 e 5 ，recommended by Tolush，comes into consideration．If， for example，14．．．d3 15 嘗xd3 Qg4， then 16 \＆c2！（as later transpires，it is important for White to force ．．．g7－g6） 16．．．g6 17 Qc4 是xf3 18 単xf3 0 gxe5 19 ©xe5 ©xe5 20 Wb7 §d6 21 \＆h6 Ee8 22 目a4 ※e7 23 曹e4．White＇s positional advantage provides more than sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn．

$$
11 \ldots \text { 暑a5 }
$$

The alternative is Shamkovich＇s rec－ ommendation of $11 \ldots$ 官 $\mathbf{e}^{7}$ ，and if 12 dxc5 峟a5＂with roughly equal chances＂． Thirty years ago I pointed out that after 12 Qxc5 Qxc5 13 dxc 5 峟c7（13．．．峟a5 14 \＆d2 是xc5 15 a 3 ） 14 显d2 White has some advantage．This variation will be required by us for later evaluations．

## 12 \＆${ }^{2} 2$

Recommended by Mikenas．White wants to exploit the drawbacks to the queen＇s position at a5．

Keres－Spassky（Amsterdam Candid－ ates 1956）went 12 e4 $\begin{aligned} & \text { bub } \\ & \text {（it is dan－}\end{aligned}$ gerous to take the pawn：12．．9xe4 13 d 5 ，or $12 \ldots$ \＆xe4 13 Qg5） 13 誛 1是xe4（13．．． $0 x$ xe4 is strongly met by 14 d5！，e．g．14．．．c4 15 dxe6 fxe6 16 国c2 Qdf6 17 Qd2） 14 De5！（now 14 d 5 is
parried by 14．．．c4！）14．．．c4！15 Dxc4， and now Black should have played 15．．．今d5，and if 16 e5 气e7，when White＇s advantage is minimal．

White does not gain anything by 12

 Qe4 17 是el 0－0 18 Qd4 favours White，Liberzon－Nurmamedov，Mos－ cow 1967） 15 a3 演b6．

12
\＆e7


Many modern authors focus on this move．

As in the line given in the note to the previous move， $12 \ldots .{ }^{W} \mathrm{~W} 5$ is unfavour－ able in view of 13 曾xb5 axb5 14 Qxc5
 Qe5，when Black is in difficulties due to the weakness of his doubled pawns．

If $12 \ldots$ ．．．c6 13 Qxc5 是xc5 14 dxc 5 Qxc5 15 Qd4！，again with advantage to White．

If $12 \ldots$ cxd4 13 Qxd4 e5（after 13．．．e7 14 a3 Black is forced to part with a pawn），and now
（a） 14 Qc2 Sc6 15 棌c4 是xa4 16娄xf7＋d8 17 e4，and Black comes under an attack；
（b） 14 a3（an original idea introduced in Christiansen－Korchnoi，Antwerp

1993）14．．．exd4 15 exd4－ 16 d8 16
 （xf7） $17 \mathrm{dxc} 5 \Xi \mathrm{E} 818$ Wd3 Wb5，and now 19 g3！would have placed Black in a difficult situation；
（b3） 14 玉acl！（as shown by Christ－ iansen，this version of the knight sac－ rifice is even more effective） 14 ．．．exd4 15 exd4＋宫d8 16 这f4！，e．g．16．．．巴c8
 with irresistible threats．

After 12．．．se7 Black intends to castle and activate his rooks．What should White play？

The attempt to exploit the queen＇s position at a5 by 13 a3（the idea of Mikenas＇s recommendation）in this case adds strength to the manoeuvre 13．．．断5！After 14 峟xb5 axb5 15 Oxc5 Qxc5 16 dxc 5 bxa3 the game is equal．

However，let us play 13 dxc5 $0 \times 5$ 14 备xc5 安xc5 15 a3，when we reach a position that the reader has twice en－ countered．The first time was in the note to Black＇s 1th move（the line 11．．．\＆e7 12 dxc 5 etc．）．and the second time was in the note to White＇s 12th move（the line 12 dxc5 5 xc5 etc．）．What is the difference？In the second case Black has already castled，whereas in the first his king is still at e8，since he has lost a tempo on ．．．官e7 and ．．． $\mathrm{exc5}^{2}$ ．In the second line（with castling）Black＇s po－ sition is satisfactory，whereas in the first，due to the potential threat of \＆${ }^{2} 4$ the position favours White．And it is this first position that we have now reached．
1.1117 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 是xc4 c5 $60-0$ a6 7
 0 c 3


11 e4 b4（the transposition of moves compared with $10 \ldots$ b4 and $11 \ldots$ was all－ ows White to begin play in the centre） 12 e5 bxc3 13 exf6 $\uparrow x f 6$（or 13．．．cxb2 14 是xb2 ©xf6 15 d5） 14 d5 c2（to divert one of the attacking pieces） 15曾xc2 9xd5 16 定a4＋．The black king is forced to remain in the centre（Frid－ stein－Mikenas，USSR Ch． $1 / 2$－Final 1958）．

> 1.112 (1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 亿.f3 5 ff 64 e3 e6 5 全xc4 c5 60.0 a 67 曾 e 2b5 8 全b3食b79 9 d 1 占bd7

$$
10 \text { e4!? }
$$



$$
10 \text {... cxd4 }
$$

First let us analyse the acceptance of the sacrifice： $10 \ldots$ ．．． xe 4 （ $10 \ldots .0 \mathrm{xe4}$ is strongly met by 11 d 5 ！，e．g．11．．．${ }^{\text {i } x d 5}$ 12 是xd5 exd5 13 Qc3），and now：
（a） $11 \triangleq \mathrm{~g} 5$ ，with these possibilities：
（a1）11．．．\＆xbl 12 Qxf7 曹e7 13 sxh8，when：
（all）13．．．定f5 14 dxc5 Qxc5 15最e3 Qxb3 16 axb3（threatening 17
 16．．．峟b7 17 きacl－the white pieces occupy threatening positions，and Black has no time to go after the knight at h8；
（a12）13．．．c4 14 全xc4 bxc4 15 Exbl
 シxc4 19 曹xc4 定xh8 20 当xa6 $\pm$ el with a decisive advantage （Knyshenko－Sukhomovsky，Rostov－on－ Don 1960）；
（a2） $11 \ldots$ ．．．ff 12 d 5 ，and：
（a21） $12 \ldots \mathrm{c} 413$ dxe6 fxe6 $14 \boldsymbol{\Omega} \mathrm{c} 2$旬xc2 15 崫xc2 宸b6 16 a4．Black＇s position has been weakened，and he has not castled（Novogrudsky－Zelinsky （Vladimir 1962）；
（a22）12．．．e5（a more recent attempt to rehabilitate the variation made in Lazarev－Yakovich，Saratov 1984） 13 a4 c4 14 宣c2 是xc2 15 挡 xc2 h6？！，when White gained a clear positional advan－ tage by 16 Qe6！甾c8 17 axb5 $⿹ \mathrm{Qb} 618$ Qxf8．Black should seriously consider $15 \ldots$ ．．．d6，avoiding the weakening of g6 and continuing his mobilisation；
（a3）11．．． g 6 is another attempt， recommended by Gorelov： 12 d5 e5 13 De6（13 d6 当b6）13．．．挡b6 14 Qxf8解xf8．At the cost of the right to castle， Black has held the gambit pawn，and both sides have chances；
（b） 11 d 5 e5：
（b1） 12 d6 c4 13 Qxe5 Qxe5 14 Qc3（Kazanov－Korsunsky，USSR 1984）．After 14．．．今xd6 15 Qxe4 ©xe4

16 䖪xe4 0－0（16．．．cxb3 17 ※xd6） 17是c2 g6 18 a4 White has the initiative for the pawn；
（b2） 12 Qbd2 \＆xf3 13 Qxf3 是d6
 a4 c4 16 \＆c2 0－0 17 \＆e3 Qc5 with chances for both sides（Yurtaev－ Korsunsky，Leningrad 1989）．

Two more restrained replies to 10 e4：
10 ．．．当b6 11 d 5 e 512 全c2 主d6 13 b3 0－0 14 是b2．White has the better prospects．

10．．．峟c7 11 Oc3 cxd4 12 包xd4 leads to a variation examined below．

## 11 e5

After 11 Oxd4 喽b8 12 Qc3 a posi－ tion from the $10 \ldots$ 监b8 variation is reached，and if $11 \ldots$ ．．． 12 b6 12 c3 a po－ sition from the $10 \ldots$ ．．．${ }^{\text {b }} \mathrm{b} 6$ variation（12 \＆e3 can be met by $12 \ldots$ 定c5 $13 \mathrm{f} 30-0$ ）．

$$
11 \ldots \text { d5 }
$$



Black has also tried 11．．．＠e4（11．．． Qg4 requires testing in practice） 12
 （ $14 \ldots$ ．．．e 7 comes into consideration，and if 15 乌c3 b4） 15 気 3 b4 16 気 4 ！因e7 （16．．．©xe5 17 Qxe5 㟶xe5 is met by

昷a4＋宜c6 20 且e3．in both cases
winning） 17 ⿹勹d6 ${ }^{\text {exd }} \mathrm{xd} 18$ Exd6（18 exd6 also looks quite good）18．．．0－0 19最f4 22 显d3 a5（Magerramov－Chekhov， USSR Cup 1982）．Now with 23 巴el， intending h2－h4 and $\Xi \mathrm{g} 4$（or $23 \mathrm{~h} 4 \mathrm{im}-$ mediately）White could have developed his kingside initiative（Chekhov）．

11．．．\＆xf3 12 gxf3 $9 \mathrm{~h} 513 \mathrm{f4}$（13 Exd4 is premature：13．．．定c5 14 Edl断4）leads to great complications：
（a）13．．g6 14 Exd4（if 14 f5 Black has the good reply $14 \ldots 0 \mathrm{~g} 7$ ）14．．．当b6 （compared with the note to White＇s 13th move，here $14 \ldots$ ．．．c5 15 घdl 䇾h4 is strongly met by 16 wis and 2c3－e4） 15 \＃dl \＃d8 16 Ec3 色e7？（White＇s next could have been prevented by 16．．． ig7！） 17 f 5 （opening the diagonal for the bishop at cl）17．．．0 0 （ $17 \ldots$ ．．．exf5？
 obvious advantage to White（Timman－ Seirawan，Indonesia 1983）；
（b）13．．．断4 14 Exd4 臽c5，and now：
（b1） 15 घxd7（exploiting the divert－ ing of the opponent＇s pieces to the kingside）15．．．家xd716曹f3 玉ac8（16．．． Enc8 is interesting，preventing the bishop sacrifice at e6，when White can continue the offensive by 17 Qc3 f5 18 exf6 $0 x f 619$ f5！with an extremely sharp，unclear position） 17 Qc3 f5（de－ fending against the threat of e4，but allowing the following combination， which，however，is not dangerous） 18
 Black has a draw，but if he wants more， he can try escaping with his king to the queenside，as in Salov－Kupreichik（54th USSR Ch．，Minsk 1987），which nevertheless ended in a draw：
（b2） $15 \stackrel{ \pm}{=} 4 \Omega \mathrm{~g} 3$（apart from this problematic piece sacrifice，15．．．eb6 intending ．．． 0 c5 also requires testing）

 （Salov）．

$$
12 \Xi x d 4 \text { \&c5 }
$$

Other continuations：
12．．．${ }^{\text {ee } 713 \text { Dbd2（the immediate }}$ switching of the rook to the kingside by $13 \Xi \mathrm{~g} 4$ is also possible：13．．．${ }^{\mathbf{W}} \mathrm{C} 714$
 gel with the better chances for White， Condie－Botterill，Brighton 1984）13．．．${ }^{W}$ c 7 14 Qfl 0－0 15 シg4 シfc8 16 ©h6g6 17 h 4 ，and in this sharp position White＇s chances are somewhat better（Vaiser－ Damljanovic，Vrnjacka Banja 1984）．

12．．．看c713 \＆d2，and now：
（a） $13 \ldots$ ．． $5 b 614$ Qc3 $£ c 515$ Eg4


 two bishops promise some advantage （Mikhalchishin－Balashov．Minsk 1986）；
（b） $13 \ldots$ Qe $7 \quad 14$ Qc3 Qc6（ $14 \ldots$ Qg6！？） 15 』f4 Qdxe5 16 Qxe5 当xe5 （ $16 \ldots$ ．．©xe5 $17 \Xi \mathrm{cl}$ ） $17 \Xi$ e4 with highly unclear play．
 Qc3 h5 16 Eg3 \＆e7 17 Qe4 with the initiative for White（Timman－Garcia Martinez，Reggio Emilia 1984／5）．

$$
13 \quad \underset{\Xi}{ } 44 \quad \text { Wc7 }
$$



This indirect defence of the $g 7$ pawn （14 シxg7？定f8，simultaneously attack－ ing the rook and the bishop at cl ）is stronger than 13．．．g6 14 \＆h6！\＆f8 15
 White gained the advantage in Gorelov－ Baryshev（USSR 1984）．

After 13．．．${ }^{\prime} \mathrm{c} 7$ White has two plans．
The first is to complete his queenside developed with $14 \hat{2} \mathbf{d} 2$ followed by Qc3．

The second is to force matters by 14 \＆ xd 5 是xd5 15 乌c3 \＆xf3 16 道xf3 $\pm \mathrm{c} 8$ ，when the exchange of the g 7 and e5 pawns leads to an extremely unclear situation（Perez－Valdes，Cuba 1987）．
1.12 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 $\mathrm{Dff}^{\mathrm{f}}$
 b5 8 宣b3 皿b7
$9 \quad$ a4


Before advancing in the centre， White provokes a weakening of the op－ ponent＇s queenside．

$$
9
$$

Qbd7
Other continuations：
9．．．b4，and now：
（a） 10 Qbd2 cxd4 11 exd4 包6 12 Qc4 今e7（it is dangerous to accept the
pawn sacrifice in view of $12 \ldots$ ．．．xd4 13
 roughly equal chances；
（b） 10 d 1 Qbd7 11 Qbd2（also worth trying is 11 Qe5 $\mathrm{W} / \mathrm{c} 712$ Qxd7 Qxd7 13 d5 exd5 14 定 $x d 5$ 宣 $x d 515$ Exd5，Beikert－Kallai，France 1993，15．．．
 queen＇s knight at $d 7$ rather than c 6 ，less favourable is $11 \ldots . . c x d 412$ exd4 \＆e7 13 Qc4 0－0 14 Qfe5 Qd5 15 a5 with the initiative for White，Bogoljubow－Rub－ instein，Kissingen 1928；Black would have done better to play ．．．a6－a5 him－ self，and White to play a4－a5 earlier） 12 Qc4 \＆e7 13 Qfe5 0－0，when：
 White has the more pleasant position （Keres－Reshevsky，Semmering 1937）；
（b2） 14 e4！？was played in the mod－ ern game Khalifman－Sadler（Hastings 1995／6）：

$14 . . . c x d 4$ ！（taking on e4 loses the ex－
 シacl Wa7 17 Da5．Black＇s position appears perilous，but he held on to the sacrificed pawn：17．．．宣c5 18 Qxb7
 Qd5 22 挡f3 a5 23 シdcl Exc4 24今xc4 घ． 8 ．

9．．．c4 10 最c2 Qc6（after 10．．．थbd7

 Efdl White stands better，Averbakh－ Aronin，19th USSR Ch．，Moscow 1951），and now：
（a） 110 c 3 ，when Black has：
（al）11．．．b4 12 Qe4 世d5 13 Qfd2


 （Shishkin－Cherepkov，Leningrad 1960）；
 axb5 14 e4 थb4（14．．．Qxd4 15 Qxd4临xd4 is bad in view of 16 xb5，after

 with some advantage to White（Pilnik－ Stoltz，Belgrade 1952）；
（b） 11 axb5 axb5 12 Exa8 ${ }^{\omega} \times \mathrm{wa8} 13$
是 e 716 定g5，threatening d4－d5） 14 e4 Qd7 15 d 5 ！थd8 16 Qd4！b4 17 Qcb5 with a difficult position for Black（Fine－ H．Steiner，Hollywood 1945）．

Now White has：
$10 \operatorname{axb5}$（1．121）
10 e4（1．122）－p． 41
10 Еd1（1．123）－p． 42
1.121 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 完xc4 c5 6 0－0 a6 7 㟶e2 b5 8 是b3昷b79a4 ©bd7

| 10 | axb5 | axb5 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 11 | Exa8 | wxa8 |

12 Oc3
12 嵝xb5 is not good on account of 12．．． $\mathrm{exf3}$ ，while 12 Qbd2 does not cause Black any difficulties：12．．．c4 13 \＆c2 乌e4（Bondarevsky－Alatortsev， 18th USSR Ch．，Moscow 1950）．

## 12 <br> b4

If first 12．．． $8 x f 313 \mathrm{gxf3}$ and now 13．．．b4，then 14 Qb5 wb8 15 e4 with the threat of e4－e5．

## 13 Db5



Black＇s main continuations are：
13．．．偹a5（1．1211）
13．．．世b8（1．1212）－p． 39
13．．．ixf3！？also comes seriously in－ to consideration．Yusupov－Anand（Las Palmas 1993）continued $14 \mathrm{gxf3}$ 躬 15 Ed1（ 15 f 4 ！？\＆e7 16 e4 0 b 617 d 5 ， the latest try，was dangerous for Black in Djurhuus－Degerman，Reykjavik 1995）15．．．皿e7 16 e4 cxd4 17 Sxd4
 give White a minimal advantage－ Anand）18．．．宣xe5 19 Qxe6 fxe6 20 f 4
这 4 White has a winning attack．but Anand＇s suggestion of $20 \ldots f 7$ is worth trying） 21 监c4 ©d5！ 22 fxe5
 and Black maintained the balance．
1.1211 （ 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc 435 S 2f6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 6 0－0 a6 7宸e2 b5 8 显b3 定b7 9 a 4 Qbd7 10 axb5 axb5 11 Exa8 䊑xa8 12 〔：c3 b4 13 mb 5 ）
13 ．．．茈a5

## 14 e4

14 De5 is interesting．Obukhov－Ibra－ gimov（Novorossisk 1989）continued

14．．．Qxe5（14．．．8a6 15 乌c7＋） $15 \mathrm{dxe5}$ Qd7 16 玉dl 宜c6（16．．．巳xe5？ 17曾d2！） 17 Qd6＋显xd6 18 Exd6 企b5 19 皿c4 是xc4 20 喽xc4 Qb6（20．．． Qxe5 21 we4），and now 21 wd3！0－0 $22 \Xi \mathrm{~d} 8 \mathrm{~g} 623$ e4 would have set Black problems in view of the weakness of the dark squares（Obukhov）．

$$
14 \ldots \text { \&e7 }
$$

14．．．Oxe4 15 Qg5，and after 15．．． Oxg5 16 是xg5 White threatens 17 © e ． 6.

Or 14．．．${ }^{2}$ xe4 150 g 5 and if $15 \ldots$宣g6 16 d5！（Gligoric）．

14．．．丹c6 15 是c4 Qxe4 is unsatis－ factory： 16 Qg5（or 16 ＠f4）16．．．Ddf6 17 ⿹xe4 Qxe4 18 f3 ⿹d6 19 Qxd6＋最xd6．As 20 是xe6 can be met by $20 \ldots$ $0-0$ ，it used to be thought that Black＇s position was quite sound，but 20 d 5 ！ gives White the advantage（analysis）．

15 d5
After $\mathbf{1 5}$ e5 Black has two replies：

（a） $15 \ldots$ e4，and now：
觜c2 c4 19 \＆g5（the pawn sacrifice 19 d5 是xd5 20 \＆xd5 exd5 21 Qd4 comes into consideration）19．．．是xe4 20 寝xe4
 Qf3 0－0 $24 \quad \Xi_{c l}$ Dc6 and Black achieved a good position（Uhlmann－ Benko，Buenos Aires 1960）；
（a2） 16 Edl cxd4 17 Qfxd4 0－0 （17．．．⿹ec5） 18 Qxe6 fxe6 19 Exd7 （interesting is 19 是xe6 + 额 820 Exd7 Exf2 21 Exe7 ${ }^{W} \mathrm{~d} 8$ ，Meister－V．Ivanov， USSR 1991，after which 22 wxf2 $Q x f 2$ 23 Ed7 should be tried－Ivanov）19．．．

 and the position remains sharp（Hübner－ Waitzkin，San Francisco 1995）；

単cl．In Maderna－Stahlberg（Mar del Plata 1947）Black＇s pawn sacrifice 20．．． h6 21 \＆xe7 22 畨xc5＋？擂xc5 23 dxc 5 乌a4！，but 22 dxc5 would have given White the advantage．

$$
15 \ldots \text { exd5 }
$$

Not 15．．．e5 16 d 6 ．

$$
16 \text { 是xd5 }
$$

16 exd5 does not prevent Black from castling：16．．．0－0（17 当xe7 嘪xb5）． Ruzele－Howell（Gelsenkirchen 1995）

 （22 當d3！？）22．．．Qe4 23 篎d3 全xb5 24 cxb5 シe6，and here 25 Qd2 would have retained the initiative（Ruzele）．


16．．．${ }^{\text {exd5 }} 17$ exd5 0.0 is weaker in view of 18 d6 量d8 19 wic4 with advan－ tage to White（Gligoric）．

| 17 | exd5 | $0-0$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 18 | Wxe7 | Wxb5 |
| 19 | $\Xi d 1$ |  |

Now after 19．．． 0 f 620 宜e 3 c 421 d 6

当d4 h6 28 h 4 a draw was agreed in Florian－Pilnik（Helsinki Olympiad 1952）．

Serious consideration should be given to Ravinsky＇s suggestion of 19．．．曾a4！If the rook moves on the d－file （the d5 pawn has to be defended），there follows $20 \ldots \mathrm{c} 4$ ，while if 20 we2 In this variation Black＇s position is more promising than in the Florian－ Pilnik game．
1.1212 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 佥xc4 c5 $60-0$ a6 7䊑 e 2 b 58 全b3奚b79a4 Qbd7 10 axb5 axb5 11 Exa8 啙xa8 12 Øc3 b4 13 分b5）

$$
13 \ldots \text { 幽b8 }
$$



14 e4
cxd4
If $14 \ldots$ ．．．xe4，as in the 13．．． $\mathbf{W}$ as variation White attacks with 15 gh5

是c6（suggested by Obukhov：if $15 \ldots$ Qdf6 16 察 4 定c6 17 d 5 ，or $15 \ldots$ ．．．xg5 16 全xg5 with two threats－ 17 是xe6 and 17 d 5 ） 16 d 5 （this leads to an ex－ tremely complicated tactical situation；if
 good position for Black）16．．．全xb5 17粰xe4 Qf6．This line was tested in Yusupov－J．Polgar（Moscow Olympiad

 Qxd5 23 臽a4＋皃e7 24 \＆g5＋Df6 25 ©xfl，with advantage to White，since Black cannot regain the piece（ 25 ．．．g6 26 实e3 ©d7 27 Qf7）．

14．．．${ }^{\text {\＆}}$ xe4 is also answered by 15 Og5 是f5（if $15 \ldots$ ．．． i d5 White develops a strong attack by 16 全xd5 Qxd5 17 Q．xe6 fxe6 18 当xe6－），and in Osnos－ Spassky（USSR Ch． $1 / 2$－Final 1959） 16 d5！ would have given a winning position．

Other replies：
14．．．\＆e7 15 d5！and now：
（a） $15 \ldots 0-016 \mathrm{dxe} 6$ 全c6 17 气．bd 4 cxd4 18 exd7 宣xe4 19 亿xd4 $\Xi \mathrm{d} 820$
和xh7 23 当xe7 and after the compli－ cations White remains a pawn up（Lihl－ mann－Stahlberg，Wageningen 1957）；
（b） $15 \ldots \mathrm{e} 5$（blocking the centre） 16臽g5 0－0 17 Eal with the better chances for White（Gligoric）；
（c） $15 \ldots$ exd5 16 exd5．This line illus－ trates well the difference between $13 . .2 \mathrm{wa}$ and $13 \ldots$ 㟶b8．With the queen at a5 Black could now castle（ 17 当xe7巽xb5），whereas here the knight is not attacked，and castling is impossible．

14．．．ec6 is unsatisfactory in view of 15 ＠a4！Qxe4（or 15．．．乌b6 16 Ee5！ Qxa4 17 Qxc6 蒋b6 18 d5 with advan－ tage to White） 16 De5！Qxe5 17 dxe5

 18．．．定e719 亿c7•皃f8 20 食xc6咱xc6

21 Qb5．Black has a difficult position： his knight at e4 is in danger，and his rook is shut out of play（Suetin－Alat－ ortsev，19th USSR Ch．，Moscow 1951）．

Now White has a choice of good moves：

15 Qfxd4（1．12121）
15 Obxd4（1．12122）（p．41）
If he delays capturing on d 4 ，after 15
 18 gxf 3 定e7 the chances are equal （Najdorf－Reshevsky，match，1953）．
1.12121 （ 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 是xc4 c5 $60-0 \mathrm{a} 7$珰e2 b5 8 宣b3 定b7 9 a4 Qbd7 10
 b4 13 ＠b5 蒋b8 14 e 4 cxd 4 ）

## 15 Dfxd4 De5

Black has to defend his e6－after 15．．．${ }^{\text {Q }} \mathbf{7} 7$ he comes under an attack by 16 显xe6 fxe6 17 Qxe6，with the threats of $18 \mathrm{Qbc} 7+, 18 \mathrm{xg} 7+$ and 18 畨c4．
$15 . .9$ xe4 is also unsatisfactory in view of 16 f3 Dec5 17 \＆xe6．

$$
16 \quad e 5
$$

Black faced a new test in this already difficult variation in I．Sokolov－De la Villa Garcia（Lyon 1995）： 16 \＆c4 定e7 （after 16．．．是xe4 17 f 3 是d5 18 是xd5 Qxd5 19 \＃dl White has a dangerous initiative for the sacrificed pawn） 17 e5 Qfd7 18 Eel 0－0 19 \＆f4 气b6 20 Qd6 －White stands better．

$$
16 \ldots \quad \text { Qfd7 }
$$

Or 16．．． $0 x$ x3 17 exf6（stronger than 17 Qxb3 Qd7 18 Qa5，which is also good）17．．． $\mathrm{xxd}^{2} 18$ Qxd4 莤d5（19 wb5＋was threatened） 19 wa6 gxf6 20
 Qc6＋）and if $21 \ldots$ ．．．d6 22 \＆f4！（analysis）．

$$
17 \text { \&f4 \&e7 }
$$

After $17 \ldots$ ．．．xb3 18 勾b3 定e7 19 モd1＠a6（not 19．．．丹d5 20 区xd5！exd5

21 Q3d4 with a dangerous attack） 20
 23 监c4 Black succeeds in completing his development，but White＇s position remains preferable（Kopylov－Flohr， 19th USSR Ch．，Moscow 1951）．


In Darga－Clarke（Luzern 1963）came the unexpected sacrifice 18 Of5？！包x3（after 18．．．exf5 19 是xf7＋ 20
 that Black can parry the threats） 19
 when $21 . .$. שf8？allowed White to conclude his attack successfully： 22


 could have defended，e．g． 26 Qf7＋ 7



Ravinsky＇s recommendation of 18 Qd6＋©xd6 19 exd6 should be consid－ ered，e．g．19．．．0－0（if 19．．． $0 \times 6320$
 with a very strong attack） 20 ＠c2 with advantage to White．

Later in Uhlmann－Gheorghiu（Hast－ ings 1965／6）White adopted the posi－ tional plan 18 \＆ $\mathbf{2}$ c2．After 18．．．0－0 19 Eel

 gained the advantage．
1.12122 （ 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc 43 五 3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 宣xc4 c5 6 0－0 a6 7曾e2 b5 8 宣b3 㝠b79a4 Qbd7 10
 b4 13 匂5 曾b8 14 e 4 cxd 4 ）

## 15 Dbxd4



15 ．．．Dc5
If 15 ．．．© ${ }^{\text {e }} 7$ the bishop sacrifice 16 \＆xe6 fxe6 17 Qxe6 is promising．

After 15．．．今d6（Uhlmann－Balcer－ owski，Bad Liebenstein 1963）there again followed 16 \＆xe6 fxe6 17 Qxe6 Qe5（after 17．．．g6 the position remains unclear），when Black came under a strong attack： 18 Qxe5 是xe5 19 f 4
 ※xa7是xb223 $0 \times 57$ ．

After 15 ．．．${ }^{\text {ec }} 5$ Black again has to reckon with 16 莤xe6 fxe6 17 Qxe6
 has three pawns for the piece with a continuing attack（Kuzminykh）．

Thus the sacrifice at e6 is constantly in the air，and in the main line Black radically prevents it．

16 \＆ 4
If 16 柴 $\mathrm{b} 5+$ 分d 7 ．

$$
16 \text {... Se7 }
$$

Capturing the central pawn gives White an overwhelming advantage：

 Qd718 是xd7＋曾xd719宸b5－


White stands better（analysis）．
This evaluation was tested in Hübner－Kir．Georgiev（Moscow Olym－ piad 1994）：18．．．0－0 19 全xd7 $\mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{xd}} \mathrm{xd} 20$ Qxe6 fxe6 21 Exd7 怕c8 22 Еxe7
 25 Exe6，with an extra pawn in a complicated ending．

1．122（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 60－0 a6 7 曾e2 b5 8 最b3 皿b79a4 Qbd7）

## $10 \quad e 4$

A gambit variation，which is not dangerous for Black，if he declines the sacrifice．

$$
10 \text {... cxd4 }
$$

If $10 \ldots$ ．．．xe4 there follows 11 S．g5
 if $11 \ldots$ §d5 12 定xd5 $0 x d 513 \pm \mathrm{el}$ ． with the threat of $14 \Omega \times f 7) 12 \mathrm{~d} 5 \mathrm{c} 413$
 with a strong attack．

And if $10 \ldots 0 x e 4$ ？ 11 d 5 ！食xd5 （Black loses after 11．．．exd5 12 食xd5令xd5 13 Qc3 公df6 14 シd1！） 12 安xd5 exd5 13 Oc3 ©df6 14 ＝dl with a clear advantage to White．

$$
11 \quad e 5
$$

To 11 axb5 Black should reply 11．．． Qc5！（11．．．${ }^{\text {w }}$ b6 is also possible，San－ guinetti－Pilnik，Buenos Aires 1944） 12 lec4 d3 13 we3 a5 with a good position，but not 13．．．今xe4？ 14 bxa6
© C 615 b 4 ，when White gained the advantage in Kotov－Flohr（Budapest Candidates 1950）．

The quiet $110 \mathrm{xd4}$ can lead to great complications：
 12．．．細xd4！ 13 ヨxd4 $0 x b 3$ ．How should White give up rook for knight？ If 14 \＆e3 Qxal，or 14 当d1 Qxd4！， and 15 㟶 $x d 4$ loses to 15 ．．．dd $8!$ ；
 $0-0$ gives Black a sound position （Stahlberg－Najdorf，Buenos Aires 1941）．


Petrosian－Smyslov（18th USSR Ch．， Moscow 1950）now continued $11 . .9 \mathrm{~g} 4$ 12 axb5，when 12．．．Dc5 13 是c4 d3 would have been advisable（Petrosian）．
$11 \ldots . \mathrm{d} 5$ is the soundest move，and
 Qb6 15 曹c2 axb5，or $14 \ldots$ ．．． 9 b3 15暑xb3 飠b6 with roughly equal chances．
1.123 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 Df6 4 e3 e6 5 是xc4 c5 $60-0$ a6 7 曾e2 b5 8 显b3显b79a4 分bd7）

## 10 Edl

This allows Black to complete his development successfully．

10．．．㟶b6 is also satisfactory：
（a） 11 e4 cxd4！ 12 e5 Qd5 13 axb5定c5 14 定c4 0－0 15 bxa6 0 b 416 是f4 d3！ 17 \＆xd3 $0 x d 318$ 蒌xd3 定xf2＋19
 22 d6 wh！，with slightly the more active position for Black（Wexler－ Fuchs，Leipzig Olympiad 1960）；
（b） 11 axb5 axb5 12 区a8 $\times$ 全xa8 13各c3 b4 14 dxc5 \＆xc5 15 公a4 Wb8 16
 （Dokhoian－Balashov，Irkutsk 1986）．

10 ．．． U b 8 is a modern idea，to answer 11 axb5 axb5 12 Exa8 with 12 ．．．${ }^{\text {exa8 }}$ defending the $b$－pawn with the queen．
 axb5 13 b3 cxb3 14 宣xb3 县d6 15 Qa3！White has the initiative （Vaganian－Mukhin，USSR 1969）．

## 11 Obd2

If White first exchanges on b 5 and a8 － 11 axb5 axb5 12 Exa8 娄xa8，and then plays 13 Qbd2，after 13．．．c4 14 \＆c2 De4 this leads to a position from Bondarevsky－Alatortsev（p．37）．

Other continuations：
11 Qa3 0－0 12 \＆ d 2 （not 12 axb5 axb5 13 wb5？in view of 13．．．宣a6 14
 12．．．cxd4 13 exd4 bxa4 14 宣xa4 0 b6
 tory position for Black（Novotelnov－ Flohr，19th USSR Ch．，Moscow 1951）．

11 dxc5 0－0 12 定c2（in Guimard－ Bazan，Buenos Aires 1960，after 12
 cxb7 Q leg4 $15 \mathrm{f} 4 \mathrm{~W} \times 7$ led to an advantage for Black）12．．．b4（or 12．．．莤xc5 13 Qe5 b4 14 Qxd7 Qxd7 15 Qd2 f5 16 Qb3 昷d5 with an equal game，Euwe－Alekhine，match，Holland 1937） 13 c6 宜xc6 14 Qe5 崽c7 15 Qxc6 柴xc6．Black has harmoniously developed his forces（Ilivitsky－Pet－ rosian，22nd USSR Ch．，Moscow 1955）．

Olafsson－Keres（Zurich Candidates 1959）now continued 11．．． W b6 12 פfl 0－0 $13 \triangleq \mathrm{~g} 3$ 』dd8 with chances for both sides．
1.2 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 宣xc4 c5 6 0－0 a6 7 曾e2 b5）

## 8 全d3

The bishop moves off the a2－g8 di－ agonal，and e6 and f 7 do not now come under attack．White＇s plans involve attacking the b5 pawn，which will give him strong points on the queenside，and also the advance e3－e4．


We consider：
8．．．cxd4（1．21
8．．．㑒b7（1．22）－－p． 45
8．．．0c6（1．23）－p． 46
After 8．．．⿹bd79a4c4 10 显c2 企b7 11 e4 童e7 12 皿g5 White has a domi－ nating position in the centre（Lilienthal－ Landau，Amsterdam 1934）．
1.21 （ 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 乌f6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆exc4 c5 60－0 a6 7 睍 e 2 b5 8 （d3）

$$
8 \text {... cxd4 }
$$

Probably best．

## 9 exd4

Or 9 Oxd4 曾b7 10 玉dl Ebd7 （10．．．觜c7 11 a 4 b4 is dubious： 12 名）d2
 0－0 16 额 1 単c7 17 e4－White stands better，Gheorghiu－Wittmann．Vienna 1986）Il a4 bxa4 with an equal game．

9
食e7

What difference does it make whether Black first plays 9．．． ⿳亠丷厂彡 b 7 and then ．．．莤e7，or vice versa？But after 9．．．${ }^{2}$ b7 10 a4 there is a difference：
（a）10．．．bxa4 11 且c2！（11 ※xa4 transposes into the main line），and while the opponent is completing his kingside development，White seizes the initiative：11．．．宣e7 12 \＆xa4＋abd7 （12．．．＠c6 13 \＆xc6＋Qxc6 14 ※xa6
 17 昷e3－Black cannot take the b2 pawn and，with his passed pawn，White has the better chances；to avoid weaken－ ing the c6 square，Black can play 12．．． 0 fd 7 ，but even then after 130 c 3 White stands better） 13 De5 $\Xi \mathrm{c} 8$ （13．．．0－0 14 Qc6！） 14 d5！：


By this sacrifice White opens the d－ file，tying down the opponent＇s pieces：
（a1）14．．．定xd5 15 0c3！0－0（no better is $15 \ldots$ \＆ $\mathrm{e} 716 \mathrm{Ed} \mathrm{Ec} 717 \mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{xd}}^{\mathrm{xd}}$ ©xd7 18 \＆f4 and wins，Ahues） 16

Sxd5 exd5 17 5c6，and Black is obliged to part with the exchange；
（a2）14．．．exd5 15 Qxd7 $0 x d 716$䒼g4！g6 17 \＃̈el h5（this weakens g6， but 17 ．．． \＆c6 is unpleasantly met by 18官h6，and if 18．．．9f6 19 畨d4） 18 畨h3宣c6 19 皿g5 f6 Endzelins－Szily（corr． 1959）and now 20 we6！（Ahues）would have given White the advantage；
（b） $10 \ldots$ b4：


11 Qbd2 Dc6（after 11．．．昷e7 12 Oc4 a5 13 是f4 0－014 14 fd 1 White has a promising position，Landau－ Reshevsky，Kemeri 1937），and now：
（bl） 12 Qc4，sacrificing the central pawn－12．．． 0 xd 4 ？！ 13 Qxd4 晏xd4 14是e3 ${ }^{W} \mathrm{~d} 515 \mathrm{f}$ ，when it is difficult for Black to complete his development；
（b2） 12 De4 is also strong，as in Böhm－Seirawan（Holland 1983）：12．．．全e7（the acceptance of the sacrifice 12．．．Qxd4 13 Qxd4 宸xd4 14 显e3 We5 $15 \mathrm{f4}$ gives White a strong position）， and now 13 皿e3！followed by Efcl would have given White the better chances（Seirawan）．

9．．．Dc6 10 a4 bxa4 11 坒xa4 Qb4 has also been played many times：
 14 Qc3 \＆e7 15 昷g50－0（Black should have played 15．．．珰b7！） 16 \＆xf6 gxf6


 and Black found himself in a critical position（Kozul－Psakhis，Zagreb 1993）；
（b） 12 \＆ c 4 气e7 13 \＆ g 5 a 514 \＆ $\mathrm{b} 5+$ \＆d7 15 Qe5（instead 15 Qc3 was good） $15 \ldots 0-0$（parrying the threat of capturing on f 6 and d7） 16 区xb4（16
 18 Oc6 ©xg5（there is nothing else） 19 Qxd8 Efxd8．White has queen for rook and bishop，but the poor position of his knight at b1 would appear to give Black sufficient counter－chances（Portisch－ Seirawan，Dubai Olympiad 1986）．

## $10 \quad 34$

 a position from the Steinitz Variation．

10 §g5 \＆b7 11 a4 bxa4 12 Exa4 （Szabo－Portisch，Kecskemet 1962） 12．．．©c6 13 Mal 0－0 leads to a position from the main line（cf．the note to Black＇s 12th move）．We should like to mention the idea of $12 \otimes \mathrm{c} 3$（intending Qxa4－c5）．

| 10 | $\ldots$ | ■xa4 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 11 | 玉xa4 |  |

Here 11 － $\mathbf{e} 2$ does not promise White anything，since Black immediately evacuates his king－11．．．0－0．

But 11 Oc3 0－0 12 Exa4 Ec6 13 Edl comes into consideration，as in Lputian－Meister（58th USSR Cham－ pionship，Moscow 1991）．

11昷b7
11．．．』d7 12 Eal 0－0 13 ©c3 a5 14 \＆g5 Oc6 15 घad1 Qb4 16 昷b1 can also be considered．After 16．．．a4 17 d5

 Wiv2 娄a8 Black maintained the balance in Grechkin－Borisenko（corr．1961／2）．

## 12 Q 3

White achieves nothing by 12 bd2 $0-013$ Qb3（13 Qc4 ©c6）13．．．宣c6 14
 （Barcza－Keres，Budapest 1952）．

$$
12 \ldots \quad 0-0
$$


 Qbd7 with equal chances（Reshevsky－ Portisch，Santa Monica 1966）．

13 md a5，and now：
（a） 14 昷g 5 （or in reverse order－ 13蕞g5 a5 14 gll），when Black has：
（al） $14 \ldots$ ．．bd 7 ．Compared with the previous variation Black has left the rook at a4 in peace，and this allows White to open the fourth rank for the rook，at the same time vacating d 4 for his knight： 15 d 5 ！？exd5 16 \＃h4 $\pm \mathrm{e} 817$ Qd4 g6 18 \＆b5 Qh5（18．．．De4 is refu－ ted by 19 』xe4！dxe4 20 Øe6！，Rash－ kovsky－Meszaros，Hungary 1989） 19
 the pawn White has a strong position （Kjellander－Endzelins，corr．1959）；
（a2） $14 \ldots$ ©c6 15 昷xf6 乌xf6 16 d 5 exd5 17 Qxd5 g6 18 － f 4 \＆g7 19 \＆ c 4 ， when White is more active，but Black＇s position is quite defensible（Donner－ Van den Berg，Beverwijk 1966）；
（b） 14 Qe5 0 c 615 \＆g5 Qb4 16
 18 Qxe4 \＆e7（Nogueiras－Ehlvest， Zagreb 1987），and now White should
have considered switching his rook to the kingside by $19 \pm$ a3，with somewhat the better chances．

| $\begin{aligned} & 4 \text { e3 e6 } 5 \$ 8 \\ & \text { b5 } 8 \text { \& } 8 \text { d3) } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: |

8 ．．．㑒b7
Black＇s desire to fianchetto his bishop is understandable，otherwise the advanced position of his pawns may tell unfavourably．But here he has to reckon with tactical nuances．

## 9 dxc5

The alternative is $9 \mathrm{a4}$ ，forcing one of the pawns to advance： $9 \ldots b 4$ （conceding the centre by $9 \ldots . . c 410$ 会c2 Qbd7 11 e4 \＆e7 12 \＆g5 favours White，Lilienthal－Landau，Amsterdam 1934） 10 Qbd2，and now：
（a） $10 \ldots$ cxd4 11 exd4 Qc6 12 Qe4 or 12 Qc4，leading to a position analysed on p．44；
（b） $10 \ldots$ Qbd7 11 e 4 cxd4 12 e 5 气d5 13 Qb3 Qc5！ 14 Qxc5 食xc5 15 全d2 h6 $16 \quad$ Efcl $\Xi \mathrm{fd} 8$ with equal chances（Hübner－Hort， Biel 1987）．

$$
9 \ldots \text { Dc6 }
$$

After 9．．．${ }^{\text {exc5 }} 10$ 宜xb5＋Qbd7 11 §d3 \＆xf3 $12 \mathrm{gxf3}$（12 菅xf3？乌e5） 12．．．0－0 13 Qc3 Black＇s compensation for the pawn is insufficient（G．Boris－ enko－Gurgenidze，USSR 1967）．

## 10 b4

This leads to complications．A good positional continuation is $\mathbf{1 0} \boldsymbol{m d} 1$ um 11 a4 b4（11．．．bxa4 is preferable，al－ though even then White stands better） 12 Qbd2 \＆xc5 13 Qb3 昷e7 14 e4 Qd7 15 皿e3 0－0 16 Eac 1 with advan－ tage to White（Taimanov－Rubinetti， Mallorca 1967）．

$$
10 \ldots \text { axb4 }
$$

10．．．炭c7 comes into consideration．If 11 a 3 ，then $11 \ldots$ g 412 g 3 （．．．Oce5 was threatened） $12 \ldots$ h5 followed by queenside castling（B．Borisenko－ Ranniku，USSR 1967）．

11 ＠xb5＋axb5
After 11．．．＠d7 12 是a4 是c6 （12．．．显xc5？13 Qe5） 13 是xc6 Qxc6 14 Qd4 $\pm c 815$ 是a3 定xc5 White gains a material advantage by 16 Qxe6！fxe6


## 12 楼x5＋


$12 \ldots$ D $\quad .$.
Weaker is $12 . .$. 类d7 13 当xb4，when the attempt to create threats on the kingside with 13．．．巴a4 14 畄b3 g 4 is easily parried： 15 h 3 घg6 16 ©bd2这xc5 $17 \Sigma$ ．White＇s king is pro－ tected，and he has an extra passed pawn on the a－file（Neikirch，Tsvetkov）．

12．．．莤c6 13 当xb4 是xf3 $14 \mathrm{gxf3}$
象f8 18 曾c6解 also favours White（V．Zagorovsky－ Perlov，USSR Ch． $1 / 2$－Final 1956）．

## 13 枼xb4


 Oxal requires testing） 15 㥩e4 $0 \times x$ 16 ®e5（if 16 c6 $0 \mathrm{c} 517 \Xi x d 8+\Xi x d 8$

18 岩b4 Qc2，and it is Black who wins！）16．．．©xe5 17 凹xd8＋Еxd8 18
 White will pick up the knight，while Black completes his development，when he will have two rooks for queen and pawn．Both sides have chances（analysis）．

| 13 | $\ldots$ | 是xf3 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 14 | gxf3 |  |



We are following Gusev－Vasilchuk （Moscow 1963）．After 14．．．${ }^{\boldsymbol{W}} \mathrm{G} 5+15$

 \＆xc5 the ending should be drawn．
> 1.23 （ 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 Df6 4 e3 e6 5 是xc4 c5 6 0－0 a6 7 曹e2 b5 8 \＆${ }^{\text {d }}$ d）

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
8 & \ldots & 0 \mathrm{c} 6 \\
9 & \mathrm{a4} &
\end{array}
$$

Other continuations：
9 dxc5 exc5，and now：
（a） 10 a3，when Black has：
（al） $10 \ldots 0-0 \quad 11$ b4 是e7 12 酋b2
 Qb3（Henley－Radulov，Indonesia 1982） and White has good prospects；
（a2）10．．．曾c7！？，and if 11 b4 䀂d6 12定b2 0 g 4 （Henley）；
（a4） $10 \ldots$ 요d6 11 巴d1 \＆b7 12 b4
 complications result from 14 Qxe5

是xal－both sides have chances）14．．．是xe5 15 合xe5 䂞xe5 16 气d2 0－0 17 Qb3 \＆ $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{L}} 18$ Qc5 with a slight in－ itiative for White（Malanyuk－E．Vlad－ imirov，Tashkent 1987）；

 $0-016$ 是b2 with some initiative for White（Polugayevsky－Toprover，USSR 1959）：

当b6，although even in this case White＇s position is preferable） $140 \times f 6+$ 全xf6 15 e4 xa2？（he should have played 15．．． W d7，after which 16 \＆${ }^{2} \mathrm{c} 3$ gives White a definite positional advantage）
 （threatening to win the queen） $18 \ldots . \mathrm{d}_{8}$

宜el Black resigns（Ruban－Rublevsky， Russian Ch．1995）．

9 2c3，and now：
（a）9．．．cxd4 10 exd4 Qb4（10．．． Qxd4？ 11 Qxd4 㟶xd4 12 类f3 favours White） 11 是bl \＆e7，or
（b）9．．．定b7 10 dxc 5 定xc5 11 e 4 Qd4 12 ©xd4 \＆xd4，in each case with chances for both sides；
（c） $9 \ldots$ ．．． Qxe4（better 11．．．会e7） 12 是xe4 全b7 13 息d2 with the initiative for White （Yusupov－Hübner．Barcelona 1989）．

For $9 \quad \mathrm{Edl}$ c4 10 县c2 $\quad$ Ob4 see section 2.111 （p．49）．

$$
9 \ldots \text { bxa4 }
$$

Keres－Smyslov（Budapest Candid－ ates 1950）went 9．．．b4 10 dxc 5 （White
can also consider the fami．ar pawn sacrifice 10 Qbd2，and if $10 \ldots$ cxd4 11
 with the initiative） $10 \ldots$ exc5 11 e 4 e5 12 是e3！是x 3 （if $12 \ldots$ d4 13 Qxd4定xd4 14 乌d2 是xb2 $15 \approx a b 1$ 是c3 16 0 c 4 ；however，it is not essential to sac－ rifice a pawn，and 14 dl is also quite good） 13 觜xe3 0－0 14 Qbd2 with the better chances for White．

9．．．c4 10 显c2 皿b7 11 axb5 axb5 12 Exa8 㟶xa8 13 Qc3 transposes into the $7 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 58$ 全b3 昷b79a4c4 variation．

$$
10 \text { \&c2! }
$$

As in the $7 \ldots$ ．．．bs 8 全d3 cxd4 9 exdt首 $b 7$ variation，when Black delays the development of his king＇s bishop this move is very desirable．
 also possible．In Hertneck－Klundt （Kecskemet 1989）White gained the ad－ vantage after 12．．．异b4 13 昷bl 食e714 e4 cxd4 15 Qxd4 0－0 16 e5 乌d7 17宣f4


Now after 10．．．仓b4｜｜全xa4－全d7 12 Qc3 今e7（or 12．．cxd4 13 §xd4宣e714 \＃dl 是xa415 公xa4 Wc716e4
 Qxd7 15 d5 White has the advantage．

## Classical Variation 

| 1 | d4 | d5 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | c4 | dxc4 |
| 3 | Qf3 | Qf6 |
| 4 | e3 | e6 |
| 5 | 目xc4 | c5 |
| 6 | 0－0 | a6 |
| 7 | 淅 e 2 |  |

Here we consider：
7．．． 0 c6（2．1）
7．．．Qbd7（2．2）－p． 60
 e3 e65 \＆ $\mathrm{exc} 4 \mathrm{c} 560-0 \mathrm{a} 67$ 曾e2）

$$
7 \text {... Dc6 }
$$



Black wants to exchange the enemy bishop by ．．．b7－b5，．．c5－c4 and ．．．9b4． White has the following continuations：

8 』d1（2．11）
8 ©c3（2．12）－p． 52
8 dxc5（2．13）－p． 58
8 a3（2．14）－p． 59
The position reached after 8 a4 is analysed in Chapter 3 （p．61）．

8 \＆ $\mathbf{b 3}$ is considered under the move

2.11 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 0 f 6 4 e 3 e6 5 ＠xc4 c5 6 0－0 a6 7 需e2 Qc6）

## 8 島d

White agrees to the exchange of his bishop．

$$
8 \text {... b5 }
$$

After 8．．．亚c79903（if White wants to prevent ．．．b7－b5＇for ever＇，he can choose 9 a 4 ）Black has：
（a）9．．．b5 10 eb3，leading to posi－ tions from section 2.121 （p．53）；
（b） $9 \ldots$ ．．．e7 and now：

（bl） 10 a3 b5 11 昷a2 b4 12 Qa4 cxd4 13 exd4＠d7 14 axb4 $0 x b 415$
 $\mathrm{V}_{\mathrm{F}} \times 55+9 \mathrm{~d} 7$ ，and there is no way of de－ fending the bishop at a2） 16 ．．． w b7 with roughly equal chances（Flohr－ Capablanca（Semmering－Baden 1937）；
（b2） 10 dxc 5 \＆xc5 11 h 3 deserves consideration，taking play along the
lines of the Furman Variation（Chapter 6，p．114）；
（b3） 10 d 5 is another way of fighting for the initiative，e．g．10．．．exd5 11 Qxd5 Qxd5 12 皿xd5 0－0 13 h 3 （ 13 e 4 e g 4 ）， when White＇s position is preferable；
（b4） 10 \＆$b 3$ is another possibility，to answer $10 \ldots$ b5 with 11 a4；
（c） $9 \ldots$ b5 10 金d3 全b7 11 全d2（un－ blocking the c－file，in order to exploit the position of the queen at c7） 11 ．．． cxd4 12 exd4 定d6？！（after 12．．．定e7 13 Eacl 0－0 14 Qe4 White stands better， but $12 \ldots$ ．．． 64 comes into consideration） 13 घacl 粕e7（13．．．0－0 14 Qe4 Qxe4 15 宸xe4 g6 16 暑h4 favours White） 14 De4 and White has the better position （Taimanov－Rashkovsky（Minsk 1976）．

We now consider：
9 \＆b3（2．111）
9 dxc5（2．112）－p． 51
The attempt to create threats in the centre－ 9 d5 exd5 10 \＆xd5 ©xd5 11 e4－is easily parried by $11 \ldots$ 䂞e 7 ！ 12 あxd5 \＆e6．
2.111 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 皿xc4 c5 $60-0$ a6 7 葿e2 Qc6 8 － d ）b5）

$$
9 \text { 宣b3 c4 }
$$

Black exchanges the opponent＇s ac－ tive bishop，but in so doing he removes the pressure on the d 4 pawn and allows White freedom of action in the centre．

Other replies：
 good），and now：
（a） $10 \ldots .0 \mathrm{xd} 411$ exd4，when Black has to reckon with the threat of $\mathrm{d} 4-\mathrm{d} 5$ ， e．g．11．．．真b7 12 显g5 昷e7 13 显xf6 ©xf6 14 d 5 with advantage to White；
（b） $10 \ldots$ ．．．Wc7 11 a4 b4（if 11．．．bxa4 12 Qxc6） 12 Qxc6 垍xc6 13 a5 是d7 （13．．．釈b7 is unsatisfactory in view of

14 e4！） 14 Qd2 \＆e7 15 Qc4，and White has an undisputed advantage．
 when the routine $12 \otimes c 3$ ？is met by $12 \ldots \triangleq \mathrm{~g} 413 \Xi \mathrm{fl}$ Qd4！，while if first 12 h 3 ，then $12 \ldots \mathrm{~h} 5$ is interesting．
 cf．variation 2.12 （p．52）．

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
10 & \& c 2 & \text { \&b4 } \\
11 & \Delta c 3
\end{array}
$$

White wastes a tempo with 11 a3
 venting e3－e4 and \＆g5） 14 e4 $0 x \mathrm{x} 315$ bxc3 \＆e7．Both sides have chances．

11 e4 0 xc 212 峟xc2 \＆ e 713 d 5 ！is promising for White．

| 11 |  | 0 xc 2 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 12 | 装xc2 | Sb7 |

Other replies：
12．．．Dd5 13 e4（13 b3？cxb3 14
 17 雷el 是d6 18 Dd3 wh gave Black the advantage in Euwe－Keres，Holland 1939）13．．．Qb4（13．．．Qxc3 is weaker in view of 14 曾xc3！\＆b7 15 d 5 exd5 16 exd5 with a dangerous initiative for White，Gligoric－Medan，Belgrade 1941） 14 We2 ©d3 15 a3！White prevents ．．．莤b4（the routine 15 是e3 是b4 gives Black an equal game）and intends 全e3 and b2－b3．After 15．．．2xcl 16 シaxcl he has a lead in development．

12．．．今e7 13 e 4 ！（ 13 d 5 岩c7 14 e4 e5 15 h 3 leads to an equal game）13．．．${ }^{\text {eb }} \mathrm{b} 7$ 14 a3 with somewhat the better pros－ pects for White．

12．．．Wc7 13 e4（here 13 d 5 is not good：13．．．b4！）13．．．eb7 14 a3．White＇s chances are somewhat preferable．

## 13 d5

13 e4 used to be considered unsatis－ factory on the basis of Szabo－Euwe （Groningen 1946）：13．．．b4 14 e5（14 d5 bxc3 15 dxe6 曾a5 favours Black）14．．．

 seized the initiative．But instead of 17宸xc4 White can exchange queens，and a move earlier 16 当xc3 is possible，and if $16 \ldots$ 曾d5 $17 \& f 4$ ．We must also men－ tion Mikh．Tseitlin＇s modern idea of 16 d5．and if $16 \ldots$ 宣xd5 17 bxc 3 ．


13 ．．．歯c7！
The idea of this move，employed by Flohr against Reshevsky（Nottingham 1936）is to block the centre after e3－e4 with ．．．e6－e5．

If 13．．．崑b6 there can follow 14 e4最c5 15 是g5 0－0 16 a 4 with advantage to White（Vidmar－Grünfeld，Warsaw Olympiad 1935）．

Now let us see what happens if Black accepts the challenge：13．．．exd5 14 e4 \＆e7（ $14 \ldots$ ．．．c5 15 \＆g5） 15 e5 Qd7 16 Qxd5 0－0．

We are following Euwe－Grünfeld （Zandvoort 1936），where after 17 㟶f5 Black gave up his queen for rook and knight：17．．．0c5 18 Qf6＋（not 18
 18．．．＠xf6 19 Exd8 是xd8 20 Og5定xg5 21 是xg5 ${ }^{\text {me8 }}$（Black cannot drive away the bishop and occupy the
 h6 25 \＆f6！White soon won，but

23．．．』g6 would have been more tena－ cious（Euwe）．

However，several moves earlier White could have prepared his offen－ sive with 17 \＆$e 3$（Kmoch）．

14 e4
White gains no advantage by 14 dxe6 fxe6 15 Qd4（if 15 e4 b4！）



Black has nothing to complain of．In the event of passive play by his oppo－ nent he can try to exploit his queenside pawn majority．

In Reshevsky－Flohr（Nottingham 1936）after 16 \＆e3 isc5 17 \＆xc5

 Qb3 the players agreed a draw，al－ though Black＇s position is preferable （23．．．0xb3 followed by ．．．${ }^{\mathbf{w}} \mathrm{d} 6$ ）．As shown by Alekhine，16．．．＠d6 would have been more accurate，when White＇s demonstration on the kingside does not achieve its aim： 17 乌h4 g6 18 \＆h6 f6．

A roughly equal game results from 16 玉ac1 §d6 17 §e2（intending to
manoeuvre the knight to g3 and f5； White will attack the opponent＇s pawn chain with b2－b3）17．．．0－0 18 Qg3巴ac8（not 18．．．f6 19 요e3 g6 20 h 4 Eac8 21 h5 with an attack，Stahlberg－ Alexander，London 1951），and if 19 4 f 5 fe 8 with a defensible position．
$2.112(1 \mathrm{~d} 4 \mathrm{~d} 52 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 43$ Df3 亿f6 4 e3 e6 5 显xc4 c5 60－0 a6 7 䊑e2 4．c6 $8 \stackrel{\text { ®dl b5）}}{ }$

## 9 dxc5

White＇s plan is to attack the oppo－ nent＇s queenside，therefore his bishop will then retreat to d3．

If immediately 9 §d3 cxd4！（9．．．c4 leads to the main line） $10 \Omega x d 40 \times x d 4$ 11 exd4 显b7 or 10 exd4 Qb4， exchanging the important bishop．

$$
\begin{array}{rll}
9 & \because & \text { 雪 } 7 \\
10 & \AA \mathrm{~d} 3
\end{array}
$$

Retreating the bishop to b3 is not in the spirit of the variation．

$$
10 \ldots \text {... Db4! }
$$



This last move is an old recommen－ dation by Leonhardt．Black intends to exchange the dangerous bishop．

Subsequent games showed that Black should not hurry with the capture of the
c5 pawn，since after $10 \ldots$ ．．．$x$ x 511 a4 his queenside comes under pressure：
（a）11．．．bxa4（employed in Pirc－ Flohr，Sliac 1932；later Flohr also played this in his match with Botvinnik in 1933） 12 Exa4 Qb4 13 ㅇbs＋莤d7
 is bad in view of 16 皿c3 0－0 17 食 $\times$ b4
 （but not 16 全xb4 是xb4 17 曾b5 18 玉xd7？㟶xd7 19 曾xb8－家e7！，and Black wins）16．．．当b7．This occurred in the Botvinnik－Flohr match；by contin－ uing now 17 ©a3！White would have obtained the better game．
（b）after 11．．．b4 12 Qbd2 Flohr suf－ fered in two earlier games：
（b1）12．．．0－0 13 ゆb3（or 13 b3 De5 14 De4 Qxd3 15 Qxf6＋gxf6 16 䊓xd3 with advantage to White，Flohr－Horo－ witz，USSR－USA 1945）13．．．量e7 14 e4 Qd7 15 \＆e3 Qde5 16 Qxe5 Qxe5 17 エacl 㯰b8 18 是c5 and White gained a lead in development（Alekhine－Flohr， Bled 1931）；
（b2）12．．．＠a5 13 b3 乌d5 14 \＆b2， and again Black failed to equalise （Euwe－Flohr，match，1932）．

## $11 \quad 34$

After 11 a3 Black quickly equalised in Goglidze－Lasker（Moscow 1935）： 11．．．Oxd3 12 岁 xd 3 是xc5 13 b4 是e7 14 显b2 宣b7

The sacrifice of a piece for three
 13 Qe5 is unfavourable，although it demands accurate play of Black：13．．．全b714 b4 宣e715 Dc3 0－0 16 公xc6宣xc6 17 曾c4 Efd8 18 全b2 会f8 19 Exd8 Еxd8 20 Еdl $\Xi x d 1+21$ ©xdl © d 5 and Black should win（Alatortsev－ I．Rabinovich，Moscow 1935）．

In Pachman＇s opinion， 11 Dc3 comes into consideration，and if


## 11

Not 11．．． $0 x$ x3 12 皆xd3 b4 13 c6！， when after 13．．．今e7 14 是d2 0－0 15 ${ }_{\mathrm{Em}}^{\mathrm{c}} \mathrm{c} 1$ e5 16 e4 White has the advantage （Malich－Andric，Belgrade 1952）．

$$
12 \Xi \times a 4 \quad \Xi \mathrm{~b} 8
$$

12．．．${ }^{\text {\＆}}$ xc5 can be met by 13 是b5 +定d7 14 是 $x d 7+$ ，transposing into a fa－ vourable position for White from the Botvinnik－Flohr game（cf．the note to Black＇s 10th move）．

$$
13 \text { Qc3 \&xc5 }
$$

The chances are roughly equal．
2.12 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 $勹 \mathrm{f} 6$ 4 e3 e6 5 显xc4 c5 60－0 a6 7 挡e2 Qc6）

$$
8 \text { c3 }
$$



As we saw in the preceding variation， by exchanging the c 4 bishop Black ob－ tains a satisfactory position．With 8 0 c 3 White prevents this，since now the bishop has a shelter at bl．

$$
8 \text {... b5 }
$$

It is dangerous to accept the pawn sacrifice：8．．．cxd4 9 exd4 $\sum x d 410$ Qxd4 畄xd4 11 \＃d1－cf．the Steinitz Variation（p．108）．

Other possibilities：

8．．．簤c7，and now：

（a） 9 d5 exd5 10 Qxd5 0 xd 511定xd5 定d6 12 b3 0－0 13 定b2 \＆g4 14 h3 \＆h5 15 Efd1 $\pm f d 816$ di2 with some initiative for White（Korchnoi－ Radulov，Leningrad 1973）；
（b） 9 【ad1 b5 10 显b3 b4（ $10 \ldots$ 定b7 11 d5！） 11 d5 bxc3 12 dxc6 \＆d6？！

 comes into consideration，with a defen－ sible position） 13 峟d3（13 e4 0 g 4 and

 tage to White（Eslon－Garcia Pardon， Spain 1979）；
（c） 9 ㅇd3 \＆${ }^{2} d 6$（or 9．．．是e7），and now：
（cl） 10 \＆ $\mathrm{d} 20-011 \mathrm{dxc} 5$ 昷xc5 12 \＃acl \＃d8 13 Qe4 \＆e7 14 Qd4 是d7． White＇s advantage is insignificant （Donner－Radulov，Wijk aan Zee 1974）；
（c2） 10 dxc 5 宣xc5 11 Qe4 昷e7 12
 Qb2） 14 \＆b2 and White has the better prospects（Timman－Miles，Tilburg 1986）．

## 9 Sb3

Here Black has tried：
9．．．${ }^{\text {i b }} 7$（2．121）
9．．．．e7（2．122）－p． 56
9．．．b4（2．123）－p． 57

He also has two other possibilities：
$9 . . . c 4$ ．The plan where Black gives up the battle for the centre is acceptable only when he is able to exchange his knight for the opponent＇s light－square bishop，ie．in the variation 8 Edl b5 9家b3 c4 and $10 \ldots$ b4．But here the bishop can hide at b1： 10 §c2 Qb4 11皿b1，and after 11．．．Qbd5 12 e4 Qxc3 13 bxc3 White has the better prospects．
$9 . . . c x d 410$ 己d（or immediately 10 exd4，since it is unfavourable for Black to accept the pawn sacrifice－cf． Bolbochan－Evans，p．109）：

（a）10．．．今e7 11 exd4（11 Oxd4 Oxd4 12 Exd4 菅b6 does not promise White any advantage） $11 \ldots$ as 12 \＆c2 eb7 13 De5 0－0 14 显g5 with the better chances for White
（b） $10 \ldots$ 皿b7 11 exd4 $Q b 4$ ．This at－ tempt to prevent $\mathrm{d} 4-\mathrm{d} 5$ encountered a vigorous rejoinder in Spassky－ Avtonomov（Leningrad 1950）： 12 d 5 ！ Qbxd5 13 \＆g5 with a clear advantage；
（c） $10 \ldots \mathrm{~d} 311$ 区xd3 㟶c7 12 e4＠e7 13 Qd5！Wb7（not 13．．．exd5 14 exd5
楅x715（g5！） 15 e5 De4（15．．．Qfd5 16 ⿹g 5！） 16 定c2 Dc5 17 ジd6 Qf5 （17．．．0－0？ 18 气xh7＋） 18 气e3！and White gained a significant advantage （Ubilava－Dokhoian，Sevastopol 1986）．
2.121 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 صf6 4 e3 e6 5 全xc4 c5 6 0－0 a6 7 临e2 Ec68 0 c3 b5 9 全b3）

$$
\begin{array}{rlr}
9 & \ldots & \hat{*} b^{7} \\
10 & \Xi \mathrm{~d} 1 &
\end{array}
$$



10 dxc5 定xc5 11 e4 comes into consideration：
（a）11．．．0－0 12 e5 ©d7 13 宣f4 Qe7 14 De4 with advantage to White （Suetin－Alekseev，Minsk 1959）；
（b） $11 \ldots \varrho \mathrm{~d} 4$ is given as best in some opening guides，which continue 12
 but instead of 13 皿e3 White has the energetic $130 \times b 5$ ！

10
壶 c 7
After 10．．．${ }^{\text {el }} 7$ White has a choice between two plans：
（a） 11 dxc5（compared with the ex－ change on c5 on move 10 ，White has the extra tempo Ed1）11．．．背c7 12 e4是xc5 13 h 3 （13 \＆e3 是xe3 14 当xe3 $0-015 \mathrm{Eac} 1$ is also good，with a lead in development）13．．．0－0 14 e5 ©d7 15 \＆f4 followed by $\mathrm{Eac}_{\mathrm{a}}$ ，Qe4 and 气c2 （the order depending on the opponent＇s actions）with good attacking chances；
（b） 11 d 5 （the other plan is the typi－ cal breakthrough in the centre） 11 ．．．
exd5 12 Qxd5（or 12 e4 d4 13 e5，and if 13．．．Qg8 14 e6 c4）12．．．Qxd5 13㿾xd5 炭c7 14 e4，which leads to a po－ sition examined later．

After 10．．．管b6 11 d5 exd5 White has：

（a） 12 定xd5 b4 13 是xf7 + 家xf7 14岩c4＋管e7（this seriously complicates the opponent＇s task，whereas after $14 \ldots$
 Qd5 White created decisive threats in Stahlberg－Böök，Kemeri 1937） 15
官f6 18 對f4＋．White has a draw by perpetual check，but he can hardly count on anything more；
（b） 12 e4！，and White launches an attack：
（bl）12．．．d4 13 e5 0－0－0 14 exf6 dxc3 15 \＆ f 4 （in the main line this move is not possible，since the black queen is at c7） 15 ．．．c4 16 是c2 g6 17 bxc 3 with a clear advantage to White（Furman－ Byvshev，USSR Ch．1／2－Final 1952）；
（b2）12．．．dxe4 13 Qxe4 Qxe4 14
 17 Exd5 0－0 18 』d7！\＆${ }^{\text {ed }}$（Reshevsky－ Vidmar，Nottingham 1936），and now， as shown by Alekhine， 19 b4！cxb4 20 \＆e3 would soon have forced Black＇s capitulation；
（b3）12．．．0－0－0 13 Qxd5 $9 x d 514$

Qxd5．The f7 pawn is attacked，and compared with the main line，in which his queen is at c7，Black＇s position is more dangerous．
$10 . . . b 4$ is unfavourable：

$11 \mathrm{~d} 5 \mathrm{exd5} 12$ Qxd5 Qxd5 13 宣xd5

 （Grünfeld－Lener，Vienna 1935）．

Since the preceding variations are unfavourable for Black，it is worth try－ ing 10．．．0a5 11 显c2 獣b6 12 e 4 （the critical move）12．．．cxd4 13 Qxd4 是c5 14 莤e3 0－0（not 14．．．0c4？ 15 Da4！） 15 e5 Qd7 16 Qe4 when，apart from the acceptance of the pawn sacrifice by
 after which White evidently has sufficient compensation，also possible is 16．．．仓c4 17 Øxc5 管xc5．

## 11 d5！

The most energetic．By opening the centre，White creates dangerous threats．
 （13 axb3 is also good）13．．．当xf7 14 axb3 ${ }^{\underline{W}} \mathrm{wb} 315$ e4 favours White．

$$
12 \mathrm{e} 4 \text { ! }
$$

Signalling the start of a typical attack．

12 定xd5？fails to $12 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 4$ ，and if 13 Ang5 $0.0 \cdot 0$（not $13 \ldots \mathrm{bxc} 3$ ？ 14 全xf7 7

舁e7 15 曹c4 ©d8 16 bxc3 峟c6 17 e4嘗b5 18 e 5 with a very strong attack for
 with advantage to Black．

With the quiet $120 x d 5$ White can hardly count on an advantage：12．．． Qxd5 13 \＆xd5 是e7 14 b3 0－0 15显b2，and now：
（a） $15 \ldots$ ．．fd8 16 e4 Qb4 17 是xb7宸xb7 18 血c3 0c6（if 18．．．a5 19 a 4 ） 19 コd5 b4 20 定b2 exd5 21 exd5，and af－ ter the retreat of the knight to the back rank（20．．． Q a 7 does not come into con－ sideration）the black rook is shut out of play and White has the advantage （Euwe－Kramer，New York 1948／9）；
（b） $15 \ldots . . . \pm \mathrm{ad} 8$ was therefore recom－ mended by Euwe，when the same

 exd5 乌b8 22 घel 定d8 and ．．． 2 d 7 leaves White with only a slight initia－ tive；
（c） $15 \ldots 9 \mathrm{~b} 416$ 皿e5（16 是xb7㥩xb7 leads to an equal game）16．．．需b6 17 是xb7 当xb7 18 雪b2 f6 with equal chances．


## 12 ．．．d4

After 12．．．dxe4？ 13 Qxe4 Qxe4 14楼xe4－the black king is unable to find
a secure shelter：14．．．定e7（or 14．．．皆e7
 \＆g5！with a very strong attack，Kotov－ O’Kelly，Groningen 1946） 15 合f4 wic8 16 道d5 包d8 17 气d6 莦d7 18 全xc5 ジb8 19 定xf7＋Qxf7 20 シxd7，and Black soon had to capitulate（Najdorf－ Christoffel，Groningen 1946）．

In view of the final evaluation of the variation，perhaps Black should decide on 12．．．0－0－0．After 13 Qxd5（for 13 e5 d4 cf．the notes to the next move） 13．．． $2 x \mathrm{xd} 514$ \＆xd5 White can count on an attack after undermining the opponent＇s pawn chain．The question is， are his chances better here than in the main line？

## 13 n．d5！

After 13 e5 it used to be thought that 13．．．0－0－0 14 exf6 dxc3 15 ※xd8＋ Exd8 16 bxc 3 gxf6 was a good reply：
 ．．De6 and ．．．今d6） 18 害e4 5c6 19 a4 bxa4 20 Еxa4 Еe8 21 定f5＋엽d8 22
 with advantage to Black（Fuderer－ Andric，Yugoslavia 1951）；
（b）but 17 a 4 is an improvement：
气e4 with the initiative for White （Kir．Georgiev，Donchev）．

13

## 新 d 8

White gains a powerful attack after 13．．．$勹 x$ xd5 14 exd5＋Qe7（if $14 \ldots$ ．．． w 15 糖f1 and 16 Eel） 15 a 4 （ 15 De5 is also very strong） 15 ．．．c4（Black is be－ hind in development，but his pawns may become dangerous，so that deter－ mined measures are required of White） 16 Qxd4 定xd5（after 16．．．cxb3 17 d 6 ！ Wxd6 $18 \boldsymbol{0 x b 5}$ Black gains sufficient material for the queen，but the retarded development of his kingside gives White the advantage） 17 axbs cxbs 18 Qf5！


Gipslis－Klasups（Riga 1954）contin－ ued 18．．．』d8（after18．．．0－0－0 19 是g5！ White wins） 19 bxa6 f6 20 Exd5 Exd5


 シxa8 $\Xi \mathrm{g} 828$ घb8，and White won．

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
14 & \text { \& } 44 & \Xi c 8 \\
15 & \text { a4! }
\end{array}
$$



By breaking up Black＇s pawn chain， White gains the advantage：

15．．．c4 16 axb5 d3（if $16 \ldots$ ．．．axb5 17
 gxf6 20 Qf5 and White wins） 17 bxc6！ dxe2 18 cxb 7 exdl＝曾 +19 シxdl cxb3



24 © $x$ b8 with a won ending） 20 © $7+$

 $\pm x d 6$ ．

15．．．bxa4 16 Еxa4 足e7 17 Og5 0－0 18 Qxf6＋\＆xf6 19 Qxh7，and now：
（a） $19 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 620$ Qxf8 wxf8 21 wg and White must win（Sherwin－Kramer， New York 1954）；
（b）19．．． and there is no defence against 22 Hh3：

 fails to 21 \＆d6！，so Black is obliged to sacrifice the exchange．

15．．．d3 16 Еxd3 c4 17 Еddl cxb3 18 axb5 axb5 19 杽xb5 with a decisive attack．

15．．．b4 16 gg5，and f7 cannot be de－ fended．
2.122 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 §f3 Df 6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 6 0－0 a6 7 䒼e2 Qc68 ©c3b59 \＆ e 3 ）

9 ．．．血e7


10 dxc5
Compared with the variation 9．．．莤b7 10 dxc5 \＆xc5 White has gained a tempo，which secures him the initiative．

He has also played 10 Ed1 0－0 11 dxc5 峟c7 12 e4 是xc5 13 h 3 Qd7 14目e3 \＆xe3 15 莦xe3 是b7 16 ロacl玉ac8 17 a 4 b 418 Qb5（to 18 Qd5 Black replies $18 \ldots . .{ }^{\omega} \mathrm{d} 8$ ，and after the knight moves－19．．．שe7）18．．．axb5 19 axb5 气de5 20 合d4 酱e7 21 bxc6 Oxc6 with roughly equal chances（Spassky－ Kots，30th USSR Ch．．Yerevan 1962）．

The fact that f 2 was insufficiently de－ fended（the result of $10 \Xi \mathrm{dl}$ ）allowed Black to equalise．After 10 dxc 5 ！White does not have to waste time on h2－h3．

$$
10 \ldots \text { 是xc5 }
$$

If Black defers the capture on c5 by playing 10．．．$\triangle \mathrm{d} 7$ ，then $11 \triangleq \mathrm{~d} 4$ is good， and after 11．．．Wc712 宸g4 \＆f6 13 Qe4 White has a clear advantage（Sajtar－ Podgorny，Prague 1947）．

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
11 & \text { e4 b4 }
\end{array}
$$

12 e5
White also has a good game after the quiet 12 ＠a4 定e713 气e3（Botvinnik）．

| 12 | $\cdots$ | bxc3 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 13 | exf6 | gxf6 |

After 13．．．${ }^{\boldsymbol{W}} \mathrm{Exf6} 14$ wa4 cxb2 15
 White has the advantage（Botvinnik）．
14 背c4！㟟b6


This move would seem to be even stronger than 15 we3，which occurred in the Euwe－Alekhine match（Holland 1937），where after 15．．．＠d4 16 玉xd4全xd4 17 气a4＋ gained the better chances．In Bot－ vinnik＇s opinion，Black should not have lost if he had replied $18 \ldots \triangleq \mathrm{~d} 8$ ，although it would appear that even in this case he faces certain difficulties．

Now after both $15 \ldots$ ．．． e 7716 bxc 3 with the idea of $\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{G}}^{\mathrm{h} 4,}$ and $15 \ldots$ ．．． e 716 bxc3 घg 817 \＆f4 White has the advan－ tage，while $15 \ldots . . c x b 2 \quad 16$ © $x b 2$ is completely bad for Black．
2.123 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 昷xc4 c5 6 0－0 a6 7 省e2 Qc68 Qc3 b5 9 显b3）

$$
9 \text {... b4 }
$$

An attempt to forestall White＇s ac－ tions in the centre．However，as Alekhine remarked，＇the bishop at b3 becomes too strong＇．


10 d5
This committing advance was pat－ ented by Alekhine． $100 \mathrm{a4}$ is a quiet continuation．
$10 \ldots$ Qa5

White answers 10．．．bxc3 with the vigorous 11 蓝a4！崽xd5 12 e4 （Alekhine）．

10．．．exd5 11 Qxd5 $0 x \mathrm{xd} 512$ ®d followed by e3－e4 favours White．

| 11 | \＆a4＋ | \＆ d 7 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 12 | dxe6 | fxe6 |
| 13 | छd1 |  |

 15 Qbl 皿e7 Black has at least equal chances，according to Alekhine．

Shamkovich has drawn attention to
发e7（15．．．g6 16 Ue5） 16 e4，with a dangerous attack．

| 13 |  | bxc3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 14 | Exd7 | $0 \times 17$ |
| 15 | De5 | Ea7 |



16 bxc3
This was played in the famous game Alekhine－Böök（Margate 1938），with which this variation originated．

16 e4！was later suggested by Suetin． After 16．．．cxb2 17 \＆xb2 or $16 \ldots$ ．．．${ }^{\text {Whf }} 617$
 dangerous threats．

$$
16 \ldots \text { £e7? }
$$

Böök suggested 16．．．${ }^{\text {Whb }} \mathrm{b} 817$ Qxd7 （or 17 世h5 g 618 Oxg6 hxg6 19

with the threat of $19 \ldots . . W / \mathrm{Vll}$－，when Black parries the attack．But things are not so simple：White can continue his offensive with 18 鼻a3，e．g．18．．．定d6 19
 （Shamkovich）．

The Alekhine－Böök game concluded $17 \mathrm{e4}$（with the threat of 18 Qxd7 and 19 目g5＋）17．．．©f6 18 \＆g5 嶒c7 19追f4（instead of this Brinckmann sug－ gested 19 wh 5 with the idea after $19 \ldots$米xe5 of giving mate by 20 柴e8＋
 and 24 蒋xd7；19．．．g6 20 最xg6＋hxg6 21 鬲xh8 is hopeless for Black）19．．．
 suggests itself，when Alekhine had in mind a spectacular finish： 20 娄e 3 d8
 threatening mate） 20 區 d g6 21 会g5， and the attack quickly reached its goal．
2.13 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 0 f 6 4 e3 e6 5 皿xc4 c5 $60-0$ a6 7 曾e2包c6）

8 dxc5
This exchange is usually linked with the fianchetto of the queen＇s bishop af－ ter a2－a3 and b2－b4．Of course，it is more advantageous to continue dxc5 when Black has already played ．．．宣e7， in order to gain a tempo，but if he de－ lays developing his king＇s bishop， White has to content himself with the ＇minimum program＇．

White＇s other plan is to seize space by advancing his e－pawn．

$$
\begin{array}{llll}
8 & \ldots & \& x c 5 \\
9 & \text { a3 }
\end{array}
$$

9 e4 is considered under the move order 6 e2 a6 7 dxc5 最xc5 8 0－0 Qc6 9 e4（the Furman Variation）－ p． 116 ．

$$
9 \quad \ldots \quad 0-0
$$



A simple plan，and probably the strongest．However，9．．．b5 has occurred more frequently：
（a） 10 © d 3 ，and now：
（a1） $10 \ldots 0-0 \quad 11$ b4 昷e7 12 宜b2
 Qb3 0 d 7 （ $15 \ldots$ a 5 is weak in view of 16
 advantage to White） 16 Eacl $\Xi a c 817$皿bl with excellent prospects for White （Henley－Radulov，Indonesia 1982）；
（a2） $10 \ldots$ ．．．W7 W ！？，with the idea of not losing control over e5，e．g． 11 b4 是d6 12 官b2 ©g4；
（b） 10 苃a2 昷b7 $11 \mathrm{b4}$ ：



\＃ad8 17 亿bb3（Pirc－Spielmann，Maribor 1934），and Black somehow imper－ ceptibly found himself in difficulties． With ．．．b7－b5 he allowed the enemy knight to manoeuvre via d2 and b3 to c5．If the black knight had been de－ veloped not at c 6 ，but at d 7 ，this ma－ noeuvre would not have been so strong．

Now 10 b4 ©d6！（setting up a barrier on the al－h8 diagonal） 11 食b2 e5 12 e4 （．．．e5－e4 was threatened） 12 ．．． e g 4 gives roughly equal chances．

### 2.14 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 童xc4 c5 6 0－0 a6 7 宸e2 Qc6）

## $8 \quad$ a3

In this variation too White＇s plan is $\mathrm{dxc} 5, \mathrm{~b} 2-\mathrm{b} 4$ and S b 2 ．If Black plays 8．．．b5 and ．．．．${ }^{\text {eb }} \mathrm{b} 7$ ，this transposes into variation 2.3 ，in which the knight at c6 is not well placed（it blocks the bishop and also does not control the c5 square）．

$$
8 \ldots \text { \&́e7 }
$$

This allows White to transpose into variation 2．3，with an extra tempo．

| 9 | dxc5 | Sxc5 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 10 | b4 | 家d6 |
| 11 | ¢ $\mathrm{b}^{\text {2 }}$ |  |



Stahlberg－Skalicka（Podebrady 1936） continued 11．．．0－0 12 adl wiv7 13 ©c3
 and White obtained an active position．

Despite the lost tempo，it is more sensible for Black to employ the plan indicated in the previous variation， namely $11 . . . e 5$ and ．．．是g4（or ．．．蹧e7）．

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 2.2 \text { (1 d4 d5 } 2 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 43 \text { Qf3 } 0 \mathrm{f} 64
\end{aligned}
$$

7 ．．．Qbd7

 （or in reverse order， 8 Qc3 b5 9 显b3宜b7 10 gdl）leads to a position that we have already examined in detail．Here we will dwell on continuations that are of independent significance．

## 8 e4

8 a4 is another good continuation， leading to a position typical of the Rubinstein－Botvinnik Variation（6 0－0 a6 7 a4 ©c6 8 we2），with the important difference that Black＇s queen＇s knight is not at c6（which enables him to control the b4 square that has been
weakened by a2－a4），but at d7：

（a） $8 \ldots \mathrm{axd} 49$ exd4 乌ीb6 10 定b3宜e7115c30－012 シd1 Obd5 13 亿e5是d7 14 定g5 客c6 15 gid3，and White obtains a strong attacking position （Furman－Keres，22nd USSR Ch．， Moscow 1955）；
 Qc3 cxd4 12 Qxd4 with the better chances for White（Kan－Goglidze， Leningrad 1936）．

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
8 & \because & b 5 \\
9 & \text { \&b3 } & \text { \&b7 }
\end{array}
$$

If 9．．．cxd4 there follows 10 e5．
10 e5
11 Dc3
©d5
c4

Recommended by Nikitin．The game Taimanov－Nikitin（Yalta 1962）went 11．．．Sxc3 12 bxc3 cxd4 13 cxd4 昷e7， and the pawn sacrifice 14 d5 exd5（if 14．．．\＆xd5 15 是xd5 exd5 16 e6） 15 2d4 0－0 16 © 2 enabled White to take the initiative．

$$
12 \text { \&c2 Se7 }
$$

White＇s initiative on the kingside （ $\triangle \mathrm{f} 3-\mathrm{d} 2-\mathrm{e} 4$ ）is rather more significant than Black＇s queenside activity（．．．凤d7－ b6 and in some cases ．．．b5－b4）．

# 3 Classical Variation 7 a4 

| 1 | d 4 | $\mathrm{d5}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 2 | c 4 | $\mathrm{dxc4}$ |
| 3 | ＠f3 | ＠f6 |
| 4 | e 3 | e 6 |
| 5 | \＆xc4 | $\mathrm{c5}$ |
| 6 | $0-0$ | ab |
| 7 | a 4 |  |

This continuation was a favourite of Rubinstein．White prevents the exten－ ded fianchetto（．．．b7－b5），but weakens the b4 square．In some cases his queen＇s rook can come into play via a3．

Black＇s main alternatives are：
7．．．0c6（3．1）
7．．．cxd4（3．2）－p． 82
The development of the knight at d 7 used to be considered unjustified，since White has weakened the b4 square，and the knight is＇supposed＇to be at c6．But in the following games after 7．．．啙c7 8宸e2 2 bd7 Black managed to equalise：
 0－0 11 ⿷acl b6 12 h 3 臽b7，Balashov－ Efimov，Lenk 1991）10．．．0－0 11 h3 b6 12 b3 定b7 13 显b2 cxd4 14 exd4 是b4 （Plinas－de la Villa，Mallorca 1992），in both cases with a perfectly good game；
（b） 9 e4 cxd4 10 e5 0 d 511 \＆xd5

宜f5 17 Qc3（17 Da3！？）17．．．宣d3 18

 24 0xd4 ※xe5 draw agreed（Kallai－ Balashov（European Club Cup 1991）．

> 3.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 Qf6 4e3 e65 愠xc4 c5 $60-0 \mathrm{a} 67 \mathrm{a} 4$ )

$$
7 \ldots \text { Qc6 }
$$

Now White has：

8 䒼e2（3．11）
8 Qc3（3．12）－p． 80

> 3.11 (1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf64 e3 e6 5 風xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 a4 Qc6)

## 8 䒼e2



Black has two plans available：
（a）exchange on d 4 and play against the isolated pawn，or
（b）maintain the tension in the centre while continuing his development．

We therefore consider：
8．．．cxd4（3．111）
8．．．今e7（3．112）－p． 70
8．．． $\begin{gathered}\text { wic } \\ \text { c（3．113）}\end{gathered}$－p． 76
3.111 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6
4 e3 e6 $5 \hat{\aleph} \times x 4$ c5 $60-0$ a6 7 a4
Qc6 8 e2）

8
This move occurred three times in the Botvinnik－Petrosian World Cham－ pionship Match（Moscow 1963）．

## 9 Ed1 \＆e7

Black can avoid the positions with an isolated d－pawn，typical of this vari－ ation，by playing $9 \ldots \mathrm{~d} 3$ ，after which the pawn structure is symmetric，but White has a lead in development：

（a） 10 是xd3 监c7 11 Oc3 气e7 12 h 3 （if 12 e4 $\Omega \mathrm{g} 4$ ，but $12 \mathrm{~b} 30-013$ \＆b2 Ed8 14 acl promises White a slight advantage，Rivas Pastor－Smyslov，Has－ tings 1981／2）12．．．0－0 13 e4 Qd7 14定e3 Qb4 15 是c4．White stands better，
玉acl he gained a substantial lead in development（M．Zagorovsky－Romanov， corr．1966）；
（b） 10 Exd3 宸c7，and now：
（bl） 11 e4 $0 g 4$（11．．．Ob4 should be considered，and if $12 \Xi c 3$（ E a5） 12 h 3 Qge5 13 Qxe5 Qxe5 14 \＆f4 是d6 （14．．．垍xc4 15 £xe5 favours White） 15
曾d2 Dc6 17 e5 0－0 18 Qc3 with pressure；
（b2） 11 Qc3 莤d6 12 e 4 Qg4 13 h 3 Qge5 14 Qxe5 Qxe5 15 是b5＋！ 16 Edl with advantage to White （Vaiser－Reiman，USSR 1974）．

## 10 exd4


（a） $10 \ldots$ ．．．${ }^{\text {E／}} \mathrm{C} 711$ Qxc6 bxc6（if 11．．．当xc6 12 全b5！axb5 13 axb5） 12
 with a good position for White（Simic－ Abramovic，Belgrade 1977）；
（b） $10 \ldots$ ．．$x d 411$ exd4 $0-012$ Qc3管d6 13 会g5 Od5 14 显xe7 Oxe7 15 d5 exd5 16 Qxd5 Qxd5 17 皿xd5 and a draw was agreed in Pr．Nikolic－ Ljubojevic（Belgrade 1987）．

$$
10 \ldots \quad 0-0
$$

Or 10．．．Od5 11 Qc3 Qcb4 12 Qe5 0－0 13 Qe4（other possibilities are ex－ amined on p．66），and now：

（a）13．．．9b6 14 घa3！，and in order to defend against the kingside attack， Black has to weaken his e6 pawn：14．．． f6 15 a5！Qxc4（15．．．fxe5 16 axb6 favours White） 16 xct $Q \mathrm{~d} 5$ ，when：
 Qxd5 exd5 20 Qb6 Eae8 21 ©xd5（if
 Exe7，and the opposite－colour bishops enable Black to defend successfully） 21．．．©d6！with good drawing chances Geller－Korchnoi（Moscow 1964）；
（a2） 17 Eg 3 is a much more promis－ ing plan，suggested by Boleslavsky： 17．．．Ef7（there is nothing better； 17．．． while if $17 \ldots$ ．．．d7 one of the white knights penetrates to d6） 18 © 5 exc5 （18．．．e5 is strongly met by 19 （24） 19 dxc 5 霝7（20 2 b 6 was threatened） 20

Qd6 ニe7 21 b4！©xb4 22 定h6！g6 23 h4 㥪xc5 24 ＠e4 with a won position；
（b）13．．．f6 14 包d3 b6 15 Qxb4
当xd2 $\pm c 7$ ，and White did not achieve anything（Barlov－Pliester，Dieren 1986）；
（c） $13 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 614 \stackrel{y}{\rightleftarrows} \mathrm{a} 3$（this sets Black more problems than 14 as b5 15 省b3
 Kupreichik，Hastings 1984／5）14．．．f6 15
 with a sound position for Black（Trois－ van der Sterren，Eerbeek 1978）．

After 10．．．0b4 11 De5 0－0 White can try to mount an attack by $12 \Xi$ a3 Qfd5 13 wh5（if 13 \＃h3 Black defends

 Black does not want to go in for a risky variation with an extra piece but an ex－ posed king－13．．．f6 14 【h3 fxe5 15罗xh7＋©f7 16 是h6（Haba－Pekarek， Czechoslovakia 1988），he should choose 13．．．Qf6 followed by 14 自e2 Dfd5 or 14 宸h3 Qbd5（Haba）．$^{2}$

Now White has a choice：
11 \＆g5（3．1111）
11 ©c3（3．1112）－p． 64
3.1111 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3乌）f6 4 e3 e6 5 全xc4 c5 6 0－0 a6 7
 exd4 0－0）

## 11 气g5

The point of giving priority to the development of the bishop is that for the moment White leaves the third rank free for the possible switching of his queen＇s rook to the kingside．

## 11

Qd5
After 11．．． 0 b4 12 Qe5 b6 13 玉a3 White has fair attacking chances．

The immediate 11．．．b6 is strongly met by 12 皿xf6 \＆xf6 13 d 5 ！，when
after 13．．．exd5 14 是xd5嶿c715 亿bd2！ （Euwe）Black faces difficult problems （ $15 \ldots$ 全xb2？ $16 \Xi \mathrm{a} 2$ 定f6 $17 \Xi \mathrm{c} 2$ ）．


After 13 Qc3 Black should play 13．．．） Pxc $^{14} 14$ bxc3 b6．The immediate $13 \ldots$ ．．．6 is weaker in view of 14 Exd5 Qxd5 15 De5，when after $15 \ldots$ 全b7 16 $\pm$ E3 White has a strong attacking posi－ tion，and if 16．．．f6 17 Qc6！（Novo－ telnov－Blekhtsin，Leningrad 1966）．

$$
13 \ldots \text { b6 }
$$

The 2nd game of the Botvinnik－ Petrosian match（1963）went 13．．．\＆d7 14 Od2（White leaves the third rank free for the thematic rook manoeuvre） 14．．．\＆c6 15 De4 Qf4（otherwise the white knight reaches c5） 16 畄f 3 定xe4
 White＇s position is the more promising．


## 14 Qd2

This is more accurate than 14 a5，as in Petrosian－Kotov（Moscow 1972）， when $14 \ldots$ ．．． $\mathrm{Q} b 715$ axb6 监xb6 16 Qc3 （16 9d7 does not work in view of 16．．． W c6，since White cannot take the rook on account of $17 \ldots 9 \mathrm{c} 3$ ！） $16 \ldots$
谏xe5 ${ }^{\text {and }} \mathrm{fd}$ led to an equal position．

By playing 14 9dd2，White plans Qe4，and after weakening the c5 square － 0 c 5 ．His chances are better．
3.1112 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 是xc4 c5 $60-0$ a6 7 a4 毋c6 8 峟e2 cxd4 9 玉d1 皿e7 10 exd4 0－0）

## 11 Q 3

Black＇s main options are：
11．．．Qb4（3．11121）
11．．．⿹d5（3．11122）－p． 67
To 11 ．．．\＆ $\mathbf{d} 7$ White can reply 12 \＆f4 （also $12 \mathrm{~d} 5!?$ ），and if $12 \ldots$ ．．． b 413 De5．
3.11121 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 显xc4 c5 60－0 a6 7 a4 Qc6 8 糟 $\mathrm{e} 2 \mathrm{cxd4} 9$ 玉dl 皿e7 10 exd4 0－0 11 － c 3 ）
11 O．Qb4

12 \＆ g 5 is also played（as similar set－ ups， 12 \＆e3 too is possible）：

（a）12．．．Qfd5，and now：
 De5 \＆d7）14．．．©ed5 15 Qe5 b6 and in this still unclear position a draw was agreed in Tal－Hübner（Skelleftea 1989）；
（a2） 13 Qxd5 Qxd5 14 ＠xe7 ${ }^{2} \mathrm{xe} 7$
15 当e4 Qd5（Black takes measures
 Here in Reshevsky－Petrosian（Siegen Olympiad 1970）a draw by repetition was agreed：17．．．Od5 18 显e4 Qf6 19蒋f4．White could have played on with 19 㧛f3，retaining a slight initiative；
（b） $12 \ldots$ ．．．d7，and now：
（bl） 13 d 5 exd5（if $13 \ldots$ ．．． 0 fxd 514是xe7 Qxe7 15 Qe5 Qbd5 16 各xd5 exd5 17 \＆xd5 Oxd5 18 Exd5，and 18．．． \＆g4 does not save Black in view of 19
 15 \＆xe7 Qxe7 16 Qe5，and White regains his piece，obtaining a positional advantage） 15 ＠xd5 $\mathrm{Exd}^{2} 16$ Exd5 （but now after 16 \＆xe7 Qxe7 17 Qe5 Black is saved by tactics－17．．Qc6，
 Qxg5 h6（18 曾d3 was threatened） 18
 pawn，Black gains counterplay，and in game 10 of the Botvinnik－Petrosian match he managed to draw the heavy－ piece ending；
（b2） 13 le5，and now：

（b21）13．．．©fd5 14 定xd5 $勹 x d 515$ Qxd5 exd5（15．．．是xg5？ 16 Qb6！） 16宏x 7 Ee8 17 \＆xe7，and Black faces a dismal choice：17．．．区xe7 18 De5 f6 19
 ■c7 20 घacl！（Vaganian－Inkiov， Buenos Aires Olympiad 1978）；
（b22）13．．．ac8 led to interesting play in Bareev－Ivanchuk（Linares 1994）： 14 Eel \＆e8 15 Eadl $0 f 1516$ Qxd5


 now by $23 \ldots$ ．．． b 4 ！（instead of 23 ．．． صb3） Black could have secured a draw； （c） $12 \ldots$. bd5：


13 De5 $\sum x \mathrm{xc} 314 \mathrm{bxc} 3$ ，and now：
（c1） $14 \ldots$ ．．d5 15 \＆$x$ e 7 ，when $15 \ldots$ Qxe7 is bad in view of 16 宜d3 0 d5 17 \＆c2 and the switching of the rook at dl to the kingside，while after 15．．．宸xe7 16 㟶 f 3 White retains the initiative；
（c2）14．．．仓d7 15 乌xd7 是xd7（15．．．憎xd7 is a tougher defence，although even then White has the better chances

急xc3 20 afl with a clear advantage to White（Keres－Saidy，Tallinn 1971）；
（d） $12 \ldots \mathrm{~h} 613$＠h4 घa7（in order to defend e7 with the rook） 14 De5 b6， and now：
（d1） 15 d5 ©fxd5 16 Qxd5 exd5 17 \＆xd5，and White＇s attempt to exploit the weakening of $c 6$ and the position of the enemy rook turned into an over－ sight：17．．．Qxd5 18 Qc6 㟶c7 19 Qxa7 Wxa7 20 显xe7 Qxe7，when Black gained two pieces for a rook（Gligoric－

Korchnoi，Yugoslavia v．USSR 1965）；
（d2）the weakness at c6 could have been exposed by 15 Qa 2 ！，when after 15．．．今b7 16 全xf6 gxf6 17 包xb4 全xb4 18 Og4 White has the advantage．

12
Qfd5
Other continuations：
12．．．b6，with these possibilities：
（a） 13 （13 f 3 fd 5 （13．．．Qbd5？ 14 Qc6；13．．．巴a7 14 d5！exd5 15 Qxd5

 with advantage to White），and now：
（a1） 14 畄g3 解h8 15 wh we8 16 ©e2，and White has slightly the better prospects；
（a2） 14 Qxd5 exd5 15 定b3 \＆e6 16 \＆d2 f6 17 Qg4 with some initiative （Pinter－Korchnoi，Beer－Sheva 1988）；
 $\pm$ a3 $\Xi c 816 \Xi h 3 \Xi c 717$ b3 b5 18 axb5 axb5 19 曾h5（19 是xb5 宸d5）19．．．食e4 20 \＆xb5 \＆d5？！（20．．．凤a2！？－Bis－ choff） 21 食c4 with advantage to White （Bischoff－Hort，Dortmund 1985）；
（c） $13 \pm$ a3，a typical manoeuvre in such positions，should also be men－ tioned，as well as the paradoxical 13 g 4 \＆b7（13．．．h6 14 h 4 Qh7 15 d 5 ！） 14 g 5 Qfd5 15 Qe4 Qc6，which leads to double－edged play．

12．．．\＆d7，and now：
（a） 13 Qg5－cf．the notes to White＇s 12th move；
（b）after the forcing 13 d 5 ©fxd5 14 Qxd5 exd5 15 定xd5 Qxd5 16 玉xd5 Black has the tactical rejoinder $16 \ldots$

 with an equal ending（Van Scheltinga－ Clarke，Wijk aan Zee 1970）；
（c） 13 皿f4 是c6 14 Qxc6 bxc6 15 a5！with the better chances thanks to the fixing of the weakness at a6（Gligoric－ Miagmarsuren，Sousse 1967）．

12．．．Qbd5（this abandons control of d3，allowing the rook at dl to join the attack） 13 』d3，and now：

 with the better position for White （Benko－Filip，Wijk aan Zee 1970）；
（b）13．．．＠b4 $14 \Xi g 3$ ，and if $14 \ldots$
 Qd7 是xd7 18 Exd7 with the threats of $19 \Xi \times b 7$ and 19 © 4 ．White has the advantage；
（c） $13 .$. ．xxc3 14 bxc3 Qd5 15 ■h3 with attacking chances（Quinteros－ Silva，Fortaleza 1970）；
（d） $13 \ldots$ Ee8 14 घg 3 §d7 15 且h6 g 6 16 h 4 again with attacking chances， Marin－Ghitescu，Romania 1987.


This position has already been exam－ ined on p． 62 under the move order 10．．．9d5 11 Qc3 Qcb4 12 Qe5 0－0 in Geller－Korchnoi（1964），which initiated the development of this variation． Geller continued 13 Qe4．Here we will consider White＇s other possibilities．

## 13 掌e4

13 皿d2－cf．the variation $11 \ldots$ d5 12 \＆d2 乌cb4（p．68）．

13 Qd3，exchanging the knight at b4， is an interesting plan．After 13．．．थf6 14 Qxb4 ©xb4 15 \＆f4 White＇s position is preferable（Schweber－Hase，Buenos Aires 1983）．

13 䨍f3 needs testing．Kiselev－ Kozlov（Frunze 1988）went 13．．．Ea7 14定b3 b6 15 分xd5 exd5 16 定d2 with the more promising position for White．

The aggressive 13 震 94 comes into consideration：13．．．tish8（after 13．．．b6 14
 17 Oxg5 घa7 18 ■a3 h6 19 Eh3 White has the advantage－Kouatly） 14 Wf3 dg8 15 a5 with the initiative for White （Kouatly－Marjanovic，Marseille 1986）．

$$
13 \ldots \quad \text { ■b8 }
$$

Other possibilities：
13．．．b6，and now：
（a） 14 Qc6 $\sum x \mathrm{c} 615$ 部5 is an in－ teresting tactical possibility：
 exd5（17．．．巳a5？ 18 道d3 g6 19 是h6！， and the threat of 20 爵 4 forced Black to part with the exchange，Jamroz－ Mikenas，Lublin 1972） 18 㑒xd5 寝xe4 19 ©xe4 and White stands better；
（a2） $15 \ldots \pm 7$ is stronger，and in Zs ． Polgar－Magem Badals（Pamplona 1991／2） it led to a completely equal position after 16 Qxe7＋Qxe7 17 是g5 当d7 18愠xe7档xe7 19 d5 exd5 20 是xd5；
（b） $140 x \mathrm{xd} 5$ exd5 15 （White plays positionally）15．．．昷e6 16 气b3 Ec8 17 \＆${ }^{\text {d }} 2 \mathrm{f} 6$ ，with a position from

Pinter－Korchnoi（p．65），where it was reached via a different move order．In Rashkovsky－Kupreichik（Minsk 1985） White preferred to exchange the strong enemy knight by 189 d 3 ，which gave him the better position．

13．．．Ea7，and now：
（a） 14 皿b3 气f6 15 Wh4 b6 16 学g3， when Black has：
（a1） $16 \ldots$ 定b7 17 显h6 0e8 18 Eacl宵h8 19 d 5 ！exd5（19．．．gxh6 is bad in view of 20 dxe 6 and $218 \times 77+$ ；if $19 \ldots$ Dxd5 $200 \mathrm{xd5}$ exd5 21 㿾e3 White is threatening both 22 a5 and 22 Qc6） 20今e3！\＃a8 21 Ac4，and Black＇s position became critical（Petrosian－Spassky， Moscow 1971）；
（a2）16．．．${ }^{6}$ h8（a prophylactic move， after which White sacrifices a pawn for an attack） 17 d 5 exd5 18 皿e3（18⿹xd5？Qfxd5 19 \＆xd5 Qxd5 20 Qc6 fails to 20．．．毋c3！）18．．．巴b7（in the Petrosian－Spassky game Black did not have this important defensive move） 19
 for both sides（Butkus－Pohla，corr．1984）；
全g5 16 是xg5 曾xg5 17 是xd5 公xd5 18 0xd5 exd5 19 ©xf7＋and wins） 16 Qe4 ${ }^{\mathbf{W}} \mathrm{e} 8$（intending ．．．f7－f6 and ．．．置g6） 17 是e2！\＃c7（relatively best） 18 Qg5 exg5 19 exg5 and White＇s position is preferable（Adorjan，Vegh）．
宜xd5！Qxd5（or 16．．．exd5 17 莤f4！， and if 17．．．g5 18 Qd3！） 17 Qc4 Qxc3 18 bxc3 峟c7 19 皿a3，and White stands better（Marin－Garcia Palermo，Andorra 1991）．

13．．．\＆f6 has proved quite good，e．g． 14 是d2（14 岩e2 b6 15 Qe4 显e7 leads to a position examined earlier） $14 \ldots$ ．．b6
客b3 \＆ g 719 Qc3 9 xc 320 bxc 3 Qd5 21 c 4 Qf6 22 wiv4 0 h 5 with chances
for both sides（Tibensky－Sadler， Capelle la Grande 1991）．

$$
14 \text { \&b3 b6 }
$$

Now after 15 Qxd5 exd5 16 曾f3皿e6 17 id 2 f6 18 Qd3 the only differ－ ence compared with the game Rashkovsky－Kupreichik（cf．the note to Black＇s 13th move）is the position of the queen＇s rook．White stands better （Gofstein－Panchenko，Aktyubinsk 1985）．
3.11122 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 亿f
Q．f6 4 e3 e6 5 全xc4 c5 $60-0$ a6 7
exd4 0－0 11 \＆ 2 c3）
$11 \ldots$ D


In this variation Black securely blockades the d4 pawn，but the absence of the knight from f6 weakens some－ what his kingside defences．

$$
12 \text { 是d3 }
$$

Other continuations：
12 雪e4 勾6（12．．．0cb4 13 そe5 leads to a position from variation $3.11121) 13$ wh4 ©d5．Black offers to repeat moves，but after 14 㫮g4 $\sum \mathrm{f6} 15$学g3 Qh5 16 宸3 Qf6（16．．．g6 is also possible） 17 §g5 气b4 18 学g3 \＃e8 19 Qe5 ⿹ff5 20 定h6 §f8 21 ⿷acl b6 22

2xd5 exd5 23 2b3 White has an active position（Polugayevsky－Hort，Manila 1976）．

12 h3 毋cb4 13 Øe5 员d7 14 \＆$b 3$定 815 暑f bxc3 ©c6 18 \＆f4 气d6 19 毘g 3 and White stands better（Vyzhmanavin－ Ehlvest，Tilburg 1992）．

12 \＆b3 造（12．．．0cb4 13 De5
 Qe8 17 Qxc6 bxc6 18 Qe4 with the more promising position for White， Magerramov－Ibragimov，58th USSR Ch．1991） 13 Qe5 ©xc3 14 bxc3 ©xe5 15 dxe5 単c7 16 ジd3 是d7 17 Е゙h3 g6 18 定h6 Ed8 19 對 e （with the threat
 （21 曾g7 g5！）21．．．b5（Naumkin－Sadler， Ostende 1992） 22 \＆g5，and in this double－edged position White retains attacking chances．
今c6，with chances for both sides （Ftacnik－Pr．Nikolic，Novi Sad 1984）．

12 人d2 ©cb4 13 シacl \＆d7 14 Qe5全c6 with an acceptable position for Black．
$12 \mathrm{h4}$ ，and now：
（a） $12 \ldots$ ．． $0 x 313 \mathrm{bxc} 3$ \＆xh4 14 d 5 ！
 Ed8 17 显xc6 and wins） 16 寝c4，with the threats of $17 \boldsymbol{\omega} \mathrm{wh} 4$ and 17 皿a3；
（b） $12 \ldots . \mathrm{yc} 413 \mathrm{~h} 5 \mathrm{~h} 614$ Qe5 b6 15 刍g4 Qf6 16 曾f3 Qfd5 17 Qxd5 exd5．Here in Kuzmin－Suetin（USSR 1970）White sacrificed a piece： 18 Qc6
 ixh6 g6，which led to an unclear， double－edged position．

12 De5 Dxc3 13 bxc3 Qxe5 14䒼xe5（or 14 dxe5 当c7）14．．．莤d6 （Larsen－Spassky，Leiden 1970） 15 宸e2 with equal chances．
12 定b1 它

Or 13 §e4 乌f6，and now：

（a） 14 \＆f4 Qbd5 15 Qxd5 exd5 16
 19 We3（Karpov－Hübner，Oslo 1984）． After 19．．．exf3（otherwise 20 Qe5） 20宸xf3 White＇s position is preferable；
（b） 14 De5 $\triangleq \mathrm{xe} 415$ xe4 $\triangleq \mathrm{d} 516$
 with some initiative for White（Hjar－ tarson－Marjanovic，Belgrade 1987）．

13
In this way Black prevents the queen manoeuvre that is possible after 13．．．莤d7：
（a） 14 䊑e4！g6（if $14 \ldots$ ．．． 96 White of course does not reply 15 霛 $\times 67$ ？是c6， but 15 曾h4 followed by $\boldsymbol{\ell} \mathrm{g} 5$－Black is obliged to weaken his king＇s position in an inferior situation） 15 Qe5（15 \＆\＆ 6 ＂e8 16 Qe5 显c6 17 崰g4 also comes into consideration，when Black should probably play 17．．．f5，De Boer－Hart－ man，Copenhagen 1984）15．．．\＆f6 16
 \＆c6） 18 h 4 ，and in game 16 of the Botvinnik－Petrosian match Black had to withstand a strong attack；
（b） 14 e 5 is also played： $14 \ldots \mathrm{e} \mathrm{c} 6$ ， and now：
（bl） 15 wiv4 9 f 6 （ $15 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 6$ is bad on account of 16 是xg6 fxg6 17 Qxg6

g6 17 宜g5（17 a5！？）17．．．Ec8（as Suctin showed，17．．．a5！would have given Black equal chances） 18 a5 Qh5 19
 advantage to White（Gligoric－Suetin， Yugoslavia v．USSR，Rijeka 1963）：
（b2） 15 a3：


15．．．0f6 16 \＆g5 g6（the exchange on f 6 followed by $\mathrm{e}^{\mathrm{e} \times 77+}$ was threat－ ened） 17 是h6！（stronger than 17 a 5 むc8！，which in Gligoric－Ivkov，Pula 1971，and Gligoric－Portisch，Novi Sad 1976，gave Black counterplay）17．．．． e 8 $18 \approx$ el．Black has to reckon with the sacrifice on f7．After 18．．．会f8 19 是g5 White has the initiative（Suetin）．

13．．．b6：



 Pr．Nikolic－Petrosian，Vrsac 1981）16．．．皿f8 17 全xf8 シxf8 18 De4 Qc6 19当g3 Oce7 20 Qd6，and a draw was agreed（Petrosian－Portisch，Rio de Janeiro 1979）；
（b） 14 a 5 （with the idea of weakening the c5 square；we should also mention the plan of 14 Qe5 气b7 15 Øe4 $\begin{gathered}\text { ©c8 }\end{gathered}$ 16 楮h5）14．．．bxa5（if 14．．．莤d7 15 乌e5 bxa5 16 a3！，with the threat of 17 Qxd5 and 18 exh7＋；after 16．．．f5 17 Qxd5 Qxd5 18 Qxd7 觜xd7 19 Exa5 White has the advantage in the centre， Gligoric－Portisch，Pula 1971） 15 De5
 $\Xi \mathrm{a} 3$ ！with the threat of 17 Qxd5 $\triangleq x d 5$ 18 \＆xh7＋etc．），and now：

（b1） 16 Øe4 $\pm c 817 \pm a 3 \mathrm{f5}$ ！ 18 Øc5
 similar position（with the difference that Black did not take on a5，but played ．．．b6－b5）has already been examined in Gligoric－Portisch．Here too it is very doubtful whether White＇s initiative compensates for the pawns he has given up（Browne－Portisch，Lone Pine 1978）；
 Qe4 is a quieter alternative，when Black，in turn，has the possibility of a problematic exchange sacrifice：18．．． Excl？！ 19 Excl f5 20 亿g3 Qf4 21
 N．Nikolic，Oakham 1986）．

13．．． $\begin{aligned} & \text { Wr } \\ & \text { c } \\ & \text { is a weak move：} 14 \text { De5，}\end{aligned}$ and the pawn sacrifice cannot be accepted in view of $14 \ldots 0 \mathrm{xc} 315 \mathrm{bxc} 3$



14 免g5
Or 14 De5 是d7 15 De4 是c6 16
 sacrifice on h7 was threatened） 18 \＆h6
 Spassky－Pachman（Manila 1976）some curious tactics removed most of the men from the board： 21 Qg5！？gxh5 22



14 h6
We are following Gligoric－Korchnoi （Belgrade 1965）where after 15 \＆$h 4$完d7 16 是xf6 是xf6 17 粦e4 White won


 Black gained definite compensation．
$3.112(1 \mathrm{~d} 4 \mathrm{~d} 52 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 43$ Qf3 Qf6
4 e 3 e 65 \& $\mathrm{exc} 4 \mathrm{c} 560-0 \mathrm{a} 67 \mathrm{a} 4$
2 c 68 We2)

Black avoids the exchange on d 4 and the isolation of the central pawn，in or－ der not to free the bishop at cl．

In his book of selected games（1951）， Botvinnik expressed the opinion that 8．．．民e7 was more promising than the exchange on d4．＇After 9 dxc5＇，he wrote，＇Black is ready to reply $9 .$. ． 24 ．＇ However，in the 1963 World Cham－ pionship Match，Petrosian as Black did not follow this recommendation．．．

We consider：
9 dxc5（3．1121）
9 ＝d1（3．1122）－p． 73
3．1121（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3
Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 显xc4c5 $60-0$ a6 7
a4 ©c6 8 当e2 定e7）
9 dxc5 \＆xc5

This was played by Petrosian． After 9．．．Qe4 White has：
（a） 10 dl （played by Petrosian，this time with the white pieces，against Portisch，Zagreb 1965）10．．．${ }^{\text {Wich }}$ c 711 b3 Oxc5 12 全b2 0－0 13 Obd2 会d7 14 e4 （instead White should consider playing his knight from d2 via f1 to g3，and in some cases to h5）14．．．Efd8 15 we3
 b6 with a roughly equal position；
（b） $10 \varrho \mathrm{~d} 4$ ！is a more effective re－ ply：10．．． $0 x$ xc5（or $10 \ldots$ ．．．xd4 11 exd4
 and White has the advantage．

9．．． W w 7 has also been played： 10 e 4 Qg4 11 气e3（11．．． $\mathrm{Q}_{\mathrm{d}} 4$ was threatened）
 （13．．．${ }^{\text {exc5}} \times 5$ was essential） 14 宸xc5
 17 b4！with advantage to White （Donner－Szabo，Havana 1965）．

## 10 e4

An idea of Furman．White wants to play e4－e5，which will allow him to use
the e4 square for switching his pieces to the kingside．

$$
10 \ldots . . . g 4
$$

$10 . . . e 5$ fails to 11 \＆xf7＋ 12 wc4＋

If $10 . .$. 䒼c 711 e 5 ，then：
（a） $11 \ldots . \mathrm{d} 7$（this is unsatisfactory）

皿xe4 18 䁬xe4 with an overwhelming advantage for White（Donner－Kinn－ mark，Halle 1963）．After 18．．．©xe5 19 Exd7 \＆xf4 20 Exf7！§xh2＋（the capture of either rook leads to mate） 21

䒼b8 $27 \pm \mathrm{cl}+$ Black resigned；
（b） $11 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 412$ ef4 f 6 ，and now：
（bi） 13 是xe6 leads to an interesting variation in the＇romantic＇spirit： $13 \ldots$


发h1 \＆xf2（threatening $22 \ldots$ ．．．Wxh2＋ 23 Qxh2 0 g 3 mate） 22 Qe4
 Qg3＋with a draw！（analysis）；
（b2） 13 ©c3，or more accurately 13 Qbd2，and White gives up a pawn for a marked lead in development．


Now after 11 e5 it seems that Black can play $11 \ldots$ ．．．d4，and after 12 Qxd4㟶xd4 pick up the e5 pawn．

## 11 e5

Nevertheless！This move occurred in the 8th game of the Botvinnik－Petrosian match．In the earlier 6th game Botvinnik played 11 §f4，after which Petrosian managed to equalise： 11 ．．． W f 6 12 \＆ 3 3 Qe5 13 Qxe5 Qxe5 14 Qd2 0－0 15 Eadl b6 16 橧h5 Dxc4 17 Qxc4 a5 18 ⿹e5 $\begin{aligned} & \text { We7 } 19 \text { Ed2（it trans－}\end{aligned}$ pires that the knight at e5 is not so solidly placed；if 19 §f4 f6 20 dd3 e5
 good position for Black）19．．．f6 20 Qd3 e5 21 Qxc5 当xc5，and it was White who had to strive for the draw．

A few remarks：
（a）instead of 14 9 d2（if 14 h 5 Black has the strong reply 14 ．．．sd4） White does better to preserve the bishop from exchange by 14 ＠a2，answering 14．．．0－0 with 150 c 3 followed by orel and $\mathrm{f} 2-\mathrm{f} 4$（ Tal ）；
（b）instead of $16 \ldots$ ．． xc 4 ，stronger is 16．．．ed4！，obtaining a perfectly satis－ factory position，e．g． 17 b3 \＆b7 18

（c）instead of 18 De5，correct is 18 \＆e5．After 18．．．监g6 19 畨xg6 hxg6 20 \＆d6 \＆xd6 21 ※xd6 \＆a6 22 ＠xb6定xf1 23 Qxa8 定xg2 24 家xg2 Exa8 White retains a minimal advantage．
$11 \ldots$ ©d4

## 12 Qxd4

Not 12 當e4？on account of 12．．．0xf3＋13 gxf3 Qxf2．

$$
12 \ldots \quad \text { 䒼xd4 }
$$

13 Da3！
White is threatening 14 Qc2．Black is obliged to take the e5 pawn，but first he must exchange his important bishop．

But what if he plays $13 . . \unrhd x e 5 \mathrm{im}-$ mediately，and answers $14 \Xi \mathrm{dl}$ with

14．．． W g4？This variation is indeed ac－ ceptable for Black，but the whole point is that White has a much stronger move － 14 皿e 3 ！，and only after $14 \ldots$ ．．． e d6－ 15
 17 Eacl $0 x \mathrm{xc} 418$ Oxc4 0－0 19 a 5 ，or 15．．．珰c7 16 \＆f4 f6 17 घacl，in both cases with a great lead in development．

| 13 | $\ldots$ | ＠xa3 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 14 | Exa3 | Oxe5 |



White has more than sufficient com－ pensation for the sacrificed pawn．His main trump is his dark－square bishop， which only needs to reach the a3－f8 di－ agonal．and Black will have to reckon with dangerous threats．However，to find the strongest continuation is far from simple．

$$
15 \text { b3 }
$$

This was played by Botvinnik in the afore－mentioned game with Petrosian．

Other ways of continuing the attack：
15 d1，and now：
（a） $15 \ldots$ 峟xc4 16 㥪xe5，and Black experiences difficulties，e．g．16．．．0－0 17
 or 16．．．f6 17 临h5＋g6 18 Wh；
（b）15．．．${ }^{\boldsymbol{w}} \mathrm{g} 4$（recommended by Aro－ nin） 16 监d2（the best reply； 16 f 3 湅5 deprives White＇s queen＇s rook of the
third rank）16．．．0－0 17 是e2 蒋f5．White has the initiative，but it is not clear if it compensates for the pawn．

15 ＠a2（recommended by Keres）． Here too White has the initiative：after 15．．． 0 g 616 是e3（aiming for c5）16．．．龟f6（16．．．峟b4 is dangerous： 17 Ecl b6
全d4 f6 20 全xe5 fxe5 21 Eel he has the advantage in the ending．

15 ac3（recommended by Matan－ ovic）．Black should probably reply $15 \ldots 0-0$ ，and if $16 \pm d 1{ }^{ \pm} \mathrm{g} 4$ ．

$$
15 \text {... 畨c5 }
$$

15．．．Oxc4 16 bxc4 allows White＇s queen＇s rook to take part in the attack． The following spectacular variation by Bronstein demonstrates just how dangerous Black＇s position is： $16 \ldots 0-0$



In reply to 15 ．．． 0 g6 Smyslov sug－ gests a pretty variation： 16 \＆b2 畒d6 17
 \＆e7（if 19．．．axb5 20 㯰xb5＋©e7 21
 Black cannot avoid mate．

15．．．f6 is also not good in view of 16
造xe5 fxe5 20 当xe5 0－0 21 Ea2！

## 16 玉a2

The rook vacates a3 for the bishop．
If the bishop is immediately included in the attack by 16 ＠b2，Black should play $16 \ldots$ ．．．xc4（on 16．．．f6 White at－
憎e3） 17 bxc4 是d7！（Black prepares queenside castling；17．．．0－0 fails to 18 Eg3 f6 19 \＆a3，and 17．．．f6 is weak on account of 18 gisf 19 dil）．There can follow 18 Eg3 0－0－0 19 モxg7 ${ }^{\mathbf{w}} \mathrm{f} 5$ with double－edged play．

After 16 b4（suggested by the Dutch player Wolthuis）Black defends by 16．．．临xc4 17 当xe5 0－0：



（b） 18 Edl f6 19 \＃c3 fxe5（although it looks dangerous，19．．．㗬xb4 20 蒌c7 e5 21 \＃g3 ${ }^{\text {eg } 4} 4$ is also possible） 20

 $26 \pm x g 7+{ }^{\circ} 8$ ．After White parries the mate threat，Black can offer an ending with opposite－colour bishops by 27 ．．．』d7．

| 16 | $\ldots$ | Oxc4 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 17 | bxc4 | 具d7 |
| 18 | \＆a3 | Wf5 |



It is well known that with opposite－ colour bishops an attack gains in strength．White must aim to coordinate his queen with his bishop，and with this aim $19{ }_{6} \mathrm{~b} 2$ and 19 d 2 should be studied．

Botvinnik continued 19 ．After 19．．．\＆ \＆ 6 （Black has no time to take the a4 pawn） 20 Eैel h5！ 21 We3（White was threatening both 22 wiv6 and 23
 21．．．f6！（now the sacrifice on d 5 does not work，since the black king can go to g6）Petrosian，by giving up his e6 pawn， obtained slightly the better ending（the a4 and c4 pawns are weak）．
3.1122 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 60.0 a6 7 a4 ©c6 8 䒼e2 莤e7）

$$
9 \Xi \mathrm{~d} 1
$$

White continues his development．in－ viting the opponent to exchange on dt ， or else he himself will take on c5 later．

9
w ${ }^{6}$
9．．．cxd4 leads to variations examined earlier．
$9 . .0-0$ is also played，leading after 100 c 3 to the main variation．The con－ tinuation 10 dxc 5 w 711 b 3 is of inde－ pendent significance．Exploiting White＇s delay in developing his queen＇s knight， Black can try to seize space on the kingside with 11．．．e5！Pr．Nikolic－Seira－ wan（Skelleftea 1989）went 12 Qc3 e4 13 Qd2 \＆g4 14 f 3 exf 315 gxf 3 定 h 5

 Exc4 f5 22 乌f2 ${ }^{\circ} \mathrm{f} 723 \Xi \mathrm{cc} 1 \Xi \mathrm{fe} 824$ Qd3 $\sum_{\text {ebb3 }}$ when Black regained his pawn，and both sides had chances．

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
10 & \text { Qc3 } & 0-0 \\
11 & \text { b3 }
\end{array}
$$

After 11 h 3 Black has three replies：

（a） $11 \ldots$ ．． d 8 ，and now：
（al） 12 b 3 是d7 13 \＆b2 是e8（13 $\ldots$ cxd4 14 exd4 9 b4 is bad in view of 15


18 当g5） 14 d 5 exd5 15 显xd5 Qd4！ 16
 19 岩g4 宣g6 with equal chances（Bot－ vinnik－Keres，Moscow／Leningrad 1941）；
（a3） 12 d 5 exd5 13 \＆xd5 9 b 414 e 4 Qfxd5，and now：
（a31） 15 exd5 \＆f5 16 \＆f4 学xf4 17削xe7（Reshevsky－Fine，Semmering－ Baden 1937），when Black could have gained a satisfactory position by $17 \ldots$ §xh3，e．g． 18 Øe2（18 气e1 Еe8 19
 or 18 出xc5 宸g4 19 Qel Qc2！）18．．．膤g4 19 Qg3 $0 x d 520$ 自xb7 桜c8 21道xc8 \＆xc8 22 De4c4（Fine）；
（a32） 15 Qxd5 $\triangleq x d 516$ exd5 Qf5 17 a5 定d6 18 是e3 ※e8 19 乌d2 是d7
 with somewhat the better prospects for White（Langeweg－Filip，Beverwijk 1966）；
（b） $11 \ldots$ b6 12 d 5 exd5 13 \＆xd5 \＆b7 14 e4 玉ad8 15 ㅇe3（Eliskases－Reshev－ sky，Semmering－Baden 1937），and now $15 \ldots$ Qb4 would have given Black roughly equal chances；
（c） $11 \ldots$ ． 1712 d 5 exd5 13 \＆xd5
 き̈xd8（16．．．\＆xd8 was essential） 17 Qg5最e8 18 e5 Dfd5（18．．．Qd7 19 Qxf7！） 19 e6 White gained the advantage （Pr．Nikolic－Skembris，Kavalla 1985）．

11 \＆d2：



 Kholmov，Moscow 1947）with equal chances；
（b） $11 \ldots$ de 12 \＆el！，and now：
（b1） $12 \ldots \mathrm{cxd} 4 \quad 13$ exd4 $\& \mathrm{ed} 7$（13．．． Qb4 14 玉acl and then 0 e 5 is prom－ ising for White） 14 Eacl 昷e8 15 d 5 exd5 16 Qxd5 0xd5 17 \＆xd5 \＆f6 18 b4 with the initiative（Vyzhmanavin－ Chekhov（USSR 1986）；
（b2） $12 \ldots$ ． d 713 d 5 exd 514 分d5 Qxd5 15 \＆xd5 宜g4（15．．．Qb4 is poor in view of 16 exb4 and 17 Mac1；after
 18 Eabl iff6 19 a5 White has the more active position－Foisor） 16 We4 害h5 17 Sc3 again with the initiative for White（Foisor－Anand，Moscow 1987）．

11 d 5 exd5，and now：
（a） 12 0xd5 $0 x \mathrm{~d} 513$ 会xd5．This seemingly unpretentious exchange is not in fact so harmless．White＇s plan is e3－e4，\＆e3， sure on c5：

（a1）13．．．显f6（13．．．⿹b4 14 \＆ e 4 ） 14 h3（if 14 e4 \＆g4；weak is 14 Qd2？
 the advantage is with Black，Plachetka－ Mikhalchishin，Trnava 1988）14．．．Qb4 （14．．．玉e8！？） 15 e4 $0 x \mathrm{x} 516 \mathrm{exd5}$ \＆f5

17 Se3 $\begin{gathered}\text { Eac8 } \\ 18 \\ \text { as } \\ \text { Efe8 } \\ 19 \\ \text { d6 } 6\end{gathered}$ with advantage to White（Doroshkevich－ Rashkovsky，Tbilisi 1974）；
（a2）13．．．今g4 14 h3 定h5 15 b3 定f6
 Ead8 19 ᄋe2 b6 with an equal position （Petrosian－Tal，Yerevan 1982）；
（b） 12 是xd5 ${ }^{2} g 4$（ $12 \ldots$ b4 also comes into consideration－Zilberman） 13 h3 宜h5 14 显xc6 显xc6 15 e4 Ead8 16 造f fe 8 and White achieves little （Zilberman－Chekhov，USSR 1984）．

11 e4：

（a） $11 \ldots \mathrm{cxd} 412 \quad 0 x d 4 \quad 0 x d 413$
 Qd5 Qxd5 17 金xd5 昷e6 18 是xe6 fxe6 with somewhat the better chances for White（Huzman，Weinerman）；
（b） $11 \ldots . \mathrm{g} 412$ e5（12 d5 loses to 12．．．$勹 d 4$ ！）12．．．cxd4 13 Qxd4 Qgxe5 （13．．． Qcxe5 $^{2}$ is weak on account of 14
 Qxc6 Qxc6 16 Eacl．White has com－ pensation for the pawn in the form of his superior development（Serebryanik－ Weinerman，USSR 1989）．

The exchange on c 5 is not dangerous for Black： 11 dxc5＠xc5 12 h3（12 e4 Qg4！）12．．．e5（or 12．．．＠e5－Botvinnik） 13 e4 Qd4 14 Qxd4 exd4 15 Qd5 Qxd5 16 显xd5 定e6 with an equal position（Kmoch－Euwe，Delft 1940）．


## 11 ．．．定d7

11．．．b6 comes into consideration． The modern game Pinter－Ehlvest （Zagreb 1987）continued 12 昷b2 全b7 13 acl （after 13 d 5 exd5 14 Qxd5 Qxd5 15 是xd5 Ead8 16 暑c4 Qa5 17
 position is equal； 16 e4 needs testing－ Yusupov）13．．．Efd8 14 h 3 Da5 15 亿e5 Qc6 16 分bl Qxe5 17 dxe 5 宸 618 f 3
 complicated and double－edged position．

Other continuations：
11．．．cxd4 12 exd4，and now：
（a） $12 \ldots$ ．． b 413 \＆ b 2 \＆ d 7 ？（ $13 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 6$ and ．．．＠b7 was necessary） 14 d 5 ！exd5
 Black resigns（Gligoric－Miagmasuren， Havana Olympiad 1966）；
（b）12．．＠a5 13 \＆b2（13 气g5？ Qxb3）13．．．ed7 14 Qe5（after 14 d5 Oxc4 15 bxc4 ${ }^{\text {afe }} 8$ Black maintains the balance） 14 ．．． Dxc4 $^{2} 15$ bxc4 4 fe8 16 \＆a3（or 16 Ed3 followed by f2－f4，芭f1 and $\Xi g 3$ ） $16 \ldots$ ．．．c6 17 h 3 （ 17 f 3 is also good）17．．．㯰a5 18 显xe7 Exe7 19 峟d2 Eee8 20 c 5 ！Ead8（Pinter－Anand， Barcelona 1993）．Here 21 Qc4！and if 21．．．嘗c7 22 Qd6 シe7 23 曾e3 would have led to an advantage for White．

11．．．勹a5 12 d 5 exd5 13 Qxd5 0 xd 5
 with some initiative for White．

11．．．Ed8 comes into consideration．

## 12 \＆b2

Botvinnik－Euwe（Groningen 1946） now continued 12．．．玉ac8（in Botvin－ nik＇s opinion，12．．．ffd8 was preferable） 13 d5！exd5 14 Qxd5 $0 x d 515$ 定xd5
 （ 16 h 3 宜h5 17 g 4 是g6 18 h 4 came into consideration）16．．． $\mathrm{e}_{\mathrm{e}} \mathrm{h} 517$ \＆xc6（now 17 g 4 \＆g6 18 h 4 would have given Black counterplay after 18．．．h5）17．．．
 by Botvinnik，by continuing 19．．．b5 Black could have driven the queen from its active position and counted on a successful defence．

After 12．．．cxd4 13 exd4 Qa5 14 Qe5 Dxc4 15 bxc4 是d6 16 Wh White has prospects of an attack on the kingside （Jimenez－Pena，Equador 1969）．

If $12 \ldots \Xi a d 8$ ，then：
类f4（15．．． 0 b 4 was preferable） 16 d 5 exd5 17 Qxd5 Qxd5 18 定xd5 \＆f6
气a3 シfe8 21 घe4 シxe4 22 气xe4，and Black ended up in a difficult position （Minev－Pantaleev，Bulgaria 1967）；
（b） 13 d5 exd5 14 Qxd5 Qxd5 15定xd5 昷g4 16 㘳c4 皿h5（after 16．．．

 22 f 4 Og 623 Eacl White has the advantage，Uhlmann－Hennings，East Germany 1968） $17 \Xi \mathrm{acl}$ ，with the better position for White．

> 3.113 (1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 Qf64 e3 e6 5 皿xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 a4Qc6 8 岲e2)

The prelude to a harmonious scheme of development：．．．这d6，．．．0－0 and ．．．e6－e5，or ．．．b7－b6 and ．．．${ }^{\text {eb }} \mathrm{b} 7$ ．


## 9 Dc3

In Speelman－Hübner（Barcelona 1989）White employed the rather origi－ nal manoeuvre 9 \＆ d 2 \＆ d 610 dxc 5定xc5 11 \＆ e 3 ．After $11 \ldots 0-012$ Qbd2 e5 13 【acl定g4 16 h 3 \＆ e 717 Qc4 是e6 a series of exchanges 18 Qcxe5 \＆xa2 19 Qxc6寝xe4（if 19．．．bxc6 20 \＆xf6 憎xf6 21 Exc5，or $20 \ldots$ gxf6 21 b4） 20 监xe4 Qxe4 21 \＆ b 4 g fc 8 led to considerable simplification and a draw．

$$
9 \text {... \& \& d6 }
$$

9．．．定e7 10 dl（the position after 10 dxc5 $\mathrm{exc5}$ is analysed in the notes to Black＇s next move） $10 \ldots 0-0$ is also played：
（a） 11 b3 b6 12 \＆b2 \＆b7 13 ⿷acl Efd8 14 h3 Da5 15 Qe5 Qc6 with a good game for Black（a position from Pinter－Ehlvest，mentioned on p．75，has been reached by a slight transposition）；
（b） $11 \mathrm{~h} 3 \underset{\triangle}{ } \mathrm{~d} 812 \mathrm{dxc} 5 \Xi \mathrm{xd} 1+13$

 19 \＆el Qh5！with the initiative （Fahnenschmidt－Ribli，Germany 1991）．

## 10 Еّd1

Other possibilities：
10 d 5 exd5 11 \＆xd5 0－0 12 h 3 \＆d7 13 e4 ©d4 14 甾d3 ©xf3＋ 15 崽xf3玉ab8 16 a5 ${ }^{\text {anfe8 }}$ with a satisfactory position for Black（Vistaneckis－Novo－ pashin，USSR Ch．1／2－Final 1960）．

10 \＆d2 0－0 11 d 5 ，and now：
（a）11．．．exd5 12 Qxd5 $0 x d 513$是xd5 昷g4（after 13．．． 2 e5 14 Qxe5 \＆xe5 15 f 4 ！是xb2 16 Eabl White has good compensation for the pawn， Miles－Ye Rongguang，Beijing 1991；if
 e4－e5） 14 h3 宜h5 15 宜c3，and White＇s position is preferable；
（b）11．．ゆe5 12 Qxe5 定xe5 13 f 4是xc3 14 是xc3 0xd5 15 是e5 with compensation for the pawn（Miles）．

10 b3 0－0 11 昷b2 cxd4 12 exd4：

（a） $12 \ldots$ e5 13 Qe4（13 dxe5 Qxe5 leads to equality；if 13 d 5 Qd 4 ） $13 \ldots$ Qxe4 14 当xe4 exd4（14．．． $0 x d 4$ ？is a blunder，since after 15 Qxd4 exd4 16對xd4 Black has no way of defending g7）．In Gligoric－Radulov（Ljubljana／ Portoroz 1973）White gained an active position，but he was unable to increase the pressure： $15 \cong$ adl（Gligoric suggests $15 \underset{=}{⿷ 匚}$
公xd4 \＆ d 7 ，and Black equalised；
（b）12．．．〇a5 13 （the only way for White to avoid the exchange of his bishop is by the risky pawn sacrifice 13


 slightly better（Van der Sterren－Hübner， Wijk aan Zee 1988）．If 17 Efel f6， planning ．．．a6－a5 and ．．．b7－b6（Hübner）． 10 dxc5 \＆ ex 5 ：

（a） 11 e4 Qg4！ 12 g 3 （12．．．Qd4 was threatened） $12 \ldots 0-013$＠f4 e5，and now：
（a1） 14 Qd5 wivd 15 显d2 Qf6 16 b4 Qd4（Sahovic－Adamski，Vrnjacka Banja 1985，and Dizdar－Pr．Nikolic，Sarajevo 1987，went 16．．．©xb4 17 食xb4 定xb4 18 ©xb4 對xb4 19 ©xe5，and now Black should have played 19．．．We7 followed by ．．．鸟e6） 17 WId3 Qxf3＋ 18
 gxf6 with an equal game（Dizdar）；
（a2） 14 \＆g5 h6 15 Qd5 㟶d6 16
 Wd3 Efd8（stronger than 19．．．0xd5？！ 20 是xd5 玉fd8 21 b5 Qe7 22 食b4， when White has the initiative，Pr． Nikolic－Hübner，Wijk aan Zee 1988） 20 b5 axb5 21 axb5 Qe7 22 食b4 食c5 23
是e6，and Black restored material equality（Sarno－I．in Ta，Novi Sad Olympiad 1990）；
（b） 11 b3 0－0 12 \＆b2 b6 13 Qg5食b714 Dce4 Qxe4 15 Dxe4 Qe5 16
 We7 and Black equalises（Planinc－ Radulov，Amsterdam 1973）；
（c） 11 ㅇd3 e5（Black can avoid this and continue his development－cf．the
 $0-014 \Xi a c \mid$ 峟b8 $15 \pm \mathrm{fdl}$ with the in－ itiative for White（Garcia Martinez－ Barczay，Havana 1960）．

10 \＆d3 0－0（Lin Ta suggests $10 \ldots$重d7 immediately） 11 dxc 5 会xc5 12 Qe4（12 e4 Qd7）12．．．Se7（or 12．．． Qxe4 13 \＆xe4 Qe5 14 \＆d2 with $a$ good game for White） 13 b3 Qd5 14
 （better 16．．．』ac8） 17 a5 自a7（17．．．
 with attacking chances（Lin Weiguo－ Lin Ta，China 1989）．

$$
10 \ldots \quad 0-0
$$

If Black is aiming for the set－up with ．．．e6－e5，it is advisable to castle first．On the immediate $10 \ldots$ ．．．e5 White continues 11 Qd5！©xd5 12 \＆xd5 0－0（12．．． Eg 4 is weak in view of 13 dxc5 \＆xc5 14對c4！） 13 dxe5（White can also consider 13 dxc 5 是xc5 14 㟶c4！，and if $14 \ldots 9 \mathrm{a} 5$ 15 皆h4）13．．．©xe5 14 Qxe5 是xe5 15 f4 \＆ $\mathrm{f} 616{ }_{\mathrm{a}}^{\mathrm{a}}$ ！with the better pros－ pects（Gheorghiu－Radulov，Forssa－ Helsinki 1972）．

$$
11 \mathrm{~h} 3 \text { e5 }
$$

Other continuations：
11．．．b6，when White has：
（a） 12 d 5 ，and now：
（al）12．．．®a5 13 dxe6 是xe6（13．．． Qxc4 is totally unsatisfactory in view
 fxe6 $15 \Omega \mathrm{~g} 5$ with the better game；
（a2） $12 \ldots$ exd5 13 \＆xd5（leads to in－ teresting events；after 13 Qxd5 $0 x d 5$ 14 \＆$x d 5$ \＆$b 7$ the game is level，Holm－ Radulov，Hamburg 1974）13．．．皿b7
（after 13．．．$勹 x d 5140 x d 5$ and $150 x b 6$ Black loses a pawn） 14 e4 घae8，when：
（a21） 15 酉e3 是f4 16 a5（first 16 $\pm$ acl should be considered，covering c2 and putting pressure on the c5 pawn， Janjgava－Sadler，Yerevan Olympiad 1996）16．．．©xe3（16．．． $0 \times 17$ 是xf4

传xf2 䊑xb6 19 Qa4 White＇s position is

 21 Qf5 是xe4！ 22 §d6 \＃e6 23 Qxe4f5 with a roughly equal heavy piece end－ ing（Sadler）；
（a22） 15 \＆g5 Qd4！？（this move， employed several times by Radulov，is a bold prelude to wild complications； 15．．．\＆e7 16 e 5 \＆d8 is too passive） 16
 ※xe4 19 确 H 5 ，when Black has：
（a21）19．．．g6 20 ＠f6！！and wins；
（a22）19．．．』fe8 $20 \quad$ Qxg7 $\Xi 8 \mathrm{e} 5$
 \＆f6） 21 f 4 （note，however，the sugges－ tion by Lautier given below）21．．．Exf4



This line，where everything hangs by a thread，used to be considered favour－ able for White on the basis of Portisch－ Radulov（Nice Olympiad 1974），where after 23．．．f6（23．．．室xd6 24 这xf4）White

 25 凹xe5 fxe5 26 Qf5）．

Many years later，in Jacobi－Radulov （Hamburg 1984）to the surprise of his opponent Black repeated these moves， only in the diagram position he played 23．．．h6！This prepared move changed the picture in an instant，and after 24宸xh6（now White does not have 24 Eel．Black plays $24 \ldots \pm x g 5$ and after $25 \stackrel{\Xi}{\Xi} \mathrm{e} 8+$ moves his king to g7） $24 \ldots$ $\pm \mathrm{e}$ ！the Bulgarian GM＇s counterattack proved victorious；
（a23）19．．．f6（explaining why he re－ jected the seemingly favourable $19 \ldots$ Efe8，Lautier gives the stunning 20
 23 凹ّd3 when Black must resign） 20 \＆ e 6 fe8 21 是xg7？（correct is 210 xg 7 是h2＋

皿e3，when White has slightly the worse position with good drawing chances）， and now instead of $21 \ldots$ ．．．f7？（Morovic Fernandez－Lautier，Las Palmas 1994），


 advantage to Black；
（a3）12．．包e5 13 分xe5 是xe5 14
 （compared with the line 12．．．Da5 13 dxec 定xe6 14 食xe6 fxe6 15 宸c4 the knight at f has been exchanged，which is important for Black）16．．．崖c6
 19 』abl 全xc3 20 是xc3 b5 21 劏 44 ！ with the more promising position （Karpov－Timman，Linares 1989）；
（b） 12 dxc 5 显xc5 13 e 4 comes seri－ ously into consideration：
（b1） $13 \ldots$ ．．．${ }^{\text {e } 5 ~(i f ~} 13 \ldots$ 是b7 14 e5） 14


㟶xc4 17 定d6 position for White；
（b2）13．．．＠d7 14 e5！？Qdxe5（or 14．．．2cxe5 15 定f4 2xf3－16曹xf
 0xf3＋（15．．．f6 16 \＃acl 曹e7 17 Qe4） 16 曾xf3（Raetsky－Golikov，Kecskemet 1991），and for the sacrificed pawn White has a substantial lead in devel－ opment（Raetsky，Vasilchenko）：
（b3）13．．．⿹h5！？ 14 定e3 Df4 15 峟d2
 Edcl 0 g 619 Dd2 Еab8 20 صc4 $D \mathrm{~d} 4$ 21 Eabl e5 with a good game for Black （Juswanto－Sadler，Yerevan Olympiad 1996）．

11．．．巴e8 12 dxc 5 量xc5 13 e 4 ：

（a）13．．．De5 14 \＆ 44 ！（a pawn sacrifice for a lead in development）

今d6 followed by e4－e5） 18 e5 ©d5 19 $\pm f 1$ with dangerous threats（Vyzhman－ avin－Kupreichik，Pinsk 1986）；
（b）13．．．乌d7 14 定a2 b6 15 e5． Qdxe5（after 15．．．全b7 16 盎f4 Qb4 17皿bl Ead8 18 h 4 followed by h4－h5 White has attacking chances without any loss of material），and now：
（bl） 16 \＆f4 f6 17 gacl with the in－ itiative for the sacrificed pawn （Lputian－Hübner，Rotterdam 1988）；


 to White（Lputian）．

（a）13．．．De5 is strongly met by 14定 $44.8 \mathrm{xf} 3+(14 \ldots$ ．．．d6 is bad in view of

 （Lukacs－Adamski，Naleczow 1985）， after which $17 . .$. xe 4 ？fails to 18 Qxe4

（b）13．．．©d6 14 ＠g5 ©e5 15 ■xd6！ Qxc4（if $15 \ldots$ ．．． W xd6 there can follow 16
 gxf6 19 莦xf6 喓xc4 20 Exd7，winning） 16 \＃d4 b5 17 e5 Qd5 18 ＠xd5 exd5 19 b3 with the better chances for White．


12 dxe5 Qxe5，and：
（a） 13 Qd5 $0 x d 514$ 显xd5 $0 x f 3+$
 with roughly equal chances（Mako－ gonov－Myasnikov，USSR 1963）；
（b） 13 Qxe5 是xe5 14 Qd5 $0 x d 515$ ＠xd5 \＆e6（15．．．g6 followed by ．．．＠g7 also comes into consideration） 16 \＆xe6 fxe6 17 f 4 \＆d6，and White has only a symbolic advantage，since in this case the isolated pawn is not a weakness （Nemeth－Buljovcic，Yugoslavia 1974）．
 Qd4 退5 15 Qd5） 14 是b2 是e6 15 Qd5 Qxd5 16 是xd5 是xd5 17 Exd5 Ead8 18 Eadl 是d6（after 18．．．e4 19
 22 Ee5 Black loses a pawn，Pinter－ Radulescu，Baile Herculane 1982） 19楝c4 \＆c7 20 e4，and White＇s control of d5 gives him the better position （Pancik－Radulov，Polanica Zdroj 1982）．

12 d 5 is best answered by $12 \ldots$ a 5 ．
3．12（1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 Qf3 Df6 4 e3 e6 5 風xc4 c5 6 0－0 a6 7 a4 Qc6）

$$
8 \text { © } 3
$$



8
＠e7
If $8 . . . c x d 4$ White can recapture with the knight－ $90 x d 4$ ！（ 9 exd4 leads to variation $3.2, \mathrm{p} .82$ ），and now：
（a） $9 . . .8 \mathrm{xd} 410$ exd4，when the ex－ change of knights denies Black the chance of exploiting the b4 square，and， more important，he is unable to prevent d4－d5，after which White＇s lead in de－ velopment tells，e．g．10．．．ᄋe7 11 d5 exd5 12 Qxd5 ©xd5 13 定xd5 0－0 14 UWf with advantage（Rubinstein－ Tartakower，Marienbad 1925）；
（b）9．．．${ }^{W}$ c． 7 10 0xc6 bxc6（10．．．跴xc6？ 11 \＆b5） 11 e 4 ，again with advantage to White；
（c） $9 \ldots$ ．．．d7 is probably best，and if


8．．．数c7 is possible：

（a） 9 we 2 leads to a position from the variation 60－0 a6 7 a4 Dc6 8 曹e2垍c790c3（p．76）；
（b） 9 d 5 exd5，and now：
（bl） 10 Qxd5 0 xd 511 粕xd5 是d6
 Qxc4 15 Ёd5（or 15 \＃d3 Qa5！ 16 \＆ d 2 c4） $15 \ldots$ b6 16 b3 Da5 $17 \quad \pm d 3 \mathrm{c} 4$ ， equalising（Uhlmann－Radulov，Hastings 1972／3）；
（b2） 10 \＆xd5，and if $10 \ldots$ \＆ d 611 b 3 followed by $\mathbf{~} \mathrm{b} 2$ with some initiative．

$$
9 \text { 娄e2 }
$$

Other possibilities：
9 dxc5 $\Psi x d l$（Black can avoid the simplification with 9 ．．．暑c7 followed by ．．．${ }^{\text {exc5}} 5$ ，which usually leads to the ear－ lier variation $60-0 \mathrm{a} 67 \mathrm{a} 4$ Qc6 8 断2
 10 Exdl exc5（as in many similar po－ sitions，Black has wasted a tempo on ．．．是e7xc5，but here White has weak－ ened his b4 square） 11 ㅇd2，and now：
（a）11．．．b6，when White has：
 Eacl 巴c8 15 Qe2 日c6（Smejkal－

Hübner，Rio de Janeiro 1979），when 16 a5 is not dangerous for Black，and the chances are equal；

 an equal game（Karpov－Hjartarson， Candidates Match，Seattle 1989）；
（b）11．．．©a5 12 是a2 b6 139 e 2 （the gambit idea 13 b4 是xb4 14 Qb5 axb5 15 \＆xb4 bxa4 16 घd $60-0$ is worth testing－Chernin）13．．．Dc6 14 a5 \＆b7 15 Еdcl（15 Еacl シd8）15．．．9d7 16 Qed4（Black also maintains the balance after 16 axb6 ${ }^{\circ} \mathrm{xb6} 17$ Qed4 Qxd4 18 Qxd4 Qf6！ 19 宜b4 Qd5！－Chernin） 16．．． $\mathrm{Sxd}^{17} 17$ ©xd4（17 exd4 气d6） 17．．．b5 18 dc2 e7 with an equal game （Smejkal－Chernin，Moscow 1989）．

9 d5 exd5 10 Qxd5 是g4（more in－ teresting than the simplifying $10 \ldots$ ．．．$x d 5$ 11 定xd5 ©b4） 11 Qxe7 挡xe7 12 b3 घ゙d8 13 䒼 c 2 定xf3 $14 \mathrm{gxf3}$ 当 e 515
 with chances for both sides（Kaem－ Lipnitsky，Kiev 1939）．

9 Qe5 cxd4 10 Qxc6 bxc6 11 exd 4 a5（ $11 \ldots 0-012$ a5） 12 曾f $f(12$ \＆ f 4 is possible，intending \＆ 5 ），and now：
（a）12．．．0－0 13 宜e3（if 13 waw
 16．．．2g4 or 16．．．昷d6）13．．．2d5 14 घacl ©a6 15 b3 曾b6 16 Qe4 シad8 （rather than 16．．．显xc4？！，Piket－ Pr．Nikolic，Wijk aan Zee 1993）with roughly equal chances）；
（b）12．．． W d7 13 \＆f4 \＆a6 14 b3 §d5
 （ 17 細xc4 also came into consideration） 17．．．0－0 18 Efdl，and White＇s position is slightly preferable（Skembris－ Chiburdanidze，Karditsa 1995）．

9 ．．．exd4
 positions examined earlier．

$$
10 \text { 玉d1 e5 }
$$

The eccentric 10．．．㟶a5 11 exd4 b5 has not justified itself． 12 \＆b3 0－0 13 d5！gave White the advantage after 13．．．b4 14 dxc6 bxc3 15 冎f4（Vaisman－ Gracun，Romania 1984）．
 favours White．

$$
12 \triangleq \mathrm{xd4}
$$

12 皿e3 is possible．After $12 \ldots 0-013$ Dxd4 曾c7 14 h3 White＇s position is somewhat freer．
12 娄 $5 \quad 0 \mathrm{xd} 4$

13 挡e3 0－0 14 Exd4 挡c7 15 岲f4
 equal position in Seirawan－Gheorghiu （Baden Baden 1981）．

$$
13
$$

## 楼d6！

After 13．．．0－0 14 Exd4 White stands better，e．g．14．．．㟶b6 15 \＆e3！\＆c5（15．．．

 ing） 16 Qe4！？是xd4（after 16．．．Qxe4 17 Exe4 \＆xe3 18 Exe3 White has the more active position） 17 §xd4 $\begin{aligned} & \boldsymbol{W} \text { d } 818\end{aligned}$巴dl 昷e6 19 あd3！with advantage to White（Gauglitz－Gelfand，Halle 1987）．

$$
\begin{array}{l|l}
14 & \text { 䨗xd6 } \\
15 & \text { Exd6 }
\end{array}
$$



Since the time of Vajda－P．Johner （Debrecen 1925）this position was con－ sidered absolutely equal after $15 . .$. ．ic5． Current practice and analysis shows that things are not so simple．Kir．Georgiev－ Semkov（Bulgaria 1985）continued 16

 active position for White．

After 15．．．宣e5 16 E゙h4 0－0（16．．．皿e6 followed by queenside castling should be considered） 17 \＆$f 4$ exf4（if $17 \ldots$ Ee8 $18 \Xi$ el Black is faced with neutralising White＇s slight lead in development） 18 きxf4 酋e6 18 食xe6
 better（Mikhalchishin）．

$\begin{array}{llll}7 & \ldots & \text { cxd4 } \\ 8 & \text { exd } 4 & \end{array}$
 does not give Black any problems （Hort－Buljovcic，Sombor 1968）．

$$
8 \ldots \text {... Qc6 }
$$

White has an isolated pawn，and he has played $\mathrm{a} 2-\mathrm{a} 4$ ，weakening the b 4 square．Nevertheless，factors such as the active placing of his pieces，the half－ open e－file and the outpost at e5 play a significant role．

$$
9 \Leftrightarrow c 3 \quad \text { \&e7 }
$$

9．．．Qb4 removes White＇s concerns over his d4 pawn．After 10 De5 \＆e7 （ $10 \ldots$ ．．． $\mathrm{Dbd}_{5}$ can be met by $11 \Omega \mathrm{Q} 5$ 会 7 12 \＆xf6 $\mathrm{Qxff}^{13} \mathrm{~d} 5$ ） $11 \mathrm{f4} 0-012$ we2 Black is behind in development．

Now White has：
10 \＆e3（3．21）
10 （g5（3．22）－p． 83
For 10 䒼e2，cf．the move order
 exd4（p．62）．
是xd5（if 12 峟xd5 是e6 13 曹xd8＋ Qxd8）12．．．0－0（or $12 \ldots$ ．． b 4 ） 13 ＠xc6 （ 13 §f4 should be considered，to an－ swer 13．．．\＆f6 with 14 \＆xc6 bxc6 15是e5）13．．．bxc6 14 当xd8 登xd8 15 包5 \＆ $\mathbf{Q} 7$（Gheorghiu suggests the pawn sacrifice 15．．．\＆f6 16 Qxc6 Ed5） 16 0xd7 $\Xi x d 7$ an equal ending was reached in Gheorghiu－Karpov（Dubai Olympiad 1986）．

| 3.21 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 帘xc4 c5 6 0－0 a6 7 a4 cxd4 8 exd4 Qc6 9 各c3 宜e7） |
| :---: |
|  |  |

10 \＆e3 0－0

11．．． 0 b4 12 De5 has also been played：


The dangers awaiting Black in this variation are demonstrated well by Spassky－Nikolaevsky（USSR Ch．1／2－ Final 1963）：12．．．b6（better 12．．．Qbd5， avoiding weakening the kingside） 13 f 4 Qfd5？！ 14 adi ${ }^{\text {ef }} 6$（measures should have been taken against f4－f5，by 14．．．g6 or even 14．．．f5） 15 乌e4 \＆b7 16 f5 exf5（16．．．Qxe3 was essential） 17
 fxe5 20 熄xe5，and White successfully concluded his attack：20．．．h6 21 yf6
当g4＋解7 725 Exh6＋！Black resigns．

| 12 | Ead1 | Qb4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 13 | Qe5 | ¢．b7 |
| 14 | f4 | Qbd5 |

14．．．g6 comes into consideration，and if 15 f5 exf5 16 㫡h6 Qbd5（16．．．巴e8？ 17 ©xf7） 17 \＆xf8 \＆xf8

```
15 f5
```



After 15．．．Qxe3 16 営xe3 exf5 17 Exf5 罾d6 18 鸴g3！White has good at－ tacking chances．

Lerner－Kharitonov（51st USSR Ch．， Lvov 1984）went 15．．．瞥d6 16 是g5 Qxc3 17 bxc3 Qe4（17．．．乌d5 18 是xd5
 Wg4＋© \＆xe7 当xe7 19 Wg4！Qf6 20 Wh3（20专g5！would have set Black more difficult problems），and now Black should have defended with $20 \ldots$ ． 1 d5， when after 21 ©d3 White stands better （Lerner）．

> 3.22 (1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 ※xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 a4cxd4 8 exd4 包6 9 Qc3 食e7)

| 10 | ®g5 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 11 | El |



11．．．0d5 12 是xe7（or 12 是xd5定xg5 13 是xc6 bxc6 14 Qe5 with ad－ vantage to White，Petran－Schulz，Hun－ gary 1983）12．．Dcxe7 13 wb3 Qf6 14 Eadl we7 15 De5 with the more active position for White（Timoshchenko－ Anikaev，USSR 1981）．
 now：

䊓a5 with roughly equal chances （Bertok－Geller，Bled 1961）；
（b） $12 \ldots$ ．．．c8 13 घad1 Qd5（13．．．Qb4 14 Qe5） 14 \＆xd5 是xg 15 气e4 \＆f6 16 d5！exd5 17 Qxd5（17 $\Xi x d 5$ was also possible）17．．．宜e6（17．．．䔰4？ 18 ※xh7＋） 18 Qf4 甾b6（18．．．管e7 19 Qxe6 fxe6 was the lesser evil） 19 Qxe6 fxe6 20 当d3 with advantage to White （Chekhov－Sveshnikov，Lvov 1983），and 20．．．g6？allowed a decisive bishop sacrifice．

11．．． D b 4 ，when White has：
（a） 12 w 3 （with the threat of 13是xf6）12．．．0c6（defending against the threat，Black in turn threatens to ex－ change the bishop and to attack the d 4
杽xc4 h6 16 ＠xf6 \＆xf6，and now：

（a1） 17 Qe4 17．．．\＆e7 18 Qe5 今d6 （ 19 d 5 was threatened） 19 m cl with the better chances for White（Antoshin－ Mascarinas，Frunze 1979）；
（a2） 17 Qe5 气d7 18 Qe4 日゙c8 19

 Eg6 25 閽xd7 with advantage to White （Gligoric－Buljovcic，Novi Sad 1976）．
（b） 12 Qe5 Qfd5 13 ＠d2（13 \＆xe7 Qxe7 14 wb3 can also be considered， and if $14 \ldots$ ．．．bc6 15 घad1）13．．．Qb6 14定b3（Pinter－Negulescu，Warsaw 1987）． The acceptance of the pawn sacrifice by 14．．．${ }^{\boldsymbol{E}} \mathrm{xd} 415$ a5 9 d 7 ？（15．．．96d5 16 Ea4！was the lesser evil） $16 \Xi \mathrm{~m}$ ！led to loss of material：16．．． 1 （c5 17 Qxd7 \＆xd718 Exb4！当xb4 19 Qd5．

If $11 . .$. What 5 White has a choice：
䦡e2 \＆e8 15 d 5 ！with advantage；
（b） 12 d5 exd5 13 ＠xf6 $\mathrm{exf6}^{14}$


 the idea of ．．．me8） 16 madl 昷e5 17 h 3 Qxf3 18 噃xf3 with a promising posi－ tion（Osnos－Anikaev，USSR 1963）．

11 ．．．b6 is weak in view of 12 d 5 ！
 15 wg5 with advantage to White （Tarjan－Buljovcic，Novi Sad 1975）．

## 4 Classical Variation： other 7th moves for White

| 1 | d 4 | d 5 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 2 | c 4 | dxc 4 |
| 3 | ＠f3 | $0 \mathrm{f6}$ |
| 4 | e 3 | e 6 |
| 5 | \＆xc4 | $\mathrm{c5}$ |
| 6 | $0-0$ | ab |

In this chapter we will consider the following：

7 亩b3（4．1）
7 昷d3（4．2）－p． 89
7 e4（4．3）－p． 92
7 b3（4．4）－p． 96
7 dxc5（4．5）－p． 97
7 Obd2（4．6）－p． 101
White also has 7 a 3 ，when a standard plan is to play dxc5，after ．．．exc5 to drive back the bishop with b2－b4，and then to continue developing with \＆b2 and Qd2－b3 or Qc3．But after 7．．．b5 play can also take a different direction：
（a） 8 \＆e2 cxd4 9 Qxd4（ 9 exd4皿b7）9．．．e5 10 Of3 皿d6 11 a 4 ！e4 （11．．．bxa4 is weak in view of 12 Qbd2 and ©c4） 12 Qd4 b4 13 Qd2 Wc7 14 h3 ©c6（Cvitan－Ye Rongguang（Bel－ grade 1988），and now 15 Qc4 \＆e7 would lead to a double－edged position；
（b） 8 皿a2 皿b7（8．．．cxd4 9 exd4 ${ }^{2}$ b7 10 Qc3 是e7 11 会g5 0－0 12 烸d3 Qbd7 13 Eadl leads to a position from the Steinitz Variation） 9 － 3 3 0 bd7 10 Eel！？（10 we2 wbs 11 घdl would be more normal）10．．．${ }^{(W)}$ b8 11 e4 cxd4 12 Qd5！？，when：
（bl）in Kozul－Sulava（Pula 1996）and Kozul－Ibragimov（Ljubljana 1996）Black stood worse after declining the sacrifice （12．．．今d6 13 气xf6＋gxf6 14 㥪xd4）；
（b2）critical is $12 \ldots$ exd5 13 exd5－
 （regaining the piece with $14 \mathrm{w} \mathrm{e} 20-0$ 15 Wxe7 घe8 16 湯b4 Exe1＋leaves White with nothing）14．．． 15 ©c6 \＆xc6 16 dxc6（analysis by Sale）．

4．1（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 ＠f3 Qf6 4 e 3
e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 $60-0 \mathrm{a} 6)$
7 臽b3


White withdraws his bishop to b3 in advance，intending to meet ．．．b7－b5 with the flank attack a2－a4．In contrast to the variation 7 粪e2 b5 8 \＆b3 \＆b7 9 a4， Black＇s queen＇s bishop is still at c8，and he is forced to weaken his pawn chain．

For example：7．．．b5 8 a4，and now：
（a）8．．．官b7 9 axb5 axb5 10 Еxa8 \＆xa8 11 e2（recommended by Rub－ levsky；Black is also in difficulties after 11 Qa3）11．．．Wb6（11．．．sc6 12 Qe5，or 11．．．c4 12 \＆c2 followed by b2－b3，and
in both cases White＇s positional pluses are evident） 12 dxc5 \＆xc5 13 ©c3，and Black faces serious problems；
（b）if $8 \ldots$ ．．．bxa4 White has the strong 9
定c6）（Rublevsky－Vaulin，Russia 1992）；
（c） $8 . . . \mathrm{b} 4$ ，when the white knight gains the convenient square c4．Lalic－ Sadler（England 1995）continued 9 Qbd2 宜b7 10 e4 cxd4（ $10 \ldots$. xe4 is dangerous in view of 11 Qxe4 \＆xe4 12
 $14 \Xi$ el with the threat of d4－d5，or $12 \ldots$
 e5 乌d5（Lalic considers 11．．．⿹fd7 to be relatively acceptable，although even then 12 Qc4 ©c5 13 最g5 紧c7－if here 13．．．f6 14 exf6 gxf6 15 Qe5！－ 14 $0 \mathrm{xd4}$ gives White the better prospects） 12 De4 \＆e7 13 宜g50－014 ©d6！with advantage to White；
（d） $8 . . . c 49$ \＆ c 2 ，and White is threat－ ening to break up the opponent＇s queenside by b2－b3．

Therefore Black should not be in a hurry to play ．．．b7－b5．

$$
7 \ldots \text { Dc6 }
$$

7．．．b6 was recommended by H．Muller．
7．．．cxd4 8 exd4 Qc6 9 Qc3＠e7 leads to the Steinitz Variation．

Yermolinsky－Jones（Las Vegas 1994） went 7．．．⿹bd7 8 e4！b5（if 8．．．Qxe4 there could have followed 9 घel Qd6 10 d5 e5 11 Qxe5 $0 x=512$ f4！） 9 e5 Qd5 10 \＆xd5 exd5 11 Qc3 Qb6 12昷g5 㟶d7 13 玉el c4 14 a 4 （the direct 14 e6 fxe6 15 Qe5 wiv7 16 wh5 g6 17
 unclear）14．．．b4？（after the strongest move 14 ．．．${ }^{\boldsymbol{W}} \mathrm{C}$ c6 White could try 15 as Qd7 16 Qh4） 15 a5 bxc3 16 bxc3 Eb 8 ？ （16．．．曾c6 was essential） 17 e6！fxe6 18 Qe5 c7 19 bl，and White gained a won position（analysis by Yermolinsky）．

8 e2

As in previous variations，White va－ cates dl for his rook．Then，according to circumstances，he intends dxc5 and e3－e4，or $£ \mathrm{c} 3$ and d4－d5．

Karpov－Gulko（Spain 1996）went 8 Qc3＠e7（this wastes a tempo，but 8．．． cxd4 9 exd4 a 510 显c2 宜e7，is more promising for White） 9 dxc5 㥪xdl （after 9．．．今xc5 10 We2 and e3－e4 White has the initiative） 10 Exdl 0 exc5 11宣d2 是d7（after 11．．．te7 12 』acl 是a7

 19 Qxe5 fxe5 20 f 4 ！White gained the advantage in Piskov－Relange，France 1994） 12 acl \＆a7（if 12．．．9a5 Kar－ pov was intending 13 Qb5！Qxb3 14
 which gave White the advantage in Malanyuk－Yakovich，Yerevan 1996） 13 \＆el 皃e7 14 ＠a4 b6，and now the original combination 15 芭xd7＋！新xd7 16 Qxb6＋！\＆xb6 17 最a4 left Black in difficulties（Karpov）．

## 8 ．．．cxd4

In view of the final evaluation of this variation，we should point out that Black can maintain the tension：8．．．${ }^{\mathbf{W} \text { c }} 7$ 9 Qc3 是d6 10 气d2 0－0 11 घacl b6 （after 11．．．cxd4 12 exd4 \＆f4 13 afd定d7 14 Qe4 勾5 15 Qc5 是xd2 16㪚xd2 घad8 17 是xd5 exd5 18 Qe5 White＇s knight is stronger than the bish－ op，A．Petrosian－Gulko，Tashkent 1984）

 17 \＆h4 \＆b7 18 』fdl，and in this advantageous position for White a draw was agreed in A．Rodriguez－Vera，Hav－ ana 1986 ； 13 Efd is also possible） $13 \ldots$ \＆b7 14 乌e4 定e7 15 Qxf6 \＆\＆$x 616$是 3 （if 16 皿e4 b5 followed by ．．．皆b6） 16．．．宜e4 貲e7，and Black equalised（Lange－ weg－Radulov，Amsterdam 1973）．

If 8 ．．．${ }^{\text {\＆}} \mathrm{e} 7$ ，then：
 0 O 3 with the better position for White；
（b） 9 घ゙dl 当c7 10 Qc3 0－0 11 乌d2 b6 12 』acl \＆b7 13 dxc 5 bxc 5 （or 13．．．显xc5 14 Qa4 是d6 15 \＆ e 3 ，as in the previous variation） 14 \＆ e 2（Lerner－ Garcia Palermo，Polanica Zdroj 1985） 14．．．Efd8 15 De4 with the better prospects for White（Lerner）．

8．．．b6 was tried in Lputian－Van Wely （Strasbourg 1994）．After 9 Edl 雷c7 10 Qc3 臽e7 11 d 5 exd5 12 皿xd5（if 12够5 ©xd5 13 อxd5 0－0 14 e4 是b7 followed by ．．．玉ad8）12．．． $0 x \mathrm{xd} 513$

 19 凹d2 \＆${ }^{\text {b }} 720$ Eadl b5 21 h 4 White had the initiative，but Black＇s position was defensible．

$$
9 \text { Edl Se7 }
$$



9．．．d3 10 Exd3 曹c7 11 Qc3 also comes into consideration：
（a）11．．．定d6 12 e4 气e5 13 Qxe5

罾a720 0e4 0－0 21 解hl，and for the sacrificed pawns White has attacking chances on the kingside（Yusupov－ Ivanchuk，Riga 1995）；
（b） $11 \ldots$ ． e c5，when：
（bl） 12 e4 Og4 13 Qdl Qd4！ 14 Qxd4 ©xd4 15 h3 h5 favours Black；
（b2） 12 a 3 0－0 13 ㅇd2 b5 14 Ecl犗b6 15 e4 0g4 16 Qd1 \＆b7 with chances for both sides（Piket－Lautier， Amsterdam 1995）；
（b3） $12 \mathrm{~h} 3 \mathrm{0}-0 \quad 13 \mathrm{e} 4$（planning e4－ e5，\＆f4 and De4）．Lalic－Hartman（Isle of Man 1995）continued 13．．．⿹d7 14皿e3 \＆xe3（if 14．．．b6 15 ＠a4） 15 對xe3 b6 16 Qa4 b5 17 Qc5 Qce5 18 Qxd7

 now 24 wh6！followed by h4－h5 would have given White the advantage；
（b4） 12 Qa4 是a7 13 ㅇd2，and now：
（b41）13．．．0－0 $14 \quad \Xi \mathrm{cl}$ e5 15 e4 （Salov－Waitzkin，New York 1996）15．．． Qg4 with a double－edged position；
（b422）13．．．b5 is an interesting gam－ bit variation： 14 घcl！Qe4（14．．．bxa4？
 17 \＆b4 眇b7 18 显xe6 fxe6（18．．．bxa4 19 気c6） 19 㟶h5＋g6（after 19．．．实f7 20 Wxf7＋xf7 21 Еxc6 bxa4 22 シd7＋ White doubles rooks on the 7th rank） 20


 with perpetual check（Salov）；
（c） $11 \ldots$ \＆e 712 e4 Qd7，when：
昷xc5 15 adl 0－0 16 e5 comes into consideration）14．．．0－0 15 Eacl $0 x b 3$ 16 axb 3 ，and with exact play Black managed to neutralise the pressure： $16 \ldots$ ロd8 17 Qa4 Exdl＋ 18 wivdl \＆d7 19
 （Topalov－Karpov，Las Palmas 1996）；
（c2） 13 Qd5！？exd5 14 exd5 Qc5 （seemingly best） $15 \mathrm{~d} 6 \quad$ 当 d 8 （ $15 \ldots$
 （Akopian－Volzin，Ubeda 1996） 18 \＆g5！（Akopian）．

## 10 exd4 Qa5

Now White does best to retreat his bishop，after which the typical break $\mathrm{d} 4-\mathrm{d} 5$ is no longer so dangerous．

Black suffered a crushing defeat in Filip－Konradi（Varna Olympiad 1962）： 10．．．0－0 11 ©c3 Qb4（here too 11．．． Qa5 is possible，whereas $11 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 5$ is dan－ gerous in view of 12 d 5 ；there is also 11．．．＠d5 with the idea of ．．．＠f6 and ．．．Dce7） 12 Qe5 Qbd5（now White switches his rook to the kingside；12．．． ©d7 was relatively best，planning ．．．

是h6 玉e8 16 h 4 \＆f8？（ $16 \ldots$ ．．．c6 was essential） 17 是g5 ${ }^{\boldsymbol{w} / \mathrm{c} 7 \text {（the bishop can }}$ no longer go back on account of 17．．．
定g719 \＆xd5，and Black resigned．

$$
11 \text { \&c2 b5 }
$$

The white bishop has left the a2－g8 diagonal（i．e．it is no longer trained on e6），and Black fianchettos his bishop．

## 12 © 3

Vaganian－Seirawan（Montpellier Can－ didates 1985）went 12 \＆g5＠b7 13
 16 是xb7 ©xb7 17 Qe4 ©d6 18 玉ac Qxe4 19 宸xe4 确b4 20 b3 घad8 21
 minimal advantage for White．

| 12 | $\ldots$ | \＆b7 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 13 | \＆g5 | $0-0$ |
| 14 | 乌e5 |  |

Another attacking possibility in－ volves a pawn sacrifice： $\mathbf{1 4}$ d5！？，and if $14 \ldots$ exd5 15 将d3 or 15 Dd4．14．．． Qxd5 is not good view of $15 \Xi x d 5$
 18 \＆xa5，when White has two minor pieces for a rook and a pawn．

In the 20th game of the Botvinnik－ Petrosian match，（Moscow 1963），with which this variation began，White
played 14 ■ac1，and after $14 \ldots$ ．．． $\mathbf{m} 815$ \＆b1 Qc4 16 Qe5 Qb6 17 清d3 g6 Black parried the attack．


14
Qd5
White was threatening not only to switch his rook to the kingside．Thus the plausible 14．．．Ex8 allows him to put Black＇s queenside under siege： 15 迬xf6
 17 Da4 曹xd4 18 mat Black has the tactical 18．．．巴xc2！）15．．．定xf6 16 定e4， with the idea of $e^{2} \times b 7,9 \mathrm{e} 4$ and $\mathrm{a} 2-\mathrm{a} 4$ ．

A slight improvement in this vari－ ation from the 60 s was made in Lerner－ Dokhoian（Kharkov 1985），where the prophylactic 14．．．g6 was played．After 15 是h6 \＃e8 16 a 3 Qh5 17 b 4 【c8！（in the game Black went wrong by

淠xc6 22 d5！，which gave White the advantage） 18 Qe4 Qc4 19 Qc5 \＆d5 （with the idea of ．．．今g5）both sides have chances（Dokhoian，Kishnev）．

## 15 \＆xe7

After 15 \＆d2 Black can play $15 \ldots$ Qxc3 $16 \mathrm{bxc} 3 \mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{E}} \mathrm{d} 5$ ，and if 17 f 3 f 5 ．

```
15 ... 潧xe7
```

16 Qe4

White＇s chances are better（analysis）．
4.2 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 Qf6 4 e 3 e65 昷xc4 c5 $60-0 \mathrm{a} 6$ ）

## 7 臽d3

A relatively new continuation．White is ready to meet 7 ．．．b5 with 8 a 4 ，or else 8 dxc 5 \＆xc5 9 e 4 ！

The position of the bishop on the bl－ h7 diagonal dictates a plan of active play on the kingside．However，the d4－d5 advance will not longer play such a role，as with the bishop at c4 or b3．

$$
7 \ldots \quad \text { exd4 }
$$

By isolating the central pawn，Black avoids the variation with the exchange on c5 followed by a2－a3，b2－b4 and \＆b2．Note that with the bishop at d3． dxc5 does not involve simplification．

Other possibilities：
7．．．Dc68 Dc3（White usually waits until the opponent develops his king＇s bishop），and now：
（a）8．．．8e79 dxc5 §xc5 $10 \mathrm{a} 30-0$ 11 b4 定d6 12 定b2：

（al）12．．．塹e7 13 De4 Dxe4 14 \＆xe4 e5（14．．．ed7 is not good in view

 17 乌d5＋© e 8（Eingorn－Dokhoian， Kharkov 1985），and here instead of 18 シ̈d2，when $18 \ldots e 4$ was possible，Black would have faced pressure after 18 e 4 ；
（a1）12．．．e5 13 Qe4 \＆ e c7 14 嘗c2 h6
 with advantage to White（Gavrilov－ Donchenko，Moscow 1989）；
（b） $8 . .$. 监c79a3：

（bl）9．．．8e7 10 dxc 5 宜xc5 11 b 4
 Qd5（Polugayevsky－Barlov，Haninge 1988；after 14．．．©xe4 15 定xe4 fol－ lowed by 0 d4 Black experiences diffi－ culties），and now 15 Qd4 would have been strong（Polugayevsky）；
（b2）9．．．b5 10 dxc 5 （otherwise Black may exchange on d4） $10 \ldots$ ．．．xc5 11 b4最e7 12 是b2 \＆b7 13 Qe4！White＇s position is better（Novikov－Sarvinsky， USSR 1988）；
（b3）9．．．b6 10 \＆d2（in Kasparov－ Kamsky，New York 1994，Black met 10 dxc5 with $10 \ldots$ bxc5，which permanently weakened his queenside pawns） 10．．．皿b711 日゙cl cxd4 12 exd4 皿e7 13 Qe4 曾d7 14 曾g5 Qd5（14．．．シd8 is sounder） 15 完bl！f6（after 15．．．宣xg5 16 Qexg5 h6 17 Qe4 0－0 18 De5 Qxe5 19 dxe5 White has the advantage） 16 是d2 0－0 $17 \underset{\Xi}{\Xi}$ el \＃ae8（M．Gure－ vich－Speelman，France 1994）and now 18 9c3 should have been considered．

7．．． 0 bd 7 ，and now：
（a） 8 a4（as the reader will already know，this is a logical reaction to the
development of the queen＇s knight at d7 ．－cf．the variation 6．．．a6 7 畨e2 Qbd7 8 a4，p．60）．Eingorn－Ehlvest（55th USSR Ch．，Moscow 1988）continued 8．．．b6 9
 Qc3 0－0（12．．．e5 is premature： 13 dxe5包e5 14 Qxe5 岩xe5 15 f 4 followed by e3－e4） 13 ㅇd2 ㅇd6 14 凹acl e5 15 \＆bl 部8 16 dxc 5 Qxc5 17 \＆ $\mathrm{a} 2(17$
 Qg5 $0 x g 520$ \＆xg5 e4 when a draw was agreed；
（b） 8 eve2，when Black has：
 b6 10 Eel（after 10 e4 cxd4 11 e5 Qd5
苃b7 Black has no problems）10．．．定b7 11 Qf1 \＆e7 12 \＆${ }^{2}$ d2 ©e4 13 上acl
 Qg3 \＆b7 17 e4 cxd4 18 显xd4
 Dortmund 1992） 21 Ëcdl with a promising position for White；
（b2）8．．．＠e7 9 ＠c3 0－0 10 dxc 5 Qxc5（10．．．exc5 11 e4） 11 定c2b5 12 e4！b4（12．．．定b7 13 Edl and e4－e5） 13
 15 b4 勾716 De5 数d5 17 是f4 White has compensation for the sacrificed pawn－Tukmakov） 14 De4 是b7 15 ※dl \＆d5 16 \＆f4，with somewhat the more promising position for White （Raetsky－Tukmakov，Bern 1995）；
（b3）8．．．b6 9 घdl 气b7 10 Qbd2 （Black answers 10 c3 with $10 \ldots$ 単b8， moving off the c－file in anticipation of \＆ d 2 and Eacl，with equal chances）
 ¥acl $\Xi$ fe8 14 e 4 with a favourable pos－ ition for White（Malanyuk－D．Prasad， Ubeda 1996）；
（c） 8 ell？is a promising idea， planning e4－e5，e．g．8．．．ee7（if 8．．．b5 9 a4！，weakening Black＇s queenside，or 8 ．．．cxd4 9 exd4 and the rook is well
placed at el） 9 e 4 cxd4 10 e5 ©d5 11 ©c4 ©c5（11．．．⿹7b6 12 气f1） 12 Qxd4 $0-0 \quad 13$ b3！？with the better chances （Gelfand－Lautier，Belgrade 1995）．
 transposes into the main line．A position from the Steinitz Variation has been reached with White＇s king＇s bishop at d3，which introduces certain corrections into the actions of the two sides．

After 8．．．g6？！（planning to fianchetto the king＇s bishop despite the associated weakening of the dark squares） 9 ©c3 ＠g7 10 ＠g5 h6（after 10．．．©c6 11 Qe4！Qe7 12 Qe5 White has pressure） 11 \＆h4 Qc6 12 \＆e4！Qe7（or 12．．．．0－0 13 \＆xc6 bxc6 14 Qe5，and Black＇s pawns are weakened） 13 §xf6 \＆xf6 14
 has problems developing his queenside （Lukacs，Hazai）．

## 9 Dc3

9 De5 is possible，when 9．．．b5？！ 10


$$
9 \ldots \quad 0-0
$$

In Karpov－Short（Linares 1995） White instructively exploited the prem－ ature 9．．．b5： 10 a4 b4 11 Qe4 昷b7 12
 13．．．Qxe4 14 是xe4 定xe4 15 浱xe4寝d5 16 当xd5 exd5 17 气e5 gives White the better chances） 14 Qed2！（14 Qeg5 a5！）14．．．a5（14．．．Qd5 15 Qb3） 15 是b5 Qb6 16 Qb3 \＆ 1517 Qc5 Qbd7 18 昷e3 E゙a7 19 Øe5！Black has a cramped and inferior position（Karpov）．

Moskalenko－Karolyi（Lvov 1988） went 9．．．Dc6 10 最g5 Qb4 11 Eel 0－0 （better 11．．． $0 x$ xd3 12 wivx 0 0－0） 12

 with advantage to White） 14 Qe5！Qd5 15 営f3 Qxc3 16 bxc3，and White gained the advantage．

## 10 \＆g5

Here too we must mention 10 De5：
（a） $10 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 5(10 \ldots$ ． Cc 611 Qxc6 favours
 ※adl 定b7 14 䩗3 g6 15 Efel b4 16 Qa4 今d5 17 ©c5 with a positional bind （Gelfand－Lautier，Cap d＇Agde 1994）；
（b）in order to solve his development problems，Black should try 10．．．乌d7， not being afraid to concede the two bishops（Dorfman）．

$$
10 \ldots \text {... } 0 \mathrm{c} 6
$$

$10 . . . \mathrm{b} 5$ is still premature：after 11 a 4 ！ bxa4（11．．．b4 12 Qbl 是b7 13 Qbd2 followed by Qc4 gives White a prom－ ising position） $120 x a 4$ the a 6 pawn is weak and White has a strong point at c5．Hjartarson－Korchnoi（match，Saint John 1988）continued 12．．．Qbd7 13



 Qc3 with a clear advantage．

$$
11 \Xi \mathrm{c} 1
$$




 16 Qb6 \＃cd8 17 ■c5 with the initiative （Gligoric－Marjanovic，Belgrade 1987）．

11．．．b6，when Dreev－Chekhov（Prot－ vino 1982）continued 12 exf6（the unhurried 12 喽d2 and $E f d 1$ should also be considered）12．．．是xf6 13 De4（13是e4 定b7 14 d5 exd5 15 Qxd5 looks tempting，but according to Dreev $15 \ldots$ Ex8 enables Black gradually to neutralise the activity of the opponent＇s pieces；instead 16 曾b3 b5 $17 \pm \mathrm{fd} 1 \mathrm{can}$ be suggested）13．．．愠b7（if 13．．．今d7 strong is 14 Qxf6－曾xf6 15 食e4 玉ac8 16 曾d3 Qb4 17 㟶b3 with the threat of 18 a3） 14 ©xf6＋gxf6（even after 14．．．
 \＆xb7 Excl 18 嵝xc1 White stands better） 15 \＆e4 $\Xi c 816 \Xi c 3$ f5 17 Øg 5 ！荘xg5（17．．．h6？ 18 显xc6 芭xc6 19楼55！） 18 是xc6 曾e7 19 d 5 ！\＆xc6 20 dxc6，and White＇s passed pawn secures him the advantage（Dreev）．

11．．．炭d6 12 㟶d2（the pawn sacrifice
丵b6 is unclear） $12 \ldots$ ．．．d8 13 【fd1（13 ＠f4 e5！）．White stands better，and the exchanging operation $13 \ldots \varrho x d 4$ ？ 14
 シxd4 17 是xe7 e 5 （17．．．』d7 18 乌a4） 18 Qd5 \＆e6（18．．．\＆f5 19 \＆d6） 19 ©c7 gave White a clear advantage in the en－ ding（Eingorn－Seirawan，Zagreb 1987）．

11．．．峟a5 12 De4，and now：
（a）12．．．⿹xe4 13 全xe7 合xe7（if


 better chances for White；
（b） $12 \ldots$ ． 0 d 513 是xe7 9dxe7（ $13 \ldots$ Qcxe7 14 a3） 14 Ec5．Now 14．．．当xa2？ is bad in view of 15 Qc3！当xb2 16
 winning，but after 14．．．${ }^{\mathbf{W}} \mathrm{d} 8$ both sides have chances（Al．Khasin，Loginov）．

Seirawan＇s recommendation of 11．．． 0 d 5 was tested in Cvitan－Kharlov（Biel 1992）： 12 Qxd5 ©xg5！（after 12．．．exd5

13 是xe7 滥xe7 14 Eel White has a clear positional advantage） 13 Qxg5
当d8 16 宣xc6 挡xb6）15．．．g6 16 㟶c5曾d8 17 Ec4 \＆ e 7 with equal chances．

We should also mention another set－ up，typical of such positions：11．．Qb4
 15 新h 3 with the initiative for White （Vera－Borges Mateos，Cuba 1995）．

> | $4.3(1 \mathrm{~d} 4 \mathrm{~d} 52 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 43$ |
| :--- |
| e 65 f 5 f 3 f 64 e 46 |

## $\begin{array}{ll}7 & \text { e4 }\end{array}$

＇The modern interpretation of the Queen＇s Gambit by White is to advance his central pawns at the very first opportunity，even at the cost of sacri－ fices＇（Alekhine）．The sharp gambit move 7 e 4 ，introduced by Geller in 1958，is fully in accordance with this idea of the World Champion．

Black can reply：
7．．．0xe4（4．31）
7．．．cxd4（4．32）－p． 94
7．．．b5（4．33）－p． 95
4.31 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 ＠f3 $⿹ \mathrm{f} 64$ e3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 $60-0 \mathrm{a} 67 \mathrm{e} 4$ ）

In accepting the pawn，Black opens the e－file for the opponent and falls be－ hind in development．Now 8 El is possible，but White＇s main moves are：

8 遷 e （4．311）
8 d5（4．312）－p． 93
4.311 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 （f3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 回xc4c560－0a67e4 ©xe4）

## 8 当e2 Qf6

After 8．．．Qd6 9 dxc 5 Qxc4 10 荘xc4当c711b4 ©c6 12 ＠c3 White gained a
positional advantage in Geller－Kots （Ukrainian Ch．1958）．

After 8．．．f5？ 9 Qc3 Qxc3 10 bxc3 Black＇s position has many weaknesses．

$$
9 \quad \text { d5 }
$$

The prelude to an interesting bishop sacrifice，suggested by the Bulgarian master Pantaleev．

The alternative is $\mathbf{9}$ घd1：

 11 b4） 11 Oc3 0－0 12 会g5 㥒xc5 13 Eacl ©c6 14 \＆b3 当a5 15 Qe4！Dxe4
 development for the pawn（Kots－ Zurakhov，USSR Ch．1／2－Final 1958）；
（b） $9 \ldots . . \mathrm{b} 510 \mathrm{dxc} 5$ ？！（ 10 d 5 bxc 4 transposes into the main line）10．．． W c7
 Black keeps his extra pawn，and the bishop sacrifice made in Hije－Romanov （corr．1964）does not seem dangerous：


 Qxa8 寝xa8．

$$
9 \text {... b5 }
$$

It is extremely dangerous to take the second central pawn：9．．．0xd5 10 巴d1 \＆e711 Oc3 Qc6（or 11．．．0－0 12 是xd5 exd5 13 Qxd5 是d6 14 \＆ f 4 อै 815匂6＋gxf6 16 Exd6） 12 ©xd5 exd5 13宣xd5 是d714

| 10 | dxe6 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 11 | bxc4 |



The correctness of Pantaleev＇s idea depends on the evaluation of this posi－ tion．

 to a win for White．

11．．． $\begin{aligned} & \text { ש．} \\ & \text { c }\end{aligned}$ also loses in view of 12 exf7＋Coxf713（1）5＋

White also has a powerful attack af－
家 714 © 3 。

11．．．䒼b6 12 exf7＋ $6 x f 7$ is the critical line：

$130 \mathrm{~g} 5+$（this is clearer than 13電xc4＋analysed by Pantaleev）13．．．

多g6（if 13．．． 14 （Wx4＋最e6 15 Qxe6） 14 Ed5！，and Black is in trouble：
（a）the rook is immune：14．．． $2 x \mathrm{xd} 515$

 oth5 $200 \mathrm{~g} 3+$ ！and Black is mated） 16

 We5！with the threat of 218 f 7 mate；
（b）meanwhile a deadly check at c 2 is threatened，and if 14．．．今f5 15 Exf5 （15．．．${ }^{\text {叐xf5 }} 16 \mathrm{g4+}$ ）；


（d） $14 \ldots$＠g4 15 f3＠xd5（15．．．exf3
 $18 \mathrm{fxg} 4+$ 家xg4 19 㟶c8＋；
 Qxd5 17 皆 $55+$ ．

This analysis from the 1980s by the Russian player Buzin was successfully used by White in Trofimov－Metlyakhin （Kolontaevo 1994）．If Buzin＇s variations are not refuted，Black should definitely avoid taking the e4 pawn．
4.312 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 乌f6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 60－0 a6 7 e4 Qxe4）

8 d5

＇Leave well alone＇－the fate of this variation depends on the evaluation of the previous one．But such is the nature of chess：that which today is considered strongest may tomorrow be refuted by practice and analysis，and so it is worth devoting attention to this and other branches．

8．．．exd5 9 是xd5 Qd6（9．．．Df6？ 10
 11．．．〇f5 12 ＠e5 0．0 13 ＠xf7 シxf7 14
 change） 12 \＆f4，and White has a pow－ erful position for the sacrificed pawn．

8．．．⿹d6 9 dxe6 fxe6（not 9．．．⿹xc4？ 10 exf7＋；after 9．．．定xe6 10 显xe6 fxe6 11 Eel White has sufficient compensa－ tion for the pawn，although for Black this is probably the lesser evil） 10 ©d3 （or 10 是xe6 是xe6 11 घel with a strong attacking position，Zilberman－ Levin，USSR 1962）10．．．是e7 11 署c2 （11 Qe5 is also good）11．．．Qf5（if $11 \ldots$ g6 12 Edl！and Sh6） 12 Edl 缕c7 13 Qxf5！exf5 14 Qc3 §e6（15 Qd5 and \＆f4 was threatened） 15 区el §f7 16曾xf5 0－0 17 ＠f4 ㅇd6 18 Qg5 g6 19
 22 घadl！£xe6 23 Exe6 Black resigns （Klüger－Szily，Hungary 1959）；

8．．．b5．In this line too the play fa－ vours White： 9 dxe6 \＆xe6（bad is $9 . . . b x c 410$ exf7＋© 9．．．莦xdl 10 exf7＋ 10 Exdl bxc4

 8．．．皿e79 dxe6 \＆xe6，and now：
（a） 10 宸 $x d 8+$ 是xd8 11 亚xe6 fxe6 $12 \Xi \mathrm{el}$ Qf6 13 』g5（13 』xe6＋is worth trying）13．．．0－0 14 Qxe6 घe8 15 Qc3 Qbd7 16 \＆f4 \＆a5，and Neikirch－ Clarke（Leipzig Olympiad 1960）ended in a quick draw；
（b） 10 \＆xe6 宸xdl（it is unfavour－ able to leave the queens on） 11 Exdl
fxe6 12 el，and in contrast to Neikirch－Clarke，Black＇s bishop is at e7 rather than d 8 ，which favours White．
4.32 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 e65 \＆\＆xc4 c5 60－0 a67e4）

$$
7 \text {... cxd4 }
$$

Black declines the sacrifice．He can also do this with 7．．．9c6，e．g． 8 e 5 乌d7
 10．．．2xe5 fails to 11 \＆xd5） 9 Eel cxd4 10 \＆f4（paying no attention to the d 4 pawn，White supports his outpost at e5 and uses the e4 square to transfer his knight to the kingside，or in some cases to d6） $10 \ldots \mathrm{c} 511$ Qbd2 b5 12 是d3 是b7 13 Qe4 with an excellent position．

## 8 e5 Qfd7

## Or 8．．．Od5 9 膤xd4． <br> 9 曹xd4 Dc6

Vaisman－Novopashin（USSR 1968） went 9．．．嶪7 10 是f4 b5 11 是e2（11


凹adi） 16 国xb5
 \＆d6．Black has been prevented from castling，but it is not clear if White has sufficient compensation for the pawn．

$$
10 \text { We4 类c7 }
$$

11 \＆ 14
After supporting his e5 pawn，White counts on using his spatial advantage．

| 11 | $\cdots$ | $b 5$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 12 | §b3 | Qc5 |

This position was reached in Petros－ ian－Sherwin（Portoroz 1959），which continued 13 宸e2 $9 \times x 314$ axb3 是b7 15 Dc3 \＆e7 16 e4 0－0．If Black can play his knight to d 5 ，he will feel secure，but it is White to move，and by preventing ．．． $9 \mathrm{~b} 4-\mathrm{d} 5$ with $17 \mathrm{\Xi acl}$ ，he gains the better chances．


13 柞e3 should be considered．Com－ pared with the Petrosian－Sherwin game， after $13 \ldots$ ．．．xb3 14 axb 3 苌b7 15 Qc3 ＠e7 16 Qe4 Black is unable to castle： 16．．．0－0？ 17 Qf6＋！ofh8（of course，the knight cannot be taken） 180 g 5 ．
4.33 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆${ }^{\text {exc4 c5 } 60-0 ~ a 67 e 4) ~}$

$$
\begin{array}{llll}
7 & \cdots & b 5 \\
8 & \text { @d3 }
\end{array}
$$

After 8 昷b3 Black can take the pawn $-8 . . .9 x e 4$ ，and answer 9 d 5 with $9 . . . c 4$ ．

If 8 e5，then $8 . .$. bxc4 9 exf6 cxd4．

$$
8 \quad \ldots \text { §b7 }
$$

8．．． 0 e6 is weaker in view of 9 e5 Qd5 10 a 4 ．

But 8．．．cxd4 is possible－ 9 e5（ 9 Qxd4 全b7）9．．．2d5 10 a 4 ，and now：
（a）10．．．bxa4 11 梪xa4＋是d7 12
宣g714 亿c4 0－0 15 h 4 f 6 with chances for both sides（Lengyel－Gunnarsson， Vrnjacka Banja 1967）；
（b） $10 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 411$ Qbd2 \＆b7 12 Qe4 occurred in Solovyev－Liberzon（Mos－ cow 1964）：12．．．Qc6（better 12．．．Qd7， and if 13 \＆g5 㟶b8） 13 \＆g5（he should have prevented White＇s next move with

13．．． W a5）and by sacrificing a pawn White created strong threats on the a4－e8 diagonal： 14 a5！©xa5 15 峟a4＋ ©c6 16 \＃fll！

8．．．⿹bd7 is another possibility： 9 d5 Qb6（9．．．c4），or 9 e5 Qd5 10 Qc3 定b7．


## $9 \quad$ e5

Portisch－Petrosian（Stockholm 1962） continued 9 Eel cxd4（if $9 \ldots$ ．．．e7 10 dxc5 \＆xc5 11 定g5，threatening e4－e5） 10 a 4 ．This appears to put Black in a difficult position，but Petrosian man－ aged to maintain equality：10．．．bxa4！ 11 Exa4 $\sum \mathrm{fd} 7$（this forces White to take the pawn with the knight，since after 12 Exd4 ©c6 the rook comes under attack by the knights） 12 Qxd4 是e7 13 全c2 ©c6．White has no advantage．

Kasparov－Gulko（Kislovodsk 1982） went 9 皿g5 cxd4 10 亿xd4（weak is 10 e5 h6 11 §h4 g5 12 Oxg5 hxg5 13宣xg5 W W5，but 10 a4 comes into consideration）10．．．⿹bd711 Qc3 De5！ （after 11．．．气cs 12 Qbう §e7 13 当e2 or 11．．．今e7 12 曾e2 包 513 gadl White＇s position is preferable） 12 Ocxb5？ （against careful defence this dashing sacrifice does not achieve its aim； however，after the quiet 12 皿e2 \＆e7 or 12．．．\＆c5 13 Qb3 \＆b6 Black has a
good position）12．．． $0 x$ xd3 13 耖xd3 axb5 14 Efdl 是e7（14．．．是xe4 leads only to equality－ 15 \＆xf6 $\mathrm{exd}^{2} 16$宣xd8 Exd8 17 Exd3 ${ }^{\text {ect }} 5$ ；if $14 \ldots$ ．．． 15 是xf6 gxf6 16 0xe6！with an attack）


相xf6 22 』d4 \＆d6．Black＇s king is exposed，but there is nothing to attack it with，and meanwhile he is already two bishops up（Gulko）．

$$
9 \ldots \text { D } 5
$$

The alternative is 9．．．⿹fd7 10 ©c3 （after 10 ＠g 5 学b6 chances are roughly equal，Petrosian－Van Scheltinga，Bever－ wijk 1960；as in the main line 10 a 4 is worth considering） $10 \ldots$ cxd4 11 De4 with active prospects on the kingside．

$$
10 \quad 34
$$

White gains no advantage by 10 c3 Qxc3 11 bxc3 皿e7 12 a 4 b 413 dxc 5 bxc3 14 紧c2 ©d7 15 当xc3 Qxc5 16皿e2 0－0（Khodos－Tarasov，USSR 1961）．

Avrukh－Baburin（Groningen 1995） went 10 ＠g5 畄b6 11 dxc 5 ＠xc5 12 Oc3 h6 13 是h4 Qd7 14 a 4 ，when Black＇s simplest would have been 14．．． $0 x \mathrm{xc} 315 \mathrm{bxc} 30-016$ Eel 是c6 with roughly equal chances．

10
b4
10．．．bxa4 11 dxc5 \＆xc5 12 莦xa4＋ Qc6 13 宸g4 g6 14 Dbd2 leaves White with slightly the better prospects．

## 11 Qbd2 cxd4

We have already met this position under a different move order（cf．the notes to Black＇s 8th move）．We should add that after 12 bb3（12 ©e4，as in Solovyev－Liberzon，looks stronger）
 15 Qg5 $)^{2} 16$ Qxe6 fxe6 17 fxe3
 Geller－Keres（Bled 1961）White prefer－ red to restore material equality by 19
 of the pawns is lost），and $21 \ldots$ ．． we 22 モac1 寝xc5 23 Ёxc5 Ё8 24 Еxc8＋ \＆xc8 25 cl ${ }^{2}$ d7 led to a draw．

There is a more tense battle after 19 Efl，when White has compensation for the pawn．

## 4.4 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 乌f3 $9 f 64$ e3 e6 5 皿xc4 c5 6 0－0 a6）

## $7 \quad$ b3

A comparatively new，but by no means harmless move．


7．．．2c6 and now：
（a） 8 eb2 cxd4 9 分xd4 定d7（or $9 . .2 \mathrm{xd} 410$ \＆ xd 4 b5 11 \＆e2 \＆b7 12 a4 b4 13 Qd2 血e7 $140 \mathrm{c} 40-015 \mathrm{a} 5$
 cas Cordoba－Adams，Dos Hermanas 1995） 10 Qf3 \＆e7 11 Qbd2 0－0 12 Qg5 （ 12 薯bl is worth considering，threat－ ening by 13 Qg5 to provoke ．．．g7－g6－ Speelman）12．．．h6 13 Qge4 b5 14 ＠e2 Qb4 15 a3（or 15 Qxf6 ${ }^{\text {exf6 }} 16$
㥪xe2 with an equal position－Speel－

 equal chances（Chernin－Speelman， Subotica 1987）；
（b） 8 dxc5 憎xdl 9 Exdl 企xc5 10 \＆ b 2 ，when White＇s pieces are more actively placed：10．．．b5 11 \＆e2 \＆b7 12 a4，or $10 \ldots$ 察d7 11 Qbd2 的 712宣xf6＋gxf6 13 乌e4．

7．．．cxd4 8 公xd4 显d6（or 8．．．酉d7 9 \＆b2 Qc6 10 Qd2，Chekhov－L．B．Han－ sen，Germany 1996，10．．．定d6！ 11 莤e2
 Eac8 15 亿ct Q $_{\text {e }} 7$ with an equal game



 chances（Miles－Ivanchuk，Moscow 1990）．

7．．．b5 8 昷e2，and now：
（a）8．．．0bd7 9 \＆b2 定b7 10 a4 bxa4 11 Exa4（11 bxa4！？）11．．．曾e7 12 ＠bd2 Qb6 13 Ea5（13 Ea 1 is more natural， but White wants to put pressure on the a6 pawn）13．．．cxd4 14 ＠xd4 ©bd5 15
 Qfe5 Qfd5 with equal chances （Agdestein－Ehlvest，Belgrade 1989）；
（b）8．．．§b7 9 a4！bxa4（after 9．．．b4 10 是b2 followed by Qbd2－c4 White has a definite positional advantage） 10
 cxd4 13 ＠xd4 \＆b4（13．．．＠e7？ 14
 Qe4 0－0 17 峟bl 炭a8 18 Qg5！g6 （weaker is 18．．．⿹5f6 19 日dl h6 20 Qdxe6 hxg5 21 Qxg5！De4 22 ※xd7 Qxg5 23 室f5 ©e6 24 \＆ d 3 when White wins，or $20 \ldots$ ．．fxe6 21 ■xd7 hxg5 22
 we4！with a very dangerous initiative （Miles－Davidovic，Sydney 1991）．
$7 . . .0$ bd7 8 \＆b2 b6（8．．．© ${ }^{\text {e }}$ 7 would seem better，and only then ．．．b7－b6） 9 d5！exd5 10 是xd5 $\boxed{\boxed{E}}$ 7（if $10 \ldots .0 x d 5$ 11 茪xd5 $\Xi a 712 \Xi d l$ with advantage） 11 Qc3 昷e7 12 㟶c2 0－0（12．．．Oxd5 13 Qxd5 favours White：13．．．2f6 14 Qxe7 当xe7 15 乌e5 是b7 16 Efd $0-0$ 17 Dc4，13．．．ef6 14 峟e4＋，or $13 \ldots 0-0$

 h6（after 14．．．巴e8 15 פd5，14．．．⿹xe4 15 Qd5 or $14 \ldots$ 是b7 15 是xb7 㥪xb7 and 16 e 4 White has the advantage） 15 Ed2（15 a4 is also good），with the more promising position for White（Malan－ yuk－Hübner，Moscow Olympiad 1994）．
> 4.5 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 乌f6 4 e 3 e6 5 会xc4 c5 $60-0 \mathrm{a}$ ）

$$
7 \text { dxc5 }
$$



This simplifying move looks com－ pletely harmless．White himself offers the exchange of queens，and with a symmetrical pawn structure．Black can indeed obtain an equal game，but，as shown by the games examined below， this occurs by no means automatically．

Black has：
7．．．${ }^{\text {wixdx }}$（4．51）
7．．．8xc5（4．52）－p． 100
By 7．．．${ }^{\text {wid }} \mathbf{c} 7$ Black can avoid the ex－ change of queens：
（a） 8 㟶e2（possible is 8 b3 ${ }^{2} \times x 59$官b2 Qbd7 10 Qbd2 b5 11 \＆d3 \＆b7 $12 \Xi \mathrm{~m}$ ，Veingold－Pohla，USSR 1976） 8．．．典xc5 9 e 4 ，transposing into the Furman Variation（p．115）；
（b） 8 b4！？（the evaluation of $7 \ldots$ ．．． w c 7 depends on this unusual pawn sacrifice） 8．．．a5（after 8．．．b6 9 宣b2 bxc5 10 b5 White＇s position is the more promising）
 followed by 定b2 and $\mathrm{Eac}^{\mathrm{a}}$（Gligoric）．
4.51 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 0 f 64 e3 e6 5 \＆\＆xc4 c5 $60-0 \mathrm{a} 67$ dxc5）

| 7 | $\ldots$ | 渻xd1 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 8 | 玉xd1 | \＆xc5 |



This allows White to vary his plan in accordance with the opponent＇s actions．

Other continuations：
9 b3 थbd7 10 \＆b2 occurred several times in the Spassky－Fischer match （Sveti Stefan／Belgrade 1992）：

 14 f3（instead of this routine move， White should have considered 14 \＆e2 $0-015$ 昷f3 是xf3 16 gxf3）14．．．b5 15 §e2 \＆c5！ 16 家f1 皃e7 17 e 4 g 5 ！and Black took the initiative（4th game）；
（b） $10 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 511$ 显e2 是b7 12 Qbd2 and now：
（b1）12．．． 13 a4 bxa4 14 Exa4
 Qc5 17 \＆a3 with a great advantage for White） 16 Qe5，and White＇s position is preferable（6th game）；
（b2）12．．．0－0（dissatisfied with the previous game，Fischer introduces an

 （17．．．b4 18 Qc4 气́c7 19 气d4 would have given White some positional ad－ vantage，but 17．．．bxa4！ 18 Qc4 \＆b4 19 Qd3 a5 20 bxa4 是c6 21 al 县d5 would have secured Black a good game） 18 axb5 axb5 $19 \Xi \mathrm{\Xi c} 2$ घc7 with an equal position（14th game）．

9 a 3 ：

（a）9．．．b5 10 宜e2 \＆ l b 71 b 4 定e7（or 11．．．皿b6 12 宣b2 Qbd7 13 Qc3 0－0 14 Eacl afc8 with equality，Lilienthal－ Keres，Budapest Candidates 1950） 12
 Ivkov－Pr．Nikolic，Yugoslavia 1982） 14
 with an equal position（Flohr－Alekhine， Kemeri 1937）；
是e2 Qbd7 13 Qbd2 是b7 14 Qb3 Eac8 15 Qfd4（Dorfman－Lerner，Lvov 1981；or 15 Qa5 皿e4 16 ジdc1 e5 17皃fl h6，Andersson－Rodriguez，Moscow 1982），and after 15．．． bb $^{\text {White＇s }}$ chances of strengthening his position are minimal．

9 ©c3 b5 10 定 e 2 定b7 11 气d2 Qbd7 12 b4 是d6 13 a 4 bxa4 14 Qxa4 Qe4 with a roughly equal game （Angos－Lundin，Leipzig 1960）．
 12 Qc3 b5 13 感e2 定b7 14 a4 bxa4 15 Qxa4 【゙hb8 with equal chances（De Roj－Nei，Beverwijk 1964）．


Despite the symmetrical pawns and the quiet nature of the forthcoming play，accuracy is required of Black．

Bronstein－Spassky（Moscow 1964） took an instructive course：9．．．b5 10
\＆e2 \＆b7 11 Qb3 \＆e7（11．．．定b6 12是d2 ©c6 13 a4 bxa4 14 Exa4 0－0 15凹dal 气b8 16 乌a5 \＆xa5 17 \＆xa5 al－ lows White to create strong pressure on the a－pawn，Trifunovic－Bilek，Yugo－ slavia v．Hungary 1962） 12 Qa5！id5 13 \＆d2 Qc6（13．．．⿹bd7 14 Qd4 is good for White） 14 Qxc6 Sxc6 15 Dd4 \＆d5（15．．．eb7 16 a 4 is unpleasant for Black） 16 f 3 气c5 17 Qc2 （17．．．0－0！？） 18 宴fl Dd7 19 e4 金b7 20 a4 bxa4 21 Exa4 Ehc 22 定c3 f6，and now 23 Dd4！（intending ©b3）would have been very strong，when $23 \ldots$ ．．．d6
 26 全c4＋ Black has a difficult position．

Black was wrong to allow the enemy knight to become established at a5． $9 . . .0 \mathrm{c} 6$ prevents this：
（a） 10 a3 b5 11 皿e2 定b7 12 b4 全e7 13 \＆b2 0－0 14 Qb3 玉fd8 15 玉dc1 シac8 16 Qc5 是xc5 17 Exc5 Qd7 18 Ec2 Qe7 and the game has become equal（Trifunovic－Lundin，Helsinki Olympiad 1952）；
（b） 10 Qb3 金b6 11 요 2 요d7 12 シacl 鲳7 13 Qbd4 むhd8 14 Qxc6＋
 tage is minimal，and soon Black equal－ ised completely： 16 Qe5 \＆ 8 d5 17 显xd5 Exd5 18 日c4 日xdl＋ 19 日xdl 定c7 （Averbakh－Suetin，Moscow 1982）．
皿e713 是b2 包bd7 $14 \Xi \mathrm{ac} 1 \Xi \mathrm{fc} 815$ Qb3 Excl 16 Excl $\Xi \mathrm{E} 817$ Еxc8＋
 Qa5！Despite the limited material and symmetrical pawns，White＇s position is preferable（Spassky－Fischer，18th match game，Sveti Stefan／Belgrade 1992）．

9．．．$勹 \mathrm{bd} 710$ Qb3 皿e7 11 全d2 b6 12
 with an equal game（Gligoric－Keres， Bled 1961）．
电d2 Qc6 looks satisfactory．After 12 Qfd4 $\mathrm{Dxd}^{13}$ Qxd4 气d7 14 玉acl Ethc8 the game is equal（Gligoric－ Donner，match，Eersel 1968）．
4.52 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 乌f6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 60－0 a6 7 dxc5）

$$
7 \ldots \text { \&xc5 }
$$

It is not essential for Black himself to exchange the queens．

$$
8 \text { wd8+ }
$$

White gains no advantage by：
8 a3 0－0 9 b4 \＆e7 10 안2 b5 11 \＆e2 \＆b7 12 乌bd2 Qbd7（Uddenfeldt－ Petrosian，Nice Olympiad 1974）．

8 当e2 11 b4 \＆d6 12 \＆b2 Qg4 13 h 3 Qge5 14 Eacl ${ }^{\text {en }} 7$ with an equal game （Furman－Korchnoi，USSR 1965，and， by transposition，Gligoric－Portisch， Yugoslavia v．Hungary 1966）．

8 ．．．©xd8


The black king will feel fine at e 7 ．

$$
9 \text { Qbd2 }
$$

Other continuations：
$9 \mathrm{a3}$ ，and now：
（a） $9 \ldots$ ．．．b5 10 \＆e2 ${ }^{\text {eb } b 711 ~ b 4 ~ \& d 6 ~} 12$ \＆b2 ©e7 13 Qbd2 Qbd7 14 玉acl

Eac8 with equal chances（Najdorf－ Pilnik，Mar del Plata 1943，and，by a somewhat different move order，Csom－ Portisch，Palma de Mallorca 1971）；
 12 Qbd2（12 ©c3！？，Keres）12．．．むd8 13 Qd4 Qb6 14 \＆b3 id7 with equal chances（Rytov－Keres，Tallinn 1975）．

9 b3 b5（9．．．b6，9．．．Qbd7 and 9．．．de7 are also possible） 10 定 2 全b7 11 是b2 （\％） 7 ！

（a） 12 Qbd2 Ec 813 a 4 b 414 acl Qbd7 with an equal game（Pr．Nikolic－ Ljubojevic，Belgrade 1989）；
（b） 12 a 4 b 4 （after 12．．．bxa4 13 Exa4 Qbd7 14 Qbd2 £d6 15 Qc4 Qc5 16
是xc4 17 Exc4 a5 18 是c3 the advan－ tage is with White，who has appreciable pressure on the a－pawn） 13 a5！Qbd7 14 Qbd2 Eind8 15 Efcl（Spassky－ Hubner，Venice 1989）15．．． equal chances．

 Zc6 with an equal game（Letelier－Filip， Mar del Plata 1961）．

Let us return to 9 Qbd2．
定b6 13 是b2 显b7 14 ■ac1 ■ac8 15 Qb3 0 b 8 ，and a draw was soon agreed in Trifunovic－Petrosian（Bled 1961）．


9．．．むe7 10 b3 b6 11 \＆b2 \＆b7 12
 15 凹acl £． c 7 with equal chances （Shamkovich－Keres，29th USSR Ch．， Baku 1961）．Note that（in this and other games given earlier）Keres avoided playing ．．．b7－b5．
4.6 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 Qf3 乌f6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆ 8 xc4 c5 $60-0 \mathrm{a} 6$ ）

## 7 Obd2

The latest word in fashion．The main virtue of this development of the knight is the possibility of deviating from well studied variations．

$$
7 \text {... cxd4 }
$$

An alternative is 7．．．0c6（7．．．b5 8显e2 and then a2－a4） 8 dxc5 是xc5 9 b3


 the ending is equal） $9 \ldots 0-0 \quad 10 \times b 2$獣7 11 莦c2（Atalik－Ibragimov，Ano－ liosia 1995，went 11 宸bl \＆a3 12 是xa3
 Exd8 + Qxd8；White has no advantage）

11．．．Qb4（after 11．．．\＆a3 12 \＆xa3

 White has some positional advantage） 12 wbl （if immediately 12 w c 3 ，then 12．．．b5 13 \＆e2 定b7 equalises） $12 \ldots$ b5 （12．．』d8 13 Qe4 Qxe4 14 当xe4 Qd5 $15 \cong$ adl favours White） 13 Qg5 e5 14 \＆e2 g6．Both sides have chances （Ibragimov）．

## 8 ⿹勹xd4 全d6

8．．． Obd $^{2}$ comes into consideration．
After 8．．．昷e7 9 b3 0－0 10 定b2 宣d7 11 立e2 ©c6 12 昷f3 in this position with symmetrical pawns White retains som：initiative．

## 904 f

9 b 3 and ${ }^{2} \mathrm{~b} 2$ is possible，as well as 9 血e2，to meet $9 \ldots$ ．．．b5 with 10 a 4 ．

$$
9 \quad . .
$$


je are following D．Gurevich－Gulko （ C A 1995）．After $10 \mathrm{~b} 3 \mathrm{~b} 511 \mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{e} 2}$ －． 12 昷b2 Qbd7 13 a4 bxa4 14 Gjc4食．（also 14．．．${ }^{\text {ebb4！？}} 15$ bxa4 Black sh ald have played 15．．．皿d5，after wl in it is difficult for White to count on ny advantage（Gurevich）．

# Steinitz Variation 6．．．cxd4 

| 1 | d 4 | d 5 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 2 | c 4 | $\mathrm{dxc4}$ |
| 3 | Qf3 | Qf6 |
| 4 | e 3 | $\mathrm{e6}$ |
| 5 | ＠xc4 | c5 |
| 6 | $0-0$ | cxd4 |

The prelude to a plan that was suc－ cessfully employed by Steinitz in his match with Zukertort（1886）．

$$
7 \text { exd4 }
$$

7 Qxd4 is soundly answered by $7 \ldots$ a6，e．g． 8 Qc3 ©c5 9 Qb3 是d6 when we reach a position from the variation 6 $0-0 \mathrm{a} 67$ Qc3 cxd4 8 Qxd4．


The basic position of the Steinitz Variation．After blockading the d 4 pawn（or in some other way preventing d4－d5）Black aims to simplify the posi－ tion and to begin besieging the pawn． At the same time he takes measures against the opponent＇s threats on the kingside．We have already met posi－ tions of this type，except that the
exchange in the centre was made at a later stage．

We will consider：
$7 . .$. ©c6（5．1）
7．．．昷e7（5．2）－p． 110
5.1 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 乌f6 4 e 3 e65 \＆xc4 c5 60－0 cxd4 7 exd4）

$$
7 \ldots \text {... }
$$

Black puts the d 4 pawn under attack．

$$
8 \text { Qc3 }
$$

The classic set－up for White is queen at e2，bishop at g5，and king＇s rook at d1．However， 8 wive2 leaves his d－pawn undefended．But what if he sacrifices it， gaining time for development？－8．．．

（a） 11 \＆$b 5+\& d 7$ ，and now：
 14 气e3 气e7 15 思ac1 0－0 16 莦xc6 bxc6．White＇s lead in mobilisation is sufficient to regain his pawn，with a probable draw（Lutikov－Flohr，USSR Ch．1／2－Final 1952）；
（a2） 12 显xd7＋ $0 x d 713$ 分 3 ，in－ tensifying the pressure．After 13．．．＠f6 14 是e3 监c6 15 Eac1 Black，who is a pawn up，gave up his queen for rook and bishop in order to parry the threats －15．．．a6 16 乌d5 ${ }^{\boldsymbol{w}} \mathrm{xd} 517$ Exd5 $0 x \mathrm{x} 5$ ， but the compensation seems inadequate， and White＇s chances are better（Malich－ Uhlmann，Zinnowitz 1966）；
（b） 11 Qc3 \＆e7 12 ＠e3 世a5 13
 and White retains a lead in develop－ ment．

Thus it is advisable for Black to reject the win of the pawn and to continue his development with $8 \ldots$ 全e7 or $8 \ldots \mathrm{a}$ ，transposing into the main line．

We therefore consider：
8．．．今e7（5．11）
8．．．a6（5．12）－p． 107
5.11 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 （ ff $⿹ \mathrm{f} 64$ e3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 6 0－0 cxd4 7 exd4 Qc6 8 气c3）

$$
8 \quad \ldots \text { \&e7 }
$$



## 9 当 2

The positions after $9 \pm \mathrm{m} 10-0 \quad 10 \mathrm{a} 3$ （or 9 a3 0－0 $10 \pm \mathrm{el}$ or 10 w d3 occur in the Nimzo－Indian and Caro－Kann De－ fences（ 1 d 4 乌f6 2 c 4 e 63 Qc3 莤b4 4 e3 0－05 \＆d 3 d 56 亿f3 c5 $70-0$ Qc6 8 a3 dxc4 9 显xc4 cxd4 10 exd4 \＆e7 11 Eel or 11 峟d3，and 1 e 4 c 62 d 4 d 53 exd5 cxd5 4 c4 0 f 65 ©c3 e6 6 Qf3
 $0-010$ a3 or 9 a3 $0-010$ wd3）．The reader will find a detailed analysis in appropriate books．

The point of the move $\mathrm{a} 2-\mathrm{a} 3$ is to vacate $a 2$ for the bishop（for example， in the event of ．．．a7－a6 and ．．．b7－b5）． While exerting pressure on e6，at the
same time the bishop can be switched to the bl－h7 diagonal，where in tandem with the queen（ ${ }^{(\mathrm{w}} \mathrm{d} 3$ ）it can force a weakening of the opponent＇s kingside． And one more point：when the black knight is developed at c 6 ，the move a2－ a3 prevents the blockading manoeuvre ．．．$\triangle \mathrm{b} 4-\mathrm{d} 5$ ．

Another possible strategy for White is the d4－d5 break，in order to open up the position and exploit his spatial ad－ vantage．

9 \＆e3．This unpretentious move is now rarely played，but it is by no means harmless．According to Euwe，after 9．．．0－0 10 Qe5 Dxe5（10．．．且d7 11
 11 dxe5 曹xdl（if $11 \ldots .9 \mathrm{~d} 712 \mathrm{f4}$ ） 12 $\pm \mathrm{fxdl} 9 \mathrm{~d} 713 \mathrm{f4}$ Black is cramped．

9 \＆f4 is an old continuation，dating back to games between Pillsbury and Steinitz．After 9．．．0－0 $10 \Xi \mathrm{cl}$（the natu－ ral 10 Ëel was played in Sveshnikov－ I．Ivanov，USSR 1976，but after 10．．．b6 White hurried to force events： 11 d5

 14．．．\＆a6，and if 15 b3 笪a3！）Steinitz played the provocative 10 ．．． wb b？

（a） 11 Qb5 De8 12 Ee1 乌a5 13
 （al） 15 Qd5 exd5 16 Exe7 Qf6 17

 \＆xg5 ${ }^{\mathbf{E}} \mathrm{xb} 222 \mathrm{~h} 4$ with a dangerous
 the wild complications have led to a position with roughly equal chances （Pillsbury－Steinitz，New York 1894）；
（a2） 15 Qxe8！This seemingly simple exchange is a significant improvement suggested by Ravinsky：


15．．．Excl（if 15．．．Efxe8 16 De5， threatening not only to take the bishop， but also 17 ＠xf7 and 17 \＆xh7＋） 16

 White threatens $21 \Xi \mathrm{\Xi} 3,21 \Xi \mathrm{E} 5$ ，and also 21 Qd2－Black＇s position is des－ perate（this analysis dates from 1970）；
（b）Meanwhile in St Petersburg （1895／6）the same players repeated the variation．This time Pillsbury decided on the positional 11 㟶d2 $\pm \mathrm{d} 812 \pm \mathrm{fd} 1$

 sides have chances．

Compared with Lutikov－Flohr （p．102）here the capture of the d 4 pawn is even more dangerous： $9 \ldots 0 x d 410$ Qxd4 搝xd4 11 घdl（11 Qb5 is also



## 10 －d1

The 3rd game of the Spassky－ Petrosian match（Moscow 1966），where this position was reached from a Caro－ Kann Defence，went 10 \＆e3 ©a5 11乌d3 b6 12 酉g5（if 12 Qe5 皿b7 13 f 4
 （14 ©e5 Qd5 15 里d2 Qb4）14．．．h6！ 15
 \＆xc3 $17 \mathrm{bxc} 3 \mathrm{~W}_{\mathrm{W}} \mathrm{d} 5$ ．The loss of time （丹c1－e3－g5－cl－d2）has allowed the black pieces to take up ideal positions．


We now consider：
10．．． 0 a5（5．111）
10．．．⿹b4（5．112）－p． 105
10．．．a6（5．113）－p． 106
10．．．蕽c7 is strongly met by 11 是g 5 and mac ．
5.111 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 0 f 64 e3 e6 5 是xc4 c5 $60-0$ cxd4 7 exd4


$$
10 \ldots \text { Qa5 }
$$

Directed against d4－d5（10．．．b6？ 11 d5）．

| 11 | \＆ d 3 | b 6 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 12 | $\AA \mathrm{~g} 5$ |  |

The alternative is 12 Qe5 §b7 13 \＆a6（13 we3 QdS 14 Wh3 f5 leads to a
double－edged situation，Lengyel－Van Scheltinga，Beverwijk 1965； 13 \＆g5 transposes into the main line）13．．．©xa6 （13．．．岩c8！？－Averbakh） 14 宸xa6 Dd5 15 요d2（or 15 葸e2）15．．．Qb4（Black is tempted by the win of a pawn；15．．f6
 （16．．．©ac6 is correct） 17 anacl $0 x d 4$（a dangerous pin） 18 峟e4 f6 19 国 $f 4$ fxe5 20 \＆xe5 ©ac6 21 \＆xd4 with advan－ tage to White（Szabo－Van Scheltinga， Amsterdam 1966）．

$$
\begin{array}{llll}
12 & \ldots & \text { \&b7 } \\
13 & \text { gacl }
\end{array}
$$

 and 13 De5 Dd5 14 \＆ d 2 have also been played．

$$
13 \ldots \text { Q } 13
$$

Or 13．．．Ec8 14 De5：
（a） $14 \ldots 9 \mathrm{~d} 515$＠xe7（ 15 断 h 5 f ）
 White＇s position is preferable（Djuric－ Mascarinas，Subotica 1984）；
（b）14．．．©c6 15 \＆bl g6（the d4 pawn is indirectly defended：15．．．
 with fair attacking chances（Gulko－ Lombard，Biel 1976）．

## 14 当 4

g6
14．．．9f6 fails to 15 wh4 h6 16显xh6！gxh6（or 16．．．0d5 17 \＆g5） 17潾xh6 followed by 0 g 5 and wins．

| 15 | wh4 | $f 6$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 16 | 角6 | Qxc3 |
| 17 | bxc3 |  |

17 xc3 is weaker in view of $17 \ldots$
 White has difficulties over the defence of his d 4 pawn．

| 17 | $\ldots$ | 良xf3 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 18 | gxf3 | f5 |
| 19 | 峔g3 |  |

This position was reached in Vukic－ Marjanovic（Nis 1979）．Due to the weakness of the e6 pawn on the open
file，Black began to experience difficul－
 22 品 3 ．


5．112（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 〇f3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 是xc4 c5 6 0－0 cxd4 7 exd4

$10 \ldots$ 宜 4


## 11 ig5

11 De5 also has a good reputation：
（a）Botvinnik－Alatortsev（Leningrad 1932）continued 11．．．Dbd5 12 莤g5 h6 （this weakens the kingside，or more pre－ cisely g6，and therefore $12 \ldots$ ． $\mathrm{id7}$ is
more advisable） 13 ＠h4 \＆ e 7 （after 13．．．©xc3 14 bxc3 ©d5 15 §xe7 Black has to recapture with his knight，since 15．．．当xe7 16 气g6！fxg6 17 \＆xd5 leads to an unfavourable position，similar to the game） $14 Q_{x d 5} Q_{x d 5}$（if 14．．．exd5

 Black stands badly） 15 是xe7 | we7 |
| :--- | （15．．．©xe7 16 d5！） 16 Qg6！fxg6 17 ＠xd5．The black pawns are compro－ mised，and White has a clear advantage （Botvinnik）；

（b） $11 \ldots$ ．．．d7 12 d 5 （since Black has not blockaded the pawn，this move sug－ gests itself，but 12 \＆g5 is preferable， when White retains a definite initiative） 12．．．exd5 13 Qxd5 Qbxd5 14 \＆xd5 Qxd5 $15 \Xi x d 5$ ，when Black is saved by a clever tactical reply，found by



11 \＆f4．This plan was employed by Ryumin in the 1930s．The queen＇s bishop had also been developed at f 4 in the past，but Ryumin＇s idea was then to play it to e5，exploiting the fact that Black＇s queen＇s knight is at b4 or d5． Ryumin－Kasparian（7th USSR Ch．， Moscow 1931）continued 11．．．a6 12
 （14．．．h6！should have been considered， not allowing the enemy knight to go to g5） 15 Qg5 Qbd5 16 Wd3 h6 17 Qxd5
 and now 20 would have placed Black in a critical position（Botvinnik）

## 11 <br> Qbd5 <br> 12 macl

Or 12 Qe5，when after 12．．． 0 xc3 13
 16 \＆b3 घb8 17 c 4 Qf6 18 潧e3 \＆d7 19 f 4 White stands better（Pachman－ Yanofsky，Natanya 1973）．

Now 12．．．b6 is strongly met by 13 Qxd5 exd5 14 昷d3．


After 12．．．sd7 13 Qxd5 Qxd5 $^{2} 4$
 \＆xb2 17 莤e4 the bishop at b2 has no good retreat square，and by a double attack White wins a pawn（analysis）．

If $12 \ldots$ ．．．xc3 13 bxc 3 显d7 14 Qe5
是b5 White has the advantage （Alekhine－Hönlinger，Vienna 1936）．
5.113 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 $60-0$ cxd4 7 exd4


10
a6


This move does not prevent White＇s planned advance in the centre，and after 11 d5 exd5 12 Qxd5 $0 x d 513$ 星xd5曾c7 White can gain an advantage in various ways：

 Eel！莦xb2 19 h5） 18 自g3 シae8 19 घel 崖b8 20 ＂e3 b5 21 玉ael（Rubin－ stein－Duras，San Sebastian 1911）；
（b） 14 莦e4 道f6 15 Og5 是xg5 16
 Guldin，Moscow 1963），when White could have intensified the pressure by

垱xe7（analysis）．
5.12 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 Df6 4 e3 e6 5 完xc4 c5 $60-0$ cxd4 7 exd4 Qc6 8 合 3 ）


As in the previous variation，the question arises：is it not possible to ex－ ploit Black＇s slight lag in development by making the break in the centre？

We consider：
9 d5（5．121）
9 a3（5．122）

9 宸e2（5．123）－p． 108
9 皿e3（5．124）－p． 109
5.121 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 气f3 2 ff 4 e3 e6 5 \＆${ }^{2} x 4$ c5 $60-0$ cxd4 7 exd4 4c6 8 －c3 a6）

$$
9 \text { d5 صa5 }
$$

It is on this move and the subsequent forcing variation that the evaluation of this variation depends．If $9 . . . e x d 510$ Dxd5 Qxd5 11 是xd5（after 11 世xd5 Qe6 12 wxd8＋ $0 x d 8$ the game is equal） $11 \ldots$ \＆e7 12 el（White can also avoid simplification with 12 彩b3 0－0 13 Ed1）12．．．0－0（12．．．Sd7 13 当e2） 13 \＆xc6 bxc6 14 Wxd8 \＆xd8 Black has to reckon with the weakness of his c6 pawn．

Now after 10 dxe6 ${ }^{W} \times x d 111$ exf7＋解7 12 Exdl ©xc4 13 b3：


Black is a piece up，but his king is in danger（13．．．Db6 14 Qg5），Kampars－ Kotek（Austria 1958）．
5.122 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 صf3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 $60-0$ cxd4 7 exd4 Qc6 8 ©c3a6）

9 a3

White defers d4－d5．If his bishop at c 4 is attacked（．．． $\mathrm{Qa}^{2}$ or ．．．b7－b5）it will have a convenient retreat square at a2． In addition，Black is deprived of the manoeuvre ．．．乌b4－d5．

$$
9 \ldots \text { \&e7 }
$$

$10 \quad \mathrm{~d} 5$
10 Ee1 0－0 or 10 挳d3 0－0 trans－ poses into the variations $60-0 \operatorname{cxd} 47$ exd4 ©c6 8 Qc3 皿e7 9 Еel 0－0 10 a3 a6 or 9 a3 0－0 10 数d3 a6．

| 10 | O． | exd5 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 11 | Qxd5 | Qxd5 |
| 12 | \＆xd5 | $0-0$ |



## 13 潱b3！

If 13 \＆e3 Black has the acceptable
㥩a5．

$$
13 \ldots \text {... 婁a5 }
$$

An important detail of the position （and the 9 a3 variation）is that after 13．．． Q 5 the queen retreats to a 2 ． 13．．．』f6 is strongly met by 14 Edl，
 with mounting pressure．

Black＇s queen move has the aim of simplifying the position at the cost of a weakening of his pawns．At the same time he sets a trap：on the＇automatic＇ 14 ⓔ1？there follows 14．．． 2 d 4 ！

Furman－Borisenko（22nd USSR Ch．， Moscow 1955）now continued 14
 otherwise Black will play 15 ．．． 156 and White will achieve nothing） 15 ．．．axb5 16 Eacl with advantage to White．
5.123 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 $⿹ \mathrm{ff} 4$ e3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 $60-0$ cxd4 7 exd4 Qc68 ©c3a6）

## 9 当e2



Compared with the variation 8．．．\＆e7
 square is covered against the invasion of the white knight．But here too it is extremely dangerous for Black to take the central pawn．

$$
9 \quad \ldots \quad b 5
$$

After the immediate $9 . .0 x \mathrm{xd} 410$
 two ways of continuing the offensive：
（a） 12 Qb5 axb5 13 ＠xb5＋あe7 14是e3 with a powerful attack；
（b） 12 Qd5（suggested by the Ger－ man master Herrmann）12．．．撆xe2 13 Oc7＋ゆe7 14 显xe2 \＆e3 and wins） 15 \＆f4 Qd7 16 \＆d6＋
 fxe6 18 \＆ e xb，winning the exchange．

9．．．e7 10 Edl leads to a position from variation 5.113 （p．106）．

## 10 \＆b3

Suetin＇s recommendation of 10 d 5 should also be considered．

$$
10 \ldots . . \quad \text { xd4 }
$$

As the final evaluation of the vari－ ation shows，it is more prudent to de－ cline the sacrifice by $10 \ldots$ ．．${ }^{2} 7$ ．

$$
11 \text { Qxd4 } \mathrm{Uxd} 4
$$


12 Dd5！Qxd5

If $13 . . .044$ White wins by 14 踣f3． 13．．．軖a7 14 是xd5 \＆b7 also does not help in view of 15 exe6，while after
 Black does not obtain sufficient com－ pensation for his queen．

Bolbochan－Evans
（Helsinki
Olympiad 1952），now continued 14

 18 \＆xb7 $\mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{E}}^{\mathrm{xb}} 719 \mathrm{a} 4$ ，when Black was in serious difficulties．
> 5.124 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 §f3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 血xc4 c5 $60-0$ cxd4 7 exd4 Dc6 8 Oc3 a6）

$$
9 \text { \&e3 }
$$

This was played at the time when it was thought that the d4 pawn should not be left undefended．Then，by con－ tinuing 9 䊦e2，©e5 and f2－f4－f5，White would prepare an offensive on the kingside．We have already encountered a similar plan in previous sections．

$$
\begin{array}{rlr}
9 & \text { 清e2 } \\
10 & \text { \&e7 }
\end{array}
$$

Keres－Flohr（22nd USSR Ch．，Mos－ cow 1955）went $10 \mathrm{a} 30-011$ De5，and after the poor move 11．．． W Fc 7 （11．．．©d7 and ．．．\＃c8 was correct） 12 Qxc6 wxc6
 16 d 5 White gained the advantage．

| 10 | $\cdots$ | $b 5$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 11 | $\dot{Q} 3$ | Da5 |
| 12 | De5 | \＆b7 |

After 12．．． $0 \times x 313 \mathrm{axb} 3$ Black does not have time to fianchetto his bishop in view of $0 \times b 5$ ，and he has to play 13．．．\＆d7，when 14 Efdl with the threat of d 4 －d5 gives White the advantage．

| 13 | \＆c2 |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 14 | f4 | 0 |

White＇s plan is to attack e6 and f7， and he now threatens 15 f5．However， the advance of the f－pawn has left weaknesses in his position．But in the event of 14 f 3 followed by Qe4 or Se4 the position is simplified，and Black stands quite satisfactorily．

| 14 | $\ldots$ | थc6 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 15 | gad1 | थb4 |
| 16 | \＆b3 | Qbd5 |
| 17 | f5 |  |

This position was reached in two of Flohr＇s games in 1954：

Borisenko－Flohr（21st USSR Ch．， Kiev 1954）went 17．．．exf5 18 Еxf5 \＃c8 19 §d2 乌xc3 20 bxc 3 ■c7 21 』df1 b4！ 22 cxb4 $\mathrm{wd} 4+23$ h1（as shown by Konstantinopolsky， 23 监f2 was stronger，although even then by $23 \ldots$


26 ฐxf7 ■xf7 27 ■xf7 モc2 Black


 g5！and Black took the initiative．


When a few months later the same position arose（via a different move order）in Vistaneckis－Flohr（Yerevan 1954）the grandmaster，evidently fear－ ing a prepared variation，deviated with 17．．．Ec8，but the move proved unfor－ tunate，and 18 fxe 6 fxe 619 \＆g5 寝d6 20 dd led to an advantage for White．
5.2 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e 3 e65 \＆xc4 c5 $60-0$ cxd4 7 exd4）

$$
7 \text {... Se7 }
$$

The development of the bishop at e7 also comes into Black＇s plans in the 7．．．Dc6 variation，so that things often reduce to a transposition of moves．Of independent significance is the variation where Black carries out Steinitz＇s plan．

In the 9th game of his match with Zukertort（1886），Steinitz blockaded the d－pawn with ．．．Qbd7－b6－d5．He then developed his queen at a5 and played his king＇s rook to d8，preparing a siege of the pawn，or（in the event of the
exchange on c3 and c3－c4）counterplay against the＇hanging＇ c －and d－pawns．

## 8 電e2

Now Black has：
8．．．0－0（5．21）
8．．．a6 9 Øc3（9 id1）9．．．b5（5．22）－ p． 111
5.21 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 6 0－0 cxd4 7 exd4乌e7 8 畄e2）

| 8 | $\ldots$ | $0-0$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 9 | 0 O 3 | 0 bd 7 |
| 10 | تd1 |  |

Zukertort played 10 \＆b3（the posi－ tion was reached by transposition from a Queen＇s Gambit Declined）10．．．$毋 \mathrm{~b} 6$ 11 ＠f4 乌bd5 12 ＠g3（12 县e5 came into consideration，as in Ryumin＇s Variation，p．106）12．．．wa5 13 Eacl \＆d7 14 Qe5 $f 4$ was interesting，by analogy with the plan employed in Borisenko－Flohr， p．109）15．．．©e8 16 \＆$h 4$ Qxc3（forced in view of the threats of 17 \＆xf6 and 17 Qxd5） 17 bxc3 数c7（playing for a blockade by $17 . . . \mathrm{b} 5$ would have been premature in view of $18 \triangleq \mathrm{~g} 4$ ；with the move played Steinitz defends his bishop at e7 and thereby parries the threat of 18 ©g4） 18 』fel ac8．Both sides have chances．

## 10

## Qb6

Attempts have been made to modern－ ise Steinitz＇s plan by linking it to the fianchetto of the queen＇s bishop with 10．．．a6：
 exd5 14 Qxd5 \＆xd5 15 \＆xd5 埌d5 16 Exd5＠xg5 17 Qxg5 h6（18 淠d3 was threatened） 18 寝d2 hxg5 19 Exd7 Wf6，and Black should not lose the heavy－piece ending（Levenfish－Rauzer， Leningrad 1936）；
（b） 11 d 5 seems more energetic：after 1．．．exd5 12 Qxd5 $\mathrm{Qx}_{\mathrm{xd}} 13$ \＆xd5 \＆f6 4 \＆f4 White has the advantage．

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
11 & \& b 3 \\
12 & \& \mathrm{~g} 5 & \text { Obd5 }
\end{array}
$$



White has a promising position． Against Steinitz＇s plan 12．．．宸a5 13
 his opponent serious problems．
$12 . .0 \times \mathrm{x} 313 \mathrm{bxc} 3$ is evidently the lesser evil for Black，although in this case White has ideal development and well－placed pieces．
5.22 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 昷xc4 c5 $60-0$ cxd4 7 exd4風e78潈e2）

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
8 & \dddot{O} & \text { a6 } \\
9 & \ddot{\mathrm{c}} 3
\end{array}
$$

The other development of White＇s queen＇s knight is illustrated by the variation 9 di b5 $10 \&$ b3（or 10 \＆d3 \＆b7 11 a4 b4 12 Qbd2）10．．．昷d7 11 a4 b4 12 Qbd2（12 a5 ©c6！）12．．．a5（if 12．．．0－0 13 a5！） 13 Qc4．

$$
9 \quad \ldots \quad \text { b5 }
$$

In this variation Black delays the de－ velopment of his queen＇s knight and first fianchettos his bishop．


White has：
10 宜b3（5．221）
10 \＆ d 3 （5．222）－p． 113
5.221 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 Qf6 4 e3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 $60-0$ cxd4 7 exd4


$$
\begin{array}{lll}
10 & \text { \&b3 } \\
11 & \varrho g 5
\end{array}
$$

Interesting complications can arise after 11 Qe5 0－0 12 ©xf7？！As shown by Furman－Bannik（25th USSR Ch．， Riga 1958）the sacrifice is problematic： 12．．．Exf7 13 wxe6 黄f8 14 Ee1 \＃c6 15
 \＆xd6（forced，since if the queen moves there follows 18．．．$勹 \mathrm{fd} 5$ ）18．．． $0 x f 519$
 two minor pieces for a rook and two pawns，has perhaps slightly the better chances．

Of course，White is not obliged to sacrifice on f 7 ．By continuing 12 mdl he retains the initiative．Nevertheless （as becomes clear later）it is more fav－ ourable to post the rooks at dl and el ．

```
11 ... 0-0
```

If $11 \ldots .0 \mathrm{c}$ ，then 12 是xf6 and 13 d 5 ．
If 11．．．Qbd7，with the intention after
．．．ゆb6 of blockading the d 4 pawn，then apart from 12 Qe5 White also has the more effective 12 d 5 ！：

（a） $12 \ldots .$. xd5 13 Qxd5（or 13 是xd5 exd5 14 ■fel f6 15 ＠f4）13．．．＠xg5 14
 with a clear advantage to White；
（b） $12 \ldots \& x d 5 \quad 13$ Qxd5 exd5 14 Efel；
（c）12．．．exd5 13 玉fe1 b4 14 Qa4， and in view of the threats on the e－file Black has to give the right to castle，af－ ter which White gains more than suffi－ cient compensation for the pawn．

## 12 Efel！

Note the deployment of the rooks． Uhlmann－Spassky（Amsterdam 1970） went 12 Efd1 Qbd7，and White achieved nothing by the break 13 d 5 （the other typical move $13 母 \mathrm{e} 5$ is more promising）13．．．exd5 14 Qxd5 exd5！ 15 \＆xd5 Qxd5 16 Exd5 \＆xg5 17
 and we reach the pre－endgame position from Levenfish－Rauzer（cf．the note to Black＇s 10th move，p．110）．

$$
12 \ldots \text {... ©c6 }
$$

With the rook at el the knight can no longer be developed at $\mathrm{d} 7: 12 . . .2 \mathrm{bd} 7$ ？ 13 d 5 ！$\sum \mathrm{xd5}$（if 13．．． $8 \mathrm{xd5} 14 \mathrm{Qxd}^{2}$ Qxd5 15 \＆xd5 and White wins） 14 ＠xd5！\＆xd5 15 \＆xe7 \＆xf3 16 \＆xd8
 Qd5 Eee8 20 ©c7，winning the ex－ change．

In order to prevent d4－d5，Black must first drive away the knight with 12．．．b4，and after 13 Qa4 play 13．．． Qbd7，but then 14 Qe5 gives White strong pressure．

```
13 [ad1
```



13 ．．．Da5
This does not prevent d4－d5，but nor， however，does 13．．．Qb4．After 14 d5 Qbxd5？ 15 Qxd5 是xd5 16 显xd5 Qxd5 17 \＆xe7 絸xe7 18 Exd5 White wins a piece．

Black can defend his bishop with 13．．．巴e8，but 14 乌e5！（with the threat of 15 Qxf7； 14 d 5 leads merely to sim－ plification）gives White a strong attack：
 Qd5 loses a piece after 16 Qxd5 $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{ing}}$ 17 Qf4） 16 杪 h ；
（b2）14．．． $\mathrm{Qxe5} 15 \mathrm{dxe} 5$ 乌d7 16 §f4断c717 \＆c2 Df8 18 Qe4 with a clear advantage（Boleslavsky）．

13．．． 0 d 5 is met by 14 ＠xd5（14 Qxd5 $\sum_{x g 5} 15$ Qb6 is refuted by 15．．．थxd4！ 14 \＆xd5 \＆xg5 15 \＆e4， when d4－d5 cannot be prevented．

14 d5！

This leads to the win of a pawn．
14 ．．．包b3
It is easy to see that the d5 pawn cannot be taken．

| 15 | dxe6 | 世゙ Wb |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 16 | axb3 | fxe6 |
| 17 | Qd4 |  |

Strategically the game is decided．
 （Boleslavsky－Kotov，Zurich Candidates 1953）the simplest was 19 是f4！是c5
 20 喽xb6 显xb6 21 घe7（Boleslavsky）．
造xb6 20 e7 is also unsatisfactory for Black．

The entire variation in which Black， by playing ．．．a7－a6 and ．．．b7－b5，delays the development of his queen＇s knight， must be considered unfavourable． Exploiting the lack of pressure on his centre，White deploys his forces in the most advantageous manner．
5.222 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 Df6 4 e3 e6 5 皿xc4 c5 6 0－0 cxd4 7 exd4


## 10 宜d3

This retreat is less promising for White than 10 \＆b3，since now the break in the centre is possible only in exceptional cases．

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
10 & \because g & \& b 7 \\
11 & \& g 5
\end{array}
$$

Ryumin＇s idea of 11 ©f4 followed by 皿e 5 comes into consideration：
（a）11．．．Qbd7，when the standard set－ up 12 Efdl 0－0 13 Eacl Ex8 14 Qe5 Qb6 15 \＆g3 Qbd5 promises White lit－ tle（Garcia Padron－Tereshchenko，Malta Olympiad 1980）；
（b） $11 \ldots$ ．．．c6 12 ■adl Qb4 13 ＠bl Qbd5 14 \＆e5（Antoshin－O．Chernikov， Lipetsk 1960）．


$$
11 \ldots 000
$$

$11 . . Q \mathrm{~d} 5$ is premature in view of 12 \＆xe7 世xe7 13 \＆e4！Qf6 14 \＆xb7紧xb7 15 d5 $\sum_{x d 5}$（if $15 \ldots$ b4 16 Qe4公xe4 17 监xe4 䒼xd5 18 监xb4 Qc6 19㥪a3 with advantage to White） 16 Dxd5

 Qc6 23 gxh5 with the better prospects for White（Korchnoi－Borisenko，28th USSR Ch．，Moscow 1961）

## 12 Iad1 Qbd7 <br> 13 De5

13 \＆c1 could be tried，to answer 13．．．2d5 with 14 De4．

If 13 玉fe1 Qb6（not 13．．．乌d5？ 14
 Qe5 b4！ 15 是xf6 \＆xf6 with equal chances．

Lasker－Reshevsky（Nottingham 1936）now continued 13．．．Qd5 14 \＆ 1 Qxc3 15 bxc3 Qf6 with chances for both sides．

| 1 | d4 | d5 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | c4 | dxc4 |
| 3 | Df3 | Qf6 |
| 4 | e3 | e6 |
| 5 | 是xc4 | c5 |
| 6 | 眇e2 |  |



White hurries to remove his queen from the d－file，in order then to play dxc5，0－0 and e3－e4，or else immedi－ ately e3－e4 before castling．This plan was first employed by Furman．

$$
6 \ldots \text { a6 }
$$

$6 . . . \mathrm{cxd4}$ or $6 .$. ． c 6 normally leads to positions examined earlier．

We must mention only the recent idea of developing Black＇s bishop at b4：6．．．cxd4 7 exd4 \＆b4＋ 8 Qc3 0－0 （or 8．．．Dc6 $90-000010$ घdl Qd5 11 \＆d2 \＆e7 12 Eacl with the better prospects for White，Psakhis－Gofstein， Zagreb 1993） 9 \＆g5！©c6 10 Idl h6 11 \＆h4 \＆xc3＋？！（11．．．\＆e7 would have led to a favourable position for White
from the Steinitz Variation with an
学xc3＋14 ©d2 gxf6 1500 0！©xd4 16㘳g4＋©h8 17 wh5 Qf5 18 g 4 and White built up a very strong attack （Yakovich－Steinbacher，Ostende 1993）． 7 dxc5 \＆xc5
We now consider：
$80-0$（6．1）
8 e4（6．2）－p． 120
6．1（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 Df6 4 e 3


8 0－0 Qc6
Other continuations：
8．．．b5 9 \＆${ }^{\text {d }}$ 3：

（a）9．．．0－0 10 e4 e5！？（after 10．．．ᄋb7 11 e 5 White has the initiative），offering a clever pawn sacrifice：
（a1） 11 Qxe5 Ee8 12 Qf3 \＆g4 13畒c2 Qbd7 14 Qbd2 تc8 15 世bl \＆d6 16 Eel 0 c 517 \＆c2 \＆f4 with a power－ ful attacking position（Furman－ Ibdalaev，Tashkent 1960）；
（a2） 11 a4！b4（11．．．bxa4 12 Qc3 gives White good chances） 12 Qbd2 （here too the acceptance of the sacrifice gives Black serious counterplay： 12
 Qb3 followed by dl and 皿e3；
（b） $9 \ldots . .0$ bd 710 e 4 定b7，and now：
（bl） 11 a4 b4（11．．．bxa4 12 Qc3 0－0 13 Exa4 a5 14 e5！\＆xf3 15 gxf3 0 d 5 16 毋xd5 exd5 17 घg4 Еe8 18 f4， I．Sokolov－Van Wely，Wijk aan Zee 1996，with advantage to White） 12 0 bd 2 §e7（vacating c5 for the knight）
 Qfd2 Qhf6 17 f 3 Qe5 18 ＠b5 and White held the initiative（Malanyuk－ Yakovich，Kiev 1986）；
（b2） 11 Qbd2 e5（11．．0－0 12 e5 Og4 13 乌e4 घc8 14 \＆f4 with an ex－ cellent game for White，Taimanov－ Bazan，Buenos Aires 1960） 12 Db3 0－0 13 \＃d1 eb6 14 Qh4 数b8 15 Qf5 with a strong attacking position；
（c） $9 \ldots 0 \mathrm{c} 6$ ：

（c1） 10 ＠c3 \＆b7 11 e 4 Qd7 12 玉d
 Eacl with the initiative for White （Korchnoi－Hubner，Merano 1980／1）；
（c2） 10 Qbd2 $\mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{b}} \mathrm{b} 711$ De4（11 Dd 1 ， 11 a 3 and 11 D 3 have also been play－
 14 Eac1（intending Qg3 and e3－e4），
and in Malanyuk－Ehlvest（55th USSR Ch．，Moscow 1988）14．．．Efd8 would have given roughly equal chances；
（c3） 10 a3 §d6 11 【d1 §b7 12 b4桉c7 13 \＆b2 Qe5 14 \＆xe5（of interest is the sharp variation 14 Qxe5 ${ }^{2} \times 515$
 Se5 18 Ecl 学xcl＋19 \＆xcl \＆xal，in which Black has two rooks for the queen－Ehlvest，Veingold）14．．．©xe5 15 Qxe5 U1世xe5 16 Qd2 0－0 17 Qb3
 axb4 21 axb4 Exal 22 Exal \＃b8．Here a draw was agreed in Malanyuk－ E．Vladimirov（Tashkent 1987），al－ though after 23 El Black would still have had to fight for it．

8．．．当c7：

（a） 9 e4 Qg4，and now：
（a1） 10 Qbd2 9 c 611 Qb3 是d6 12 h3 Qge5，and by keeping secure control of e5，Black solves his opening prob－ lems（Taimanov－Filip，Mallorca 1970）；
（a2） 10 \＆g5 Qc6 11 Qbd2（11 h3 Qd4！）11．．．\＆d6 12 h 3 h 6 （the simplest was 12．．．Oge5 13 Qxe5 \＆xe5 with equality） 13 ＠h4 Qge5 14 Qxe5 \＆xe5 15 Qf3 g5（Black accepts the offered pawn；after 15．．．乌d4 16 Qxd4 $)^{2 x d} 4$ the position is completely equal） 16是g3 \＆xg3 17 fxg 3 当xg3 18 Eadl g4 19 hxg 4 \＆d7 20 b 4 b 521 气d5！$\Xi \mathrm{g} 8$
with chances for both sides（Farago－ Zs．Polgar，Hungary 1991）；
（b） $9 \mathrm{a} 3 \mathrm{~b} 510 \uparrow \mathrm{~d} 3 \mathrm{Q} \mathrm{b} 711 \mathrm{~b} 4 \xlongequal{2} \mathrm{~d} 6$ 12 \＆b2 Qbd7 13 थbd2 0－0 14 घacl単b8 15 h 3 包 516 Qxe5 \＆xe5 17 Qb3．White stands better，since the opponent＇s c5 square is weak（Ruban－ Ibragimov，Smolesnk 1991）；
（c） 9 Qbd2：
（c1） $9 \ldots . .2 \mathrm{c} 6$ ，and now：
（cl1） 10 a3 ${ }^{2}$ d6（or 10．．．b5 11 \＆d3
 b4 15 e4 \＆b7 with equal chances， Timman－Hubner，Tilburg 1987） 11 b4 Og4 12 h3 Qge5 13 \＆b2 0－0 14 玉acl边 715 Efd $\Xi \mathrm{fd} 816$ Qe4 0 xc 417 Uxc4．White＇s position looks more pro－ mising，but after 17．．．酉e7 18 断c3 f6 19
 22 Qd2 e5 23 Qe4 §e6 Black equal－ ised（Nogueiras－Karpov，Belfort 1988）；
（c12） 10 ㅇd3 b5 11 Qb3 §d6 12
 Ec4！Qd7？！（15．．．0－0 is more natural， although even then White＇s position is preferable） 16 \＆e4 Qde5 17 \＆xc6＋ Qxc6 18 玉acl，and Black ended up in a difficult position（Ehlvest－Zs．Polgar， Pamplona 1991／2）；
（c2） $9 . . . \varphi_{\mathrm{bd} 7} 10$ थb3 \＆d6 11 \＆d2 b6 12 玉acl 㥩8 13 血d3 \＆b7 14 h 3 $0-0 \quad 15$ e4 $\quad \mathrm{md} 8$ with equal chances （Stangl－Sadler，Altensteig 1992）．

## 9 e4

90 bd2 0－0，and now：
（a） 10 a 3 Qd5（or $10 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 511$ \＆d3 \＆d6 12 Qe4 Qxe4 13 ＠xe4 \＆b7 14 Ed1 we7 with an equal position， Zs．Polgar－Anand，Monaco 1993） 11 De4 肴e7 12 b 4 （the less sharp 12 Edl
 game）13．．．b5 13 \＆d3（13 \＆b3 a5！ 14垱xb5 \＆d7）13．．．f5 14 Qg3（14 Qc5 can be met by $14 \ldots .0 \mathrm{cxb} 4 \quad 15 \mathrm{axb} 4$

覀xb2 ©xe3 17 是xb5 axb5（17．．．©xf1 18 \＆xc6） 18 fxe3（Lautier－Dorfman， Barcelona 1992），and now after
 f4 20 Oh5 घa7 both sides have chances （Dorfman）；
（b）Astrom－Sadler（Yerevan Olympiad 1996）went 10 \＆d3 \＆e7 （ $10 . . .0 \mathrm{~b} 411$ \＆b1 \＆ d 7 also comes into consideration） 11 b 3 （11 e4 e5；after 11

 even stands better） $11 \ldots$ ．． D 412 \＆bl b5
 successfully solved his opening prob－ lems．After 15 Qe4 0 bd5 16 Qeg5 Wa5 both sides have chances（Sadler）．

Topalov－Lautier（Amsterdam 1996） went 9 a3 ${ }^{\circ} \mathrm{d} 610$ Dbd2 $0-011$ \＆d3

 with attacking chances），and now 16．．． Q 5 ！ 17 \＆a2（ 17 axb5 थb3） 17．．． Cc 4 would have given Black a good game（Topalov）．

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 9 \text { b5 } \\
& \text { Other possibilities: } \\
& \text { 9... } 4 \mathrm{~g} 4:
\end{aligned}
$$


（a） 10 h 3 Qge5 11 Qxe5 Qxe5 with an equal game；
（b） $10 \triangle \mathrm{c} 3 \Psi \mathrm{c} 7$ with the threat of
．．． d $^{2}$（11 h3？©d4，and Black wins）；
（c） 10 ＠f4 e5 11 \＆g5 Wid6 12 h 3 h 6 13 \＆h4 ©f6 14 घdI 需e7 15 Qc3 with the better position for White（Illescas Cordoba－de la Villa，Lyon 1992）；
（d） 10 e5 9 d 4 （10．．．${ }^{W} \mathrm{c} 7$ leads to the
显xd4．The e5 pawn cannot be de－ fended，but by continuing his develop－ ment White obtains a strong attacking position： 12 Dd2 $\sum$ xe5（if 12．．．b5 13 \＆d3 Qxe5 14 是e4，or 13．．．\＆b7 14 Qb3） 13 Qb3 wxc4 14 Wive5．Black is obliged to return his bishop to its initial position，and after 14．．．\＆f8 15 \＆e3 White has more than sufficient compensation for the pawn：
（a） $15 \ldots \mathrm{f} 616{ }^{\mathrm{w}} \mathrm{h} 5+\mathrm{g} 617{ }^{\mathrm{w}} \mathrm{f} 3$ ，and this analysis of mine of 30 years ago was repeated in Lerner－Sorokin （Moscow 1992）；

 Eg8）17．．．蒋e4 18 Eadl 是e7 $19 \mathrm{f5}$ ！ exf5 20 afel！with a dangerous attack for the sacrificed pawns（Gelfand－ Salov，Madrid 1996）．

9．．． W E 710 e 5 ，and now：
（a） $10 \ldots . \mathrm{g} 411$＠f4 6 ，when Black wins the e5 pawn，but at a high price：

（a1） 12 exf6？愐xf4 13 fxg7 $\Xi g 814$ \＆xe6 ©d4！and White is crushed；
（a2） 12 Qc3！Qgxe5 13 Qxe5 Qxe5 14 Eael \＆${ }^{(1)} 15$ \＆xe5 \＆xe5 16 f 4 ＠xc3 17 bxc3 $0-018 \mathrm{f5}$ ，and White restores material equality with a posi－ tional advantage（analysis）；
（a3）Despite the favourable evalu－ ation of 12 §c3，which I analysed back in 1965，in recent games White has parted with his e5 pawn by 12 Qbd2 Ogxe5 13 Qxe5 fxe5 14 \＆g3（if 14皿e3 \＆d4！15 Df3 0－0）14．．．0－0 15 Eacl！（more promising than 15 Qf3， Stohl－Mikhalchishin，Dortmund 1992）
 Ef5！），when Black thought it best to return the gambit pawn with 17 ．．．$\oint d 4$ 18 Oxe5 Qxe5 19 \＆xe5 \＆xe5 20 livexe5，agreeing to an inferior position （Nogueiras－Seirawan（Montpellier Can－ didates 1985）；
（a32）is less promising： $15 \ldots .2 \mathrm{~d} 416$

 © b 5 with counterplay）18．．．㥩c5 19
 would have replied 20．．．玉f5！ 21 是xf5 exf5－Mikhalchishin）20．．．${ }^{\text {exe5 }} 21$

（b）Black has begun giving prefer－ ence to $10 . . . \sum \mathrm{d} 7$ ．


There can follow 11 \＆f4 b5

good for White，Topalov－Santo Roman， Las Palmas 1991） 12 \＆d3 \＆b7 13 Qc3 Qe7 14 Qe4 0－0（Black loses material after 14．．．ゆdxe5？ 15 Qxe5 Qxe5 16 ※ac1 Whbs 17 Wh5 \＆f6 18 Ec5） 15 Eac1 畄d8 16 a3 Qb6 17 Qfg5！g6 18
 exd6 20 wh5＋followed by the bishop sacrifice on g 6 and $\Xi \mathrm{c} 3$ with decisive threats） 19 Qhf6＋\＆xf6 20 Qxf6＋ Qxf6 21 exf6 wxf6 22 e3 with the better chances for White（Yakovich－Ye Rongguang，Calcutta 1991）－analysis by Flear and Yakovich．

After 9．．．b5 White has：
10 e5（6．11）
10 \＆b3（6．12）－p． 119
6.11 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Øf3 9 f 64 e3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 6 悪e2 a6 7 dxc5是xc5 80－0 ©c6 9 e4 b5）

| 10 | e5 | bxc4 |
| ---: | :---: | :---: |
| $10 \ldots .2 d 7$ | （also | $10 \ldots .$. d 5 ）can be |

（a） 11 \＆ b 3 最b7 12 Ed1 比b6 13 Qc3 De7 with chances for both sides （Gelfand－Balashov，Minsk 1986）． 14 Qe4？is bad in view of 14．．．exe4 15
 18 \＆g5 \＆c5 with advantage to Black， while 14 Qg5 wiv6 leads to very sharp play；
（b） 11 ＠d3 \＆b7 12 a 4 （or 12 Qc3 ©d4）12．．．bxa4 13 Exa4 ©b4 with equal chances（Gelfand，Kapengut）．

$$
11 \text { exf6 gxf6 }
$$

11．．．${ }^{W}$ d3，as played in Yakovich－ Kallai（Sochi 1989）comes into consid－ eration．After 12 fxg 7 mg 813 Wd3 cxd3 14 ＠h6 Qd4 15 Qxd4 $\mathrm{exd}^{2} 16$ Qc3 ■b8 17 ■adl $\Xi x b 218$ ■xd3 \＆xg7 19 日fdl §f6 20 Qe4 昷e7 21 Qd6＋the complications ended in a draw．

## 12 著xc4

12 Zd 1 is a possible improvement in this well known variation．White an－ swers $12 . .$. 留b6 with 13 Qbd2，when he regains the pawn in more favourable circumstances than in the main line．

## 12 ．．．単b6 <br> 13 Qc3

After the aggressive 13 単g4 是b7 14 Wg 7 de 7 the black king is securely de－ fended，and the open g－file causes White serious problems．

13 \＆e3！？is an interesting pawn sac－ rifice，suggested by Shatskes．After
 White has the initiative．It is dangerous for Black to take a second time on e3， opening the e－file for the opponent．

```
13

\section*{w4！}


14 数e2 \＆e7（if 14．．．0－0 15 Qe4） 15 h3（15 \＆h6！？－Suetin）15．．． \＆b \(^{\text {b }} 16\) a3当 a 517 昷f4 g 8 with a sharp game and chances for both sides（Furman－ Suetin，27th USSR Ch．，Tallinn 1960）．

Averbakh－Suetin，from the same tournament，developed more quietly： 14
 17 \＆f4 コg8 18 Qel Qb4 19 Qd6＋ Qxd6 20 \＆xd6 Qd5 with a roughly equal ending．
6.12 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Df6 4 e3 e6 5 定xc4 c5 6 垍e2 a6 7 dxc5是xc5 \(80-0\) ©c6 9 e4 b5）

\section*{10 臽b3}

10 \＆d3 allows Black to exchange the bishop by \(10 \ldots\) Qb4 11 Ed1 \()^{2 x d}\)

\[
10 \ldots \text { e5 }
\]

10．．．8b711e5 ©d712 Qc3 楼c713 \＆f4 乌a5（if 13．．．乌d4 14 Qxd4 \＆xd4 15 玉acl；13．．．g5？！leads to great com－ plications，most probably favourable to
 ©h1！） 14 \＆c2 Ec8（Vera－Espinoza， Durango 1989） 15 Qg5 h6 16 wh5 0－0 17 Oge4 with a strong position for White．


11 \＆ 3
White achieves nothing by 11 h 3是b712 2 c 3 分d4．

The attempt by 11 wiv2 to create threats on the c－file does not succeed： 11．．．监b6！ 12 §g5 9d4（13 Ecl was threatened） 13 §xd4 \＆xd4 14 §xf6．It appears that Black has to recapture with the pawn，since if he takes with the queen there follows 15 ㅇd5 and then
 16 単c7．


16．．．0－0！This entire variation，ana－ lysed by Ravinsky in 1964，was re－ peated in Lengyel－Földi（Budapest

成xf1 20 xf1 l cl＋，and Black gains a decisive material advantage）18．．． 19 gxh3 \＆xb2 20 Qd2 \＆xal 21 Exal
 has to leave the rook at b8 in peace，and can merely regret his futile queen raid．

\section*{11 \\ 学b6}

White has the better chances after 11．．．Od4 12 Qxd4 \＆xd4 13 Ed1，but 11．．．\＆xe3 12 栄xe3 0－0 comes into consideration．After 13 Dbd2 \(\frac{\mathrm{W}}{\mathrm{i}} \mathrm{e} 714\)玉ac1 \＆b7 15 玉c5 Black succeeds by exchanges in neutralising the oppon－ ent＇s queenside initiative： \(15 \ldots\). Qd7 16
 19 Exc8 \＆xc8 20 䒼c3 是b7（Gulko－ Pr．Nikolic，Hastings 1989／90）．
\[
12 \Delta c 3
\]

The tactical 12 － \(\mathbf{c 1}\) \＆xe3 13 §xf7＋ \＄xf7 14 Exc6 does not succeed after




13 fxe3
In view of the positional threat of Qd5，White＇s position is the more promising．Nogueiras－Spraggett（Szirak

1986）continued 13．．．0－0 14 Qd5 \(Q x d 5\) 15 exd5 ©a5 16 Qxe5 \(0 \times \mathrm{xb} 317 \mathrm{axb} 3\)

 El5－White has supported his pawns and stands better．
> 6.2 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e 3 e6 5 \＆xc4 c5 6 堂e2 a6 7 dxc 5 \＆xc5）

\section*{8 e4}

After White castles this usually transposes into variation 6．1，e．g． 8．．． 0 c6 9 e5 \(0 \mathrm{~g} 4100-0 \mathrm{wic7} 11\) ef4， or 8．．．b5 9 \＆d3 Qbd7 1000 \＆b7 11 Qbd2．Of independent significance is the variation in which White hastens to seize space in the centre．
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline 8 & &  \\
\hline 9 & e5 & Qg4 \\
\hline 10 & 0－0 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

White deliberately allow a com－ bination by which Black wins the exchange．


10
\[
0 \times 12
\]

If Black first drives back the bishop by \(10 . . . \mathrm{b} 5\) ，in order to take on f 2 later， then \(11 \mathrm{\rho} \mathrm{~b} 3\) ！is strong，and if \(11 . .9 \times f 2\) （11．．． exf 2 12 h1 leads to a similar
position，since the threat of h2－h3 forces Black to retreat his bishop） 12 Qc3！， and after any discovery by the knight White has good attacking chances．

\section*{11 Oc3！}

Thirty years after my analysis，this move，allowing the discovered check （without ．．．b5 and 是b3 first being played）was made in I．Sokolov－ Brenninkmeijer（Holland 1995）．

After 11 －xf2 \＆ \(\mathrm{ef} 2+12\) 额xf2 b5 （one of White＇s bishops is lost，but the point of his plan becomes clear after his next move） 13 b3 0－0（prudently de－ clining the gift；after 13．．．bxc4 14 皿a3！ Black is prevented from castling） 14
 \(16 \mathrm{bxc4}\) ，but little is promised by the pawn sacrifice 16 Qbd2 cxb3 17 0xb3） 16．．． Wxc 417 bxc 4 material equality is restored（analysis）．
\[
11 \text {... De4+ }
\]

A development of the above vari－ ation was seen in I．Sokolov－Kir． Georgiev（Tilburg 1994）：11．．．b5 12 \＆b3 De4＋ 13 安h1 ©xc3 14 bxc3 h6 15 Qd4 粪e7 16 䒼g4 g6 17 臽e3 h5 18

 24 畨g5，and White won．

I．Sokolov－Brenninkmeijer continued 12 \＄h1 \(0 x 3\)（if 12．．． \(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{f}} 2+\) there fol－ lows 13 Exf2 \＆xf2 14 Qe4 \＆．c5 15是e3 皿e716 昷g5！0－0 17 Qf6＋！gxf6
 21 dl，and Black has no defence－ Sokolov） 13 bxc3 \＆e7 14 Qg5！显xg5 15 是xg5 Qc6 16 靼h5 h6（if 16．．． Qxe5？ 17 \＆f4 喓xc4 18 是xe5 0－0 19

 fice on e6 was threatened） 20 监xe5嚐xc4 21 Ifdl，and White won．

\section*{7 4．．．臬g4 Variation}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
1 & d 4 & d 5 \\
2 & c 4 & \(\mathrm{dxc4}\) \\
3 & \(\sum \mathrm{f} 3\) & \(\sum \mathrm{f6}\) \\
4 & e 3 & \(\sum \mathrm{~g} 4\)
\end{tabular}

With this variation we begin consid－ ering deviations by Black from the Classical Variation．By developing his bishop at g 4 ，he aims to solve one of the main problems of the Queen＇s Gambit．


White can capture immediately on c4，or first drive back the bishop：

5 会xc4（7．1）
5 h 3 置h5 6 g 4 s g 67 © D 5 （7．2）－ p． 146

After 5 Qbd2（intending to take on c4 with the knight） \(5 \ldots\). bd7 6 Dxc4 e6
 घc8 chances are equal（Osnos－Boris－ enko，32nd USSR Ch．，Kiev 1964／5）．
7.1 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e 3回g4）

\section*{5 \＆xc4 e6}

6 \＆xf7＋was threatened．We now consider the following continuations：

6 對b3（7．11）
6 h3 \＆h5 7 Qc3 or 7 g4（7．12）－ p． 129

6 2c3（7．13）－p． 143
\(60-0\)（7．14）－p． 144
6 Obd2（7．15）－p． 145
If 6 a3（with the idea of meeting ．．．c7－c5 with the standard manoeurre dxc5，b2－b4 and Sb2），Black should reply \(6 \ldots \triangleq b d 7\) ，preparing e6－e5．The loss of time prevents White from gain－ ing an opening advantage．
7.11 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Df6 4


6 学b3
At one time the 4．．．ig4 variation was considered unfavourable for Black on account of this queen sortie．Now the evaluation has changed，and most players prefer the developing moves examined in the other sections．

6
\＆xf3
The sacrifice of the b7 pawn without first exchanging on f 3 is unjustified：

 （Spassky－Klaman，Leningrad 1963）．
\[
7 \text { gxf3 Qbd7! }
\]

An absolutely correct sacrifice．If Black defends the pawn，he has to withstand a strong attack：

7．．．b6（this weakens the queenside） 8 Qc3 \＆e7 9 d 5 （White wants to open the position，to exploit his two bishops）
 12 \＆d2 a6（an attempt to restrict the white bishops by advancing the pawns）
 \＆b4，or \(14 \ldots\) ．．． xd 515 w xd 5 Qd7 16

显c3 g6 17 0－0－0 with a strong attack－ ing position） 15 \＆c3 with advantage to White（I．Zaitsev－Spassky，USSR Ch．1／2－ Final 1960）＊．

Here and later an asterisk is used to indicate games in which h2－h3 and ．．．ih5 have already been played，when therefore the white pawn is not at h2， but at \(h 3\) ．

7．．．\({ }^{\mathbf{W}} \mathrm{c}\) c8（this move was also em－ ployed by the young Spassky） 8 Dc3 （White also gains a strong position after \(8 \mathrm{f4} 669\) Qc3 气e7 10 e4 0－0 11 £e3 a5 12 日al \＆b4 13 §d3 气a6 14 a3
 Shishkin－Spassky，Kislovodsk 1960） 8．．．Qbd7 9 e4 Ob6 10 \＆e2 昷e7 11 \＆e3 0－0 12 Excl wd7 \(130-0\) with the better game for White（Evans－Simos， Hollywood 1954）．

7．．．c5．Now 8 䦠xb7 Qbd7 leads to positions examined below．Of indepen－ dent significance are lines where White does not take the b7 pawn，or does this later：
 Qbd7 11 Qd2 \(\mathbf{Z c} 812\) Eg1 g6 13
 Shiyanovsky，30th USSR Ch．，Yerevan 1962）with an equal game；
（b） 8 f 4 cxd 4 ．If now \(9 \mathrm{wxb7} 0 \mathrm{bd} 7\) 10 exd4 it transpires that White has de－ prived his bishop of the important square f 4 ．As in the main line Black can continue ．．．\＆e7，．．．0－0 and then ．．． Q b6－ d5 with the initiative．

\section*{8 类xb7}

Declining the pawn gives Black a good game，for example：

8 Qc3 Qb6（in Panno－Olafsson，Los Angeles 1963，Black，leaving his b7 pawn en prise，continued his develop－ ment with 8．．．＠e7 9 f4 0－0 10 ＠e2 c5 11 d 5 ，and then carried out a clever gambit idea：11．．．c4！ 12 \＆xc4 exd5 13

Qxd5 Qxd5 14 是xd5 Qc5 15 㥩c4 Wivill 16 e4 5 ac8 with compensation for the pawn） 9 \＆e2 \＆e7（9．．．g6 is dubious on account of 10 Qe4，Ehlvest－Fomin－ ykh，Helsinki 1992，and if 10．．．\＆g7 11 Oc5 with advantage to White；possible is \(9 \ldots . . c 510 \mathrm{dxc} 5\) \＆xc5 11 Qa4 Qxa4
 Qf6 15 玉gl g6 16 wh4 ©d5 with equal chances，Bukic－Ivkov，Yugoslavia 1963）：

（a） 10 \＆ \(\mathrm{d} 20-011\) ㅍd1（or \(110-0-0\) c5 12 dxc 5 \＆xc5 13 Ehg1 皆e7 14 Eg5 Efd8 15 Edg1 g6 with chances for both sides，Kaldor－Ghitescu，Spain 1975） 11．．．c5（after exchanging the d4 pawn， Black completes his mobilisation） 12 dxc5 \＆xc5 13 0－0 \({ }^{\text {anc8．Gligoric－Smys－}}\) lov（Hastings 1962／3）continued 14
 17 \＆c3 घxdl！（this exchange of rooks is essential；17．．．Qbd5？loses to 18 Exd5！） 18 Wxd1 Qbd5 19 \＆d2 a6 20



 position is preferable；after 27 \＆el Exdl 28 气xdl \(\uparrow\) b4！the knight proved stronger than the bishop；
（b）100－0 0－0 11 Ed1 er b 8 ，and：
（bl） 12 e4（this attempt to begin play in the centre encounters an energetic
response） \(12 \ldots \mathrm{c} 513 \mathrm{dxc} 5\) 是xc5 14 f 4 e5 15 f5 a6 16 皿e3 是xe3 17 fxe3 wa7！，and the white king was obliged to defend the e3 pawn（Alatortsev－ Zakharov，Yalta 1962）；
（b2） \(12 \& \mathrm{~d} 2\) is better，although even then after \(12 \ldots \mathrm{c} 513 \mathrm{dxc} 5\) 显xc5 14
 17 \＆el mac8 and Black＇s chances are not worse（Gheorghiu－Zakharov， Vrnjacka Banja 1963）＊；
（c） \(10 \mathrm{f4} \mathrm{c} 511\) §f3 \(0-0!12 \mathrm{dxc} 5\)（if


 chances for both sides（Szabo－Larsen， Portoroz 1958）．

8 Eg1，played in Quinones－Stein （Amsterdam 1964）is unpromising for White．After 8．．．＠b6 9 §e2 g6 10 ＠d2 a5（here this plan is justified：the ad－ vance of the f－pawn is not threatened， and besides，he is intending to fian－ chetto his bishop） 11 Qc3 a4 12 蹧c2 a 3 ！ 13 bxa 3 是g7 14 日l \(\mathrm{cl} 0-0\) Black obtained good counterplay．
\[
8 \quad \ldots \quad \text { c5 }
\]


White＇s queen，stuck in enemy terri－ tory，is for a time shut out of the game． What is better for him：in the interests
of mobilisation to make a useful move but allow the exchange on d 4 ，or him－ self to exchange on c5？In the first case White＇s pawn structure in the centre and on the kingside is significantly weakened．In the second case he falls behind in development．

We will consider these possibilities in the following order：

9 2c3（7．111）
9 g1（7．112）－p． 126
\(90-0\)（7．113）－p． 126
9 dxc 5 （7．114）－p． 127
7.111 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4
 gxf3 Qbd7 8 畨xb7 c5）
\[
9 \text { Dc3 cxd4 }
\]

This is also the strongest reply to 9 f4．Black breaks up the enemy pawns and prepares ．．．\(\triangle \mathrm{b} 6-\mathrm{d} 5\) ．

If 9．．．e9 7 there can follow 10 d 5 （10 dxc5 \({ }^{2} \mathrm{xc} 511 \mathrm{f} 4\) can also be consid－ ered，along the lines of Tal－ Shiyanovsky examined below，but with an extra tempo for White）：

（a）10．．．0－0 11 dxe6 Qe5 12 exf7＋ ゆh8 13 요 \(\mathrm{Exf7} 14 \mathrm{f4}\) ，and Black does not have compensation for the lost material（Smolny－Sushkov，Leningrad 1963）；
（b） \(10 \ldots . . \square b 8\) is another way of sacri－ ficing a second pawn－ 11 営xa7（after 11 寝a6 exd5 12 是xd5 0－0 13 当e2 Qe5 14 e4 是d6 15 f 4 Qg6 Black has a substantial lead in development for the pawn，Spassky－Hort，Palma de Mallorca 1969） 11 ．．．\(\Xi \mathrm{a} 8\)（to be considered is 11 ．．． exd5 12 Qxd5 \(0 x d 513\)＠xd5 0－0 14
 an attacking position，BirbragerShakh－ Zade，USSR 1964） 12 當b7 Eb8 13㟶a6 玉a8，and now：
（bl） 14 唓c6 0－0！ 15 dxe6 Qe5 16
 19 曾f5 ©xf7 20 \＆xf7 日xf7 and for the sacrificed material Black has excellent attacking chances（Portisch－Gheorghiu， Hungary v．Romania 1963）；
临a6 ©b8（if 16．．．0－0 17 dxe6 Qb8 18

 the threat of the passed a－pawn＇s further advance gives White a clear advantage；
（c）10．．．exd5 \(110 \times \mathrm{xd} 50-0\) is more promising for Black：

（cl） 12 f 4 Qxd5 13 敞xd5 \＆f6 14
 itiative for the sacrificed pawn（Donner－ Johannessen，Halle 1963）；
（c2）Pomar－Palasios（Spain 1964） concluded with a spectacular attack： 12
 Exb2 15 eb3（White is intending to castle long，but a series of tactical blows awaits him）15．．． De \(^{2}\) ！ \(160-0-0\)（if 16
 of ．．．De5，or 16 Edl c4！ 17 ＠xc4 Qxd2 18 Exd2 \(\Xi \mathrm{b} 1+19\) Ed1 Wb4＋



 threat of ．．．⿷axa2）20．．．Wra6 21 fxe4 Qd3＋22 ©bl Qxf2，and Black won．

Let us now analyse the sacrifice of the second pawn on the 9th move－ 9．．．\＃b8 10 皆xa7 Ea （preferable to \(10 \ldots\) \＆e7 11 0－0 0－0 12 \＆e2！，when Black has insufficient compensation for the lost material（Uhlmann－Polugayev－ sky，Bad Liebenstein 1963） 11 橎b
 \＆d6（Minev－Bobotsov，Bulgaria 1964）．
\[
10 \text { exd4 §d6 }
\]

Black prevents iff4．
After 10．．．昷e7 11 \＆f4 0－0 12 \＆c7 White retains his extra pawn：
（a）12．．．wrc8？ 13 四a6！we8 1400 with advantage to White（Gligoric－ Kozomara，Sarajevo 1963）；
（b）12．．． W e8，and now：
（bl）130－0－0 Qb6 14 \＆b5（forcing the exchange of queens） \(14 \ldots \mathrm{~W}\) c8 15誛xc8（a more complicated game results from 15 \＆ 06 霊d7 16 bl 0 bd5 17 Qxd5 Qxd5 18 \＆e5，Johannsson－ Gaprindashvili，Reykjavik 1964，and now 18．．．\(\pm f d 8\) and ．．．＠f6）15．．．玉axc8 16 \＆xb6 axb6 17 bl \(\mathbf{E f d} 8\) ．White has retained his extra pawn，but with op－ posite－colour bishops and numerous pawn＇islands＇the most probable out－ come is a draw（Zilber－Shiyanovsky， Kiev 1963）；
（b2） 13 \＆b5 \＆b4 14 \＆e5（Euwe recommended \(140-0\) ，and if \(14 \ldots\) ．．． W 7

15 \＆g3，retaining the pawn） \(14 \ldots\) ．．． w c8

 with chances for both sides（Khodos－ Birbrager，USSR Ch． \(1 / 2\)－Final 1964）．

10．．．Eb8 led to an extremely sharp position in Maslov－Spassky（USSR Ch． 1／2－Final 1963）： 11 畾xa7 是d6 12 Qb5昷b4＋13 安f1 日c8 14 \＆e2 ©d5 15
 Q7f6 19 是d2 Qh5 20 f 4 ！Qhxf4 21 \＆d1 粕f6 22 a4 業f5．White is two pass－ ed pawns to the good，which obliges Black to succeed with his attack．


\section*{11 De4}

Other continuations：
11 Ob5 \＆b4＋ 12 fif 0－0，and：
（a） 13 Egl （Bisguier－Van Scheltinga， Beverwijk 1962），and by 13．．．巴c8 Black would have gained a couple of tempi compared with Maslov－Spassky and gained strong counterplay；
（b） 13 £f4 Qb6 14 ＠e2 Qbd5 15 ©g3 a6 with advantage to Black（Shats－ kes－Ageichenko，Moscow 1964）－after
 the knight perished in enemy territory．

11 \＆d2（before playing his knight to b5，White takes measures against the check at b4）11．．．0－0 12 Qb5 Qb6 13

昷b3 a6 14 Qxd6 wivd6（threatening 15．．．afb8）．White has two bishops，but the chances are with Black（Gadalinski－ Porebski，Poland 1963）．

11 \＆e3 0－0 \(120-0\) Qb6，and Black would appear to have sufficient com－ pensation for the sacrificed pawn．

\section*{11 छg1：}

（a）11．．．g6 is strongly met by 12皿h6！，e．g．12．．．玉b8 13 世xa7 ■xb2 14 Qb5！when the rook is in danger，and meanwhile 15 \＆g7 and 16 \＆xf6 is threatened；
（b）11．．．0－0 12 皿h6 g6（this ex－ change sacrifice is forced；if \(12 \ldots\) Qe8 13 需e4） 13 ＠xf8 \＆xf8．White has a material advantage，but from the practi－ cal viewpoint Black＇s activity cannot be underestimated（Khodos－Zilber，USSR Ch．1／2－Final 1964）；
（c）11．．．Eb8 12 業xa7 0－0 is an un－ clear pawn sacrifice（Artsukevich－ Korolev，Leningrad 1963）．

11 f4 0－0 12 §b3 Qb6（better 12．．．Oh5！with double－edged play－ Pachman） 13 企f3 Ec8 14 0－0 © E 415 De2 分f5 16 昷e3 18 光g4（Uhlmann－Bukic，Sarajevo 1964）．White has consolidated，and in view of the threatened manoeuvre \(0 g 3\)－ e4（h5）he has the advantage．
\[
11 \ldots \text {... }
\]

11．．．䀂 7 is weak in view of 12 \＆f4．
12 fxe4

 Black＇s active position compensates for the sacrificed pawn． 17 晋a6？！is strongly met by 17．．．Qe4（Chernikov－ Blagidze，Baku 1964）．

Blagidze－Klavins（Tbilisi 1962）now continued 12．．．0－0 13 e5 Qb6 14 ＠d3定b4＋15 © 2 ，when Black blockaded the central pawn with \(15 \ldots . \mathrm{D}^{2}\) ，al－ though he could well have taken it： 15 ．．．
 （or \(17 \ldots\) ab8） 18 皿e3 \＆ L 5 with an equal game．

7．112（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 乌f6 4 e3 \＆g4 5 ＠xc4 e6 6 畄b3 ※xf3 7 gxf3 Qbd7 8 当xb7c5）

\section*{9 \＃g1}

White wants to delay the opponent＇s kingside development．


If 10 ．．．cxd4 11 exd4 \({ }^{\text {Pd }} 6\)（by analogy with variation 7．111）White gains the advantage by 12 园 6 ！－this is the idea of 9 Eg ．

11 dxc5
11 d 5 fails to \(11 \ldots\) ．． 5 （ 12 dxe6 Eb8！）．
\[
11 \text { 曹c6+ } 9 \times 5
\]

12 栄 \(\mathrm{b} 5+\) comes into consideration （Pachman）．
\[
12 \ldots . \quad \text {.. }
\]
 move 13 f 4 ，ensuring the return of his queen．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
13 & \text { f4 } \\
14 & \text { \&fe4! }
\end{array}
\]

After 14 Qxe4？玉c8 15 㬐b5 a6 the queen is lost．


Khodos－Tal（30th USSR Ch．，Yere－ van 1962）now continued \(14 . . .{ }^{\text {Ebb }} 15\)

 Eg5 f5 21 e4 \({ }^{\circ} \mathrm{g} 7\) ，when White＇s bishop at c8 was surrounded，and he resigned．As shown by Shamkovich，he should have given up his queen for rook and bishop－16 Wxc5 1 xc5 17 Qxc5
 \＆c3，when the outcome is still unclear．

Tal in turn could have played more strongly with \(14 . . .0 \times \mathrm{xc} 3\) ！ 15 bxc 3 and only now \(15 . . . \pm b 8\) ，after which Black has the advantage（ 16 \＆ a 3 曾a5）
7.113 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 §f3 \(\mathrm{Df}_{\mathrm{f}} 4\) e3 \＆g4 5 定xc4 e6 6 䒼b3 是xf3 7 gxf3 Qbd7 8 类xb7c5）
\[
\begin{array}{rll}
9 & 0-0 & \text { cxd4 } \\
10 & \Xi d 1 &
\end{array}
\]

An idea of Volovich．By returning the pawn，White brings his bishop into play and，what is very important，opens the d－file．

As shown by Volovich－Gurevich （Yalta 1964）Black should not take the pawn．After 10．．．dxe3 11 是xe3

（not \(14 \ldots \Xi x b 2\) ？ 15 乌d4 and 16 ＠xf6） 15 \＆xd7＋©xd7 16 \＆xa7 White real－ ised his material advantage．


Smith－Engel（corr．1966）went 10．．． Eb8 11 宸xa7 是c5 12 装a4 \(0-013\)

 when Black had reasonable compen－ sation for the missing pawn．

Also to be considered is my old rec－ ommendation of \(10 \ldots\) ．．． 5 ，and if 11 exd4 \＆\({ }^{\text {b }} \mathrm{b} 6\).
7.114 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 \＆g4 5 \＆xc4 e6 6 腾b3 \＆xf3 7 gxf3 亿bd7 8 書xb7c5）

\section*{9 dxc5}

White does not allow his pawns to be spoiled，but he loses time．
\[
\begin{array}{rll}
9 & \ldots & \& x c 5 \\
10 & \mathrm{f} 4
\end{array}
\]

So that the queen will be able to re－ turn to the kingside．After \(100 \mathrm{c} 30-0\) 11 Wb3，with the intention of playing dd2 and castling queenside，Black can reply \(11 \ldots\) ．．． threatened，then \(13 \ldots\) ．． exe \(^{2}\) and ．．．滥 \(\times 4\) ）
 when he maintains strong pressure．
\[
\begin{gathered}
10 \ldots \\
\text { The alternative is } \\
10 . . . \pm b 8:
\end{gathered}
\]

 \＆g2 e5 14 b3 e4？（of course，Black should not relieve the tension in the centre；correct is \(14 \ldots\) ．．exf4，or \(14 \ldots \Xi \mathrm{~b} 6\) 15 \＆b2 exf4，when after 16 鲨xf4 Qh5 he gains counterplay－H．Müller） 15
 \％h1 Qxc4 19 bxc4 and White retained his material advantage（Lubensky－ Lenchiner，Rovno 1963）；
 Qb6 14 \＆d3 Qbd5 15 \＆b2 Ec8 16
 pawn Black has an active position（Elis－ kases－Schweber，Mar del Plata 1968）．

11 0－0
A risky continuation，to say the least， since Black can separate the white queen from the kingside defenders．

Other possibilities：
11 © 3 ，and now：
（a）11．．．छb8 12 断 f ：
（al）12．．．\＆b4 13 0－0 \＆xc3 14 bxc3
 sharp play and chances for both sides （Bukic－Damjanovic，Yugoslavia 1963）＊；
（a2）12．．． W ＂c 713 \＆b3 ib4，when Tal－Shiyanovsky（30th USSR Ch．， Yerevan 1962），which is considered the origin of this variation，continued 14

ㅇd2（it is not essential for White to defend his knight； 14 0－0 comes seriously into consideration） \(14 \ldots \mathrm{c} 5\) 15 \＆c2 \＆\({ }^{2} 16\) Eb1 日fd8（Black＇s initiative fully compensates for the pawn） 17 鮆e2：

 Qxe4 20 對d3 \＆ \(\mathrm{xc} 3+\) ．

Here，as shown by Shiyanovsky，af－ ter the strongest move \(21 \mathrm{bxc} 3 \mathrm{Exb} 1+\)
 f 5 the probable outcome is a draw．

Tal incorrectly played 21 e2，when 21．．．f5 22 Ehcl 区d8 23 Еxc3 We7！ 24 wc2 wh4 25 Efl could have led to a slight advantage for Black after 25．．．


Let us return to the last diagram and play 17．．．Da4．After 18 \＆xa4 Exd2 19
 Exbl＋22 \(\&\) dl Qe4 Black has the ad－ vantage，so White would have had to give up his b2 pawn with \(180-0\) ．
（b） \(11 . . . \mathrm{bb}^{2}\) was played in Quin－ teros－Miles（Amsterdam 1974）．After 12 \＆e2 Black＇arrested＇the enemy queen by \(12 \ldots\) fd 5 ，and \(130-0\) wh

 strong threats－Miles） \(15 \ldots .0 \times 1316\) bxc3 f5 17 \＆g2 \(\mathbf{\Xi f 6}\) enabled him to build up an attack（if 18 we2 ©d5！）．

With 11 簤2 White can seize the opportunity to return his queen to the kingside，when there follows \(11 . . . \pm \mathrm{m}\) ：

（a） 12 b3 Qb6 \(130-0\) 〇xc4 14 bxc4 We7 and Black gains sufficient com－ pensation for the pawn（Spassky－ Gurgenidze，USSR Ch．½－Final 1963）；
（b）12 0－0（Foguelman－Smyslov， Amsterdam 1964）．After 12．．．©xe3 13

 Black restored material equality and gained a slight advantage．
```

                                    1 1
    0 d 5

```


\section*{12 － 3}

Foguelman－Bronstein（Amsterdam 1964）went 12 ㄹd（a dubious move：
the queen＇s path to the kingside has been cut off，and the rook should not be moved away）12．．．ab8 13 学c6 細h4 （threatening 14．．．畒g4＋，so that White has no time to take on d7） 140 c 3 （if
 Qb6 17 曾xc5 \({ }^{\text {Efc }} 8\) with a great advan－ tage to Black）14．．．巴b6！ 15 wxd7 Qxf4！ 16 Qe2（the knight cannot be taken on account of mate； 16 £fl also does not help in view of \(16 \ldots\) ．． \(\mathrm{W} \mathrm{g} 4+17\)
多g2 ©xf2 18 Ed4 \(2 \mathrm{~g} 4!\) ，and Black won．
 Wa4 exd5 Black has good chances of an attack against the opponent＇s weakened kingside．

If White returns his queen to the de－ fence of the kingside via b3－12 \({ }^{\mathrm{W}} \mathrm{b} 3\) Eb8（also interesting is 12．．． 4 h4 13
 16 铛 f f5，again with attacking chances for the pawn，Stupen－Kots，USSR 1962） 13 崰dl Black replies 13．．．\(\triangle 7 \mathrm{~b} 6\) ，and after 14 \＆e2（weaker is 14 气b3 f5！）he has the initiative，but White is a pawn up with chances of a successful defence．

Now after 12．．．Eb8！ 13 觜c6 \＃̈b6 14 \＆xd5（suggested by B．Vladimirov） 14．．．Exc6 15 ＠xc6 Qf6 16 \＆g2 White has rook，bishop and pawn for the queen，and a complicated struggle is in prospect．
7.12 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Df6 4

\begin{tabular}{llll}
6 & h3 & Sh5 \\
7 & Qc3
\end{tabular}

The variation with the exchange of the bishop at g6－7 g4 \＆g6 8 De5 Qbd7（8．．．皿e4 comes into consider－ ation） 9 Qxg6 hxg6 is not so harmless：

（a） \(10 \mathrm{w} f\) ，and now：
（a1） \(10 \ldots \mathrm{c} 5 \quad 11 \quad 0-0\) cxd4 12 exd4皿e713 Oc3 Qb6 14 定 \(\mathrm{b} 5+1515\)
 18 当g2 単xg2 +19 富xg2 Qd5 20 c 4 Qxe3＋21 fxe3 with the initiative for White in the ending（Hort－Miles， Amsterdam 1978）；
（a2） \(10 \ldots\) bb8 11 Qc3 c5 12 d 5 exd5 13 Qxd5 \＆d6 14 g5 Qe5 15 Qxf6＋
 Qc6（Gerusel－Hübner，Busum 1969）， and after 19 \＆ d 2 ，preparing queenside castling，both sides have chances；
（b） 10 Qc3 \＆e7 11 箵 f 3 c 612 会d2㫮c7 13 \＆b3 Qd5 14 Qxd5 cxd5 15 Ecl wb6 16 安f1 0－0 17 h 4 Qf6 18 h 5 Qe4 with chances for both sides （Portisch－Padevsky，Havana 1964）．

7 㟶b3 \＆xf3 8 gxf3 leads to a posi－ tion from variation 7.11 ，with the dif－ ference that the pawn is not at h2，but h3．In certain cases（mainly when Black attacks on the kingside）this may be significant．
\(70-0\) and 7 －0bd2 usually lead to positions from sections 7.14 and 7.15 ． Of course，here too the inclusion of the moves h2－h3 and ．．．eh5 has its nuances．We should mention Rubinetti－ Miles（Buenos Aires 1979），which went \(70-0\) Qbd7 8 b3 c5 9 dxc5＠xc5 10

Q 0 b2 0－0 11 Qbd2 当e7 12 a3 a5 13 e4
 double－edged play（compare with Botvinnik－Smyslov in variation 7．15， p．146）．


Black has available several replies：
7．．．Qbd7（7．121）
7．．．a6（7．122）－p． 138
7．．． 0 c6（7．123）－p． 143
7．．．c5 has not been refuted，yet it is rarely played：
（a）in Klasups－Zilber（Riga 1963） White replied with the energetic 8
 after 10．．．a6 11 ©xg6 hxg6 12 皿e2 b5 Black obtained a good position；
（b） 8 ＠b5＋is an interesting try，and if 8．．． 0 bd7 9 g 4 臽g6 10 dxc 5 \＆xc5 11 g5，aiming to exploit the pin on the knight．After 11．．．a6（if 11．．． 2 d5 12 De5 D5b6 13 ＠a4） 12 gxf6 axb5 13
 （ \(15 . .\). 皿e4 \(16 \Xi \mathrm{gl}\) ） 16 ggl White is a pawn up．
7.121 （ 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 Qf6 4 e3 \＆g 45 国xc4e6 6 h 3 昷h5 7 Qc3）

Other continuations：
8 e4，when Black has：
（a） 8 ．．．e5，exploiting the fact that f 7 is securely defended：

（al） 9 wh（if White continues his development，then ．．．9d6，．．．0－0 and ．．． W e7 7 with a satisfactory position for Black）9．．．exd4 10 Qxd4 ©c5，and un－ expectedly White loses material；
（a2） 9 g 4 meets with a vigorous re－ joinder：9．．．exd4（not 9．．．\＆g6 10 dxe5 Qxe4 11 \＆xf7＋！ 10 e5 dxc3（10．．．Qg8 11 Uxd4 favours White） 11 gxh5 \(Q \mathrm{~b} 6\) ！ with advantage to Black（analysis）；
（a3） 9 dxe 5 §xf3 10 数xf3 Qxe5 11
 still has to fight for equality；
（a4） 9 d5！？is untried；
（b） \(8 \ldots .\). b6：

（bl） 9 ＠b3 \(\& x f 310\) gxf3（the pawn sacrifice 10 曾xf3 can also be consid－ ered） 10 ．．．c5 11 §e3 cxd4 12 熦xd4
宴e2 with the more promising position for White（Marovic－Mestrovic，Yugo－ slavia 1963）；
 （White sacrifices a pawn）11．．．㟶xd4 12显b5＋Qfd7 13 峟e2 是e7 14 思d1 （Kozma－Smejkal，Czechoslovakia 1964）． After 14．．． 15 Exd7！Black managed to parry the attack： \(15 \ldots\). ．．．xd7 16 是xd7＋© \({ }^{\circ}\) d8（forced，since if \(16 \ldots\)


 but with two minor pieces for rook and pawn，White has the better chances；
（c） \(8 \ldots\) ．．．\({ }^{\text {b }} 4\) ：

（c1） 9 e5 Qd5 10 \＆xd5（or 10 ＠d2 Q7b6 11 是d3 0－0 12 a 3 Qxc3 13 bxc3定e7 14 挡c2 显g6 15 h 4 c 516 h 5 是xd3 17 当xd3 Ec8 with an equal position， Lerner－Lukin，USSR Ch．1991）10．．． exd5 11 粕b3 \(e^{2 x c} 3+\)（11．．．c5 is shar－ per） 12 bxc3 0 b6 with an equal game；
（c2） 9 \＆d3 c5（9．．．e5 is probably
 12 渻xd7＋Qfxd7 13 Qxe5 Qxe5， Meissner－Kraut，Altensteig 1993） 10 a3 ＠a5 11 b4 cxd4（after 11．．．cxb4 12

Qb5 bxa3＋ 13 fl White has an active position for the pawn－Matulovic） 12 Qb5 요7 13 企c2 是b8 14 Qbxd4 0－0 15 \＆b2 a5 16 Qd2 axb4 17 axb4 Exal＋ 18 \＆xal \＆d6 19 当b3 当e7 20 \＆c3 \＆g6 with roughly equal chances （I．Sokolov－Matulovic，Yugoslavia 1988）．

8 g 4 \＆g6 9 Qh4（to exchange the black bishop）9．．．\＆e4（or 9．．．乌b6 10 Qxg6 hxg6 11 \＆e2 c5！，Moskalenko－ Matulovic，Yugoslavia 1988） 10 Qxe4 Qxe4 11 Qf3 h5 12 \＆ d 3 Qg5！ 13 gxh 5 Qxf3 +14 wxf3 Qe5 15 we4 Qxd3＋ 16 枼xd3 当d5 17 e4 学xh5 18 学e2 wa5＋ 19 fl 0－0－0．Black＇s position is preferable（Bondarevsky－Krogius， Sochi 1964）．

8 \＆e2，relieving the pin on the knight：
（a）8．．．ᄋg6 \(90-0\) \＆e7（9．．．』d6！？－ Gligoric） 10 Qh4！0－0 11 Qxg6 hxg6 12 e4 c6 13 ＠e3 e5 14 Ecl with the better position for White（Gligoric－ Ghitescu，Busum 1969）；
（b）8．．．c5 9 d 5 exd5 \(109 \mathrm{xd5}\)＠d6 11 Qf4 \＆xf4 12 exf4 \＆g6 13 0－0 0－0 14 De5（Ghitescu－Matulovic，Wijk aan Zee 1974），and White＇s position is preferable；
（c）8．．．ㅇd6 9 e4（90－0 transposes into the main line） 9 ．．．eb4！ 10 e5 Qd5 11 世b3 c5 \(120-0\)＠xc3 13 bxc 3 畄b6！ with chances for both sides（Gligoric－ Matulovic，Novi Sad 1976）．

Now Black has：
8．．．\＆d6（7．1211）
8．．．＠e7（7．1212）－p． 137
If 8．．．\＆b4 the simplest is 9 獣b3 （9．．．当e7 10 a3 \＆xc3 11 bxc3）．
7.1211 （ 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 Df6
 Qbd7 \(80-0\) ）

8
\＆d6

\section*{9 e4}

This is more energetic than 9 \＆e2：
（a） \(9 . . . e 5\) ？fails to 10 dxe 5 Qxe5 11 Qxe5＠xe2 12 㟶a4＋；
 \(12 \mathrm{~d} 5 . \mathrm{h} 6 \quad 13\) \＆e3 \(0-0 \quad 14\) 【． cl a6 （Osnos－Kovacs，Debrecen 1969） 15峎b3！with advantage to White；
（c） \(9 . . . \& \mathrm{~g} 6\) ，when both 10 hh4 and 10 b3 e5 11 dxe5 \(0 x e 512\) Qd4 are possible；
（d）9．．．0－0 10 b3（in Korchnoi－ Matulovic，Ohrid 1972， 10 wb3 led to an advantage for White after 10．．． W c8？！ 11 g 4 Sg6 12 Qh4；Black should have played \(10 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 6\) ） 10 ．．．a6（a roughly equal position results from 10．．．世皆e7 11 ＠b2 \＆a3 12 \＆xa3 荲xa3 13 Qd2 \＆xe2 14 Wxe2 Ue7，Damjanovic－Matulovic， Sarajevo 1971，or \(10 \ldots . . c 511 \& b 2\) cxd4 12 ©xd4 isxe2 13 企xe2 a6 14 Efd
 Smyslov，Hastings 1972／3） 11 \＆b2 We7 12 Dd2（Flear recommends 12 Qe5）12．．．\＆xe2，and now：


 Qd1 a5 19 De3 a4 20 ¥c2 axb3 21 \(\operatorname{axb} 3 \mathrm{~g} 6\) with equal chances（Roman－ ishin－Matulovic，Novi Sad 1975）；
（d2） 13 Qxe2 b5（after the exchange of the dark－square bishops－13．．．丹a3
 some pressure on his opponent＇s queen－ side） 14 e4 \＆b4（14．．．e5 15 f 4 ！） 15 Qg3 with slightly the better chances for White（Skembris－Flear，Paris 1983）．

9 ．．．e5


White＇s main continuations are：
10 dxe5（7．12111）
10 \＆e2（7．12112）－p． 133
10 g4（7．12113）－p． 135
If White prevents the opening of the position by 10 d 5 ，then after \(10 \ldots 0-011\) \＆g5 a6 12 \＆e2 Black should consider 12．．．ee7，planning ．．．＠e8－d6．

10 Qb5 does not set Black any problems．After 10．．．0－0 11 Qxd6 cxd6 12 dxe5 dxe5 passive play by White in Khodos－Gurgenidze（USSR Ch． \(1 / 2\)－Final 1963）－ 13 玉el 営c7 14 \＆f1 0c5 al－ lowed Black to take the initiative．

The chances are roughly equal after 10 苗e3 0－0 11 Eel（Hort－Hubner，Ath－ ens \(1969 ; 11\) \＆e2 is considered below） 11．．．c6．

\footnotetext{
7.12111 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 \(\mathrm{Df}^{2}\)
 Qbd7 \(80-0\) \＆ d 69 e 4 e 5 ）
}

10 dxe5

White bases his plan on exploiting his active pawn chain on the kingside．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
10 & \cdots & \text { Qxe5 } \\
11 & \text { \&e2 } & \Delta x f 3+
\end{array}
\]
\(11 . .0-0\) leads to position from vari－ ation 7.12112 ．

Black can retreat his bishop with 11．．．定g6：
（a） 12 Qh4 §c5（not \(12 \ldots\) ．．．\(x\) e4 13 Qxe4 Oxe4 14 単a4＋；12．．．Qxe4 also
 Qxe4 cxb5 16 Qxd6＋断xd6 17㥩xb5＋） 13 Qxg6 hxg6 14 \＆g5 c6 15婁xd8＋Exd8 16 Efdl \(0-017\) fl Exdl +18 Exdl Qh7 19 \＆d8 b5 20 f 4
 advantage to White（Korchnoi－Szabo， Belgrade 1964）；
（b） 12 \＆ 3 0xf3 \(+(12 \ldots\) xe4？is again not possible for the same reason：

 （Ghitescu－Kovacs，Debrecen 1968） 15．．．c6 16 \＆d4 with the better position for White．

11．．．\(\& x f 3\) is of independent signifi－ cance，if after 12 这xf3 Black avoids the second exchange：
（a） \(12 \ldots\) 烸 e 713 \＆e2 0－0－0（13．．． Dg6 14 粕a4＋c6 15 f 4 ！－Marovic） 14
 （16．．．\＆d4 17 Еacl！） 17 ■ab1 \＆c5 （17．．．是xc3？ 18 监xa7） 18 \＆ 44 ，and White gained excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn（Boleslavsky－ Peterson，Moscow 1966）；
（b） \(12 \ldots 0-0 \quad 13\) \＆ \(\mathrm{e} 2 \mathrm{Og} 6 \quad 14 \mathrm{f} 4\)
 e5 De8 18 Qe4（Szabo－Haag，Budapest 1965），with the better position for White．
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline 12 & Sx13 & Qxf3 \\
\hline 13 & W \(\mathbf{4}\) x 3 & 巣e7 \\
\hline 14 & \＆ 14 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

14 \＃el can also be considered．
嶒e3 0－0 \(17 \mathrm{f4}\) 党e7 18 e5 White stands better（Taimanov－Matulovic，Mar del Plata 1970）．
\[
15 \text { 洷xf4 } 0-0
\]


Spassky－Szabo（Belgrade 1964）now


 Within a few moves the position simpli－ fied still further，but Black still did not manage to equalise：23．．．世e7 24 De4


\[
10 \text { \&e2 } 0-0
\]

The altemative is \(10 \ldots\) ．．．\(\times\) f 11 ＠xf3 exd4 12 Wxd4（or 12 Qb5 §e5 13 Qxd4 0－0，when Black has no difficul－ ties），and now：
（a） \(12 \ldots 0-013 \mathrm{~g} 3!\Xi \mathrm{E} 814\) \＆g2 a5
 thanks to his two bishops and mobile centre，White stands better；
（b）12．．．De5，when after 13 世e3（13 ©e2 immediately is not possible on
account of 13．．． \(\mathrm{Df}^{2}+\) and \(14 \ldots\) ．．．2h2＋） 13．．．c6 14 \＆ e 2 曾e7 or 13 燔a4＋c6 14昷e2 是c5 both sides have chances．


11 dxe5
If 11 \＆e3 Black releases the tension： 11．．．exd4 12 Qxd4 ixe2（12．．．今g6 13 f3） 13 怕 \(x=2\) Ee8 14 Qf5，and White＇s activity is extinguished by 14 ．．．©e5 15 ＠g5 c6 16 ■adl （Gligoric－Rukavina，Leningrad 1973）．

\section*{11 \\ \(0 \times 5\) \\ 12 Od4}

The most promising．
After 12 ©xe5 \＆xe2 13 情xe2 ©xe5 14 \＆g5 楼e8！？（this pressure on e4 is an attempt to gain more than by 14 ．．．c6 with an equal game，Rajkovic－Matulo－ vic，Yugoslavia 1975） 15 Efel \＆xc3 16 bxc3 we5 17 背e3 Efe8（of course， not 17．．．⿹xe4？ 18 \＆f4） 18 f3 h6 19
鲜4 \({ }^{\mathrm{w}} \mathrm{b} 6+\) ） 21 ．．．c6．Black has squeezed the maximum out of the position，but after 22 Eadl（the game went \(22 \Xi a b 1\) Ed7）chances would have been equal （Balashov－Miles，Tilburg 1977）．

An equal position results from 12

 Qce2 \＆xe3＋ 19 情xe3 Qd5 20 监d2

Qdf4（Gligoric－Matulovic，Yugoslavia 1975.

\section*{12}
\＆x 2
Other possibilities：
 into consideration，and also the plan of restricting the g6 bishop： 13 f 3 皿c5 14

 Stip 1979）13．．．今e7（after 13．．．Еe8 14 Qdb5 Qc6 15 Qxd6 cxd6 16 f3 White＇s position is the more promising， Portisch－Spassky，Candidates Match， Geneva 1977），and now：

（a） 14 Qf3（aiming for control of e5； here too the quiet 14 f 3 comes into consideration） \(14 \ldots\) ．．．xf3＋ 15 显xf3
 Ead1 \(\Xi \mathrm{fd} 819\) we3 with slightly the better prospects for White（Ljubojevic－ Andersson，Turin 1982）；
（b） 14 Qf5 \＆xf5 15 exf5 c6，when White has slightly the better chances after：
 18 Exd1 \＃d8 19 Exd8＋©xd8 20 g 4 with a favourable ending（Smyslov－ Matulovic，Palma de Mallorca 1970）；
（b2） 16 戦c2（avoiding the exchange） 16．．．h6 17 モadl Qed7 18 \＆h4 Еe8 19 \＆c4（Lukacs－Mikhalchishin，USSR 1978）．

12．．．ec5 13 Qb3（White has a minimal initiative after 13 \＆xh5 \(\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{K}} \mathrm{d} 4\) 14 乌d5 c5 15 \＆g5 Qed7 16 Eel h6 17 （e3！－Miles），and now：

 16 Ed1 楮e7 17 是g5 c6 18 Qd4 with the better position for White；
显xd1 15 合c5 是c2 16 是g5 favours White） 15 a4 exdl 16 Exdl a5（16．．． c6？is weak in view of 17 a5 全c7 18 f 4 Dg6 19 e5，Portisch－Miles，Lone Pine 1978，but 16．．a6 17 最g5 c6 18 显xf6 gxf6 19 Qd4 \(\Xi \mathrm{fd} 820\) Qf5 \(\sum \mathrm{d} 3\) is possible） 17 \＆g5 c6 18 家f1 Efd 19
 and Black gained a draw in this slightly inferior ending（Andersson－Miles，Wijk aan Zee 1979）．

\section*{13 雷xe2 Dg6}

Black must watch closely for the possible advance of the e－pawn，and therefore it is important to keep the f4 square under fire．

\section*{14 ㅍd1}

Alternatives：
14 Qf5 昷e5，and now：
（a） 15 f 4 §xc3 16 bxc3 \(\Xi \mathrm{e} 817\) e5 Qd5 18 誛f3 Qb6 19 Ed1 觜c8 （Lukacs－Marszalek，Budapest 1976） 20 De3！with the more active position for White：
 Qd5 寝d8（17．．．\＆d8，planning ．．．c7－c6， comes into consideration） 18 畨g4． White＇s position is preferable（Tarjan－ Cordes，corr．1979）．
 contrast to the previous variation， \(14 \ldots\) Qe5 does not threaten to weaken White＇s queenside by exchanging on c3，but 14．．．\({ }^{\text {eb }} 4\) comes into consider－ ation） 15 乌a4 濖e7（after 15．．．\＆e7 16 Ed1 㘳c8 17 当c2 ©e8 18 \＆e3 c5 19 Qbc3 White has pressure on the queen－ side and in the centre，Ivkov－Miles， Buenos Aires 1979） 16 0xc5 曹xc5 17 Qc3．White＇s position is preferable （Kuligowski－Ghitescu，Warsaw 1979）．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
14 & \(\because\) & 世＂c8 \\
15 & \＆g5 & \＆e5 \\
16 & 当 e 3 & Qh5
\end{tabular}

17 f 4 was threatened．
After 16．．．h6 17 ＠xf6 定xf6 18 Qf5 c6 19 Eacl or 18 Qd5 \＆xd4 19 Exd4 c6 20 Qc3 and Eadl White has the in－ itiative．

\section*{17 䉼反 Qhf4}

17．．．Qf6 is weaker in view of 18 Qf5罾e6 19 h 4 ！h6 20 ＠xf6 §xf6 21 乌d5．

18 Df5 we6
After 18．．．تe8 19 h4！h6（or 19．．．\＆xc3 20 bxc3 De6 21 是e3 with
㥩e6 22 Eadl White，who controls the d－file，has the initiative（Portisch－Miles， Tilburg 1978）．

Now after 19 h4 h6 20 \＆xf4 Qxf4 21 エd2 घad8 22 玉ad1 White＇s position is slightly the more active（Ivkov－Miles， Bled／Portoroz 1979）．

\footnotetext{
7.12113 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6


Dbd78 0－0 \(1 . \mathrm{d} 69 \mathrm{e} 4 \mathrm{e} 5\) ）
}


This，a more aggressive continuation than 10 dxe5，was first employed in Flear－Norman（London 1979）．It may have been borrowed from Euwe－Bogol－ jubow（Bern 1932），where the same idea occurred in a Slav Defence： 1 d 4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 乌f3 乌f6 4 Qc3 dxc4 5 a 4
 9 曾e2 \＆g4 10 h 3 \＆h5 11 e 4 e 512 g 4 ．
\[
10 \ldots \text { \&g6 }
\]

The sacrifice does not give anything：
 \＆e2，and White parries the attack，re－ taining a material advantage：13．．． 1 ig 6 14 Qh4 \＆xe2＋ 15 Qxg6 \＆xd1 16
 Qg5 h6 16 \＆ h 5 ．

It is considered that after 10 ．．．exd4 \(11.0 x d 4\) the piece sacrifice \(11 . . \sum \mathrm{xg} 4\) is refuted by the spectacular 12 Df5 （not 12 hxg 4 ？営h4！）：
（a）in Skembris－Stomatopulos（Thes－ saloniki 1980），White won by repeating an analysis by P．Littlewood：12．．．\＆h2＋ 13 ©h1 Qxf2＋ 14 Exf2 \＆xd1 15 Qxg7＋\＄e716 【xf7＋ゆd6 17 \＆e3 c5 18 日xd1＋家c6 19 是b5＋ 20 ■dxd7 \({ }^{\boldsymbol{\omega}} \mathrm{b} 821 \mathrm{~b} 4\) ；
（b）12．．．De3 \(13 \quad 0 \mathrm{xg} 7+\quad 18\)（if 13．．．\＄e7 14 Wh5 Qxc4 15 气g5＋ 6

16 Qd5＋©f8 17 Qe6＋），when various sources suggest that White wins imme－ diately by 14 fxe 3 ，since the queen can－ not be taken on account of mate． However，after 14．．． W g \(5+\) the outcome is completely unclear： 15 h1（ 15 lv g 4㥩xg7）15．．．\({ }^{W}\) e5．Probably White should be content with positional gains

\[
11 \text { dxe5 Qxe5 }
\]

11．．．\＆xe5 12 Qxe5 ©xe5 13 \＆e2！ with the threat of \(\mathrm{f} 4-\mathrm{f} 5\) favours White．

12 Qxe5 \＆xe5
13 f4！
This leads to an extremely sharp situation，in view of the critical position of the bishop at g 6 ．

13
啙d4＋
13．．．显d4＋ 14 h2 是xc3 15 bxc3㥪xdl 16 Exdl favours White （Zs．Polgar－Duckstein，Vienna 1993）．
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline 14 & Wed4 & \＆ \(\mathrm{xd}^{\text {＋}}\) \\
\hline 15 & ¢ h 2 & \＆xc3 \\
\hline 16 & bxc3 &  \\
\hline 17 & g5 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


This occurred in the source game Flear－Norman．

17
全d5
The only move．After \(17 \ldots\). ©d7 18 Eel f5 19 gxf6 Qxf6 20 id3 the pin
on the e－file is extremely unpleasant for Black：
（a）20．．．0－0－0？ 21 \＆ \＆xe4 区゙he8 22 ©f5＋；
（b）20．．．0－0 21 是xe4 玉ae8 （21．．．\({ }^{\text {fe } 8} 22\) exb7！） 22 \＆a3，and White wins the exchange for a pawn （P．Littlewood－Muir，England 1979）；
（c）20．．．ضf 21 Exe4 \(\sum \mathrm{xe} 422\) exe4，and the two bishops give White winning chances．
\[
18 \text { Eel+ \$18 }
\]

Not 18．．． \(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{d}} \mathrm{d}\)（Hulak－Matulovic， Yugoslavia 1981）in view of 19 \＆d3！



This position was reached in Ftacnik－ Matulovic（Vrsac 1981）．After 19 ＠a3＋ \＄g8 20 gxf6 ©xc4 21 Ee7 h5！ 22 Еxc 7 b5 23 Еg1 Еh6！ \(24 \Xi \mathrm{Eg} 7+\$ \mathrm{~h} 8\) the opposite－colour bishops led to a draw．
7.1212 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6
 Qbd7 \(80-0\) ）
\[
8 \quad \ldots \text { \&e7 }
\]

Compared with 8．．．今d6，this allows White better chances of developing an initiative．

\section*{9 e4}

9 \＆e2 is also logical，e．g．9．．．0－0 （9．．．\＆g6 10 Qh4 0－0 11 Qxg6 hxg6 12 e4 c6 13 ＠e3 favours White） 10 e 4 ，and now：

（a） \(10 \ldots \mathrm{c} 611\) 昷e3 \＆ e 4 （11．．．h6 12 Ecl with a favourable position，Malich－ Padevsky，Budapest 1965） 12 e5 Qd5 13 Qxd5 cxd5 14 Qg5，when：
（al）14．．．定xe2？！ 15 䒼 c 2 g 6 （if \(15 \ldots\) Ee8 White was intending 16 宸xh7＋

 f5（forced，since if 17．．．Qf8 18 Wh4

 We3 gives White a clear advantage （Krogius－Damjanovic，Sochi 1964）；
（a2） \(14 \ldots\) ．．．g6 should be considered， e．g． 15 是d3 乌e7 16 是xg6 hxg6 17

（b） \(10 . . . \mathrm{Db}_{6}(10 \ldots . . \mathrm{c} 11 \mathrm{e} 5) 11\) §e3 （or 11 \＆g5 h6 12 \＆e3），when：
（bl）11．．．ㅇg6 12 ＠d3 Ofd7（12．．．
 for White） 13 §f4 \＆d6 14 e5 \＆xd3 15
 Ed3 with advantage to White （Korchnoi－Peterson，32nd USSR Ch．， Kiev 1964／5）；
（b2）11．．．玉c8 12 乌e5＠xe2 13 䒼xe2 c5 14 日fdl \({ }^{W} \mathrm{e}\) e8（after 14．．．cxd4 15
 18 a4 a6 19 a5 axb5 20 axb6 \(\mathbf{~ f f d ~} 21\)䊦xb5 White has an obvious advantage， Gligoric－Ankerst，Yugoslavia 1965） 15 a4 a6 16 a5 cxd4 17 是xd4 Qbd7 （Asafov－Yudovich，corr．1967），when 18 Da4！retains an active position．

9 b3 0－0 10 \＆b2 Qb6 11 \＆e2 c5 12
 equal position in Kholmov－Spassky （31st USSR Ch．，Leningrad 1963）．
\[
9 \ldots \text {... } 066
\]

9．．．c6（9．．．0－0 10 e5！） 10 \＆e3＠g6 11 是d3 0－0 12 a3 घc8 13 Eel \＆h5 14
 （after 17 茈b3 学b8 18 \＆f3 h6 19 g 3 Ec8 20 \＆g2 b5 21 e5 a4 both sides had chances in Larsen－Spassky，Santa Monica 1966）17．．．＠d5 18 Qxd5 cxd5 19 当b3 with a positional advantage for White（Ivkov）．

\section*{10 §e2}
 13 dxc 5 \＆xc5 14 \＆g5 h6 15 \＆h4 霊c7 16 额1 显f4 17 \＆g3 \＆xf3 18 gxf3曾g5 led to a roughly equal position （Vaisman－Klovans，USSR 1964）．
\[
10 \ldots \text { \&g6 }
\]

Razuvayev－Mestrovic（Keszthely 1981）went 10．．．0－0 11 \＆e3 \＆b4（the idea is to press on the e4 pawn； 11．．．巴c8 12 De5！是xe2 13 Wex c5 14 Efd1 favours White） 12 Qd2 §g6 13气f3 显e7 14 a 3 \＆xc3 15 bxc 3 e5 16 d 5

 21 Qb3 淠b6 22 c 5 ，with a clear posi－ tional advantage for White．
\[
\begin{aligned}
& 11 \\
& 12 \\
& 12 \text { \&e3 }
\end{aligned}
\]

Or immediately 12 農e2 c5 13 dxc 5 ＠xc5 14 §g5 新b8（Gligoric－Matulo－ vic，Skopje 1970，when 15 ＠xf6！gxf6 16 hl（intending ©h2 and f2－f4） would have been promising for White．


14 ghd（White wants to post the other rook at cl）14．．．cxd4 15 \＆xd4， and now：
（a）15．．．乌fd7？ 16 \＆b5，and Black experiences serious difficulties：if \(16 \ldots\)
 \＆xg7 winning material（Trifunovic）；
（b）Black should simplify the posi－ tion by 15．．．\＆c5（Smejkal－Matulovic， Vrsac 1981）．

14 Iad1 15 Qxd4！，and：
（a） \(15 \ldots . \mathrm{fd} 716\) Db3，and if \(16 \ldots\) e5 （if Black does not play this，he has to reckon with f2－f4） 17 昷b5！；
（b） \(15 .\). \＆\(b 4\) ，when there can follow 16 2db5 a6 17 \＆b1 Qbd7 18 a3 苗c5 19 Qd6（Matulovic）；
（c） \(15 \ldots\) \＆c5 16 Qc2 \＆xe3 17 Qxe3
 Qed5 \(勹 \mathrm{fxd5} 20\) Qxd5 0 xd 521 是xd5 with advantage to White（Petronic－ Matulovic，Yugoslavia 1993）．
7.122 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 \(Q \mathrm{f} 64\)


Other continuations：
\(8 \mathrm{g4}\) 国g6：

（a） 9 Qe5 Qbd7（after 9．．． Dfd 710
 13 \＆b3，Borisenko－Lutikov，35th USSR Ch．，Kharkov 1967，White stands better） 100 xg 6 hxg 6 ：

（al） 11 g 5 Qd5（after \(11 \ldots\) Qg 12
 White＇s lead in development gives him the advantage，Mochalov－Vorotnikov， USSR 1981），and now：
（a11） 12 Qxd5 exd5 13 定xd5 c6 14
 16 管xf5 gxf5 17 §d2 g6 18 0－0－0
 Tal－Romanishin，46th USSR Ch．，Tbil－ isi 1978 ，when White could have gained the better chances by 22 e 5 \＆e7 \(23 \mathrm{f4}\) ，
intending d4－d5－Tal） 16 \＆d2 exd2 \(^{2}\)
 gxf5（Lengyel－Matulovic，Havana 1966） or 18 家 l b5＋（Sokolov－Matulovic， Yugoslavia 1967）with an equal game；
（a12） 12 学g4 \(07 b 6\)（in the modern game Lev－Murshed，London 1991，after 12．．．c6 13 凡d2 昷e7 14 e4 Qb4 15 \(0-0-0\) c5 16 ＠e3 Ec8 both sides had chances） 13 \＆b3 c5 14 Qxd5 \(0 \mathrm{xd5} 15\)

 21 舁2 9f5（Petrosian－Polugayevsky， Moscow 1963），and with 22 \＆c3 White would have retained his extra pawn with a sound position；
（a2） 11 §fl，switching the bishop to the long diagonal：
（a21）11．．．実d6 12 ＠g2 【b8 13 g 5 Qd5 14 Qe4！是e7 15 h 4 and White＇s position is preferable（Pytel－ Pokojowczyk，Poland 1971）；
（a22）11．．．e5 12 \＆g2 exd4 13 exd4 ジb8 14 世 W e2＋凡e7 15 g 5 Qh5 16 Qd5 Qb6（E．Vladimirov－Bagirov，Yerevan 1982），when the double exchange on e7 gives White slightly the better ending；
（a23）11．．．c5 12 ＠g2 cxd4 13 exd4数b6 1400 ＠d6 15 d 5 ！e5 16 g 5 Qh5 17 De4 with advantage to White （Pinter－Forintos，Hungary 1981）；
（a24）11．．．c6 12 ＠g2 䒼c7 \(130-0\)皿e714f4 Qb6 15 g 5 Qfd7（15．．．©fd5 16 e4！） 16 wig4 0－0－0（relatively best； \(16 \ldots 0-0\) is more than dangerous in view of 17 h 4 followed by h4－h5） 17 Ebl \＄b8 18 b4！with active play for White on the queenside（Kasparov－Petrosian， Tilburg 1981）；
（a3） 11 皿e2 c5 12 d5 exd5 13 Qxd5

 with some endgame advantage for White（Bondarevsky－Alatortsev，15th USSR Ch．，Moscow 1947）；
（a4） 11 览f3 \(0-0-0\) b5 14 \＆e2 cxd4 15 exd4 Qb6 16官b1 Qfd5 17 §d3 Oxc3＋ 18 造x 3
 h4！when White stands better（Larsen－ Speelman，Hastings 1990／1），since it is unfavourable to take the h4 pawn： 21．．．モxh4？ 22 ■xh4 \＆xh4 23 घौ1，or
 24 \＆xd5 exd5 25 \＆g5！（Larsen）．
（b） 9 h 4 ！？（instead of the traditional 9 De5）is an interesting possibility：

（a） \(9 . . .0 \mathrm{xg} 4\) ？loses to 10 h 5 \＆f5 11 e4，and 9．．．Qe4 is strongly met by 10 Qd2；
（b） \(9 \ldots\) ．．．b4 10 h 5 \＆e4 11 g 5 Qd5 12 \＆d2 \＆xc3 13 bxc3，with a complicated position where White has better chances （Balashov－Kupreichik，USSR 1967）．

8 \＆e2 Qc6 9 g 4 （Black also has no problems after 9 a3 气d6 10 e4 \({ }^{2} \times f 311\) ＠xf3 e5 12 d5 Od4 13 ＠e3 © e 5 ， Milev－Smyslov，Tel Aviv Olympiad 1964）9．．．＠g6 10 Qh4 \＆e4 11 f 3 §d6！ 12 \＆f2 Qd5 13 Qg2 \＆g6．White＇s kingside resembles an ancient＇tabia＇， and Black stands better（Panno－ Rossetto，Mar del Plata 1965）．

8 \＆d2 Qc6 9 晋e2 Qa5 10 \＆d3 c5 11 dxc 5 ＠xc5 12 Qe4 \＆e7 13 是c3 Qxe4 14 \＆xe4 \＆f6．The game is equal （Boleslavsky－Smyslov，USSR 1959）．

8 a4 0 c 6 is worth considering：
（a） 9 \＆e2 \＆d6 10000011 b 3
 14 Qxc6 We8！？or 14．．．bxc6 15 㳻xe2 Edb8 both sides have chances） 13 Qd2 13．．．\＆g6 with a double－edged position （Kovacevic－Marjanovic，Novi Sad 1984）；
 and White has the better prospects （Agzamov－Reyes，Lima 1985）．

8 ．．．Qc6
Black prepares ．．．e6－e5．
8．．．c5 is possible：

（a） 9 dxc5 \({ }^{W} \mathrm{Edl} 10\) Exdl ，and the exchanging operation promises White some activity：
（al） \(10 \ldots\) ．．．xf3 11 gxf3 ＠xc5 12 b3 Qbd7 \(13 \mathrm{f4}\) e7（more accurate is \(13 . . . \pm \mathrm{c} 8\) and only then ．．．たe7，which hampers the manoeuvre \(\& f 1-\mathrm{g} 2) 14\)是f1 Eac8 15 显g2 昷b4 16 乌e2，and the two bishops give White the better chances（Belyavsky－Romanishin，46th USSR Ch．，Tbilisi 1978）；
（a2） \(10 \ldots\) \＆xc5 11 g 4 国g6 12 Qe5 Qbd7 13 Qxg6 hxg6 14 g5 घ゙y4 15 \＆d3！（stronger than 15 gxf6 ■xc4 16
 De5 when Black stands better， A．Petrosian－Bronstein，Rostov－on－Don
 \＃c7 18 De4 with a sharp game and
slightly the better prospects for White （Magerramov－Vorotnikov，Beltsy 1979）．
（b） 9 \＆e2，and now：
（b1） \(9 . . .0 \mathrm{c} 610\) De5 是xe2 11 显xe2 Qxe5（quieter is \(11 \ldots\) c8 12 adl cxd4 13 Qxc6 Exc6 14 Exd4 是d6 15 \＆\({ }^{2}\) d2 0－0 16 घdl wic7 17 \＆el with a slight initiative for White，Browne－Roman－ ishin，Amsterdam 1978） 12 dxe5 ©d7 13 f4 with chances of a kingside attack for White，Podgaets－Bagirov，37th USSR Ch．，Moscow 1969）；
（b2）9．．．cxd4 10 Qxd4 是xe2 11㥪xe2 2 bd 712 e4 with the more active position for White．

8．．．⿹bd7 9 e4 c5（9．．．b5 10 ＠e2 b4 comes into consideration） 10 e 5 cxd4 11 渻xd4 Qb6 12 単f4 ©xc4 13 exf6 exf3 14 Uff，and in Spassky－Mnatsa－ kanian（USSR Ch． \(1 / 2\)－Final 1958）Black ended up in a difficult position．
\[
9 \text { Se2 }
\]

Other continuations：
9 宸e2：

 very strongly met by 12 ©xf6＋gxf6 13 e4 §xf3 14 Wxf3 \(\begin{aligned} & \text { Wxd4 } \\ & 15 \\ & \text { e5！}\end{aligned}\)
（b）9．．．ed6 10 g 4 （or 10 dall 0－0 11
 e4＠d7 15 \＆g5 f6 16 \＆e3 with advan－ tage to White，Kapengut－Zakharov， USSR 1964）10．．．ᄋg6 11 e4 Qd7（if

11．．．e5 12 dxe5 Qxe5 13 Qxe5 §xe5 14 f 4 \＆ \(\mathrm{d} 4+15\) \＄g2 h5 16 \＃d1，but 11．．．eb4 is possible） 12 Edl 0－0 13 e 5回b4 14 d 5 ！with advantage to White （Kholmov－Sajtar，Bucharest 1962）；
 12 dxc5 \＆xc5 13 \＆d2 毋c6 14 区acl \＆e7 15 De4 with the more active posi－ tion（Pollak－Kupreichik，Holland 1966）．
 sacrifice \(11 \ldots\) ）xg4 12 hxg 4 \＆xg4 is unclear） 12 d5 Qb8 13 ＠fl Qbd7 14 Qd2 h5 with chances for both sides （Chukaev－Maryasin，Moscow 1972）．

 \＆xe2 14 Qxc6 \＆xd1 15 勿 \(7+\) \＆xe7 16 Efxdl c6 led to an equal ending （Bronstein－Stein，31st USSR Ch．， Leningrad 1963）．
\[
9 \quad \ldots \quad \text { \&d6 }
\]

Gligoric－Andric（Belgrade 1962） went 9．．．̊g6 10 Qh4 乌e7 11 Qxg6 hxg6 12 w＇b3 Eb8 13 Edl with some－ what the better prospects for White．

10 b3
Other possibilities：
10 a3 0－0（not 10．．．e5？ 11 Qxe5是xe2 12 Qxc6） 11 b4：

（a）11．．．\({ }^{W} \mathrm{e} 7\)（a natural development of the queen，which，however，does not assist ．．．e6－e5） 12 \＆b2 玉ad8（12．．．e5？

13 Qxe5） 13 【cl h6 14 b5 Qb8 15妆b3 Qbd7（15．．．e5？again does not work in view of 16 dxe5 \＆xe5 17 Qxe5 \＆xe2 18 Qg6 and White wins） 16 Efdl＠g6 17 a 4 a 518 Qbl with the idea of playing the knight to c 4 ．White stands better（Geller－Zakharov，31st USSR Ch．，Leningrad 1963）；
（b）11．．．曾e8 12 b5（or 12 昷b2 e5 13 d5 ©a7 14 e4 ©xf3 15 exf3 a5 16 bxa5 Qb5 with an equal game， Voiculescu－Boljovcic，Hamburg 1965） 12．．．axb5 13 Qxb5 Qa5（or 13．．．学b8 14 g 4 \＆g6 15 Qh4 \＆e7 16 Qxg6 hxg6 17 ○b2 Da5 18 ■c1 c6 19 Øc3 घd8 with equal chances，Uhlmann－Emma， Mar del Plata 1966） 14 a4 彩b8 15 \＆b2
 \(0 \times b 319\) 断xb3 ©e4．The game is equal （Minev－Matulovic，Halle 1967）．

10 Og5 \＆xe2 11 蒋xe2 0－0 12 f 4
 an equal game（Golombek－Sliwa， Moscow Olympiad 1956）．

10 De5 \＆xe2 11 Qxc6 是xd1 12 Qxd8 气e2 13 Qxe2 Exd8 leads to complete equality（Sokolsky－Ragozin， Moscow 1947）．
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline 10 & & 0－0 \\
\hline 11 & 显 b 2 & We8 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

We will also analyse the standard continuation 11．．． \(\begin{aligned} & \text { Wen } \\ & \text { e7 }\end{aligned}\)
（a） \(12 \Xi \mathrm{cl} \Xi \mathrm{fd} 8\)（White has some－ what the better chances after both \(12 \ldots\)皿a3 13 是xa3 wa3 14 ©e5，Luik－ Khermlin，USSR 1965，and 12．．．』fe8 13 Qe5 \＆xe2 14 Oxc6 \＆xd1 15
 Ead8 18 e2 Kalinsky－Mukhin，USSR 1974） 13 d2 and now：
（a1）13．．．是xe2 14 寝xe2 皿a3（14．．． e5 15 d5 favours White，Uhlmann－ W．Schmidt，Polanica Zdroj 1967） 15是xa3 显xa3 16 Qde4 Qxe4 17 Qxe4 with the better prospects for White （Antoshin－Bukal，Sarajevo 1970）；
（a2）13．．．＠g6 was played in Yusu－ pov－Timman（Sarajevo 1984），where 14 Ec4 e5！ 15 ©xd6（ 15 d 5 is dubious in view of 15 ．．．©b4，Andersson－Marjano－ vic，Reggio Emilia 1985／6；Marjanovic recommends 15 dxe5）15．．．exd4（15．．． cxd6 16 d5 favours White） 16 ©xb7 dxc3 17 Qxd8 Exd8 18 定xc3 Exd1 19 Efxd1 h6 20 \＆xa6 led to a com－ plicated，double－edged position；
 （Axelson－Alekhine，Örebro 1935）or 13．．．ひfd8 14 Qe2 e5 15 d 5 Qa7 16 Qc3 Qb5（Suarez－Lebredo，Cienfuegos 1981）with roughly equal chances；
（c） 12 Qe5 \＆xe2 13 Qxc6 does not give White anything after 13．．． 1 e8！ 14
 Lalic，Yugoslavia 1983）；
（d） 12 Qd2 \＆xe2（after 12．．．\＆g6 13 Qc4 Efd8 14 \＆f3 White stands better） 13 we2 Qd5 14 Qc4 Qxc3 15 是xc3 Ead8 16 Eacl \({ }^{\mathbf{w}} \mathrm{h} 4\) with roughly equal chances（Tal－Hort，Porz 1982）．

\section*{12 Od2 ©g6}

This is more favourable than 12．．．今xe2 13 䒼xe2 e5 14 d 5 ，when：
（a）the tempting \(14 \ldots . \mathrm{b} 4\) is strongly
 17 田fd We6 18 Qxd6 単xd6（White also has the better ending after

18．．．cxd6 19 wiw followed by 20 we6 and 21 Exd6） 19 暑c4 Qb6 20 岮e4当e6 21 览xb7 with a clear advantage （Najdorf－Ivkov，Santa Monica 1966）；
（b） \(14 \ldots\) ．．．e7 15 e4 乌d7 16 シacl， and White＇s position is preferable （Reshevsky－Barczay，Switzerland 1967）．

\section*{13 Oc4 Sb4}

White＇s chances are also better after
 shevsky－Kupreichik，Minsk 1972）．

Marovic－Ivkov（Amsterdam 1968） now continued 14 §f3 \(\mathbf{E d}\) d 15 \＆xc6
 an equal game．

White should not have relieved the tension in a position where the oppo－ nent was cramped．With 15 Ecl he would have retained the initiative．
7.123 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4

\(7 \ldots\) ．．． 06


8 ＠e2 \＆d6 9 0－0 0－0 10 b 3 ，and：
（a）10．．．a6 11 Qb2 鋢 712 Qe5（or 12 a3 Ead8 13 Qh4 \＆xe2 14 㥩xe2 Qd5 15 Qxd5 \(\begin{aligned} & \text { Wxh4 } 160 c 3 ~ e 5, ~ V a n ~\end{aligned}\) Seeters－Duckstein，Nice Olympiad 1974）12．．．莤xe2 13 Oxc6 \＆xd1 14

分xe7＋\＆xe7 15 \＃fxdl \(\Xi f d 816\) 玉acl c5 with an equal game（Krogius－ Matulovic，Sochi 1964）；
（b） \(10 \ldots\) ．．．d5 11 是b2 \(9 x c 312\) 是xc3宸e7 13 Qd2 \＆xe2 14 当xe2 \＆b4 with an equal position（Filip－Antoshin， Zagreb 1965）．
 \(0-0!\) ？ 11 显xc6 bxc6 12 䒼xc6 تb8 13
 pawn Black has definite compensation （Kapu－Barczay，Hungary 1964）．

8 \＆ e b！（I recommended this move in 1965）8．．．\({ }^{2} d 69\) e4 Qd7 10 \＆e3 0－0 11 e5 \＆e7 12 ＠e2 Qb4？！（Kotov suggests \(12 . . У b 6\) ，although even then White stands better） 13 a3 0 d 514 Qxd5 exd5 15 颜b3 with advantage to White （Shamkovich－Ghitescu，Moscow 1969）．
7.13 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 Qf6 4 e3 \＆\({ }^{2} 45\) \＆xc4 6 ）

\section*{6 Oc3}

Compared with the variation 6 h3 Qh5 7 Qc3，it would appear that here White is no longer able to drive back the bishop from g 4 and that therefore Black has greater freedom of action． However，in certain cases the position of the bishop at g 4 has its drawbacks．
\[
6 \ldots \text { Qbd7 }
\]

Other possibilities：
6 ．．．c5 is weak in view of 7 党a4＋ Qbd7 8 De5．

6．．．0c6 7 \＆b5 \＆b4（compare this with variation 7.123 ；with the inclusion of h2－h3 and ．．．\(\& \mathrm{~h} 5\) White could advan－ tageously continue g2－g4，De5 and wia4，whereas here if 8 h 3 Black ex－ changes on f3） 8 䒼a4 \(£ x f 39\) gxf3 断d6
 This position was reached from another variation in Yakin－Boleslavsky（Mos－ cow 1964）．Black has a sound position．

6．．．a6：


After 7 h3 \＆xf3 8 䖪xf3 Oc6（this position can also be reached by trans－ position in the variation 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc4 3 Qf3 a6 4 e3 是g4 5 显xc4 e6） White has two plans：
（a） 9 0－0 是d6 10 घd1 0－0 11 b3
 De4 ©xe4 14 当xe4，when his position is preferable（Farago－Kierzek，Dort－ mund 1978）；
（b） 9 ＠d2 \＆d6 \(100-0-00-011 \mathrm{~g} 4\) is sharper with attacking chances（Pach－ man－Lundin，Leipzig Olympiad 1960）．
\[
7 \quad 0-0
\]

Or 7 e 4 \＆ b 4 （in contrast to variation 7．121，Black cannot reply 7．．．e5？on ac－ count of 8 㯰b3！） 8 e5 9d5（8．．．De4 is weak in view of 9 當b3 \(\mathrm{exf}^{2} 10 \mathrm{gxf} 3\) ，

 when White is a pawn up with an excel－ lent position，Lilienthal－Bokuchava， USSR 1965） 9 §d2（9 蓜3 c5）9．．． \＆xc3（9．．．ゆ7b6 10 ＠d3 0－0 11 a3 Qxc3 12 bxc 3 定e7 13 wiv2 h6 14 h 3
 wxd2 favours White，Lilienthal－ Gurgenidze，USSR 1964） 10 bxc3 0－0 \(110-0\) c5 with roughly equal chances （Korchnoi－Matanovic，USSR v．Yugo－ slavia 1972）．

If 7 \＆e2 \(\& d 68 \mathrm{e} 4\) ，despite the loss of a tempo，Black can reply 8．．．＠b4． Gligoric－Miles（Bugojno 1978）went 9 ＠g5（9 e5 0d5 10 铛b3 c5）9．．．h6 （9．．．c5 10 e5！） 10 \＆xf6 是xc3＋11 bxc3 Qxf6 12 Qe5 §xe2 13 娄xe2 0－0 14 \(0-0 \mathrm{c} 5\) with an equal position．For the development of the bishop at b4 with the inclusion of h2－h3 and ．．．\({ }^{\text {h }} \mathrm{h} 5\) ，cf． section 7.121 （p．131）．


7．．．遏d6 8 e4 e5 9 dxe5 Qxe5 10 \＆e2，and play develops in analogy with the variation on p．133，with an insig－ nificant difference－the pawn is at h 2 ．
\(7 . . .0 \mathrm{~b} 6\) is also acceptable： 8 是e2
 \(12 \mathrm{dxc5}\) \＆xc5 13 Qd3 \＆e7 \(14 \mathrm{e} 40-0\)
 （Donner－Bronstein，Beverwijk 1963）．
7.14 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 0 f 64 e3 \＆\({ }^{2} 45\) \＆ Pc 4 e ）

\section*{6 0－0 \\ \(a 6\)}

6．．．Qbd7 7 是e2 是d6 8 Qbd2 0－0 9
 a6 with an equal position（Kavalek－ Miles，Tilburg 1977）．

6．．．⿹c6 7 \＆b5 \＆d6 8 Qbd2 0－0 9 \＆xc6 bxc6 10 Wher e8 11 e4 \＆f4 12

Qe5 \＆xe5 13 dxe5 Qd7 14 f 3 乌h5 15 Oc4，and the weakness of the isolated pawns and the out of play bishop at h5 give White the advantage（Averbakh－ Damjanovic，Hamburg 1965）．
\(6 . . .557\) wa4＋Qbd7 8 Qe5 显f5 9 Qxd7 Qxd7 10 d5 e5 11 e4 with ad－ vantage to White（Vistaneckis－Zilber， Riga 1963）．


7 㟶e2（7 将b3 b5）7．．．Dc6（Black＇s plan is to hinder e3－e4，and when this move is nevertheless made，to be able to reply ．．．e6－e5；the alternative is 7．．．c5） 8

 b5 14 s．b3 Qd7 Black has a good
 This position was reached in Korchnoi－ Spassky（27th USSR Ch．，Leningrad 1960）．Instead of 14．．．g6，which allow－ ed White to gain a clear advantage by 15 ig5！，Black had several other poss－ ibilities：14．．．b5 15 \＆d3 b4 16 Qe2
 with roughly equal chances， \(14 \ldots \Xi \mathrm{~g} 8\) ， and finally，the pawn sacrifice \(14 \ldots\)


7 （e2，and now：
（a） \(7 \ldots . .0 \mathrm{c} 68 \mathrm{~b} 3\) Se7 9 是b2 0－0 10 Qbd2（Osnos－Bronstein，Moscow

1967），when 10．．．乌a7 lost time，and after 11 Qe5 是xe2 12 wive2 Qd7 13 Efd White gained the better game；
（b） \(7 \ldots \mathrm{c} 5\)（or \(7 \ldots\). bbd7）is more logi－ cal： 8 h3 \＆h5 9 Qbd2 Qc6 10 dxc5 ＠xc5 11 a3 0－0 12 b4 \＆a7 13 ＠b2 we7 with equal chances．
\(7 \mathrm{b4}\) is interesting，with the aim of preventing ．．．c7－c5，e．g．7．．． Dbd7（7．．．\(^{2}\)
 Qbd2 e5 11 䒼c2 0－0 12 dxe5 \(Q x=513\) Qxe5 \＆xe5 14 Eael．White has a min－ imal advantage（Fairhurst－Dückstein， Moscow Olympiad 1956）．
7.15 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 〇f3 Qf6 4 e3 ig 45 \＆ ex 4 e ）

6 Qbd2


6
Qbd7
6．．．a6 7 wib3 b5 leads to a position from the Alekhine Variation．

\section*{7 b3}

If 7 㟶 b 3 ，and now：
（a） \(7 \ldots . \mathrm{b} 6\)（the natural reply） 8 De5 \＆h5 \(90-0\) \＆ 2 d6 \(10 \mathrm{a} 40-0\) with roughly equal chances（I．Ivanov－Lerner，USSR 1979）；
（b） \(7 \ldots \Xi \mathrm{~b} 880-0 \mathrm{c} 69\) Qe5 \(Q \mathrm{xe5} 10\)


Qe4 c5 14 a4！？b4 15 畒d2 Qxe5 16 a5単c7 17 ＠a4＋，when Black can avoid the immediate danger by \(17 \ldots 0 \mathrm{c} 6\) ， although White＇s pressure would seem to compensate for the sacrificed pawn （Aronson－Klaman，Leningrad 1963）．

Or 7 0－0 \＆e7（if 7．．．c5 8 e4 \(Q b 6\) with a good game for Black） 8 b3 c5 9


 an equal position（Petrosian－Spassky， 28th USSR Ch．，Moscow 1961）．

Botvinnik－Smyslov（Monte Carlo 1968）continued \(7 . . . c 58 \mathrm{dxc} 5\) 最x5 9
 Qd4 \＆xe2 13 畨xe2 \＆a3 14 ＠xa3

7.2 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 开3 \(勹 \mathrm{f} 64 \mathrm{e} 3\)是g4）

\section*{5 h3}

Before taking the c4 pawn，White drives back and then exchanges the bishop．In some lines the c4 pawn is taken by the knight after ©e5．
\[
\begin{array}{llll}
5 & \cdots & \text { in5 } \\
6 & \mathrm{~g} 4 &
\end{array}
\]

This move can also be made after the development of the queen＇s knight： 6 Dc3 e6 7 g 4 \＆g6 8 Qe5 Qbd7 9 Qxg6 hxg6 10 \＆xc4 \({ }^{2}\) b6 11 \＆f1 c5．Black＇s position is perfectly satisfactory（Van Seeters－Smyslov，Hastings 1962／3）．

If 6 Qbd2 e6 7 g 4 昆g6 8 Qe5 Qbd7 9 Oxg6 hxg6 10 §g2＠b4（after 10．．．c6 11 Qxc4 Qb6 12 Da5 wiv7 13 a3 §d6 14 b4 Black ended up in a dif－ ficult position，V．Bykov－Birbrager， USSR Ch． \(1 / 2\)－Final 1965） 11 wiv2 c5 12学xc4 Wb6 \(13 \mathrm{dxc} 50 \mathrm{xc5}\) with equal chances（V．Bykov－Nei，USSR 1963）．


Without waiting for \(\mathrm{Dxg}_{\mathrm{x}} 6\) ，Black can himself exchange his bishop：7．．．e 48 f3 皿xbl 9 Exbl：

（a） \(9 \ldots\) ．．．e6 10 \＆xc4 Qbd7 11 \＆d2 with the more promising position for White （Solntsev－Ravinsky，Moscow 1964）；
（b） \(9 \ldots . \mathrm{Qfd}^{10}\) Qxc4 Qb6 11 Wc2 e6 12 \＆g2 08 d 713 b 4 요 614 囚a5 Eb8 15 f 4 with the better chances for White（B．Vladimirov－Korolev，Lenin－ grad 1964）；
（c） \(9 \ldots\) Obd7 10 Qxc4 e6 11 Qg2

 accurate，and only if \(15 \ldots\) ．． W g3 \(16 \$ \mathrm{fl}\) ） 15．．．今b4 16 Qc3 0－0 17 \＆d2 a5．For the pawn Black has a definite initiative （Korelov－Korolev，Leningrad 1964）．

7．．．e6：

（a） 8 Qxg6 hxg6 9 是g 2 （this leads by a slight transposition to a position typical of the main line）9．．．c6 10000
 c5 14 Qxc4 cxd4 15 Qe5 d3（15．．．dxe3 allows White a significant lead in de－
 Ofd7 18 显d2．White has the advantage （Farago－Lebredo，Cienfuegos 1973）；
（b） 8 \＆g2 \＆e4 9 f 3 \＆xb1 10 Exb1， and now：
（bl）10．．．b5．Nogueiras considers this to be dangerous in view of 11 f 4 Qd 5 12 0－0 f6 13 f5 fxe5 14 fxe6 with an attack，but its correctness still has to be demonstrated if Black defends by
 Ef7 曹g5（Flear）；
（b2） \(10 \ldots\) ．．\(\circlearrowright \mathrm{d} 511\) Qxc4（11 0－0！？） 11．．．皿b4＋ 12 皃e2 Qd7 13 a3 （Nogueiras－Hort，Lugano 1987），and here Black should have considered the sharp 13．．．b5 14 axb4（or 14 Qe5 Qxe5 15 dxe5 是a5 16 峟d3 c6 17 b4 \＆b6） 14．．．bxc4 15 糟c2 Q7b6 16 是d2 雷d6 （Nogueiras）．

\section*{8 －xg6}

Lputian－Fominykh（Rimavska Sob－ ota 1991）went 8 Qxc4 Qb6 9 Qc3 かxc4 10 定xc4e6 11 f3 a6 12 e4 c5 13官e3 cxd4 14 罩xd4 皆xd4 15 \＆xd4 Ec8 16 是b3 是c5 17 是xf6 gxf6 18 f 4 f5 19 h 4 ！h5 20 gxf5 exf5 21 e5，and due to the poor position of his bishop Black was in some difficulty．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
8 & \ldots & h x g 6 \\
9 & \dot{Q} 2
\end{array}
\]

The start of a plan devised by Furman．After the fianchetto of his bishop，White intends to take the c4 pawn with his knight．

9 exc4 e6 leads to a position from variation 7.12 （p．129）．


9 ．．．c6
10 Dd2
Furman－Geller（31st USSR Ch．， Leningrad 1963）continued 10．．．Qb6 11對c2 e6 12 Oxc4 是b4＋13 Od2 \＆e7 （13．．．显d6！？） 14 a3 a5（14．．．0－0 15 b4 Qbd7 was more cautious） 15 Qb3 櫺c7 16 \＆d2 Qbd7 17 Qc1！\＆d6 18 乌e2 5 19 dxe 5 是xe5 20 f 4 \＆ d 621 e 4 \＆e7 22 e5 Qh7 with advantage to White．By 23 \(0-0-0\) he could have denied his oppo－ nent any counterplay．

After 10．．．e5 11 ©xc4 Black has：

 with some advantage to White （Forintos－Sapi，Hungary 1964）；
 then ．．． \(0-0\) with roughly equal chances．

Bany－Marjanovic（Istanbul 1988） went 10．．．\({ }^{1 / 2}\) a5 11 0－0 Qb6 12 b3！？（the quiet 12 览c2 e6 13 Qxc4 Qxc4 14
 a6 17 a4 \(0-0 \quad 18\) \＆d 2 also promises White an advantage－Bany）12．．．cxb3
 White has definite compensation for the sacrificed pawn．

\section*{Smyslov Variation 4．．．g6}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
1 & d 4 & d 5 \\
2 & c 4 & dxc 4 \\
3 & \(\sum \mathrm{f} 3\) & 乌f6 \\
4 & e 3 & g 6
\end{tabular}


The idea of fianchettoing the bishop， and then transferring the knight via d7 to b6，belongs to Smyslov．Black does not prevent the opponent from setting up a pawn centre，but exerts piece pres－ sure on it．The queen＇s bishop is usually developed at g4．Thus Black takes the play into positions typical of another opening－the Gruinfeld Defence．

In certain variations the d4 pawn is attacked by ．．．c7－c5，and other set－ups， apart from the ．．．Dd7－b6 manoeuvre， are also employed．

\section*{5 \＆xc4}

5 §a3 looks artificial．After 5．．．昷g7 6 Qxc4 0－0 7 \＆e2 c5 8 0－0 Qc6 9 dxc5 De4 Black has a good position （Donner－Bouwmeester，Beverwijk 1958）．

If 5 Wa4＋the simplest is \(5 \ldots \mathrm{w} 6\)
 but \(5 . . . \bigcup\) bd7 cannot be recommended， since White plays 6 exc4，when 6 ．．． \＆g7？loses to 7 ＠xf7＋


Other continuations：
6 Qe5（this activity is premature） 6．．．0－0 7 橎b3 e6 \(80-0\) ，and now：
（a）8．．．\(勹 \mathrm{fd} 79 \mathrm{f} 4 \mathrm{c5} 10\) घ゙d1 cxd4 11 exd4 Qc6！ 12 \＆e3（or 12 Qxc6 bxc6） \(12 . . . \mathrm{a} 5\) ，and Black＇s position is pref－ erable（Padevsky－Mechkarov，Bulgaria 1954）；
 Qc3 a6 11 a4 cxd4 12 exd4 Qc6 Black＇s position is slightly preferable） 9．．．De4（or 9．．．\({ }^{W} \mathrm{c} 710\) Qd3 \(\mathrm{D}^{2} \mathrm{bd} 711\) \＆d2 Qe4 12 当 a 3 a 5 ！） 10 Qd3 Qd7 11
 when the white queen is badly placed and Black has a comfortable game （Sazhaev－Tarasov，RSFSR Ch． \(1 / 2\)－Final 1963）．

To 6 宸a4＋Black replies 6．．．c6（but

 if 7 擂b3 0－0 followed by ．．．Qbd7－b6 and ．．．\＆e6．

After 6 寝b3 0－0 7 a4 Qc6？！（Black should have prevented the advance of the a－pawn by 7．．．a5） 8 a5！ \(0 d 79\) Dc3 e5 10 d 5 Qe7 11 e4 \＄h8 12 皿e3 h6 13 h4 f5 14 Qg5！Df6 15 d6 White gained a great advantage in Makogonov－ Kalashian（Moscow 1963）．

6 Qc3：

（a）after 6．．．c5？！White has a choice of several alternatives：
（al）the＇naïve＇ 7 dxc5 㥩a5
 10 c 6 bxc 611 £xc6 Eb 8 is unclear－ Black has a certain compensation for the pawn，Khodos－Tarasov，RSFSR Team Ch．1962） 8 wa4＋wxa4 9 ©xa4 Qbd7 10 Qd2；
（a2）the strategic 7 d 5 ，e．g．7．．．§f5 （for other moves，see below under a dif－ ferent move order）80－0 0－0 9 घel Qbd7 10 e4 Qb6 11 昷f1 皿c8 12 皿e3 with the better game for White （Furman－Klaman，USSR 1960）；
（a3）combinational，in the spirit of the Open Games－ 7 wa4＋Qbd7（7．．．当 d 7 ？is met by 8 皿xf7＋or 8 是b5 \(Q \mathrm{c} 6\) 9 Qe5，if 7．．． Qfd 8 \＆xf7＋and 9 Qg5＋with a very strong attack，while 7．．．』d7 8 世b3 0－09 Qe5 is unpleasant
 10 Wc4 e6（10．．．Ef8 11 Qe6，while if the queen moves，then 11 f7＋and 12 Qe6 mate） 11 Qxe6 Qb6 12 Qxg7＋

 \(0-0\) ，and for the piece White has three pawns and an attack（Gulko－Sukhanov， Moscow 1963）；
（b）after \(6 \ldots . \mathrm{fd} 7\) some opening guides suggest 7 h 3 － b 68 \＆e2 0－0 9
e4＇with a strong defended centre and the better prospects for White＇，but in fact he can win immediately by 7 \＆xf7＋！ mating；
（c） \(6 \ldots 0\) ，and now：
（cl） 7 e4（ 7000 transposes into the main line），when 7 ．．．\(Q \mathrm{fd} 78\) e5 c5 leads to complications favourable for White： 9 e6＠b6 10 exf7＋ \＆c2 ©c6 \(13 \mathrm{h4}\)（Cherepkov－Kholmov （Minsk 1961）：
（c2） 7 h3，a prophylactic move：

（c21）7．．．a6 8 a4 c5 9 d5 Qe8 10 e4 Qd6 11 昷b3 c4 12 \＆ c 2 Qd7 1300 b6 14 \＆e3 \＆b7 15 \＆d4 f6 16 Qe2 \＆h6 \(17 \& c 3\) ©c5 with chances for both sides（Shamkovich－Smyslov，27th USSR Ch．，Leningrad 1960）；
（c22）7．．．是f5 8 当e2（8 Qh4 is also worth trying）8．．．De4 \(90-0\) Od7 10

 16 \＆b3 曹b6（Bielicki－Smyslov，Mar del Plata 1962）．If 17 Qd2 Black equalises by \(17 . . . c 5\) ，but，as pointed out by R．Schwarz，White can play 17 Ëc5！ with the threat of 18 Qa5．Nevertheless， as also after 7．．．a6，White achieves little in this variation．

We should also mention the possibil－ ity of 6 b 4 ．
\[
6 \quad \ldots \quad 0-0
\]

Or 6．．．c5，and：
（a）here too Black has to reckon with 7 眥a4＋，to which the correct reply is 7．．．＠bd7（7．．．仓fd7？ 8 是xf7＋；7．．．蒋d7 8 ＠xf7＋）；
（b） 7 d5 0－0 8 Qc3 Qe8 9 對2 （P．Ivanov－Mechkarov，Bulgaria 1954，

 Dc4 15 we2 0 a 5 with the initiative for Black）9．．．乌d6 10 \＆d3（if 10 ㅇb3 strong is \(10 \ldots\) ．．b5） \(10 \ldots\) es 11 e 4 ，with somewhat the better prospects for White（Mechkarov）．

White＇s main continuations are：
79 c 3 （8．1）
7 当e2（8．2）－p． 155
Other possibilities：
7 h3：

（a）7．．．c5，and now：
（al） 8 ©c3 cxd4 9 Qxd4 \＆d7！ 10 e4 Qc6 11 \＆e3 Qxd4（or 11．．．日c8） 12 \＆xd4 Ec 8 and Black equalises；
（a2） 8 企e2 cxd4 9 exd4 Qbd7 10 \＆f4 Ob6 11 \＆b3 Qbd5 12 \＆e5 b6 13 Qc3 \＆ b 714 Eacl，and White＇s posi－ tion is slightly preferable（Malich－ Packroff，Weimar 1968）；
（b） \(7 \ldots . . . \mathrm{c} 689 \mathrm{c} 39 \mathrm{~d} 79 \mathrm{We2}\)（cf． variation 8.13 for White＇s other possi－ bilities）9．．．Qb6 10 ＠b3 a5 11 a4．

White has the more active position （Kondratiev－Taimanov，USSR 1952）．

7 b3 c6（7．．．c5！？） 8 气b2 §g4 9 Qbd2 Obd7 10 h 3 是f5（10．．．\({ }^{2} \mathrm{xf} 311\) Qxf3 Qb6 12 \＆e2 \(\mathrm{Qfd}^{2} 13 \mathrm{a} 4\) favours White） 11 షel（11 Oh4！？－Matanovic） 11．．．0b6 12 最f1 Qe4 13 Qxe4 \＆xe4
 （16．．．c5 17 Qf3） 17 a4 是c8 18 回a3． White has the initiative（Karpov－ Korchnoi，Candidates，Moscow 1974）．
 Qc3 Qb6 10 \＆b3 Qbd5 11 Qxd5 cxd5 12 Qe5 \＆e6 with an equal game（Fud－ erer－Sandor，Yugoslavia－Hungary 1957）．
8.1 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 §f3 صf6 4 e3g65 \＆xc4 \＆g760000－0）

\section*{7 Qc3 Qfd7}

Smyslov＇s manoeuvre，which recalls ideas from the Grunfeld Defence（1 d4

 Qfd7）

7．．．Dc6 is possible：
（a） 8 e \(4 \AA \mathrm{~g} 49 \mathrm{~d} 5\) 乌a5 10 ＠e2 c6 11 h3 是xf3 12 \＆xf3 cxd5 13 exd5 ■c8 with roughly equal chances（Fuchs－ Smyslov，Leipzig Olympiad 1960）；
（b） 8 h 3 a 69 e4 b5 10 \＆b3 Qd7 with chances for both sides（Milev－ Smyslov，Moscow 1959）；
（c） 8 d5 乌a5 9 皿e2 c6 10 dxc 6 Qxc6 11 e4（White can avoid the ex－
 h6 13 a3 \＆e6 with an equal position （Porath－Stahlberg，Leipzig Olympiad 1960）．

7．．．Obd7 is less good．In Mititelu－ Zita（Sofia 1957）after 8 e4 Qb6 9 \＆e2 c6 10 \＆f4 \＆g4 11 h 3 \＆ xf 312 \＆xf3
 De8 16 Efdl e6 17 d5 Black did not manage to create counterplay．

7．．．c6 also does not promise equality． After 8 h 3 \＆f5 9 Qg5 b5 10 \＆b3（if 10
 both sides have chances） 10 ．．．h6 11 e4 © c8 12 Qf3 White stands better（Suba－ Negulescu，Romania 1981）．

After Black has castled， \(7 . . . c 5\) no longer entails tactical difficulties：

（a） 8 d 5 昷g4，and now：
（a1） 9 a4 a6 10 气e2 Qbd7 11 e4宣xf312 \＆xf3 ©e8 planning the block－ ading ．．．Qd6，with an equal position （Polugayevsky－Matulovic，Palma de Mallorca 1970）；
（a2） 9 e4 Qbd7 10 ＠e2 \＆xf3 11 \＆xf3，when Black＇s plan of activity on the queenside combined with the block－ ade of the e4 pawn proved unsuccess－ ful：11．．．a6 12 Eel 莦c7 13 \＆g5 h6 14皿h4 乌e5 15 是e2 g5 16 \＆g3 b5 17 ©f1 Qfd7 \(18 \Psi{ }^{\boldsymbol{\xi}} \mathrm{d} 2\) ，with advantage to White（Taimanov－Portisch，Leningrad v．Hungary 1959）；
（b） 8 dxc5，when Black has：
（b1）8．．．笑xd1 9 Exdl Qbd7 10 c6！ bxc6 11 气d2 Qb6 12 乌e2 with \(a\) positional advantage（Mechkarov）；


（b3）8．．．\({ }^{\text {Wec }} \mathrm{c} 7\)（to neutralise 9 Db5），
 Wh5．

If 7．．．a6 White has：
（a） 8 ＠e2 c5 9 dxc5 Qbd7 10 c 6 ！ bxc6 11 e4 with the better chances （Vera－Giardelli，Buenos Aires 1987）；
（b） 8 e4 b5 9 皿b3 \＆b7（9．．．b4 10 Qd5 Qxe4 11 we2 favours White） 10 e5 0 d 511 \＆g 5 with the initiative（Vera）．

We now consider：
8 電e2（8．11）
8 e4（8．12）－p． 153
8 h3（8．13）－p． 154
Other possibilities：
 §e3 Qc6 12 Qb5 乌b4 13 h 3 §xf3 14㥩xf3．White＇s position is preferable （Korchnoi－Bronstein，Moscow v．Len－ ingrad 1962）．

8 皿e2 \＆b6 9 h3 a5 10 e4 a4 11 是e3 Qc6（11．．．c6 and ．．．\＆e6 comes into consideration） 12 Ecl \＆ d 713 d 5 乌a5 14 £d4 \＆h6 15 Еc2．White＇s central－ ised pieces give him the advantage （Gligoric－Westerinen，Havana 1967）．

8 De4 Db6 9 皿b3 a5（after 9．．．Dc6 10 \＆d2？！a5 11 a3 e5！Black equalises， Razuvaev－Tal，Jurmala 1987） 10 a4 Qc6（10．．．\＆f5 11 Qc5） 11 Qc5 Qd5 12 e4 Qdb4 13 d5 b6 14 Qe6！fxe6 15 dxc6＠xc6 16 皿e3 世xdl（16．．．今xb2？ 17 誛c2！是xal 18 监xc6） 17 Efxdl Qd8（17．．．是xb2 is again bad in view of \(18 \Xi \mathrm{a} 2\) and \(19 \Xi \mathrm{c} 2\) ） \(18 \Xi \mathrm{~d} 2\)－ 719 Eadl．Black＇s extra doubled pawn does not play any part．The chances are with White，all of whose pieces are actively placed（Portisch－Plater，Balatonfured 1958）．

8 a3 毋b6 9 \＆a2 ©c6 10 h3 e5 11 d 5 De7 12 e4 with some advantage to White（Hodgson－Barua，Dhaka 1993）．

8 b3 c5（if 8．．．e5 9 （a3 is good） 9 \＆b2 2 c 6 （or 9．．． 2 b 610 ＠e2 cxd4 11 Qxd4 with somewhat the better chances for White） 10 d 5 Qce5 11 Qxe5 Qxe5 （Skembris－Barua，Manila Olympiad

1992） \(12 \mathrm{f4}\) Qg4（or \(12 \ldots\) ．．． Pc 413 bxc4） \(13 \Xi \mathrm{El}\) ．White＇s position is preferable（Skembris）．


\section*{8 畒e2}


8 ．．．Qb6
8．．．c5 9 d 5 Qb6 10 \＆b3 \＆g4 also comes into consideration．

\section*{9 \＆b3 a5}

We must also consider：
9．．．Dc6 10 Ed1，and now：
（a）10．．．Da5 11 ＠c2 \＆e6（Muhring－ Lehman，Utrecht 1954），after which 12 d5 is strong，when 12．．． \(0 x \mathrm{xd} 5130 \mathrm{xd} 5\) £xd5 loses to 14 e4 \＆c4 15 曾el！，and 12．．． \(\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{e}} \mathrm{xc} 313\) dxe6 favours White；
（b） \(10 \ldots\) ．．．d7 11 Qe4 a5 12 a4 \＆f5 13 Qc5 ©d7 14 Qd3 e6 15 \＆\({ }^{2} 2\) 数e7 \(16 \Xi \mathrm{acl}\) ，and White stands better （Goldenberg－Filip，Mar del Plata 1961）；
（c） \(10 \ldots \mathrm{a} \quad 11 \mathrm{a} 3\) 皿d7 12 h 3 a 413 \＆a2 e5（Panno－Rossetto，Argentina 1954）with equal chances，but 12 De4！ gives White the better game（Pachman）；
 \(12 \Xi \mathrm{dl}\) ，and now：

（a）12．．． W c8 13 Qe4 Qa5 14 ®c2 Dac4 15 Qc5 e6 16 b3 Qd6 17 \＆b2 Qd7 18 Qd3 with the better position for White（Golombek－Gligoric，Mos－ cow Olympiad 1956）；
（b）12．．．e5 13 d 5 Qa5 14 \＆c2 乌ac4 15 e4 \(\frac{1}{6}\) e7 16 a4 with the better chances for White（Mühring－Jauregui，Moscow Olympiad 1956）；
（c）12．．． W d7 13 Qe4 玉ad8 14 Qc5
 with advantage（Kholmov－Nezhmet－ dinov，26th USSR Ch．，Tbilisi 1959）；
（d） \(12 \ldots\) e6 13 Qa4（even so， 13 De4 suggests itself）13．．．©xa4 14 \＆xa4 Wid6 15 \＆d2 and White stands better （Taimanov－Ravisekar，Delhi 1982）．

\section*{\(10 \quad 24\)}

White physically prevents the further advance of the a－pawn．

Also possible is 10 تd1 a4（after
装c8 14 e4 e5 \(15 \mathrm{dxe5}\) Qxe5 16 \＆f4 White stands better，V．Sokolov－Maric， Belgrade 1962） 11 \＆ e 2 Qc6，and now：
（a） 12 a 3 \＆ d 713 d 5 气a5 14 e 4 䊦e8 15 \＆f4 Qbc4 16 §d3 e5！ 17 dxe6（17
 \＆xa5 Oxa5 20 \＆ O 5 \＆ \(\mathrm{e} 4!21\) 全xc4 Qxc4，when Black exerted strong pres－ sure on the opponent＇s queenside （Golombek－Smyslov，Budapest 1952）；
（b） 12 Qe 4 comes into consideration， and if 12．．．ig4 13 Oc5（I．Polgar－ Gheorghiu，Örebro 1966）；
（c） 12 Qe5 Qxe5 13 dxe5 觜e8 14 f 4定e6 15 e4 wc6 16 县e3 a3 17 最b3 axb2 18 豝xb2 0 c 4 with chances for both sides（Bolic－Gheorghiu，Vmjacka Banja 1963）．

10 a3 also comes into consideration， in order to keep the bishop on the a2－g8 diagonal without weakening the b4 square（we have already met this idea in the Sokolov－Maric game，earlier in this note）．
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline 10 & & Qc6 \\
\hline 11 & Ed1 & §g4 \\
\hline 12 & h3 & \＆ x 5 \\
\hline 13 & 䒼xf3 & e6 \\
\hline 14 & ¢ \({ }^{\text {d }} 2\) & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Or 14 Qe4 Od5 15 是d2 Qcb4 16 \＆el with somewhat the better prospects for White（Prokhorovich－Seleznev， Moscow 1958）
14
 Qxd5 Qxd5 17 是xd5 Qe5 and then ．．．c7－c6 with equal chances．
```

15 \&e1

```


This position was reached in Geller－ Plater（Szczawno Zdroj 1957）．Instead
of 15 ．．．\(\otimes \mathbf{c} 8 ?\) ？，which after 16 d 5 ！led to an advantage for White，15．．． \(\mathbf{I d} 8\) was correct，although even then \(16 \Xi \mathrm{ac}\) leaves White with slightly the better chances．
8.12 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 g6 5 ＠xc4 \＆g760－0007 ©c3 ©fd7）

\section*{8 e4}

After the advance of the e－pawn，the weakening of the d 4 square may tell．A classic example of the implementation of Smyslov＇s plan is his game with Evans（Helsinki Olympiad 1952）．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
8 & \(\cdots\) & Qb6 \\
9 & \＆e2
\end{tabular}

9 £b3 was later played here：
（a） \(9 . . . \mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g} 4} 10 \mathrm{~d} 5 \mathrm{c} 611 \mathrm{~h} 3\) \＆ xf 312腊xf3 cxd5 13 Qxd5 ©c6 14 昷e3 e6 15 Qxb6 axb6 with equal chances（Sten－ borg－Plater，Moscow Olympiad 1956）；
（b） \(9 . . .0 \mathrm{c} 610 \mathrm{~d} 5\) 乌a5 11 \＆e3 Qac4
 \＆xe6 15 \＆xe6 fxe6 16 b3 敩f6 17 Eacl c6 18 a4 with slightly the better chances（Lein－Toshkov，Saint John 1988）．
\[
\begin{array}{cll}
9 & \ldots & \text { \&g4 } \\
10 & \text { \&e3 }
\end{array}
\]

Or 10 d 5 c 611 h 3 \＆xf3 12 \＆xf3 cxd5 13 exd5 Q8d7 14 g 3 Qe5 with roughly equal chances（Unzicker－ Gheorghiu，Hamburg 1965）．

\section*{10 ．．．Dc6！ \\ 11 d 5}

If White restricts the g 7 bishop by 11 e5，after 11．．． w d7 Black creates pres－ sure on the d 4 pawn．

11
Not 11．．．De5？ 12 Qxe5 \＆xe2 13 Qxf7，when White wins a pawn．
\[
12 \text { \&xf3 }
\]
\(12 \mathrm{gxf3}\) Qe5 13 \＆ d 4 ？！is strongly
met by 13．．．g5！By controlling the f4 and e5 squares，Black obtains excellent play（Klaman－Taimanov，USSR 1952）． White should play 13 whe with pres－ sure on the opponent＇s queenside．
12
Qe5 13 气e2 Dec4

If 13．．．c6 14 営b3！cxd5（Terpugov－ Smyslov，19th USSR Ch．，Moscow 1951） 15 exd5！with the better chances．


\section*{14 §f4！}

It is not essential to defend the b2 pawn．After the timid 14 \＆c1 Black plays \(14 . . . c 6\) with a good position：
（a） 15 dxc6 严xdl 16 Exdl bxc6 with a favourable ending；
（b） 15 wh was played in Evans－ Smyslov：15．．．cxd5 16 ©xd5（after 16 exd5 Еc8 Black exerts pressure on the queenside；in particular，it is not appar－ ent how the bishop at cl can be devel－
 17．．． \(0 x\) x5 18 exd5（if 18 将xd5 当b6 19 se3 Black can boldly take the pawn－
 Ec8．Black has a lead in development， and the d 5 pawn is a convenient target to attack．
（c） 15 exc4 is comparatively best．

\section*{14}
c6

It is bad to take the pawn：14．．．
 17 学a5．

15 dxc6
Uhlmann－Gheorghiu（Havana Olym－ piad 1966）went 15 \＆xc4 Oxc4 16
 19 是f4 f5 20 Eabl fxe4 21 埰xe4， when White＇s attempts to exploit the position of the b2 knight were parried．

15
bxc6
The ending after 15．．．\({ }^{\boldsymbol{6}} \mathrm{xd} 16\) Eaxdl bxc6 17 \＆ el is slightly more pleasant for White，who has the two bishops．

\section*{16 對c2 Qxb2}

This looks risky，but the move has not been refuted．

\section*{17 绱xb2}

To the cunning 17 \＆a6 Black should reply \(17 . . .96 \mathrm{c} 4\) ！（but not 17 ．．．\({ }^{\boldsymbol{w}} \mathrm{d} \mathrm{d} 18\)
 winning position for White，Portisch－ Gheorghiu，Havana Olympiad 1966）， and attempts by White to＇surround＇the knight at b2 are parried： 18 Qe2 Qe5！
 a5，and Black remains a pawn up （Portisch）．

Now after 17．．．乌a4 18 Qxa4 \＆xb2
 Black has a queen and two pawns for three minor pieces，but the c6 pawn can be attacked by superior forces．Both sides have chances．
> 8.13 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 g6 5 \＆xc4 \＆g7 6 0－0 0－0 7 Qc3 0 fd 7 ）

\section*{8 h3}

Before occupying the centre，White prevents ．．．今g4．

8 ．．．Qb6


11 exd4 a6 12 最g5！h6 13 昷h4 g5 14宜g3 ©f6 15 De5 e6 16 0xc6 bxc6 17昷e5 White gained the advantage in Ghitescu－F．Olafsson（Reykjavik 1970）．


9 \＆b3 ©c6，and now：
（a） 10 a 4 a5 11 単e2 e5 12 d5 Qb4
 160 b 5 c 6 with chances for both sides （Malich－Soos，Havana Olympiad 1966）；
（b） 10 a 3 e5 11 d 5 Qa5 12 \＆c2（or 12 \＆a2 ©ac4！）12．．．c6 13 e4 cxd5 14 exd5 气ac4 15 a4 0 d 616 ■a2 \＆f5 with a roughly equal position（Farago－ Georgiev，Albena 1983）；
（c） 10 凹el e5 11 d 5 Qa5 12 e 4 c 613
 bxc6，and here a draw was agreed in W．Schmidt－Radulov（Indonesia 1983）．

9 \＆e2，when：
（a） \(9 \ldots . .0 \mathrm{c} 610 \mathrm{~b} 3 \mathrm{a5} 11\)＠a3 घe8 12
 Qxd5 Qxd5 16 e4 Qf6 17 世c2 曇b7 18 d5 with the initiative（Lukacs－Velikov， Vrnjacka Banja 1985）；
（b） \(9 \ldots \mathrm{a} 510\) e4 a4 11 §e3 c6 12
 15 Efel 是xe2 16 Еxe2 with the more active position for White（Alburt－ Gutman，Thessaloniki Olympiad 1984）．
\[
\begin{aligned}
& 8.2 \text { (1 d4 d5 } 2 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 43 \text { 亿f3 } 0 \mathrm{f} 64
\end{aligned}
\]

\section*{7 對e2}

Play can transpose into variation 8．1， but independent branches are also pos－ sible．
\[
7 \ldots \quad \text {... } \quad \text { fd } 7
\]

After 7．．．ゆc6 8 \＃d1 \＆g4 9 h 3 \＆xf3 10 莦xf3 e5 11 Qc3 exd4 12 exd4 Qxd4 13 当xb7 c5 14 \＆e3 Qd7 15 Eacl Qb6 16 ©a6 the c5 pawn， defending the outpost，may come under attack．White stands better（Shersher－ Kholmov，Moscow 1961）．
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline 8 & d1 & Qb6 \\
\hline 9 & \＄b3 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

 （11．．．0c6 12 Qc3 e5 13 d5 Qa5 leads to a position from Mühring－Jauregui， p．152） 12 §d2 e6 13 乌e4 Q8d7 14国d2 ©d5 15 घacl with some initiative for White（Stahlberg－Bronstein，Mos－ cow 1956）．

9．．．0c6 10 h 3 a5 11 a 4 Qb4 12 Qc3 e6 13 e4 c6 14 臽e3 Od7 15 घacl． White has the initiative（Foguelman－ Rossetto，Belgrade 1962）．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
1 & d 4 & d 5 \\
2 & c 4 & dxc 4 \\
3 & ضf3 & Df6 \\
4 & e 3 &
\end{tabular}

In this chapter we will consider：
4．．．\({ }^{\text {ee6（ }}\)（9．1）
4．．．a6（9．2）－p． 158
4．．．Qbd7（9．3）－p． 159
4．．．b5？！（9．4）－p． 159
9.1 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3）


This strange looking move was em－ ployed by Winawer in the 1896 Nürnberg tournament．In fact it is not so easy to refute．More recently it was suc－ cessfully upheld by Keres and Flohr．

Black wants to exchange bishops on c4（a logical solution to one of the main problems of the Queen＇s Gambit！）．In some lines the bishop goes to d5．

White can reply：
5 Oc3（9．11）
5 Qbd2（9．12）－p． 157
5 式3（9．13）－p． 158
If 50 g 5 Black replies 5 ．．． \＆d5，when Trmal－Vyslouzyl（Prague 1959）contin－ ued 6 Qc3 h6 7 e4 hxg5 8 exd5 \(0 x d 59\)

玉abl 是d6 16 h 4 w w 717 区fel Qb6． White has two bishops，good develop－ ment and the initiative，but Black is a pawn up with no weaknesses．

> 9.11 (1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 \(0 \mathrm{f6}\) 4 e 3 @e6).

\section*{5 Qc3 c6}

Other continuations：
 gxf3 e6 8 \＆xc4 c5 the chances are equal，but 6 e5 is also promising，pre－ paring to occupy the centre by \(\mathrm{f} 2-\mathrm{f} 3\) and
 ＠b4＋．Now 9 ㅇd2 allows Black to
 but 9 e 2 ！retains the initiative．

5．．．g6 6 Qg5 \＆d5 7 e4 h6 8 exd5 （the simple 8 Qxd5 hxg5 9 D 3 is also good）8．．．hxg5 9 \＆xc4g4 10 蒋b3 with the better position for White（Suetin－ Fazekas，Debrecen 1961）．

5 ．．．c5 is strongly met by 6 Qg 5 cxd 4 7 Qxe6 fxe6 8 exd4 Qc6 9 \＆e3！Qd5 10 \＆xc4 with advantage to White．

5．．．a6 also fails to equalise： 6 Qg5 ©d5 7 e4 h6 8 Qxd5 hxg5 9 Qxf6＋

 and Black experiences difficulties （Petkevich－Kupreichik，USSR 1970）；


White must act energetically，or Black may well hold on to his c4 pawn．

After 6 \＆e2 Qbd7 7 Qg5 \＆f5 8昷xc4 e6 9 e4 \＆g6 Black solved his opening problems in Ojanen－Keres （Finland v．Estonia 1966）．His forces are well placed，the white centre comes under siege，and the knight at g5，so powerful in other lines，is out of play．

If 6 g 5 ，then：
（a） 6 ．．．\({ }^{\text {i }} \mathrm{d} 5\)（if \(6 \ldots\) ．．．b5 7 Qxe6 fxe6 8 a4） 7 e4 h6 8 exd5 hxg5 9 dxc6 Qxc6
㥩xb2 13 \＆ d 4 Qd3＋14 \＆xd3 cxd3 15 \(0-0\) Wb4 16 薯xd3 a6 17 Efel with an overwhelming positional advantage （Timman－Ljubojevic，Hilversum 1987）；

 \＆xc4 e5 11 0－0 exd4 12 exd4 2 Qb 613 Eel＋©e7 14 b3 \＆8（Boleslavsky－ Kupreichik，USSR 1971） 15 国g5， maintaining some initiative；
（c） \(6 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 47 \mathrm{f} 3\) 號5 is the only way to avoid the exchange on e6，but after 8 ＠xc4 e6 9 e4 Dbd7 10 ＠e3＠e7 （Golz－Hennings，East Germany 1967）

11 霊d2（more vigorous is 11 \＆xe6 fxe6 12 Qxe6 \({ }^{\prime \prime}\) b6 13 －xg7＋\＄f7 14 Qxh5 ©xh5 15 学e2 or \(14 \ldots\) 比xb2 15
 Maric） \(11 \ldots \mathrm{~h} 612\) Qh3 and \(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{f} 4}\) White has the advantage．

6 a 4 g 67 e 4 Qa6 8 Qg5 Qc7 9 e5台d5 10 Qxe6 Qxe6 11 \＆xc4 Qec7 12 h 4 ！with good attacking chances （Pachman－Gerink，Czechoslovakia 1958）．

\subsection*{9.12 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 9f3 Qf6 4 e3 \＆e6）}

\section*{5 Qbd2 c5}

5．．．\＆d5 6 世＂！ 2 ！and e3－e4 favours White（Miles－Larsen，Linares 1983）．


6 \＆xc4 §xc4 7 Qxc4 Qc6 \(80-0\) （after 8 Qce5 e6 9 Qxc6 bxc6 10 罦a4 White has a slight initiative，Florian－ Klüger，Balatonfured 1959）8．．．cxd4 9 exd4 e6 10 軍b3 当d7 11 §g5 道e7 12 ＠xf6！\＆xf6 13 d5！exd5 14 日fe \(1+\) 皿e7 （14．．． 15 d 8 Dce 5 ！favours White， Bobotsov－Keres，Bamberg 1968） 15 Qce5，and Black is in some difficulties．
\(60 \mathrm{g5}\) ，and now：
（a）6．．．\＆d7．Flohr rejected this because of 7 Qxc4，when 8 Qe5 is threatened，but after \(7 \ldots . . c x d 48\) exd4（8

Qe5？粨a5＋）8．．．e6 9 Qe5 Black is rescued by 9 ．．．全b4＋10 \＆d2 \＆xd2＋11峟xd2 \(0-0\) with an equal game；
（b）6．．．今d5 7 e4 h6 8 exd5 hxg5：
是e3 暑c7 with a good position（Szi－ lagyi－Flohr（Marianske Lazne 1956）；
（b2） 9 是xc4！cxd4 10 \＆b5＋Qbd7 11 Qc4 a6（if \(11 \ldots 0 \times \mathrm{d} 512\) 显xg5 with the threat of 13 Qd6＋） 12 宸e2 畨b8（13 Qd6 mate was threatened） 13 \＆xd7＋ Qxd7 14 \＆xg5 with advantage．

6 dxc5 can also be considered．
9.13 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3 © e6）
\[
5 \text { a3 }
\]

\[
5 \text {... c5 }
\]

5．．．id5 is also acceptable，e．g． 6 Qxc4 e6 7 a3（or 7 \＆d3 §e7 \(80-000\) 9 当e2 \＆e4 10 \＆xe4 0xe4 11 䒼c2䊩d5 with an equal position，Vidmar－ Schlechter，San Sebastian 1911）7．．．c5 8 dxc5 \＆xc5 9 b4 气e7 10 \＆b2 ©c6 with equal chances（Tolush－Klaman，USSR Ch． \(1 / 2\)－Final 1957）．

\section*{6 Oxc4}

6 Sxc4 \＆xc4 7 Qxc4 Qc6 trans－ poses into Florian－Kluger（p．157）．

6 ．．．Qc6
7 §e2
After 7 畨a4 cxd4 8 Qce5 定d5

 with an equal game，Van Scheltinga， Beverwijk 1960） 9 \＆b5 a6 10 ＠xc6＋ bxc6 11 exd4 0 d7！（the pawn cannot be taken－ 12 xc6？©b6）Black has a sound position（Antoshin－Klaman， USSR Ch．1／2－Final 1957）．

Now after 7．．．g6 \(80-0\) cxd4 9 exd4昷g710 Qce5 0－0 11 Qxc6 bxc6 12㪚 a 4 id5 13 是f4 数b the chances are equal（Sherwin－Berliner，USA 1961）．
9.2 （1 d4 d5 2 ct dxc4 3 Qf3 Qf6 4 e3）
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
4 & \ldots & a 6 \\
5 & \text { ixc4 } & \text { b5 }
\end{array}
\]

Now the variation acquires indepen－ dent significance，whereas 5．．e6 and ．．．c7－c5 leads to classical set－ups．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
\(\mathbf{6}\) & \＆d3 & \＆b7 \\
7 & a4 & b4
\end{tabular}

\(80-0\) e6 9 断 e 2 c 510 dxc 5 \＆xc5 11 Edi Qbd7 12 Qbd2 0－0 13 Qb3＠e7 14 e4 震 715 ＠g5 and White stands better（Tarasov－Drozd，USSR 1961）．

8 Qbd2 e6（if \(8 \ldots\) c5 9 e4 cxd4 10 e5 intending e5－e6） 9 e4 c5 10 e5 Od5 11 Qe4 cxd4 12 昷g5 苃d7（12．．．f6 13 exf6 gxf6 14 Qe5！h5 15 皿e2，while \(12 \ldots\)庴 a 5 is strongly met by 130 fd 2 －Nen－ ashev） \(130-00 \mathrm{c} 6\)（Nenashev－Adianto， Kuala Lumpur 1993）．After \(14 \Xi \mathrm{mcl}\) White has the more promising position．
\(9.3(1 \mathrm{~d} 4 \mathrm{~d} 52 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 43 \triangleq \mathrm{f} 3 \triangle \mathrm{f} 64\)
e 3 ）
4 ．．．包bd7
A relatively new move，with the idea of playing the queen＇s knight to b 6 and d5．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
5 & \＆xc4 & Qb6 \\
6 & \＆b3 & \(c 6\) \\
7 & Qc3 & Qbd5
\end{tabular}


8 h3 定f5 9 曾e2 e6 10 乌e5 定b4 （ \(10 \ldots\) ．．．dd 11 g 4 is good for White） 11 © d2 Wa5 \(120-0\) ！White stands better． The acceptance of the pawn sacrifice－ \(12 . .0 \times \mathrm{x} 313 \mathrm{bxc} 3\) 是xc3 14 Qc4 燔b4 15 是xc3 W xc3 16 Qd6＋is clearly un－ favourable for Black（Oll－Bellon，Dos Hermanas 1992）．

8 0－0 \＆f5 9 Еel（or 9 誛e2 e6 10 Qe5 and f2－f4）9．．．e6 10 ©d2．White＇s position is preferable．

\section*{9.4 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 صf3 凤f6 4 e3）}
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
4 & \ldots & b 5 ?! \\
5 & \text { a4 } & c 6
\end{array}
\]

In Taimanov－Benedictsson（Reykja－ vik 1968）Black immediately parted with the pawn－5．．．b4 6 \＆xc4 e6．After 7 0－0 \＆b7 8 Qbd2 Qbd7 9 e4！Qb6 （9．．． \(0 x e 4\) is strongly met by 10 Qxe4 Sxe4 11 El，and after the bishop moves－ 12 d5） 10 \＆ \(\mathrm{e} 5+\mathrm{c} 611\) \＆ d 3 a 5 12 Qb3 White had the better position．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
6 & \text { axb5 } & \text { cxb5 } \\
7 & \text { b3 } & \text { @e6 }
\end{array}
\]

We are following an old line，where Black clings on＇with his teeth＇to the pawn．7．．．e6 is relatively best，although after 8 bxc4 bxc4 9 \＆xc4 White stands better thanks to his central superiority （Ruderfer－Mukhin，USSR 1968）．
\[
8 \text { bxc4 bxc4 }
\]


\section*{9 当a4＋}

9 De5 is also good．Some books give
 piece and retaining a positional advan－ tage＇，but after 10．．．थbd7 11 当xc4 \(\Xi \mathrm{Ec} 8\) White loses his bishop．

Now after 9．．．Qbd7 10 Qe5 White has an undisputed advantage．

\section*{10 Alekhine Variation 3．．．a6 4 e3 罳g4（4．．．b5）}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
1 & d 4 & d 5 \\
2 & c 4 & dxc 4 \\
3 & 0 f 3 &
\end{tabular}

In this and the following two chap－ ters we will examine lines where Black deviates from the Classical Variation as early as the third move．
\[
\begin{array}{llll}
3 & \ldots & \text { a6 } \\
4 & \text { e3 } &
\end{array}
\]

And now：
4．．．Sg4（10．1）
4．．．b5（10．2）－p． 172

\section*{10．1（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 a6 4 e3）}

4 ．．．＠g4


The idea of this，the Alekhine Varia－ tion（it was employed by the World Champion in the 3rd game of his 1934 match with Bogoljubow）is to solve the problem of developing the queenside． Against the frontal attack on the b7
pawn（after＠xc4 and \({ }^{W} \mathrm{~b}\) 3）Black plans to reply ．．．b7－b5．Another，secon－ dary idea of \(3 . . . a 6\) is to avoid the Mann－ heim Variation 1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc4 3 Qf3 Qf6 4 监a4＋（which nowadays，how－ ever，is not considered so dangerous）．

White now has：
5 \＆xc4（10．11）
5 h3（10．12）－p． 171
10．11（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc4 3 Qf3 a6 4 e3 ig \({ }^{2}\) ）

5 \＆xc4 e6
Of course，not 5．．．b5 6 ＠xf7＋
White now has several possibilities：
6 劏b3（10．111）
6 h3（10．112）－p．167x
6 Obd2（10．113）－p． 168
6 d5（10．114）－p． 169
\(60-0\)（10．115）－p． 170
6 c3 is not usually of independent significance，leading to variation 10.1122 （after 6．．．Qd7 7 h 3 \＆h5）or to variation 7.122 （after 6．．． Qf \(^{\prime} 7\) h3 Sh5）．
10.111 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 a6 4e3 \＆g4 5 \＆xc4e6）

\section*{6 嶿b3}

By attacking the b7 pawn，White practically forces the exchange of the g4 bishop，and he hopes，after ．．．b7－b5， to use the advantage of the two bishops to attack Black＇s weakened queenside．
\[
6 \ldots \text { \&xf3 }
\]

Otherwise the knight goes to e5： 6．．．■a7 7 Qe5！

6．．．b5 is also very strongly met by 7 Qe5 Sh5（7．．．bxc4 8 当a4＋） 8 g 4 宣g6 9 0xg6 hxg6 10 皿e2．

6．．．Oc6 is unsatisfactory．White does
气f5），but plays 7 \＆d2！（after which Black does not have ．．． 5 a5，and he is obliged to defend the b7 pawn）7．．．Eb8 8 d5！：

（a） \(8 . . .9 x f 39\) dxe6！fxe6 \(10 \mathrm{gxf3}\)曹f6 11 是xe6 Qh6 12 f 4 \＆ e 513 Oc3敋f8 14 乌e4 暑e7 15 Dxc5 㥪xc5 16 Egl and Black＇s position is hopeless （Alatortsev－Goglidze，Leningrad 1936）；
（b） \(8 . .\). b5 9 dxe6（or 9 dxc6 bxc4 10
 \(9 . . . b x c 410\) exf7＋ again Black stands badly；
（c）8．．．exd5 9 是xd5 wd7（9．．．eh5 is comparatively best）and White gains the advantage by 10 是xc6 曾xc6 11 Qe5
 \＆\({ }^{1}\) c3（Alatortsev）．

\section*{7 gxf3}

Black can defend his b7 pawn by：
7．．．b5（10．1111）
7．．．荱c8（10．1112）－p． 165
7．．．』а7（10．1113）－p． 166
7．．．c5 8 嘗xb7 Qd79 dxc5 \＆xc5 10 f4 ©gf6 11 Oc3 favours White．
 Qxc4 10 眔c6＋
10.1111 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3
是xf3 7 gxf3）
\[
\begin{array}{llll}
7 & \ldots & b 5 \\
8 & \text { \&e2 }
\end{array}
\]
\(8 \AA \mathrm{~d} 3\) is weaker in view of 8 ．．．c5 9 dxc5 Qd7 and then ．．． \(9 x c 5\) ．

Now Black again has a choice：
8．．．c5（10．11111）
8．．．Od7（10．11112）－p． 163
If he plays 8．．．Df6，disregarding his queenside which has just been weak－ ened by ．．．b7－b5，this allows White to gain an advantage by 9 a 4 b 410 穆c4！ Qe7（if \(10 . . .2 b d 7\) the blockading 11燔c6！is extremely unpleasant） 11 Qd2 \(0-012\) Qb3 with advantage to White （Veltmander－Aratovsky，corr．1955／6）．
10.11111 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 a6 4 e3 §g4 5 今xc4 e6 6 㯰b3定xf3 7 gxf 3 b 58 气e2）
\[
\begin{array}{llll}
8 & \ldots & c 5 \\
9 & \text { dxc5 } &
\end{array}
\]

9 a 4 b4（if \(9 \ldots \mathrm{cxd} 410 \mathrm{axb5}\) ） 10 dxc 5 exc5 transposes into the main line．

Black can either recapture immedi－ ately on c5，or defer it：

9．．．옹ㄷ（10．111111）
9．．．\(\triangle \mathrm{d} 7\)（10．111112）－p． 163
10.11111 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43
定xf3 7 gxf 3 b 58 \＆ e 2 c 59 dxc 5 ）
\[
9 \text {... \&xc5 }
\]

At one time this was considered un－ favourable on account of Foltys＇s move 10 Zgl ．However，as the reader will see，Black can successfully solve his opening problems．
\[
10 \quad \Xi g 1
\]

Other possibilities：

10 a4 b4：

（a） 11 פd2 ©f6，when White has：
（a1） 12 曾c4 Qbd7 13 Qb3（13 b3！ and \({ }^{2} \mathrm{~b} 2\) comes seriously into consid－ eration）13．．．皿e7 14 e4 0－0 15 皿e3
 a counter to the opponent＇s pressure on the queenside，Black gained counter－ play in the centre and on the kingside （Van Scheltinga－Alekhine，Buenos Aires Olympiad 1939）；
（a2） 12 wc2 \(\mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{G}} \mathrm{Qbd} 713 \mathrm{~b} 3\) 0－0 14
 Qe4 ©df6 17 Ed1 wbs 18 f4 ©xe4 19曹xe4 \＆f6 20 \＆e5！\＆xe5 21 fxe5 ©c7 22 Sc4 and White gained the advantage （Gligoric－Puc，Yugoslavia 1947）＊；

Here and later an asterisk is used to indicate games in which 6 h3 \＆h5 has been included，when therefore the white pawn is not at h2，but at h3．
（b） 11 0－0 Qf6 12 Qd2 Qbd7 13 Qc4 0－0 14 a5 Qd5 15 e4 we7 16 新h1 （if 16 exd5 exd5 17 De3 d4） \(16 \ldots . .0 \mathrm{c} 7\) 17 f 4 Qb5（ \(17 . . . \mathrm{e} 5\) ！？is unclear） 18 \＆e3 Qd4 19 \＆xd4 \＆xd4 20 ada \＆a7 21 Qd6 with the better position for White （Tolush－Smyslov，18th USSR Ch．， Moscow 1950）；
（c） 11 a 5 ．White wants to＇surround＇ the b4 pawn，and with this aim he isolates it from the a－pawn．Mikenas－

Bagirov（Vilnius 1963）continued 11．．． Qf6 12 Qd2 Qbd7 13 䜊a4 0－0 14 Qb3 峟b8 15 \＆d2 \＆d6 \(160-0-0\) Qc5 17 Qxc5 \＆xc5 18 宴bl 思d8 with a complicated game．

10 wis3，when \(10 \ldots\) ．．．f8（the pawn sacrifice 10 ．．．\＆e7 11 啙xg7 是f6 12 Wg4 Qh6，suggested by Tolush，would appear to favour White after 13 㜣e4） seems the most promising，followed by ．．．2d7 and ．．． Ec 8 ，as in the main line．

Now let us return to the position after Foltys＇s move \(10 \Xi g 1\) ，which at one time seriously frightened devotees of the Alekhine Variation．


Black cannot play 10．．g6 on account of 11 w w 3 ，and meanwhile the g 7 pawn has to be defended．
\[
10 \ldots \text { \& }
\]

10．．．Wh4 was recommended by
 Qd7 \(13 \Xi \mathrm{~g} 5 \mathrm{e} 5\) ．Note that after the in－ clusion of 6 h 3 \& 5 this variation does not work，since with his queen at h3 （11．．．W＇ixh3）Black cannot play ．．．e6－e5．

After 10．．．ef8 White has a lead in development，but how can it be ex－ ploited？It would be good to fianchetto the dark－square bishop，but his own queen，which has no good square to go
to，is in the way．And with his king in the centre he cannot connect his rooks．
\[
11 \quad 34
\]

Experience suggests that it is better for White to complete his queenside development with 11 Qc3 Qf6 12 \＆d2 followed by \(0-0-0\) ．

Milev－Smyslov（Leipzig Olympiad 1960）now continued 11．．．b4 12 a5 Qf6 13 Qd2 0 bd 714 崰 4 g 6.


By defending his pawn，Black frees his bishop for other，more important matters．After 15 Qc4 定c5 16 突d2？
 © d 2 White could have regained his pawn with roughly equal chances） \(16 \ldots\)

玉acl Qd5 Black threatens 21．．．0c5 and despite the fact that his bishop has twice moved from f8 to c5 and twice returned，he holds the initiative！
> 10.111112 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 Qf3 a6 4 e 3 \＆g45 \＆xc4e6 6 蒋b3 \＆xf3 7 gxf3 b5 8 皿e2c5 9 dxc 5 ）
\[
9 \quad \ldots \quad \text { Dd7 }
\]

Black does not hurry to capture on c5，aiming to complete his development
as quickly as possible，but events show that this is weaker than 9．．． \(\mathrm{exc}^{2}\) ．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
10 & \(c 6!\) & Qc5 \\
11 & U．\(c 2\) & \(\Xi c 8\) \\
12 & Qc3！ &
\end{tabular}

This places Black in a difficult posi－ tion．White immediately begins an at－ tack on the opponent＇s weakened queenside． 13 b4 is threatened．
12
Exc6
 14 是d2） 14 Qxc5 \＆xc5 15 b3 White has an obvious advantage．


13 Qxb5！axb5
14 b4
Bratkovsky－Marchenko（corr．1952／3）， in which the plan of breaking up the queenside was first seen，continued 14．．．㤟b8 15 Еbl Qf6 16 bxc5 Еxc5 17


The lesser evil is \(14 \ldots\) ．．． W b6 15 bxc 5 Exc5（15．．．exc5 16 wb？！），although after 16 w b followed by 17 \＆ l 3 or 17 a4 Black＇s position remains difficult．
> 10.11112 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 a6 4 e3 气g4 5 \＆xc4 e6 6 显b3 ＠xf3 7 gxf3 b5 8 \＆e2）

8
0 d 7

\section*{\(9 \quad a 4\)}

In the first instance White forces the opponent to weaken the c4 square．

After 9 f4 0 gf6 10 \＆f3 Black sacri－ fices the exchange by \(10 \ldots \mathrm{c} 511 \AA \mathrm{ex} 8\)歯xa8 12 Egl cxd4（or \(12 . . . g 613 \mathrm{dxc} 5\)
 position，Kondratiev－Solovyev，Lenin－ grad v．Moscow 1960） 13 exd4 §d6 14 \(0 \mathrm{c} 30-0\) ，and the weakness of the isola－ ted pawns and the light squares（c4，d5， e4 and f5）allows him to create counter－ play（Boronstein－Solovyev，Moscow 1956）．

The exchange sacrifice with the in－ clusion of \(9 \mathrm{a} 4 \mathrm{b4}\) is analysed below．

\section*{9 \\ \[
9 \text {.. }
\] b4 \\ 10 f4}

This was played by Botvinnik in the 10th game of his match with Smyslov （Moscow 1954）．

10 Qd2 Qgf6（if \(10 . . . c 511 \mathrm{~d} 5\) ！），as played earlier in the same match，is considered less promising for White：

（a） 11 Qe4 c5，and now：
（a1） 12 Qxf6 + wf6（Botvinnik con－ siders that \(12 \ldots 0 x f 6\) equalises） 13 d 5 e5（13．．．血d6 14 dxe6 fxe6 15 畒d3 leads to an advantage for White） 14 a5！ \＆\({ }^{\text {d } 6 ~} 15\) e4（now ．．．e5－e4 is no longer possible，and if ．．．f7－f5 and ．．．fxe4 White＇s queen＇s bishop will be able to
defend f2； \(15{ }^{w i v c} 4\) and \(15{ }^{W} \mathrm{~F} 4\) are not dangerous for Black）15．．．0－0 16 （e3 （4th game of the match）．Here，instead of the pawn sacrifice 16．．．c4 Botvinnik suggested 16．．． \(\mathbf{W}\) h4 followed by ．．．f7－f5 with a double－edged position；
（a2）the main point is that with 12 Qxc5 Oxc5 13 dxc 5 \＆xc5 14 \＆ d 2 （or
 White can count on an advantage；
（b） 11 旡c4 c5 12 d 5 exd5 13 是xd5
 with the better position for White （Donner－Dückstein，Wageningen 1957）；
（c） 11 f 4 c 512 Qf3 cxd4 13 Qxd4
 \(0-017\) b3 玉ac8 18 \＆\({ }^{\text {b }} 2\) Qd5 with a complicated game and chances for both sides（Reshevsky－Duckstein，Munich Olympiad 1958）；
（d） 11 断c4 c5 12 dxc 5 Qxc5 \(130-0\) Elb8 14 毋b3 Qfd7 with equal chances （Zhukhovitsky－Mnatsakanian，USSR 1957）．
\[
10 \quad \ldots \quad \text { Dgf6 }
\]

If \(10 . . . c 511 \mathrm{~d} 5\) ！with an excellent game for White，e．g．11．．．exd5 12 粪xd5 Qgf6 13 畒g2 \＆e7 14 Dd2 0－0 15 e4！ （Szabo－Hajtun，Hungary 1954）．

11 今约


\section*{11 ．．．c5！}

This exchange sacrifice was sug－ gested by Grechkin．From the note to－ White＇s 9th move the reader will al－ ready know how the play can develop． To demonstrate the superiority of rook over knight in the resulting position is extremely difficult：Black has strong points in the centre and chances of an attack on the enemy king．

In the Botvinnik－Smyslov game Black moved his rook－11．．．ma7，and after 12 \＆c6！ended up in a difficult position：12．．．e7 13 Qd2 0－0 14 Qc4 a5 15 De5 Qb8 16 是d2 Qd5 17 e 4 Qb6 18 \＆e3．

\section*{12 \＆xa8}

12 d5！？（Taimanov）．

> 12 ．．．對xa8
> \(13 \Xi \mathrm{~g} 1\)

\(130-0 \mathrm{~W} \mathrm{f} 3\) is unpleasant for White，
 threatened） 15 ．．．cxd4．
\[
13 \ldots \text { exd4 }
\]

This capture can be delayed，since it is unfavourable for White himself to take on c5．

In Veltmander－Grechkin（corr． 1955／6）Black first developed his bishop 13．．．Sd6 14 Qd2，and only now replied 14．．．cxd4，when 15 ©c4 昷e7 16
 to a complicated position in which he would appear to have sufficient com－ pensation for the sacrificed exchange．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
14 & \text { exd4 } & \& d 6 \\
15 & \text { \&e3 } &
\end{array}
\]

In contrast to Boronstein－Solovyev （cf．the note to White＇s 9th move）the black pawn is not at b5，but b4，and so White does not have \(15 \$ c 3\) ．On the other hand he can occupy c4 with his knight or queen．


After detaining the enemy king in the centre，Black is not obliged to attack it． The central white pawns are insuffi－ ciently well defended，and this deter－ mines his subsequent plan．Ilivitsky－ Grechkin（RSFSR Ch．1954）continued 17 © 2 dd5 18 \＃acl \(\Xi \mathrm{d} 8\)（it is impor－ tant to retain the rook） \(19 \mathrm{~h} 4 Q 7 \mathrm{f} 620\)寝c4 ©xf4＋（Black could have tried for more with 20 ．．．exf4） 21 自f1 乌h3 22 \(\Xi \mathrm{g} 2 \Omega \mathrm{f} 4\) with a draw by repetition．
10.1112 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 a6 4 e3 皿g4 5 显xc4 e6 6 情b © i xf3 \(7 \mathrm{gxf3}\) ）
\[
7 \text {... 㘳c8 }
\]

Black avoids the weakening of his queenside，but at c8 his queen is badly placed．White makes a break in the centre and gains the advantage．
```

8 Oc3!

```

The most energetic． 8 a4 also prom－ ises White the better chances．

Less good is \(\mathbf{8} \mathbf{~ f 4} 59 \mathrm{dxc} 50 \mathrm{~d} 710\) \(0-0\) Qgf6 11 Qd2 \＆e7 with roughly equal chances（Ghitescu－Szilagyi，Mos－ cow Olympiad 1956）．
\begin{tabular}{llll}
8 & \(\ldots\) & c5 \\
9 & d5 &
\end{tabular}


After 9 dxc5 \＆xc5 Black has no dif－ ficulties，whereas now he is forced to go in for complications，since \(9 . .\). e5 10 d6！ is unfavourable．
\[
9 \ldots \text { b5 }
\]

From this point events develop by force．The black king is forced to remain in the centre，where it comes under attack．
\[

\]

11．．．\(\ddagger\) e7 is strongly met by 12 e4， and if \(12 \ldots\) ．．． \(13 \mathrm{~d} 6+\) ．

After 11．．． Qd7 \(^{12}\) dxe6 fxe6 13喽xe6＋White has more than sufficient compensation for the piece．
\[
12 \text { dxe6 fxe6 }
\]

If 12．．．掌xe6 13 全c4．
\(13 \quad\) e4 分6
There appears to be nothing better．
解 716 f 4 h 6 （ \(16 \ldots\) ．．．xe4 does not help
 hxg5 18 exd6＋\＄d8 19 fxg5 Black cannot hope to resist successfully．

After 13．．．Dc6 14 \＆e3 Qd4 15


 Dxh6 23 Exd4＋White should win （Uhlmann）．

Now after 14 \＆e3 White has a strong attack（Uhlmann－ Dückstein，East Germany v．Austria 1957）．
> 10.1113 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 a6 4 e3 \＆g4 5 是xc4 e6 6 㥪b3是xf3 7 gxf3）

\section*{7 ．．．\({ }^{\text {a7 }}\)}

An awkward and anti－positional move，or，on the contrary，a subtle and unusual one？The idea of defending the pawn with the rook，thereby avoiding
weakening the queenside pawns， belongs to Alekhine．


After 8 \＆d2 Qf6 9 Qc3 Qbd7 10皿e2 c5（ 10 ．．．b5 \(11 \mathrm{a4}\) ） 11 d5 Black has：
（a）11．．．e5 12 a 4 ＠d6 \(130-0\) 曾e7 14 hal e4（otherwise White himself plays
 （Botvinnik recommends 16．．．We5 17 gg2 g5！followed by ．．．g5－g4，prevent－ ing f2－f4 and controlling e5） 17 ＠e2 0－0 \(18 \mathrm{f4}\) Og6 19 国d3 and White gained the advantage（Botvinnik－Flohr， 14th USSR Ch．，Moscow 1945）；
（b）11．．exd5 12 Qxd5 \(0 x d 513\)比xd5 定e7 was recommended by Grünfeld in his time，although White＇s position remains favourable．

Keres－Flohr（17th USSR Ch．， Moscow 1949）went 8 Qc3 Qf6 900 c5 10 dl（here the sacrifice 10 d 5 ？！b5 11 Qxb5 axb5 12 是xb5＋ promising as in variation 10．1112：the rook on the 7th rank plays an important defensive role，and the queen is better placed at d8 than c8）10．．．cxd4 11 Exd4
 \(0-0\) and Black achieved a roughly equal position．

White did not gain anything from the opening in Pirc－Flohr（Saltsjðbaden

1948）： 8 Qd2 Qf6 9 消c2 Qbd7 10 Qb3 \＆b4＋ 11 是d2 \＆xd2＋ 12 畄xd2粕e7．The game is equal．

We must also mention the plan of playing the knight to b3： 8 \＆e2 ©f6 9 Qd2 c5 10 dxc 5 \＆xc5 11 置c2 Qbd7．


鉴e7 18 Da5．White has slightly the better chances（Gligoric－Flohr，Hastings 1961／2）．
10.112 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 a6 4 e 3 酉g45酉xc4e6）

\section*{6 h3 \\ 定h5}

White＇s main alternatives are：
7 㟶b3（10．1121）
7 0c3（10．1122）
10.1121 （ 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 a6 4 e3 \＆g4 5 \＆xc4e6 6 h3 \＆h5）

\section*{7 宸b3}

Now 7．．．姩xf38 gxf3 leads to a posi－ tion from variation 10.111 with the pawn at h3．In some cases this factor is insignificant，but in others the position of the h－pawn influences the evaluation．

The variations of independent sig－ nificance are those where Black does not exchange on f ：

7．．．■a7（with the bishop at g 4 this move is frankly bad－cf．p．160）：


8 \＆e2！（after 8 a4 0 c 69 \＆ d 2 Qf6 10 \＆c3 Qd5 the game is equal，Zinner－ Alekhine，Podebrady 1936）8．．．⿹f6 9 \(0-0\) Qc6 10 ©c3 气d6 11 Еd1！（direc－ ted against ．．．e6－e5）11．．．0－0 \(12 \mathrm{e4}\) ，and if 12 ．．．exf3 13 ＠xf3 e5 14 dxe 5 Qxe5 15 昷e2 ©g6 16 \＆e3 b6 17 g 3 with a significant positional advantage（S．Vuk－ ovic－Tomovic，Yugoslavia 1949）．
\(7 . . \sum \mathrm{c} 6\) is interesting，when \(8 \& \mathrm{~d} 2\) ， preventing ．．．乌a5，is probably best，as in variation 10．111．

Note that with the bishop at h5 the move 7．．．b5？is refuted by 8 exb5＋

```

10.1122 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 Df3
a64 e3 \&g4 5 \&xc4 e6 6 h3 \&h5)

```

\section*{7 De3}
 examined under a different move order on p． 144.
\[
7 \quad \ldots \quad \text {... } 7 \text { d }
\]

Black makes this move when he does not want to allow the exchange of his bishop（8 g4 合g6 7 （2e5）．

7．．．Qf6 leads to the variation 1 d 4 d 5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 0 f 64 e 3 ＠g45 5 xc 4 e6 6 h3 \＆h5 7 Qc3 a6（p．138）．

8 e4 c5
Petrosian－Lombardy（Zurich 1961）
当e2 匂x4 12 当xc4 e5 13 a4 b6 14 0－0 with the better position for White．

He also stands better after 8．．．＠b6 9是e2c5 10 \＆e3．
\[
9 \text { d5 }
\]

\[
9 \text {... e5 }
\]

Interesting complications can arise after 9．．．0e5：
（a） 10 暑a4＋（reckless） \(10 \ldots\) ．．．b5，when it would appear that Black can parry the threats，retaining a material advantage： 11 Qxb5（or 11 是xb5 \(\mathrm{axb5} 12\) 当xb5 + Qd7）11．．． Qxf3 \(^{2} 12\) gxf3 axb5 13

 not 14．．．Exa4？ 15 d6＋or 14．．．箵xd5 15数 \(4+\) ）－Prokhorovich；
（b）instead 10 \＆e2 gives White an excellent position： \(10 \ldots\) ．．．xf3＋11 exf \(^{2}\) きxf3 12 啙xf3 e5 13 崰g3！
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
10 & \text { a4 } & \text { \&d6 } \\
11 & 0-0 &
\end{array}
\]

After 11 b3 Qgf6 12 是e3 会c7 13 \＆d2 0－0 \(140-0\)＠a5 15 Eel Qe8 16
 19 \＆xf3 a draw was agreed in Bronstein－Flohr（USSR 1949）．

11 ．．．Qe7
Preparing ．．．f7－f5．
\[
12 \text { \&e2 \&xf3 }
\]

Otherwise White will play his knight to 4 ．
\[
13 \text { \&xf3 0-0 }
\]

13．．．c4 comes into consideration．
Prokhorovich－Bagirov（USSR Ch． \(1 / 2\)－ Final 1957）now continued 14 置e2 f5 15 exf5 Qxf5 16 Qe4 Qf6 17 Qg5 Qd4 18 区cl 曹b6 19 是d3 Qxe4 20 \＆xe4 \(\boldsymbol{\Delta f 7}\) with a double－edged posi－ tion．The b2 pawn is in danger，but Black＇s kingside may come under at－ tack．
10.113 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 a6 4 e 3 ＠g4 5 §xc4e6）

\section*{6 Obd2}


6
Qd7
After 6．．．\(\triangle\) f6 White has two good replies：
（a） 7 h 3 （it is useful to exchange the bishop）7．．．今h5 8 g 4 \＆g6 9 Qe5 \(\sum \mathrm{bd} 7\) 10 Oxg6 hxg6 11 Wff；
（b） 7 a3 c5 8 dxc5 1 xc5 9 b4 followed by \(\& b 2\) ，with the better prospects，（Antoshin－Fuchs，Kinnbaum 1958）．

The immediate \(6 \ldots \mathrm{c} 5\) is met by 7 dxc5 莤xc5 8 a3 b2－b4 and Sb2．

The fianchetto of the bishop is also possible after \(6 \ldots .0 \mathrm{c} 6\) ，e．g． 7 h 3 \＆h5 8 a3（directed against ．．．©a5 and ．．．c7－c5） 8．．．थf6 9 b4 气d6 10 定b2．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
7 & 0-0 & \text { Dgf6 } \\
8 & \text { h3 }
\end{array}
\]

8 b3 \＆e7 9 \＆b2 0－0 10 \＆e2 c5 11
 position in Neishtadt－Berezin（Lenin－ grad 1964）．
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline 8 & ． & \＆ i 5 \\
\hline 9 & b3 & c5 \\
\hline 10 & ¢ 22 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

10 皆 1 cxd 411 exd 4 Qb6 12 是b2皿e713 Qf1 घc8 14 エcl 0－0 does not cause Black any problems（Osnos－Bag－ irov，31st USSR Ch．，Leningrad 1963）．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
10 & \(\ldots\) & cxd4 \\
11 & Qxd4 & \＆xe2 \\
12 & Uxe2 & §c5 \\
13 & ＠b2 &
\end{tabular}


The position has simplified，but in order to equalise Black still has to make several accurate moves．

In Bronstein－Anagnostou（Amster－ dam Olympiad 1954）after 13．．．We7 14 Oc4 0－0 15 监f3！Black began to expe－ rience difficulties．If \(15 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 516\) Qc6

宸e8 17 Q4e5 with a positional advan－ tage for White．The Greek player decided to get rid of the knight，but after \(15 \ldots\) ．．．\(x d 416\) \＆xd4 he still had an inferior position．

Smyslov－Botvinnik（The Hague／ Moscow 1948）went 13．．．0－0！ 14 Eacl （now Black can answer 14 Dc4 with
 equal game．

> \begin{tabular}{|l} \(10.114(1 \mathrm{~d} 4 \mathrm{~d} 52 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 43\) \\ 4 e 3 Sg 45 \& exc 3 e 6\()\) \\ \hline \end{tabular}

6 d5
This energetic move of Alatortsev is parried by an invention by Flohr．


6
6．．．Qf6 is an alternative：
（a） 7 Qc3 exd5 8 Qxd5 \(勹 \mathrm{bd} 79\) 歯d4 c6 10 Qxf6＋ \(0 x f 6\) with an equal game （Averbakh－Foltys，Szczawno Zdroj 1957）；
（b） 7 Wb3 b5 8 dxe6 bxc4 9 㴆b7
 this sharp line gives White no more than a draw；
（c） 7 dxe6 㥪xd1＋8 8 xdl 是xe6 9 \＆xe6 fxe6，when Black＇s queenside majority gives him some compensation
for his weak e6 pawn．Nevertheless af－ ter 100 g 5 White＇s position is slightly preferable．

A similar structure arises after 6．．．b5 7 昷b3 定b4＋ 8 Qc3 Qf6 9 dxe6
 12 这d2，with roughly the same evalu－ ation（Alatortsev－Ravinsky，Moscow 1942）．
\(6 . . .55 \mathrm{~h} 3\) is good for White． 7 定xd5 䊦 e ！
Flohr＇s move．By indirectly defend－ ing the b7 pawn（8 ©xb7？Wb4＋） Black equalises．
\[
8 \triangleq c 3
\]

Other continuations are also not dan－ gerous for Black：

8 憎b3，and now：
是xb4＋10 \(\mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{d} 2}\) \＆xd2＋11 Qbxd2 c6 12 Qe5 \＆h5 13 ＠f3 \＆xf3 14 Qdxf3
 Qd4 g6 18 e4 a draw was agreed in Alatortsev－Flohr，Moscow 1944） 9．．．管xb3，when：
（a1） 10 axb3 c6，and White cannot take on f7－11 \＆xf7＋？家e6 13 xg4 h5，since his knight has no retreat；
（a2） 10 \＆xb3 Qd7 11 e4 \＆d6 12 h 3 \＆xf3 13 gxf3 乌e5 14 （2e2 Qg6 15 Eg1 Qf6（15．．．98e7 was correct，pre－ venting 16 f4） 16 f4！§xf4 17 Exg6 \＆xcl 18 Exf6 \＆xb2 19 Ebl！with ad－ vantage to White（Forintos－Milev， Sinaia 1964）；
（b） \(8 . . . c 69\) \＆．c4（here too the capture on f 7 loses a piece） 9 ．．． exf3 \(^{2}\)（ \(9 \ldots\) ．．． b4＋
 Qbxd2 Qd7 13 \＆e2 Eff6 14 Qd4 \＆xe2 led to an equal position in Flohr－ Bronstein，16th USSR Ch．，Moscow
 12 ＠d2 \＆xd2＋13 Qxd2 Qf6 14 \＆ 2


Qb6 18 定b3 ※xdl 19 』adl a5 20 Øe5 Dfd5．Black＇s position is slightly pref－ erable（Antoshin－Smyslov，Moscow 1960）．

 \＆xb4，and 11 \＆xb7 is not possible on account of 11．．．⿷匚）10．．．＠e7 11 §d2 Wb6 12 Qg5 Qbd7！，and in this sharp position Black has a lead in develop－ ment（Vistaneckis－Flohr，USSR Ch． \(1 / 2\)－ Final 1951）；
（b） 9 ㅇd2 \({ }^{\boldsymbol{w}} \mathrm{xd} 410\) exd4．Now 10 ．．．c6 no longer works in view of 11
 h5，since the knight can go to e3 or e5， but 10．．． 9 f6！is good（White cannot take on b 7 on account of \(11 \ldots \Xi \mathrm{a} 7\) ， when the bishop is lost）．


\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline 8 & \\
\hline 9 & Sc4 \\
\hline 10 & 䒼c2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

 with an equal game．

Now after 10．．．Ogf6 110－0 \＆xf3 12
皿e7 15 b4（after 15 \＆e2 0－0－0 16 㟶c4
 initiative passes to Black，Boleslavsky－ Flohr，Pärnu 1947）15．．．We5！（weaker is
 18 皿e2 idd6 19 f 4 ，when 19．．． g 4 fails to 20 雷e4＋and 21 wiv2－Boleslavsky） 16 mbl the chances are equal．
\(10.115(1 \mathrm{~d} 4 \mathrm{~d} 52 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 43 乌 \mathrm{f} 3 \mathrm{a6}\)
4 e 3 \&g4 5 \&xc4 e6)
\[
6 \quad 0-0
\]

A similar variation is 6 \＆e2 Qf6 7 \(0-0 \mathrm{c} 58 \mathrm{~b} 3\) Qc6 9 \＆b2 घc8 10 Qbd2


12 Ec1 \＆e713 ©c4 0－0 with an equal position（Speelman－Vorotnikov，Lenin－ grad 1984）．
\[
6 \quad \ldots \quad \text {. } 6 \text { f6 }
\]

\(7 \quad\) b3
Other possibilities：
定h5 leads to lines examined earlier） \(9 . . . e 510 \mathrm{~d} 5\) 乌e7 11 h 3 §d7 12 §c3 h6 with a double－edged position （Borisenko－Tarasov，USSR 1967）．

7 b4？！，when Black can boldly take the pawn：7．．．宣xb4，and if 8 㟶a4＋©c6


Now after 7．．．c5 8 dxc5 喽xdl 9 Exd1 是xc5 10 安b2 Qc6（or 10．．．exf3 11 gxf3 Qbd7 12 乌d2 ge7，Langeweg－ Smyslov，Wijk aan Zee 1972） 11 Qbd2 \(0-0\) the game is equal（Korchnoi－Hort， Beverwijk 1968）．
\(\mathbf{1 0 . 1 2}\)（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 a6 4 e3 足g4）

\section*{5 h3}

Before taking the c4 pawn，White drives back the bishop．



White has weakened his kingside pawns，but on the other hand he has got rid of the pin．He will develop his king＇s bishop at g2 and will pick up the c4 pawn with one of his knights．In some variations White exchanges his knight for the g6 bishop，gaining the advantage of the two bishops．

Compared with the variation 1 d 4 d 5 2 c 4 dxc 43 －f3 9 f 64 e 3 Dg 4 h 3是h5 6 g 4 是g67 De5 Black has spent a tempo on ．．．a7－a6，which is of consider－ able importance．His opening problems are illustrated by the following vari－ ations：

7．．．e6（7．．．b5？loses to 8 ＠g2 \({ }_{\text {an }} 9\) Qc6） 8 \＆g2 c6 9 Qd2 Qd7 10 Qxd7
 12 the white king is securely placed in the centre） \(12 \AA \mathrm{~d} 2 \mathrm{a} 513 \mathrm{e} 4\) ， and Black has difficulties in developing his kingside（Pachman－Sajtar， Bucharest 1949）．

7．．．皿e4 8 定xc4！e6（or 8．．．是d5 9是xd5 㥩xd5 1000 and 110 c 3 with advantage） 9 f3 \＆xbl 10 Exbl Qd7 11薮b3 Qxe5 12 dxe5 b5 13 \＆d3 是e7 （Nei－Solovyev，USSR 1964） 14 a4！and White stands better．

7．．．0d78 0xc4（White also has the
better chances after \(80 \times \mathrm{xg} 6 \mathrm{hxg} 69\)
垱xc4 e5 \(130-0\) or \(9 \ldots . . .610\) 分d2 e5 11 \(0 \times c 4\)－Pachman），and now：

（a）8．．．ee49 日gl e6 10 Qc3 \＆b4 11
 14 e4 是xc4 15 皿xc4 0－0 16 寝e2 with advantage to White（Ezek－Milev， Moscow Olympiad 1956）；
（b）8．．．b5 9 Da5 c5 10 \＆d2（if 10 Qc6 啙b6 11 昷g2 Ec8）10．．．Qgf6 （10．．．b4 11 §g2！） 11 §g2 \＆e4 12
 15 Qc6 䒼c8 16 a4 with advantage to White（Taimanov－Smyslov，USSR 1960）．

This list of failures for Black after the retreat of his bishop suggests the idea of exchanging it－5．．． \(8 \times 53\)滔xf3，and then continuing 6．．．0c6， ．．．e7－e6，．．．ゆf6，．．．＠d6 and ．．．0－0． Nevertheless，after 7 \＆xc4（7 d5 Qe5 8
 gains the better chances both with the positional 90－0 \＆\({ }^{2} \mathrm{~d} 610\) Edl 0－0 11 a 3 e5 12 Qd5 Qxd5 13 §xd5 需e8 14 §d2 exd4 15 \＆xc6 Wxc6 16 虽xc6 bx－ c6 17 exd4（Geller－Sajtar，Helsinki Olympiad 1952）and with 9 \＆d2 \＆d6 \(100-0-00011 \mathrm{~g} 4\) ！，preparing an at－ tack（Pachman－Lundin，Leipzig Olym－ piad 1960）．
10.2 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 a6 4 e3）
\[
4
\]

Of course，Black cannot hold on to the gambit pawn，but the attempt to re－ vive this condemned variation，made by the Viennese theoretician Gaberditz，is of interest．Black aims to exploit the time spent by the opponent on regaining the pawn，for the purposes of rapid de－ velopment．

\section*{\(\begin{array}{lll}5 & \text { a4 } & \text { 官7 }\end{array}\)}

Of course，not 5．．．c6 6 axb5 cxb5 7 b3 cxb3 8 ＠\({ }^{\text {xb }} 5+\) ．


\section*{6 b3}

The alternative is 6 axb5 axb5 7 Exa8 \＆xa8 8 b3 e6 9 bxc4 bxc4 10 Qxc4（if 10 Qe5 Qd7，e．g． 11 酱a4

 c5 14 Qxd7 Qxd7 \(15 \mathrm{dxc} 50-016 \mathrm{f} 3\) wiv with an equal game－Gaberditz） 10．．． 2 f 6 ，and now：
（a） 11 wa4＋Qbd7 1200 （the at－ tempt to pin Black＇s pieces by 12 \＆b5 does not work：12．．．ed6 13 Qe5 是xg2 14 Egl c6！，while after 12 e 5 \＆xg2 13 Eg1 wa8！White loses a pawn） 12．．．\＆d6 13 Qe5，when Gaberditz con－
tinues 13．．．0－0 14 乌c6 ⿹bb 15 乌xd8 Qxa4 16 ＠b5 玉xd8 17 \＆xa4 c5 with an equal game；
（b）110－0 0 bd 7 （in the almost mod－ ern game Skembris－Popchev，Prokuplje

 \＆a3 gave White the better prospects） 12 Dc3（nothing is promised by 12
 Ecl cxd4 16 是xd4，Dolezal－Podgorny， Prague 1946，16．．．定a3 17 Eal 学e7 18
 \(0-0\) leads to a variation examined earlier） 12 ．．．e \({ }^{\text {e }} 7\) ，when：


 Black equalised（Grünfeld－Gaberditz， Vienna 1946）；
（b） 13 d 5 ！，with the idea of exploiting the weakness of the c7 pawn after both the exchange on d 5 ，and \(13 . . . \mathrm{e} 514 \mathrm{e} 4\) ．
\[
6 \quad \ldots \text { e6 }
\]

6．．．9f6 is weak in view of 7 bxc4 bxc4 8 昷a3！

6．．．cxb3 7 axb5 axb5 8 Exa8 \＆\(\times\) xa8 9 \＆xb5＋also favours White．
\(6 . . .55\) is possible，when White should probably reply 7 bxc4（ 7 axb5 axb5 8 Exa8 \＆xa8 9 bxc4 is weaker in view of
 obtaining a strong centre．

\section*{7 bxc4 bxc4}

Here 7．．．b4 is not good on account of 8 c 5 ．


Weiner－Gaberditz（Vienna 1948） continued 8 \＆xc4 \(Q d 790-0\)－gf6 10 Qbd2 c5 11 \＆a3 \＆e7 12 䒼c2 cxd4 13 Qxd4，when with \(13 \ldots \& x a 314\) Exa 3 We7 followed by ．．． 5 c5 Black could have expected to equalise．

In Euwe＇s opinion， 8 \＆a3 ensures White the better chances．

\section*{3．．．a6 4 e4（4 a4， 4 © c3）}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
1 & d 4 & d 5 \\
2 & \(\mathrm{c4}\) & \(\mathrm{dxc4}\) \\
3 & \(\triangle \mathrm{f} 3\) & \(\mathrm{a6}\)
\end{tabular}

In this chapter we will consider：
4 e4（11．1）
4 a4（11．2）－p． 181
4 ©c3（11．3）－p． 182
11.1 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 §f3 a6）

\section*{4 e4}

This gambit continuation was devel－ oped by Borisenko and Furman，and became popular after the game Botvinnik－Flohr（18th USSR Ch．，Mos－ cow 1950）．White allows his opponent to defend the c4 pawn and to keep a material advantage．Exploiting the fact that 3．．．a6（rather than 3．．．\(£ \mathrm{f} 6\) ）has been played，he occupies the centre．

Black can reply：
4．．．b5（11．11）
4．．．c5（11．12）－p． 179
4．．． 9 f6（11．13）－p． 179
4．．．今g4（11．14）－p． 180
11．11（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 a6 4 e4）
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
4 & \ldots & \text { b5 } \\
5 & \text { a4 } & \text { @b7 }
\end{array}
\]

5．．．c6 is weak in view of 6 b 3 cxb 37 axb5 or 6 ．．．bxa4 7 bxc4．

In contrast to the variation 4 e 3 b 55 a4 \＆b7，in which，by attacking the en－ emy queenside pawns，White quickly
restores material equality，here his e4 pawn is threatened．We consider：

6 b3（11．111）
6 ©c3（11．112）－p． 175
6 axb5（11．113）－p． 178
11.111 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 （f3 a6 4 e 4 b 55 a 4 最b7）

6 b3 \＆xe4
The restrained 6．．．e6 is also played：

 9 bxc4 Black can defend by 9 ．．．是xe4 10 Qbd2 \＆b7 11 cxb5 Qf6，basing his play on control of d5，Beil－Krnavek， Olomouc 1976）7．．．bxc4，and now：
 with a satisfactory position for Black；
（b） 8 c3，when：
（b1）8．．．eb4 9 皿d2 c5（9．．．是xc3 10 \＆xc3 \＆xe4 is unfavourable on account



15 Qd2 and the play favours White （Borisenko－Feldman（Lipeck 1960）；
 11 峟c1 a5！（after 11．．．这xc3？！ 12 是xc3
 a5 c5 16 是xc4 0－0 \(17 \mathrm{f4} \mathrm{cxd4} 18\) 需xd4断c7 190－0 the a6 pawn needs constant protection，Borisenko－Aratovsky，corr． 1955／7） 12 皿e2 0－0 13 0－0 0xc3 14是xc3 id 5 and Black held the gambit pawn（Jakobson－Belokurov，corr．1968）；
（c） 8 \＆ xc 4 （it is not essential to de－ fend the e4 pawn）8．．． \(8 \times 4\) ，when the dangers facing Black are illustrated by Bronstein－Beylin（Moscow 1953）： 9 \(0-0\) Øf6（better 9．．．Qc6 or 9．．．®b4） 10 Qc3 \＆d5 11 Qxd5 \(0 x d 512\) Qe5 是 7
情xe6＋，and White gained an attack．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
7 & \text { Qc3 } \\
8 & \text { axb5 }
\end{array}
\]

If 8 bxc4 b4．
\begin{tabular}{rll}
8 & \(\ldots\) & axb5 \\
9 & 日xa8 & ミxa8 \\
10 & bxc4 &
\end{tabular}

10 公xb5 e6 11 定xc4 是b4＋12 定d2 © \(\mathrm{ex} 2+\) gives equal play（B．Vladimirov－ Vasiliev，RSFSR Team Ch．1958）．


In the late 50 s to early 60 s ，when this variation was popular，it was thought
that 10 ．．．bxc4 would give Black an ac－ ceptable position．In 1965 I suggested that White should play 11 d 5 （if 11．．．g6， \(11 \ldots \mathrm{c} 6\) or \(11 \ldots . \mathrm{d} 7\) ，then \(12 \mathrm{Ea4+}\) ）or 110 e 5 with a clear advantage．

After this a successful attempt was made to improve Black＇s play with 10．．．e6．Vaiser－Bagirov（Novosibirsk 1971）continued 11 Qxb5（if 11 cxb5
定xf3 13 gxf3 是xd2＋14 Wxd2 c6 15 Qc3 De7 with equal chances．The im－ mediate 14．．．De7（Vaiser－Chekhov， USSR 1983）would seem to be even more convincing，keeping ．．．c7－c6 in re－ serve and forcing White to consider how to defend his pawn weaknesses．
11.112 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 a6 4 e 4 b 55 a 4 e e 7 ）
\[
6 \Delta c 3
\]

The prelude to a highly complicated variation，full of combinational ideas．
\[
6 \quad \ldots \quad b 4
\]
\[
7 \text { \&xc4 e6 }
\]

Of course，not 7．．．bxc3？ 8 witb3！
8 䒼b3


After 8 d5 bxc3 9 witb exd5 10陑xb7 dxc4 11 䒼xa8 cxb2 12 是xb2

Qb4＋ 13 flack black gained good attacking chances for the sacrificed ex－ change（Gufeld－Bagirov，Baku 1964）．

Now if 8．．．Df6 there follows 90 g 5 ！ \＆e7 \(10 \triangleq x f 7\) ！with a strong attack．The evaluation of \(6 \triangleq c 3\) rested on this variation，until Gaberditz suggested that Black should defend by counter－ attacking．
\[
8 \quad \ldots \quad \text { Qc6 }
\]

Threatening ．．．©a5．
8．．．\(Q \mathrm{~d} 7\) is a new idea in this interest－ ing variation，when \(9 母\) g5 threatens the sacrifice on f7（9．．．h6？ 10 Qxf7； \(9 \ldots b x c 310\) Qxf7！），and 9．．．We7 10 Qe2 leads to a very tense situation：

（a） \(10 \ldots 0 \mathrm{gf6}\) ，and now：
（a1） 11 e5 Od5 12 0－0 h6 13 De4 （13 㟶h3 c5 14 Qe4 整d8 requires test－
 Qxd4 \({ }^{\text {ac8 }} 17 \mathrm{~b} 3\) Qc3（17．．．97b6 or 17．．． C 5 comes into consideration） 18 9d6＋是xd6 19 贳xb7 \(\mathbf{E x c} 4!20\) bxc4 \＆c5 21 \＆e3 \＆xd4 22 \＆xd4 気2＋23 \＄h1 \(0 \mathrm{~g} 3+\) with perpetual check；
（a2） 11 §f4（according to Van Wely， a substantial improvement）11．．． Dxe4 \(^{2}\) 12 Qxe4 \＆xe4 130－0 Qf6 14 घel c6 15 Exe4 0xe4 16 嶿ff f5 17 Qxe6 with an attack for the sacrificed exchange；
（b） \(10 \ldots .9 \mathrm{~b} 6\)（this is sounder） 11 \＆\({ }^{2}\) 3 h6 12 Qf3 ©f6 13 Qg3（also 13

對c2！？）13．．．c5 14 e5（if 14 dxc 5 ，then not \(14 . .\). We5 15 且e3 with a clear ad－ vantage to White，but \(14 \ldots ., 0\) bd 715
 \＃d8 with counterplay） \(14 \ldots\) ．． 9 fd 715 Se4 ©d5 16 \＆e3 g6（16．．．cxd4？！ 17
 20 Qh5！led to an advantage for White in Piket－Granda Zuniga，Amsterdam 1995）with a complicated game and chances for both sides（Piket）．

\section*{9 a5 bxc3}

The acceptance of the pawn sacrifice looks dangerous：9．．． 0 xd4 10 ©xd4
 other queen moves to e5，f6 and d6 re－ quire testing） 12 f3 气d6 13 Qa4 4 14 e5！？（if \(140-0\) Black defends by
 Qc5（S．Pedersen－Sadler，Cannes 1995）， when Pedersen analyses 15 ．．．Sc6！：
（a） 16 ＠xa6 \＆d6！ \(170-0\)（if 17 घ゙cl
 \＆b7 18 Wd3 ©f6 with advantage to Black，since the knight at a6 is out of play；
（b）however his other variation is
 18 最b7（or even the simple 18 g 3 ）18．．．


\[
10 \text { 峟xb7 Qb4 }
\]

By＇surrounding＇the queen，Black creates counter－threats．Gaberditz＇s idea has seen some interesting develop－ ments．

Lilienthal suggested that White could gain the advantage by 11 e 5 ，with the threat of d4－d5，when one of his variations is： \(11 \ldots . \mathrm{D}_{2}+12\) §dl \(\mathrm{Qxd}^{2}\)


However，after 11．．．cxb2 12 \＆xb2 Eb8 13 曹e4 De7 14 0－0 ©ed5 Black has a solid position and the battle is only just beginning．

The gambit play beginning with 11 Sxa6（an idea of 1. Zaitsev）is quite fantastic：

（a） \(11 \ldots\) Exa6 12 bxc 3 Øc2＋ 13 d1 Qxal 14 宸xa6 with a winning position for White；
 f6（14 \＆a3＋was threatened） 14 d5

 and 18 Qh4＋were threatened） 18
 \(21 \Xi \mathrm{gl}\) ，and Black is mated；
（c） \(11 \ldots \pm b 8\) ！，when White is obliged to sacrifice his queen，burning his boats： 12 是b5＋皃e7 13 a6 Еxb7 14 axb7 ＊b8（15 \({ }^{*}\) a8 was threatened；if 14．．． \(2 \mathrm{c} 2+15\) e2 ©xal 16 Qe5！，and Black cannot even give up his queen for the b－pawn：16．．． 17 是f65 6 ，or

 Qf6（18．．．fxe6 19 （e8 mate），and now：
（cl）in analysis published in 1965 it was suggested that after 19 Qe5＋ 0 xg 5 \(200 x f 7+6\) the game should end in a draw，since the king＇s journey into enemy territory leads to mate： \(20 \ldots\) ．．．th5
 2 24 \＆f3 mate．But Ardashev found that the king can boldly advance，only to a different square： 20 ．．．\(\$ \mathrm{~d} 4\) ！：
 \(\pm \mathrm{El}\) Qd3，or
（c12） \(21 \mathrm{~g} 3+\) \＆ 22 § \(\mathrm{e} 2+\) 舁 g 2 ， hiding in the enemy position；
（cl3） 21 \＆e2（threatening 22 h3 mate） \(21 \ldots .0 \mathrm{c} 2+22\) fl \(0 \mathrm{xe} 423 \mathrm{Ee5}\)
 24．．．0xg2；
（c2） 19 Qh4＋was then suggested by Zaitsev，which after 19．．． \(8 \times \mathrm{m} 520\) e5＋ \＄h6（or 20．．． \(2 x\) xh4 \(21 \mathrm{~g} 3+\mathrm{g} 422\)
 nevertheless leads to perpetual check， but what if Black declines to take the bishop and plays 19．．． 20 \＆e2＋ Sg4？．．．

In view of this，Izeta－E．Vladimirov （Ceuta 1992）is of great interest．White played \(110-0\) ，and after 11 ．．． Eb 812 \＆xa6 he again gave up his queen，but with a different idea：12．．．\(\Xi \times b 7 \quad 13\)



In contrast to the above variations with the pursuit of the king，here after castling White bases his play on exploiting his passed pawn．Black＇s kingside is completely undeveloped， and his queen is unable to combat the
 also comes into consideration），with the threat of \(\Omega d 4\) ，and if \(16 \ldots \Omega \mathrm{c} 5\) ，then simply 17 ＠xg7．

The game continued 15．．．9xa6 16皿c6＋ 717 fb f 6 （the more tena－ cious \(17 \ldots . \mathrm{Q} 4\) would also have lost
必g6 21 De5＋宴h5 22 ©a4！，or 19．．．
 Black resigned．

A position from this game can also be reached in the Zaitsev variation if White transposes moves： 11 \＆xa6，and if \(11 \ldots . . \pm 8120-0\) ，so the ball is very much in Black＇s court．
11.113 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 〇f3 a6 4 e 4 b 55 a 4 是b7）
\(6 \quad \operatorname{axb5}\)
Recent games have shown that this branch is perhaps the most unpleasant one for Black．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
6 & O． & axb5 \\
7 & Exa8 & 气xa8 \\
8 & ®c3 &
\end{tabular}


8．．．b4 is weak in view of 9 畨a4＋ Qc6 10 Qb5 or 10 Dd5．

8．．．c6 leads to a position similar in structure to gambit lines of the Slav Defence．Black securely holds on to his pawn，but his bishop at a8 is shut in．In
modern play White usually prefers：
（a） 9 ＠g5（to hamper Black＇s king－ side development）9．．．h6（if 9．．．Df6 10 e5 ©d5 11 业al－Lputian） 10 \＆h4
 ＠xh4（accepting the sacrifice 13．．．cxb3
 gerous in view of 16 署 a 3 e e 717 Ed 1
 exd5 16 Qf5 g6 17 乌d6＋\＄f8 18 exd5 cxd5 19 Qcxb5 \＆c6（19．．．Df6？ 20渭al） 20 wb3 with a a promising position for the pawn（Knaak－Chekhov， Leipzig 1986）

 14 潧a7） 13 潧al ©d7 14 d5！（this strategy is dictated by White＇s lead in development）14．．．cxd5 15 exd5 exd5 \(^{2}\) 16 Qxd5 exd5 17 dl，and Black＇s position is difficult（Lputian－Semkov， Saint John 1988）．

8．．．e6 9 Qxb5 是xe4（after 9．．．安b4＋ 10 Qc3 是xe4 11 显xc4 Qf6 1200 White stands better） 10 全xc4（10 Ec3！？），and now：
（a）10．．．是xf3？！ 11 皆xf3 c6 \(120-0\) ！
 Sf4 with the decisive threat of \({ }^{51-a} 7\) ） 13 Dc3 leaves Black in a difficult pos－ ition（Lputian－Kaidanov，Irkutsk 1983）；
（b）10．．．c6 11 Qe5！Qf6（11．．．cxb5
 more than dangerous） 1200 \＆e7 13 Qc3 \＆d5 14 Qxd5 Qxd5 15 \＆d3 and White stands better（Lputian）；
（c） \(10 \ldots\) ．．． \(44+\) is a new idea in this sharp variation：
（cl） \(11 \otimes \mathrm{c} 3\) Qe7 1200 （if 12
 1300 §xf3 \(14 \mathrm{gxf3} 0-0\) followed by ．．．Wha8 White＇s pawns are weak）



ad7＋） 14 dl c6 with a roughly equal position（Krasenkov）；
（c2） 11 蜢 2 ！？（Korchnoi－Seirawan， Biel 1993）is an attempted improvement for White．After 11．．．©e7 12 ＠f4 \＆a5
 \(0-0\) ！Black maintained material equality，with an equal game．
11.12 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 乌f3 a6 4 e4）
\[
4 \ldots \text { c5 }
\]

Black does not try to hold the pawn， but takes measures against the strength－ ening of White＇s central position．
\[
5 \text { \&xc4 }
\]

5 d5 also comes into consideration， seizing space in the centre．
\(\begin{array}{llll}5 & & 0 & \text { cxd4 }\end{array}\)


The exchange of queens－ 6垱xd4 7 Qxd4 e6 leads to a position which can be reached in the variation 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 c5 4 Øf3 cxd4 5
 against the threat of Qb5，plays 6．．．a6． Despite the absence of the queens and the symmetric pawn formation，White retains a slight advantage thanks to his
better development and the weakening of Black＇s queenside．

6 \＆g5（with the threat of 7 曾b3）de－ serves being tested in practice．
\[
6 \ldots \text { e6 }
\]

The attempt to simplify by \(6 . . . e 5\) may cost Black dearly after 7 wa4＋：
（a）7．．． W d7 8 宣b5！axb5 9 賞xa8
 （11．．．exc3＋ 12 bxc3 Wxc3＋ 13 显d2


膤d8 16 畄xb7 and wins） 12 \＆e3 De7 13 当c7 \＆xc3＋ 14 bxc3 嘗c6（14．．．喽xg2 \(150-0-0\) is no better） 15 we5 Black resigns（Borisenko－Grechkin， corr．1955／7）；
畒xb7？畄b4＋），and if 9．．．exd4（ \(9 \ldots .0 \mathrm{c} 6\)


 mate；
 view of 9 ＠xf7＋，winning；
（d） \(7 \ldots\) ．．．d7 8 Qf5 g6 9 是xf7 \(+6 x 7\) 10 学b3＋f6 11 h 4 with a very strong attack，e．g．11．．．h6 12 昷g5＋hxg5 13 hxg5＋exg5 14 Exh8 gxf5 15 暑xg8＋ \＄f6 16 Hh \(6+\) winning the queen．

7 Dc3
Similar positions arise in the varia－ tions \(3 \mathrm{e} 4 \mathrm{c} 5,3\)＠f3c5，3 Qf3 e6 and 3 Qf3 Qf6 4 Qc3．White stands better thanks to his lead in development．
11.13 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 仓f3 a6 4
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
4 & \ldots & \text { ef6 } \\
5 & \text { e5 }
\end{array}
\]

White concedes the d5 square，but gains a spatial advantage．
\[
6 \text { \&xc4 e6 }
\]

6 ．．．©g4 is not good in view of 7
 8 Qc3 is interesting）7．．．e6 is possible （after 7．．．\({ }^{\text {ig }} 48 \mathrm{~h} 3\) ©h5 Black has to reckon with the double－edged pawn
 e6 \(10 \triangleq c 3\) with the better prospects for White）．
\[
7 \text { De3 }
\]


7 ．．．Qxc3
After 7．．． Db 8 \＆b3 Black does not have time for the manoeuvre ．．．\({ }^{\text {ed }}\) d7－c6， since 8．．．§d7 is met by the break－ through 9 d5！，e．g．， \(9 \ldots . . e x d 5100 x d 5\) \＆e6（or 10 ．．．ic6） 11 \＆g5 followed by 12 Qxb6 with advantage to White．
\begin{tabular}{rlr}
8 & bxc3 & c5 \\
9 & \(0-0\) & \(Q c 6\) \\
10 & we2 & \＆e7
\end{tabular}

10．．．cxd4 11 cxd4 \(0 x d 412\) ©xd4䊓xd4 13 \＆g5 is dangerous，since Black is well behind in development．

\section*{11 ㅍd}

White has good attacking chances． Geller－Nilsson（Stockholm 1954）con－ tinued 11．．．监c7 12 具g5 b5（12．．．0－0

 （14．．．气e6 is strongly met by 15 §xc6＋

 e6，and Black＇s position became hope－ less．

> \begin{tabular}{|l|} \hline 11.14 (1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 \\ \(\mathrm{e} 4)\) \end{tabular} Df 3 a 64
\[
4 \ldots \text { ㅇg4 }
\]

This move was made by Flohr in his game with Borisenko from the 18th USSR Ch．（Moscow 1950），where the variation 4 e4 was first employed．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
5 & \text { \&xc4 } & \text { e6 } \\
6 & 0-0 & \text { Od } 7
\end{array}
\]

Balanel－Lundin（Prague／Marianske Lazne 1954）went \(6 . .9\) ¢f 7 Dc3 \＆e7 8
 e5！） 9 Ed1 b5 10 \＆b3 b4 11 乌a4 Qbd7 12 ＠g5 \(\Xi \mathrm{E} 813\) 凹acl with the better game for White．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
7 & 0 c 3 & \(\mathrm{c5}\) \\
8 & d 5 & \(\mathrm{e5}\) \\
9 & 94 & \＆ d 6
\end{tabular}


We have reached a position from Bronstein－Flohr，p． 168 （cf．the variation 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 a6 4 e3 酉g45 h3 会h5，in which the pawn advanced to e4 in two moves），but with an extra tempo for White，which is significant．

\section*{10 \＆e2 §xß3}

The transfer of the knight to c4 was threatened，but now the light squares become weak．
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline 11 & \＆xf3 & \(0 \cdot 7\) \\
\hline 12 & Qb1 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

The other knight heads for c4！
\[
12 \quad \ldots \quad 0-0
\]

White stands better．The Borisenko－ Flohr game continued 13．．． \(\mathrm{Sc}_{\mathrm{c}} 14\) §d2是 715 a5 0 d 616 b 4 \＆g5 17 \＆c3

 Ec2 \(\triangle \mathrm{d} 7\) ，and now 24 g 3 ！would have consolidated his advantage．

\section*{11.2 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 a6）}

\section*{\(4 \quad\) a4}

White prevents ．．．b7－b5，but weakens the b4 square．
\[
\begin{array}{ll}
4 & \ldots \\
5 & \mathrm{e} 3
\end{array}
\]

Note that \(\& \mathrm{c} 3\)（here or later）can lead to a position from the variation \(3 . . . Q \mathrm{f} 6\) 4 ®c3 a65a4（p．231）．

\(5 \ldots\) … 84
5．．．今f5 6 是xc4 e6 7 Qc3 Qc6 （7．．．Qbd7！？）is the alternative：
 Ed8 11 h 3 De4 12 صa2 \＆d6 13 是d3
 17 Qh4 with a slight but enduring ad－ vantage to White（Agzamov－Kuzmin， Yerevan 1982）；
（b） \(80-0\) \＆g6 9 h 3 \＆d6 10 Ee1 0－0 11 e4 e5（after 11．．．退e712 \＆f4 Ec8 13 Ec1 \＆b4 14 \＆g5 h6 15 \＆h4 White has complete control of the centre， Tukmakov－Kuzmin，Yerevan 1982） 12 d5（12 \＆g5！？）12．．．©b8 13 是g 9 bd 7 14 Wivd2 with slightly the better pros－ pects for White．
\[
6 \text { \&xc4 }
\]

If 6 h 3 the simplest is \(6 \ldots \mathrm{enf3}^{2}\)（after 6．．．是h5 White can count on an advan－ tage by 7 g 4 定g6 8 De5） 7 䒼xf3 Dc6 8 \＆xc4 e6 9 0－0 £d6 with equal chances．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
6 & \dddot{0} & \text { e6 } \\
7 & \\
\text { ch }
\end{array}
\]

Other continuations：
 0－0＠d6 10 \＆e2，Novotelnov－Flohr， USSR 1948，but not 8 畨xb7？©a5）

 ＠xf3 14 gxf3 c5（Udovcic－Rabar， Yugoslavia 1957），in both cases with equal chances．

7 0－0 c5 8 Qc3 Dc6 9 d5 Qe5 10
 wes with an equal game（Berezhnoi－ Solovyev，USSR 1966）．

7 Qbd2 Qc6 8 0－0 \＆\({ }^{2}\) d6（or 8．．．莤e7 9 \＆e2 0－0 10 Oc4 Qb4，Vaganian－ Kim，USSR 1969） 9 \＆e2 0－0 10 Qc4 We7（Cardoso－Fuster，Portoroz 1958）， in both cases with an equal game．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
7 & \ldots & 0 \mathrm{c} 6 \\
8 & \text { \&e2 }
\end{array}
\]

After 8．．．昷d6 9 h 3 是h5 10 Qd2 （against developing moves Black plays ．．．e6－e5 after ．．．㟶e7）10．．．是xe2 11

杽xe2 e5 the game is equal（Ragozin－ Flohr，15th USSR Ch．，Leningrad 1947）．


Ahues－Alekhine（Bad Nauheim 1936）went 8．．．察b4 9000010 Od2 （10 \＆d 2 ！？）10．．．\({ }^{\text {exe2 }} 11\) Qxe2 e5 12
 the double exchange on e 5 ，the h 2 and b2 pawns would be simultaneously at－ tacked）14．．．e4！ 15 Del \＆xg3 16 hxg 3 Qe7，when Alekhine transferred his knight to d5 and obtained a promising position．
11.3 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 亿f3 a6）

4 Dc3 b5
4．．．Qf6 and 4．．．e6 transpose into other variations．
\(5 \quad a 4\)
5 e 4 comes into consideration．
5
b4
6 Da2
Or 6 Qe4 Qd7，and now：
（a） 7 Qed2，which allows Black to gain a favourable position by 7．．．c3 8 bxc3 bxc3 9 De4 ⿹勹f6 10 －xc3 e6 11
e3 是b4 12 皿d2 c5（Karpov－Portisch， Tilburg 1983）；
（b） 7 畨c2 Qgf6 8 Ded2 with slightly the better chances for White（Portisch）．


6 Qc6
If \(6 . . . e 6\) ，then 7 e 4 e e 78 e 5 ed 5 is unfavourable for White，but 7 e3 leads to a position from the variation \(3 \Omega \mathrm{~d} 3\) Qf64 Dc3 a6 5 e3 b5 6 a 4 b 47 Da2－ cf．Reshevsky－Smyslov（p．217）．
\[
7 \text { e3 }
\]

Against the fanciful 7 d5 ©a5 8 Qxb4 Black replies 8．．．定b7！，planning ．．．e7－e6（Magerramov）．
\[
7 \ldots \text { b3 }
\]

This leads to great complications． Black gains a material advantage，but comes under attack．7．．．\(毋 \mathbf{a} 5\) is strongly met by 8 De5．

Magerramov－Vorotnikov
（USSR 1986）continued 8 包3 Qb4 9 exc4 Qc2＋10 \＄f1 Qxal 11 Qe5 e6 12 世f3
 dxe5．The evaluation of this sharp posi－ tion，where White has given up a knight，is unclear．

\section*{Other 3rd Moves for Black}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
1 & d 4 & d 5 \\
2 & \(\mathrm{c4}\) & \(\mathrm{dxc4}\) \\
3 & פf3 &
\end{tabular}

In this chapter we will consider：
3．．．c5（12．1）
3．．．e6（12．2）－p． 191
3．．．Dd7（12．3）－p． 193
3．．．道g（12．4）－p． 194
3．．．b5（12．5）－p． 195
12.1 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3）
\[
3 \text {... c5 }
\]

Inviting the opponent to cross the de－ marcation line，so as then to attack the d5 pawn with ．．．e7－e6 and thus resolve the situation in the centre．Another plan involves active play on the queenside．


Now White has a choice between：
4 d5（12．11）－p． 184
4 e3（12．12）－p． 190
For 4 e 4 cf ．the move order 4 － 0 c3 e6 5 e4（p．215）．

Here we should mention the original development of events in Dautov－Van Wely（Ter Apel 1995）： 4 e4 cxd4 5
 8 e6（8 f4！？－Dautov）8．．．De5 9 exf7＋
 Q2f3 Qd7 13 Qg5＋and Qge6 with a sharp，complicated situation．

After 4 © 3 Black can continue：
 and now：
（a1）6．．．』d77 Qdb5，when：
（a11）7．．．乌a6 8 e4 ⿹ff（8．．．e6 comes into consideration，with the idea of ．．．\＆b4，and if 9 \＆xc4 Ec8 10 \＆e2 Qb4，Magerramov－Psakhis，Groningen 1993） 9 f3 是xb5 10 ©xb5 e5 11 ＠e3回b4＋12 \＆f Eacl \＆c5 15 Ehdl with the better po－ sition for White（Kasparov－Seirawan， Thesalloniki Olympiad 1988）；
（a12）7．．．d8（suggested by Kas－ parov） 8 昷e3 Qc6 \(90-0-0\) ©f6 10 g 4 ！ e6（10．．．थxg4 11 是h3 乌ge5 12 日d2 and Ehdl is strong for White） 11 ＠h3 （the simple 11 h 3 is also good） \(11 \ldots \mathrm{~h} 6\) （Krasenkov－Bus，Pardubice 1994），and now the doubling of rooks on the d－file would have given White good chances；
（a2） \(6 \ldots\) ．．．f6 7 Ddb5 8 d 88 \＆f4
 a6 12 0－0－0＋Qd7（Knaak－Sermek， Bad Wörishofen 1993），and White was unable to utilise his active forces；
（a3） \(6 \ldots\) e5 7 Qdb5 Qa6（7．．．
 and f2－f4 favours White，Knaak－Kallai， Budapest 1986） 8 \＆e3（8 Qd5！？－

Magerramov）8．．．\＆d790－0－0 Qf6 10 g3 \＆c6 11 f3（Magerramov－Vaiser， Groningen 1993），and here 11．．．\({ }^{\text {eb }}\) b should have been considered（Vaiser）；
（b） \(4 \ldots\) e6 5 e4 cxd4 6 寝xd4，when：

（bl）6．．．sd7 7 De5 Qf6 8 Qxc4

的xe7 12 皿e3 with advantage to White （Miles－Korchnoi，Tilburg 1985）；
（b2）with the simplifying \(6 \ldots\) ．．． 1 wd4 7

 \(0-0\) \＆b4 and ．．．ひe7 Black equalised in Knaak－Bialas（Germany 1990）．

\section*{12．11（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Øf3 c5）}
\[
4 \text { d5 }
\]

And now：
4．．．e6（12．111）
4．．． 9 f6（12．112）－p． 186
12．111（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 c5 4 d5）
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
4 & \ldots & \text { e6 } \\
5 & \ddot{\mathrm{Oc}} 3
\end{array}
\]

Or 5 e4 exd5 6 exd5 Qf6，and now：
（a） 7 \＆xc4 \＆d6 \(80-00\) and Black equalised（Sosonko－Bukhman， Leningrad 1965）；
（b） 7 Qc3，when Bany－Csala（Kecs－ kemet 1986）showed that even in this comparatively quiet variation a delay in development is dangerous：7．．．a6？！ 8 ＠xc4 \＆d6（8．．．b5 is strongly met by 9 \(0-0\) ！，and if \(9 \ldots\) bxc4 \(10 \mathrm{Eel}+\mathrm{E} \mathrm{e} 711\) d6 气e6 12 wa4＋wiwd 13 dxe 7 with advantage） 9 0－0 0－0 10 \＆g5 h6 11定h4是f5 12 念d3！是xd3 13 㟶xd3，and the threat of Qe4 forced Black to weaken his kingside with 13 ．．．g5．
\[
5 \text {... exd5 }
\]

5．．． 2 e7 6 e4 exd5 7 exd5 Qf5 8 \＆xc4 Qd6 is rather artificial．After 9 \(0-0\) ！全e7（9．．．©xc4 10 嘗a4＋！） 10 h 3 ！ \(0-011\) \＆d 3 ，intending the set－up \＆\(\& 4\) ，
 advantage（Farago）．
\[
\begin{aligned}
& 6 \text { 嘗xd5 霝xd5 } \\
& 7 \text { Qxd5 \&d6 }
\end{aligned}
\]

The alternative is 7．．．©a6 8 e 4 De7：

（a）9 De3 ©c7 10 Qxc4 Dg6 11 \＆e3 b6 12 0－0－0 \＆b7 13 \＆d3 f6 14 \＆c2 and White retains the initiative in this simplified position（Shipov－Zvya－ gintsev，St Petersburg 1993）；
（b） 9 exc4 \(0 x d 510\)＠xd5（or 10 exd5 id6，when the exchange on a6 does not promise White anything） 10．．．Qb4 11 0－0 Qxd5 12 exd5，and it is doubtful whether White＇s slight ad－ vantage can be exploited；
（c） 9 ef4 \(Q x d 510\) exd5 b5（or 10．．．
 El＋ Vaiser） \(110-0-0\) f6 12 a4，and White＇s lead in development is a real factor （Ikonnikov－Afek，Paris 1992）．


\section*{8 ©d2！}

Black has fewer problems after 8 e4
 gxf3 Qge7．
\[
8 \ldots \text { De7 }
\]

In recent years 8．．．⿹c6 9 Qxc4 \＆b8 has often been played：
（a） 10 e 4 Qd4 11 气d3 \(\sum \mathrm{e} 7\) and then ．．．昷e6 with chances for both sides （Farago－Kallai，Budapest 1990）；
（b） 10 g 3 ，when：
（b1） \(10 \ldots\) ．． \(\mathrm{d}^{2} 11\) Qce3 宣d7 12 b 4 ！ is promising for White：12．．． e c6（the acceptance of the sacrifice is dangerous －12．．．cxb4 13 是g2 De7 14 是b2） 13 \＆b2 Qe6 14 Qf5 \＆c6 15 \＆g2 with advantage to White（E．Vladimirov－ Westerinen，Östersund 1990）；
（b2） \(10 \ldots\) ．．．ge7 11 Qxe7色e3！b6 13 昷g2 \＆b7（Komarov－Peric， Reims 1994） 14 0－0 \＆c7 15 a 3 ，and White＇s position is preferable（Khenkin）；
（c） 10 \＆e3 昷e6 11 0－0－0 Qge7 12
（14．．．c4 is relatively best，although after 15 g 3 ！White＇s position is preferable）

 Palermo，Aosta 1989），and with 19 e3！ White could have remained a pawn up．
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline 9 & 0 xc 4 & Qxd5 \\
\hline 10 & Qxd6＋ & §゙e7 \\
\hline 11 & Qxe8＋ & 区xc8 \\
\hline 12 & g3 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

After 12 \＆g5＋f6 13 0－0－0 \({ }^{\text {g d }} 8\)（if
 16 e4 Black wins a pawn，but comes under attack） 14 e 4 （the quiet 14 \＆d2 also comes into consideration） \(14 \ldots \mathrm{fxg} 5\) 15 exd5 Qd7 16 h 4 g 417 \＆d3 Qf6 18 Ethel＋©f8 19 \＆f5 Exd 20 \＆e6 Ead8 Black maintained the balance（Ribli－ Seirawan，Montpellier Candidates 1985）．

\section*{12}

White＇s position is preferable after 12．．．©c6 13 \＆g2 Ed8 14 \＆g5＋f6 15

 Zvyagintsev－Namgilov，Rostov 1993）
 Sel g6 20 Zabl（Psakhis－Speelman， Hastings 1987／8）．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
13 & \(\sin 3\) & \＃d8 \\
14 & \(0-0\) & Q8c6
\end{tabular}


15 昷g2（15 皿e3 Qd4）15．．．巴d7 16完e3 b6 17 a3 Qd5 18 气g5＋f6 19 e4 Qc7 20 e5 ©d5 21 exf6＋gxf6 22 是d2 \％f7．White has two active bishops，but Black has managed to equalise （Timman－Seirawan，Brussels 1986）．

15 \＆g5＋f6 16 \＆ 3 ，and now：
（a） \(16 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 617 \Xi \mathrm{fc} 1\) Qd4（17．．．a5！？， and if 18 ＠g2是xd4 Exd4 19 a3 Ma6 20 b4！and White stands better（Salov－Seirawan， Wijk aan Zee 1992）；
（b） \(16 \ldots\) 〇d4 17 ＠g2 0 bc 218 ＠xd4 Qxd4 19 e3 第6 20 是xb7 Eab8 21昷 40 g 5 （the immediate \(21 \ldots \Xi \times b 2\) is more tenacious） 22 \＆g2 Exb2 23 h 4 with a favourable ending（Lputian－ Seirawan，Manila Olympiad 1992）．
\begin{tabular}{l}
\begin{tabular}{l}
\(12.112(1 \mathrm{~d} 4 \mathrm{~d} 52 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 43\) \\
\(4 \mathrm{~d} 5)\)
\end{tabular} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\(\begin{array}{llll}4 & \ldots & \text { Øf6 } \\ 5 & \text { é }\end{array}\)


5．．．\＆f5，preventing 6 e 4 ，is possible：
（a） 6 De5 a6 7 Qxc4 b5 8 De3 是c8 9 g 3 \＆b7 10 \＆g2 Qbd7110－0g612 a4 b4 13 Qe4 Qxe4 14 \＆xe4 \＆g7 （14．．．a5！？） 15 a5 0－0 16 \＆g2 Qf6 17新3 3 with the better chances for White
（Furman－Suetin，33rd USSR Ch．， Tallinn 1965）；
是xe4 9 畨xc4 \＆g6 10 e4 with a good position for White（Kluger－Hennings， East Germany 1976）；
（c） 6 e3 e6 7 ＠xc4 exd5 8 Qxd5气d6 \(90-0\) Qc6 10 Qg5！乌g6 11 f 4 h 6
 and White gained the advantage （Chekhov－Adamski，Tbilisi 1986）；

 \(0-0-0 \quad 12 \quad 0-0\) exd5 13 exd5 \＆d6 14 \＆e3 with an excellent position for White（D．Garcia－Ezsoll，Mamaia 1991）；
（e） 6 b3 cxb3 7 wb3 is an original gambit，with the idea after e2－e4 of set－ ting the centre in motion．

5．．．b5，tried in Bareev－Fedorov （Naberezhnye Chelny 1988），led after 6
 Qd7 10 0－0 烸b6 11 a4 \＆e7 to a roughly equal position．

6 e4 exd5
 did not justify itself in Shamkovich－ Mukhin（40th USSR Ch．，Baku 1972）． After 9 \＆d2 0 xd 210 wd2 是e7 11
 \(0-014\) Ehel White gained an imposing advantage in the centre．

After 6．．．©xe4 7 Qxe4 exd5 the three pawns（with White having a lead in development）hardly compensate for the piece．This old conclusion has been tested in several games：
撉d8 11 Og5 Qc6 12 \＆e2 \＆e7 13
 0－0 遜f6 17 घel畨d1 with an unclear position（Tal－ Karolyi，Tbilisi 1986）；
（b） 8 §c3 \＆e6（8．．．d4？ 9 国xc4 dxc3 10 \＆xf7＋） 9 Qg5（ 9 b3！？cxb3 10
axb3，or 9．．．歯a5 10 定d2 d4 11 Qe4 c3 12 ）f4－Mokry），and now：
 g6 12 幽g4 fif7 13 h 4 favours White （W．Schmidt－Mokry，Warsaw 1987）；
（b2） \(9 . . .0 \mathrm{c} 610\) Qxe6 fxe6 11 g 3
 with advantage to White（H．Olafsson－ Flear，Wijk aan Zee 1987）．

\section*{7 e5}

7 exd5 ©d6 8 \＆xc4 0－0 does not cause Black any problems．


7 ．．．
4 dd 7

Other replies：
7．．．Og8 8 嶒xd5 Dc6 9 是xc4 昷e6

 advantage to White（B．Vladimirov－ Khodos，USSR 1958）．

7．．．d4，and now：
（a） 8 exf6 gxf6（8．．．dxc3 9 懦xd8＋ \＆xd8 10 Og5 or 10 ㅇg5 11 \(0-0-0\) is clearly to White＇s advantage） 9 \＆xc4！dxc3 10 是xf7＋Ke7 11 Wb3曹b6 12 0－0 曾xb3 13 是xb3 and Black ended up in a difficult position （B．Vladimirov－Heuer，USSR 1961）；

 Edl with a strong attack） 9 exf6 dxc3

 his queen（Uhlmann－Wade，Hastings 1958／9）．

7．．．0e4 8 Qxd5（less convincing is 8当xd5 Qxc3 9 宸xd8＋ Qc6，or 8 Qxe4 dxe4 9 霊xd8 xd 8 10 Qg5 \＆e6 11 Qxe6＋fxe6 12 国xc4 Qc6！）8．．．气e6 9 \＆xc4 憎a5＋10 气d2
 clear advantage to White．

\section*{8 §g5}

8 畨xd5 has also been played：
（a） \(8 \ldots .9 \mathrm{c} 6\) ，and now：
（al） \(9 \AA x c 4\) ，when Black is rescued
 Qxe5（Petrosian），although 11 \＆xd5 Oxe5 \(120-0!\) ？requires testing，with compensation for the pawn；
（a2） 9 当e4 分b6 10 宣g5 是e7 11 ジd1 §d7 12 昷f6 gxf6 13 exf6 fxe7＋桊xe7 15 是e2 㥩xe4 16 Qxe4 Ee8 17 Oxc5 \＆c8 18 Ed2 with slightly the better position for White（Ubilava－ Zaichik，Tbilisi 1986）；
（a3） 9 \＆ g 5 昷e7 10 \＆xc4 0－011 e6！ （Farago）；
（b）8．．．9b6 9 wad8＋室xd8 10 Sg5t，when：
（bl）10．．． Qa6 13 ＠xe7 \＆xe7 14 Qd6 with the better chances for White（Torre－ Seirawan，London 1984）；
（b2）10．．． \＆c8（or 12．．．\＄c6 13 b4！！，Piskov－ Grotnes，Copenhagen 1991） 13 \＆xb6 axb6 \(14 \quad\) Qg5 g6 15 Qxe6 fxe6 16 Exc4 and Black stands badly（Ubilava－ Zs．Polgar，Trencinske Teplice 1985）；
（b3） \(10 \ldots\) ．．ee \(7110-0-0+\) 气d7 12 Qe4 ©xg5＋13 Qfxg5 \＆e7 14 Qd6！ h6（14．．．2c6 15 f 4 ） 15 Qge4 with an active position（Goldin－Makarov，USSR 1986）．

8
\＆e7

Or 8．．． 699 exf6 and now：
（a） \(9 . . . ⿹ x f 610\) \＆xf6 gxf6（10．．．
 \(0-0\) b5 14 घel） 11 ©xd5 b5 12 䒼e2＋ fif 13000 with a strong attack （Korelov－Miesis，Riga 1964）；
（b） \(9 \ldots . . \mathrm{gxf6}\) ，when White has：
（b1） 10 紧xd5 蒌e7＋11 \＆e3 Qb6 12単h5＋ 15 \＆e2 \＆e7 16 g 4 （or 16 \＆h6＠d7 17 Qd2 0－0－0，Novikov－Karolyi，Lvov 1988） \(16 \ldots\) ．．． d 5 ！，and in this compli－ cated position both sides have chances；
（b2） 10 \＆h4 d4（10．．． 2 b 6 ？ 11 Qe5！）
 \(13 \Delta g 5\) with an irresistible attack， Kharitonov，Gagarin） 12 Qe2 Qb6 13 \(0-0 Q x c 4\) with a sharp，unclear position （Gagarin－Malyutin，Moscow 1990），and if 14 Elel \({ }^{(1)}\) ！
 （after 11．．．fxg5 \(120-0-0\) White has an attack for the sacrificed piece，J．Wat－ son） 12 \＆e3 b5 13 0－0－0（Ivanchuk－ Zs．Polgar，Roquebrune 1992）．White has the initiative for the sacrificed pawn：13．．．Еe8 14 世 E 2 dg8 15 \＆f4．
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline 9 & \＆xe7 \\
\hline 0 & －xd5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


11 \＆xc4

11 We2 is also possible：
（a）11．．． w a5＋fails to the simple 12
 \＆xc4） \(140-0-0 \mathrm{~b} 515\) §g5 Ef8 16 e 6 ；
（b）11．．．0－0 \(120-0-0\) 0c6 13 \＆xc4 Qdxe5 14 Qxe5 Qxe5 15 \＃he1！；
（c） \(11 \ldots .06\) is strongly met by 12 \(0-0-0\) ，when \(12 \ldots .9\) dxe5？loses to 13 Qxe5 Qxe5 14 党e4；
（d）11．．．Dxe5 12 We4 \＆e6 13 世xe5
 Se2 Qd7 17 Qg5！曹g6 18 Qxe6㥩xe6，and now：
（d1） 19 䒼g5 f6 20 㪚h5＋\＃f7 \(210-0\) \(0-0-022\) Ed6 wxd6 23 世要xf7 De5 24

 （Piket－E．Vladimirov，Rotterdam 1988）， when the game should have ended in a draw by repetition－ 30 䊐e3 Ee4 31

（d2）the no less complicated variation

 b5 25 we4，analysed by Vladimirov and assessed in favour of White，was tested in Brenninkmeijer－Zs．Polgar（Wijk aan Zee 1990）：25．．．Wb6！ 26 §f1 Ee6 27 h5 \＄b8 28 §g4 \(0 x g 429\) 光xg4 d3 30


 \(39 \mathrm{f} 4 \mathrm{Ed} 640 \mathrm{f5} \mathrm{c} 3\)－the black pawns proved stronger，and White resigned；
（d3） 19 0－0 0－0－0 20 eg4 f5 21
 chances for White（Lobron－Zs．Polgar， Munich 1991）；
（e）11．．．Da6 12 0－0－0 b5 13 类e4 \＆b7 14 e6 Qb6 15 畄f5！（15 Qf6＋
 15．．．f6（Farago－Hertneck，Altensteig 1987），and now 16 Qxb6！\({ }^{W} \times 6617\)



Wxf6 leads to an advantage for White （Farago）；
（f）11．．．Qb6 120－0－0，and：
（f1） \(12 \ldots .98 \mathrm{~d} 713\) ©xb6（or 13 e 6 ！ fxe6 14 Qf4）13．．．宸xb6 14 ©xc4
 （Lukacs－Zs．Polgar，Budapest 1986） 17 Ell！©b6 18 \＆ d 3 and White wins；
（f2）12．．．Oxd5 13 ＠xc4 0－0（13．．．园e6？ 14 \＆xd5 \＆xd5 15 嶒xc5，or \(14 \ldots\)
 Lukacs－Pekarek，Polanica Zdroj 1986， 17 㟶d6！with a decisive material ad－ vantage for White） 14 Exd5（ 14 exd5 we7 15 h 4 ，when in Lukacs＇s opinion White stands better，but after \(15 \ldots\) ．．．\({ }^{2} 6\) Black would appear to have counter－
 15．．．0c6 16 曾e4（16 Exc5 定f5）16．．．宜e6 17 Qg 5618 Qxe6 fxe6 19 Еd6 Qd4 Black can successfully defend （Averkin－Mirkovic，Belgrade 1992）；
（g）11．．．b5 120－0－0（or 12 㟶e4 回b7
 leads to an extremely sharp position：
（g1） 13 h 4 显xd5 14 Exd5 世学e7 15毗e4 Qb6 16 e6 f6 17 h 5 （Yusupov－ Seirawan，Rotterdam 1989），or 17 \＃h5 （Rychagov－Baulin，St Petersburg 1995）；
（g2） \(13 \mathrm{~g} 3!\) 寝a5（13．．．Dc6 14 昷h3， and the capture of the e5 pawn gives White a dangerous attack after Ehel；if 13．．．0－0 White attacks with 14 h 4 h 615

 decisive material advantage（Ivanchuk－ Zs．Polgar，Monaco 1993）．
\[
11 \quad \ldots \quad 0-0
\]

Or 11．．．0c6，and：
（a）120－00－0 13 Еel 0 b 614 Qxb6 axb6 15 畨xd8 匂x8 16 a3 包6 17 Ead1 定g4 18 e6 §xe6 19 ＠xe6 fxe6
 equal game（Karpov－Ehlvest，Belfort 1988）；
（b） 12 wa4 0－0（or 12．．． W a5 \(\mathrm{G}+13\)滥xa5 Qxa5 14 \＆b5 with some initiative for White） 13 0－0－0 Qd4 （13．．．Qxe5 14 Qxe5 Qxe5 15 Ehel gives White a menacing position，Flear－ Garcia Palermo，Szirak 1986） 14 Ehe 1

 with the better position for White （Cvitan－Ehlvest，Vrsac 1987）；
（c） 12 管e2！ \(\mathrm{w} 5+(12 \ldots .0 \mathrm{~b} 6\) is prob－ ably best，althought after the simple 13 Qxb6 Black still has problems）：


13 b4！（first played by Shcherbakov， who，in New in Chess Yearbook No．42， mentions that the same move occurred earlier in a similar situation in a game Dautov－Donchenko－cf．p．249； 13 ¢f1 or \(13 Q \mathrm{~d} 2\) allows Black time to con－ solidate）13．．． \(2 x\) xb4（after 13．．．cxb4 14 e6 White wins） \(140-09 x d 5\) ，and now：
（cl） 15 e6 \(\sum 7 \mathrm{f} 616\) exf7＋\({ }^{6} \times 7717\) Ead1 Ee8 18 是xd5＋\＄f8 19 Wiv2 （Shcherbakov－Vaulin，Chelyabinsk 1990） when Black＇s best chance was to return the pawn by 19．．．\＆g4 20 \＆xb7 玉ad8 21 Exd8 Exd8 22 De5，after which White retains the initiative thanks to the exposed position of the black king （Shcherbakov）；
（c2） 15 ixd5 9 f8（White has a win－ ning attack after 15．．．＠b6 16 ＠xf7＋！

舁xf7 17 e6＋家e8 18 当e5，Cvitan－ Hulak，Croatia Rapid 1996，or 15．．．0－0 16 Qg5） 16 ©d2，and with \(0 \mathrm{c} 4-\mathrm{d} 6\) to follow Black was unable to develop normally and lost quickly in Sulava－ Zelcic（Nova Gorica 1996）．

 Exf7 16 葿d5 曹c7 17 Eadl 0 c 618
 （Vaiser－Mirkovic，Vmjacka Banja 1984） or 20 f 4 ．With material roughly equal， White＇s position looks more promising．

\section*{12 䒼c2}

12 0－0 Qc6 13 Еe1 Qb6 14 Qxb6 axb6 15 単c2䒼xf3 垍d4 leads to an equal position （Krasenkov－Bus，Budapest 1989）．
\[
12 \ldots \text {... } 0
\]

If he wishes，Black can transpose into the variation from the previous note by \(12 . . .9 \mathrm{~b} 6\) ．

After 12．．．Ee8 13 0－0－0 it is more than dangerous for Black to take the pawn：13．．．Oxe5（13．．．Dc6 14 Ehel leads to a position from the main line） 14 Ehel Qbc6 15 Qxe5 Qxe5（15．．． シxe5 16 ロxe5 Qxe5 17 㪚e4！） 16 \＆b5！ Ee6（16．．．\＆d7？ 17 \＆xd7 Qxd7 18 Exe8＋啙xe8 19 ©c7 and wins，or \(16 \ldots\)是g4 17 \＆xe8 \＆xdl 18 Exdl c4 19
 Salov－Radulov，Leningrad 1984） 17
 Qxe6＋and wins（Belyavsky－Seirawan， USSR v．Rest of the World，1984）．

The sharp \(12 . . . b 5\) is parried by 13
 \＆e6 \(160-0-0\) with advantage to White （W．Watson）．
\[
\begin{aligned}
& 13 \text { 0-0-0 } \mathbf{- 1 e 8} \\
& \text { If 13...Qdxe5 } 14 \text { Qxe5 Qxe5 } 15 \\
& \text { Ehel. } \\
& \text { Now there can follow } 14 \text { Ehel Qd4 }
\end{aligned}
\]
 19 モxd8 \(\Xi x d 820\) Wxc4 \＆f5 followed by ．．．玉ac8）18．．．气e6 19 舁bl．White is a pawn up，for which Black has some compensation．

The character of the positions arising in this complicated variation suggests that corrections and even radical reassessments can be expected．
\[
12.12(1 \mathrm{~d} 4 \mathrm{~d} 52 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 439 \mathrm{f} 3 \mathrm{c} 5)
\]

4 e3
A quiet continuation，inviting Black to revert to classical lines with 4．．．e6 5是xc4 0 f 6 ．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
4 & \ldots & \text { cxd4 } \\
5 & \text { @xc4 }
\end{array}
\]

If 5 exd4 Black can play 5．．．©e6 with a favourable version of the Winawer Variation：
（a） 6 Qc3 Qf6 7 Qe5 Qc6 8 Qxc6 bxc6 9 枼a4 罾d7 10 显xc4 全xc4 11喓xc4 e6 with a roughly equal position （Chekhov－Lukin，USSR 1982）；

 \(0-0\) and ．．．Qd7，and Black overcomes his problems（Hebert－Lputian，Saint John 1988）．
\[
5 \text {... 装c7 }
\]

The prelude to the modern variation． Of course，not 5．．．dxe3？ 6 是xf7＋
5．．．d3 is possible（Nenashev－Afek， Hania 1994）： 6 0－0 ©f6 7 Qc3（7 \＆d3
 －g7 11 定xd3 紧e7 12 Qe4 0－0 13是d2 and 5 acl with the initiative．

5．．．e6 6 exd4 Qf6 leads to the Steinitz Variation．

\section*{6 背b3}
畨x6 90－0 Qf6 the game is equal （Guseinov－A．Mikhalchishin，Klaipeda 1988）．

Christiansen－de la Villa（Szirak 1987）went 6 Qa3 e6 7 wa4＋\＆d7 8 Qb5 Wd8 9 0－0 a6 10 莤e2 Qf6 11 Qe5 d3 12 是xd3 Qc6 13 Qxd7 Qxd7

今d6 with equal chances．
\[
6 \text {... e6 }
\]

6．．．皿e6？is bad： 7 是xe6 寝xcl＋8宵e2 挡xh19 定xf7＋宫d8 10 莦xb7．
\[
7 \text { exd4 }
\]

Little is promised by playing for a lead in development： 7 Qxd4a68 8 c3



舁d8 19 兠xb7 favours White） 14 Da4 Qd5 15 \＆xd5 exd5 16 Qb6 घd8 17 \(0-0\) 世 Wd 18 Efel 0－0（Gaprindashvili－ Levitina，match，Lvov 1983）．
\[
7 \ldots \text { ac6 }
\]

7．．．）d78000 0 is strongly met by 9 d5！Qa5 10 dxe6！Qxb3 11 exf7＋
 \(14 母 \mathrm{~g} 5\) ．For the moment the material equivalent for the queen is insufficient， but Black has to defend against the threat of 15 Qf7＋，and White gains time to include his reserves in the attack．


8 Qc3 a6（or 8．．．Qf6 \(90-0\) \＆d7 10
 Lukin，USSR 1984） 9 憎dl（．．．Da5 was threatened）9．．．Qf6 10 0－0 宜e7 （Vyzhmanavin－Kaidanov，Norilsk 1987）． 11 当e2 and Edl leads to a position typical of the Steinitz Variation with an extra tempo for Black．Chances are roughly equal．

8 当d1 \＆b4＋9 Qc3 \＆ d 7 ．The white queen has returned prematurely，and Black has the typical positional threat of seizing control of c4．After 10 0－0 \＆xc3 11 bxc3 Qa5 12 \＆ d 3 （ff6（with development incomplete it is dangerous to take the c3 pawn）his position is slightly preferable（Timoshchenko－ Lputian，Pavlodar 1982）．
\(80-0\) a6 9 \＆e2 comes into consid－ eration，e．g．9．．．＠f6 10 Qc3 \＆e7 11 \＆e3 0－0 12 घacl 是d7 13 Qa4 亿d5 14 Qc5 \＃ab8 15 【ddl with the initiative for White（Yermolinsky－Lima，Manila Olympiad 1992）．

12．2（1d4 d5 2c4dxc4 3 صf3）
3 ．．．e6


This position（more usually reached via the move order \(2 \ldots\) ．．e6 3 Qf3 dxc4）
has been popular recently on account of its transpositional possibilities．

\section*{4 e4}

The prophylactic 4 a4 is well met by \(4 \ldots 9 \mathrm{c}\) ，and if 5 e4 Qa5．

The restrained 4 e3 can lead to a position in which Black，while con－ ceding the centre，obtains two passed pawns on the queenside：4．．．b5 5 a4 c6 6 axb5 cxb5 7 b3 and now 7．．．eb4＋ 8 \＆ 2 2 \(8 x d 2+9\) Qbxd2 a5 10 bxc4 b4． White＇s chances look better，but Ruban has regularly employed this variation with quite good results（it is examined in more detail under a different move order on p．195）．

4 畨a4＋has been popular of late：
（a） \(4 \ldots\) ．．．c6 5 要xc4 Qf6 6 皿g 5 （for 6 Qc3 cf．the Mannheim Variation
 9 g 3 0－0 10 §g2（Kramnik－Ivanchuk， Dortmund 1995）and now Black should have played the active \(10 \ldots\) ．．． 5 ；
（b） \(4 . .9 \mathrm{~d} 75 \mathrm{e} 4\) ，when：
（b1）5．．．Df6 6 Qc3 a6 7 ＠xc4 ¥b8 8
 Edl c5 12 d5 c4 13 dxe6（better 13臽e2）13．．．cxd3（Kramnik－Ehlvest，Nov－ gorod 1995），and now the sacrifice 14 exf7＋？proved unsound；
（b2） \(5 . . . c 56\)＠xc4 cxd4 7 Qxd4 wb6！？（a provocative move aimed at disrupting White＇s development） \(8 Q \mathrm{~b} 3\) （after 8 Qb5 a6 9 \＆f4 e5 10 \＆xe5？ Qxe5！11 ⿹c7＋皃d8 12 Qxa8 常b4＋！ Black wins material）8．．．\＆d6 9 \＆e3蓸c7 and the white queen looks rather misplaced at a4（Piket－Lautier，match， Monaco 1996）－analysis by Speelman；
 e3 0－0 8 \＆e2 \({ }^{(W a 5}+9\) Qc3 \(0 b d 710\) \(0-0\) e5 with a roughly equal game （Ivanchuk－Anand，Las Palmas 1996）．
\[
4 \ldots \quad \text { c5 }
\]

Or 4．．．b5 5 a4，and now：
（a） \(5 \ldots\) 定b7 6 axb5 是xe4 7 是xc4 £xbl 8 Exbl（Osnos－Zavernyaev，Mos－ cow 1959）8．．．\＆b4＋9 \＄f1（or even 9 （1）2）with the better position for White；
（b） 5 ．．．c6 leads to complicated play：
（b1） 6 ＠g5＠b4＋7 0 c 3 乌e7 8 ＠e2 \＆b7 9 0－0 a6（Lputian－Kupreichik， Yerevan 1984）9．．．a6，when Black keeps his pawn but White has a strong centre；
（b2） 6 axb5 cxb5 7 b3 9 定 78 bxc4 \＆xe4 9 cxb5 Qf6 10 会e2 是e7（after 10．．．显b4＋Zaitsev suggests 11 Qbd2 \(0-12\) \＆a3 \＆xa3 13 Exa3 是d5 14 \(0-0\) Qbd7 15 Wal with pressure on the a7 pawn） \(110-00-012\) Qc3 with the initiative for White（Anand－Karpov， Las Palmas 1996）．
\[
\begin{array}{llll}
5 & \text { Qxc4 cxd4 } \\
6 & Q x d 4
\end{array}
\]

After further simplification－ 6 㓯xd4
 Qxd4 White，with his excellent development，retains the initiative，e．g． 9．．．a6 10 e 5 ＠d7 11 f4 b5 12 \＆e2 \＆b7 13 a4（Elbilia－Afek，Tel Aviv 1992）．


Now 6．．．a67 ©c3 leads to a position considered on p．179，while for 6．．．乌f6 7 ©c3 cf．p． 216.

Of the other possibilities we should


Sxd49 \＆xd4 Qf6 10 Qc3 0－0 11 昷c5
 15 \＆fl b5 16 \＆g5 with somewhat the better game for White（Sosonko－ Radulov，Surokarta－Denpasar 1982）．

\section*{12.3 （ d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3）}

\section*{3 \\ ©d7}

The early development of the queen＇s knight followed by playing it to b6 is an idea of the Russian player Godes．

\section*{4 e4！}

The most energetic．Other options：
4 e3 Qb6（4．．．b5 5 a 4 c6 6 axb5 cxb5 7 b3 Qb6 8 Qa3！favours White），and now：
（a） 5 exc4 是xc4 6 㟶a4＋暑d7？！ （after this Black is forced to weaken his position with ．．．f7－f6；6．．．c6 7 畨xc4 Qf6 is correct） 7 Wxc4 f6 8 Qc3 e6 9 e4 a6 10 定f4 c6 11 0－0－0 and White gained a promising position（Gaprin－ dashvili－Lematschko，Jajce 1982）；
（b） 5 Qbd2 是e6，when：
（bl） 6 Qg5？！是d5 7 e4 e6！ 8 exd5（8⿹gf3 是c6； 8 Qdf3 sic6 9 Qe5 is unfa－ vourable in view of \(9 \ldots\) ．．． \(\mathrm{e} 4+\) ） \(8 \ldots\) ．．． w xg 5 9 dxe6 \(0-0-0\) ！ 10 exf7（if 10 － f 3

 and Black seized the initiative（Nikolac－ Kovacevic，Yugoslavia 1976）；
定xc4 定xc4 9 瞥xc4 c6 10 0－0 e6 11显d2 崖d5 12 घfc1 Qe4 13 \＆el 今d6 14 b4 and White retained a slight initia－ tive（Lukacs－Kovacevic，Tuzla 1981）．

4 Qc3 should be considered．After
 axb6 8 ＠f4 c6 9 e3 Qf6 10 ＠e5 0－0 11 \＆e2 b5 12 a 4 White gained the better chances in Mishuchkov－Godes（USSR 1981）．

With 4 Wiva4 White can invite trans－ position into the Mannheim Variation （by 4．．．Qf6）．If 4．．．a6 5 当xc4，then


4 Qbd2 is dubious：4．．．b5！5 b3 c3 6 Qbl（if 6 Qe4 b4 7 a 3 是b7 8 Qg3 a5 it is not apparent how White can regain the pawn）6．．．b4 7 a3 c5 8 dxc5 \(0 x \mathrm{xc} 59\)糷c2 \＆e6！with advantage to Black （Borisenko－Dorfman，Chelyabinsk 1975）．
\[
4 \ldots \text {... }
\]

 Qxc4 7 Wa4＋and 8 厝xc4 is possible） 6．．．e6 7 0－0 Qf6 8 皿e3 昷b4 9 皆c2 \＆xc3 10 bxc3 h6 11 宣c1 0－0 12 是 a 3 Ee8 13 Qe5 \＆xe2 14 当xe2 乌fd7 with roughly equal chances（Grigorian－ Skvortsov，Moscow 1981）．

If White prevents ．．． \(\mathrm{Q}_{\mathrm{g}} 4\) by 5 h 3 ， Black develops with 5．．．Qf6 6 ©c3 e6 7
 Zilberman－Godes（Chelyabinsk 1975） he sacrificed a pawn：9．．．b5 10 wxc6＋是d7 11 学a6 b4 12 Qb5 世／b8！ 13 a 4
 gained the advantage．

It is more advisable for White to take on \(c 4\) with a knight，and with this aim 5 Qe5 looks logical：5．．．Qf6（Godes recommends 5．．．g6） 6 Øc3 e6（6．．．⿹fd7
and ．．．g7－g6 is possible，as in the vari－ ation 5 a4 a5 6 De5） 7 ©xc4 定b4 8 f3 \(0-09\) 是e3 c6 10 a3 \＆\({ }^{\text {e }} 711\) 䊘d2 with a solid centre and good prospects．
\(5 \mathrm{a4}\) a5 6 Qe5 \(Q \mathrm{f6} 7\) Qc3，and now：
（a） \(7 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 68\)－xc4 0 xc 49 是xc4 \＆g7 10 e5 ©d7 11 嵝b3 e6（not 11．．．0－0？ 12是xf7＋Exf7 13 e6） 12 Qe4 with ad－ vantage to White（Brilla－Banfalvi－Godes， corr．1981／4）；
（b） \(7 \ldots\) ．．．fd7 8 Qxc4 g6 9 §f4 c6 10
 13 \＆xc4 Qb6（Black should counter－
 14 \＆a2！Wd6 15 h 4 and White launched an offensive（Gavrikov－ Gulko，49th USSR Ch．，Frunze 1981）．
 Qf6 8 Qc3 \＆e6 9 䐗d3 g6 1000 §g7
 position is the more promising（Petur－ sson－Bellon Lopez，Hastings 1985／6）．
12.4 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3）
\[
3 \ldots \quad \text { \& } \quad . .
\]

Before White has played e2－e3 or e2－e4，this is considered premature．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
4 & \text { Qe5 } \\
5 & \text { Qh5 }
\end{array}
\]


5 g 4 leads to interesting complications：
（a）5．．．苃g6 6 h 4 （after 6 Dc3 Dd7 7 Qxc4 c6 Black＇s position is satisfac－
监a4＋b5 10 \＆ 22 with advantage to White（analysis）；
（b） \(5 \ldots\) ．．f6 is a sharp reply： 6 gxh5
 there can follow 8．．． \(0 \mathrm{c} 69 \mathrm{f4} 0-0-0+\) 10 Qd2 g5）7．．．c6 8 d5（if 8 dxe5
 ＠b4） \(10 \ldots\) exd5 11 exd5 cxd5 12 \＆g5 （after 12 Qc3 the exchange sacrifice 12．．．d4 13 ＠xb7 \(\mathrm{Qbd}_{\mathrm{b}}\) ！is promising）

 with a double－edged position，in which Black has to reckon with his kingside being undeveloped（Malich－Kavalek， Halle 1963）．
\[
5 \ldots f
\]

Obvious moves are unsatisfactory：
5．．．e6？ 6 g 4 ＠g6 7 h 4 f 68 皆a4＋c6 9 0xg6 hxg6 10 监xc4，and the old game Alekhine－Grünfeld（Semmering
 e4 ©d7 12 ＠e3 0－0－0 13 d 5 ！also fa－ vours White） 11 e4 Qd7 12 \＆e3 世a5 13 a3（directed against 13．．．Qb6 14 wb3 wh；the queen must be kept on the a2－g8 diagonal）13．．．巴e8 \(14 \mathrm{f4}\) Qe7 \(150-0-0\) §c8 \(16 \mathrm{f5}\) ！Qd6 17 当a2！g5 18 h5 b5 19 e 5 with a decisive advan－ tage for White．

After 5．．．Qd7 Black has a difficult （a） \(6 \$ x c 4 \triangleq\) gf6，and now：
（a1） 7 喈b3 Qb6 8 e4 wivd4（after 8．．．e6 9 \＆e3 White has a positional ad－ vantage without any material loss） 9 \＆e3 wd8（the queen has to return， since \(9 \ldots . . . \frac{\mathrm{w}}{\mathrm{E}} \mathrm{d} 7\) ？is refuted by 10 exb6！ axb6 11 Qxb6 and 12 §b5，Bogol－ jubow－Grekov，Kiev 1914） 10 f3 e6 11 Qb5（first \(11 \Xi d 1\) Qb5 \(0 \mathrm{xc} 413 \mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{xc} 4}\) is also favourable）
\(11 . .0 \mathrm{xc} 412 \mathrm{wxc4}\) ，and White has a clear advantage（Bogoljubow）；
（a2） 7 f3 Qb6 8 Øa5
 0－0 14 \＆e2 with excellent game （Andersson－Kavalek，Bugojno 1982）；
 （perhaps even stronger than 70 xd 7
 with a good position for White－ Alekhine）7．．． \(\mathrm{Oxe5}^{2 \mathrm{dxe} 5 \mathrm{e} 69 \mathrm{~g} 4}\) \＆g6 10 \＆g2 暑c7 11 f 4 ，and if \(11 \ldots \mathrm{~h} 512 \mathrm{~h} 3\) hxg4 13 hxg 4 Exhl +14 是xhl \(0-0\) 15 寝a4！
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
6 & \text { Qxc4 } & \text { e6 } \\
7 & \text { Wb3 } & \text { Qc6 }
\end{array}
\]

If 7．．． 8 e3
The white pieces are actively placed， but，in Tartakower＇s opinion，after 8．．． \(\mathbf{m}\) black can defend successfully．

\section*{12.5 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 9f3）}
\[
3 \ldots \text { b5 }
\]

Until recently this move was uncon－ ditionally accompanied by a question mark．The attempt to keep the pawn is， of course，faulty．But，in allowing the opponent superiority in the centre， Black can hope to use his passed pawns on the queenside to create counterplay．

4 a4
If 4 e3 \({ }^{2} d 7\)（ \(4 \ldots\) ．．． f 6 leads to the variation 3 Df3 ©f6 4 e3 b5） 5 a 4 c 66 Qe5！（not 6 axb5 cxb5 7 Qe5 ©c6，and
 play lies ahead）．But now 7 axb5 cxb5 8 WIS is threatened－White stands better．

Here it should be mentioned that Black can avoid these not very favour－ able variations by not hurrying with 3．．．b5，but instead playing 3．．．c6，and only if 4 e3 b5，when after 5 a4 e6 a positional analysed below is reached．
\[
\begin{array}{llll}
4 & \ldots & \text { c6 } \\
5 & \text { e3 } &
\end{array}
\]

5 axb5 cxb5 6 b3 is less clear in view of \(5 \ldots\) ．．e5．

5 e4 is possible，when 5．．．e6 6 b3 leads to a position from the Slav Defence（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 c 63 Qf3 dxc4 4 e4 b5 followed by 5．．．e6 or 5．．．Qf6）．
\[
5 \text {... e6 }
\]

Or 5．．．嘗b6 6 axb 5 cxb 5 and now：
（a） 7 Qe5 e6（but not \(7 \ldots\) ．．．b7，when the usual 8 b3 cxb3 9 宸xb3 enables White advantageously to restore mate－



（b） 7 b3！cxb3 8 wb3 and White re－ gains the pawn with the better position： Black cannot reply 8 ．．．b4 in view of 9
 12 当xf7＋，winning，while 8．．．\＆d7 is met by 9 De5．


This position also arises in the Slav Defence after 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 c 63 Df3 dxc4 4 e3 b5 5 a 4 e6．
\[
6 \quad \text { axb5 }
\]

If 6 b3 Black has：
（a） 6 ．．．\＆b4＋ 7 \＆d2 \＆\(x d 2+8\) Qfxd2 e5？！（if 8 ．．．a5 9 bxc4 b4 Osnos indicates 10 c5，after which the white knight may
reach d6；8．．．cxb3 9 axb5 b2 \(10 \Xi{ }_{\mathrm{ma}}\) requires testing） 9 axb5 exd4 10 Qxc4最e6 11 㟶xd4 曾xd4 12 exd4 and White gained a great advantage（Osnos－ Vorotnikov，USSR 1985）；
（b） \(6 \ldots\) ．．b4 is an improvement： \(7 \Omega \times \mathrm{e} 4\) （if \(7 \mathrm{bxc} 4 \mathrm{c} 5!\) ） 7 ．．．\(勹 \mathrm{f} 680-00 \mathrm{bd} 79\) \＆b2 \＆e7 10 Qbd2 0－0 11 觜e2 c5 12 \(\Xi \mathrm{ac} 1 \stackrel{\mathrm{~L}}{\mathrm{~b}} 7\) with a satisfactory position （A．Maric－Ruban，Hastings 1991）．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
6 & \ldots & \text { cxb5 } \\
7 & \text { b3 } & \text { £b4+ }
\end{array}
\]

In Kramnik－Hubner（Biel 1993） Black preferred 7．．．9f6，but after 8 bxc4 bxc4 9 \＆xc4＠e7 10 Qe5！0－0
 14 थxd5 \＆xd2＋ 15 安xd2 \＆xd5 16 \＆xd5 exd5 17 Ehbl White gained an undisputed positional advantage．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
8 & \AA d 2 & \S x d 2+ \\
9 & \text { Qbxd2 } & a 5
\end{array}
\]

It is on this move，setting up two passed pawns，that the modern interpretation of the variation is based． 10 bxc4 b4


\section*{11 \＆ d 3}

The alternative plan is \(11 \mathrm{c5}\) with the possible transfer of the knight to d6：
 （after 13 ＠xd7＋©xd7 \(140-00015\)

Qc4 Qd5 Black has counterplay with ．．． 2 c 3 ；if 15 e 4 he replies \(15 \ldots . \mathrm{b} 8\) ，in－ tending ．．．थbc6）13．．．0－0 14 Qe5 \＆ eb 5
 Qxa4 17 Qxe6 fxe6 18 Exa4 favours White） 15 崽xb5 Wc7 16 Qdc4 Qbc6 （Neverov－Gurgenidze，USSR 1985） 17 Qxc6 Qxc6 \(180-0\) ，planning Qb6， Efdl and e3－e4．White＇s superiority in the centre and control over important squares on the queenside give him the advantage（Neverov）；
（b） \(11 \ldots .9 \mathrm{f} 6 \quad 12\) \＆b5＋（12 ©c4） 12．．．\({ }^{\text {idd7 }} 13\) wa4 0－0（Baburin－Ruban， USSR 1986） 14 Qe5！with the better chances for White．
```

11 ... Qf6
12 g4!?

```

White uses his central advantage to prepare a kingside attack．If，as in the previous variation，he continues \(120-0\) \(0-013\) c5（not 13 e4 e5！）（Ruban－ Vorotnikov，USSR 1985），then 13．．．
 h6 16 Qd6 ©c3） 14 Qc4 是xc4 15是xc4 Qe4 16 荘d3 ©c3 17 Qd2，and White exchanges the knight at c3 by Qbl，with a complicated battle and chances for both sides．
\[
12 \ldots \text { \&b7 }
\]

If \(12 \ldots 0 \times 134\) gl，picking up the g 7 pawn and intending c4－c5 and 0 c 4 ．
\begin{tabular}{llll}
13 & g 5 & Ofd7 \\
14 & Oe4 &
\end{tabular}

14 h4 曾c7 15 c5 h6 16 ©c4 hxg5 17 Qd6＋ 18 ggl leads to a sharp， unclear position（Lputian－Gurgenidze， 52nd USSR Ch．，Riga 1985）．

Naumkin－Ruban（Moscow 1991） now continued 14．．．Wc7 15 c5 0－0 16 Eg1 g6，when Ruban evaluates this position as roughly equal．After 17 ©d6 \＆c6 18 h 4 a 419 h 5 b 3 Black does have counterplay，but White＇s pieces are very active，and his chances seem better．

\section*{13 Mannheim Variation
}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
1 & d 4 & \(\mathrm{d5}\) \\
2 & c 4 & dxc4 \\
3 & Qf3 & Qf6 \\
4 & Wa4＋ &
\end{tabular}

The variation in which White regains the pawn at c4 by the queen manoeuvre Wa4＋and \(W \times 4\) occurred in one of the games from the Bogoljubow－Alekhine match（1934）played in Mannheim，and became known as the Mannheim Variation．The resulting set－ups are close to the Catalan Opening，or，more precisely，to the variation 1 d 4 §f6 2 c 4 e6 3 g 3 d 54 显g2dxc4 5 紧4＋


Black＇s main replies are：
4．．．c6（13．1）
4．．．Oc6（13．2）－p． 203
4．．．Qbd7（13．3）－p． 207
4．．．\({ }^{-1 / d 7}\)（13．4）－p． 212
4．．．ᄋd7（13．5）－p． 213
After 4．．．⿹fd75 e4 e6 6 ＠xc4 c5 7 d5 exd5 8 \＆ xd 5 White stands better （Pachman－Janetschek（Barcelona 1975）．
> 13.1 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 صf6 4 畨 \(\mathrm{a} 4+\) ）

4 ．．．c6
5 嘗xc4
The main continuations are：
5．．．）\({ }^{\text {f }} 5\)（13．11）
5．．．＠g4（13．12）－p． 201
5．．．g6（13．13）－p． 202
If Black is agreeable to a slightly inferior ending，he can offer the exchange of queens by 5 ．．．\({ }^{w} \mathrm{l} \mathbf{d} 5\) ．

For 5．．．e6 cf．p． 192.

5 ．．．\＆f5
This move，currently considered very sound，was employed in game 23 of the Bogoljubow－Alekhine match．By taking control of e4，Black intends to prevent White from strengthening his centre．

White has two plans：
6 ©c3（13．111）
6 g3（13．112）－p． 200
In Andersson－Garcia Palermo（Mar del Plata 1982）the modest 6 e3 was successfully employed：after 6 ．．．e6 7
 （9．．．c5！？） 10 Oc3 0－0 11 e4 㕷c7 12 ©g5 White had the initiative．

6 昷g5 Qe4 is satisfactory for Black．

> \begin{tabular}{l} 13.111 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 Qf3 \\ Qf6 4 Wa4+ c6 5 當xc4 @f5) \\ \hline \end{tabular}

6．．．e6 is also played：
（a） 7 g3 ©e4（beginning a battle for the e4 square） 8 \＆g2 0 xc3 9 bxc3 皿e4 10 0－0 \＆e7 11 仓ेd2 是xg2 12 皃xg2䊦d5＋13 e4 娩xc4 14 Oxc4．White＇s position is preferable（Trifunovic－ Radulescu，Budapest 1948）；
 b5 10 Qxf5 exf5 11 e3 Qbd7 12 是d3 g 6 ，and Black＇s position is even slightly preferable（Smyslov－Hubner，match， Velden 1983）．

\section*{7 g3}

Skembris－Lirindzakis（Ano Liosia 1993／4）went 7 e3 e6 8 Qh4 \＆g4（8．．．
 Qf5（or 11 Qg2 是g6 12 乌f4）11．．．Sg6 120 g 3 with chances for both sides．
\[
7 \text {... e6 }
\]

Or 7．．．0e4 8 \＆g2，when \(8 \ldots\) ．．．xc3 9
 although after 11 Qe5 \＆d5 12 \＆xd5当xd5 13 f 3 e6 14 e4 \({ }^{W} \mathrm{wb} 315 \mathrm{axb} 3\) the ending is more pleasant for White．
\[
8 \text { \&g2 \&e7 }
\]

In the Bogoljubow－Alekhine game the World Champion unexpectedly played 8．．．©c2？！The white queen is surrounded，and Black threatens to win it by \(9 . . . \otimes \mathrm{b} 6\) ．But after the＇forced＇ 9 e 3 White occupied the centre and gained the advantage：9．．．ee7 \(100-00-011\)
皆a6 15 単c2．

Alekhine played ．．．\＆c2 too early． Perhaps he should have waited，to see if the opponent would play his rook to dl －8．．．今e7 9 0－0 0－0 10 \＃d1？（pre－ paring \(Q \mathrm{~h} 4\) and \(\mathrm{e} 2-\mathrm{e} 4\) ），and then win the exchange by \(10 \ldots\) \＆ c 2 ！，since after 11 Ed2？ 2 b 6 White loses his queen．

In Dlugy－Williams（New York 1983） White fell into this trap after 8．．．h6 9 \(0-0\) \＆e7 10 Ed 1 ？\＆ c 2 ！Correct（as in the Bogoljubow－Alekhine game）is 10
e3（or 10 a4）10．．．0－0 11 罾e2 De4 12 Qd2 \(0 x \mathrm{xd} 213\) 定xd2 ©f6 14 e4 \＆g6 15 是e3 Wa5 16 a3，when White＇s position is preferable（Fedorowicz－ Williams，New York 1982／3）．

In Portisch－Spassky（Amsterdam 1964）Black chose 8．．．dd6．This move too cannot be considered good，since White obtains a strong centre： 900 0－0 10 Qh4！\＆g4 11 h 3 皿h5 12 e4 De8 13 宜e3 血e7 14 Df3 Dd6 15 杽b3 with the better position．

After 8．．．De4 9 0－0 Qb6 10 嶙b3昷e7 strong is 11 a 4 ！
\[
9 \quad 0-0
\]


\section*{10 e3}

The modern continuation．
As already mentioned， 10 － \(\mathbf{d 1}\) ？loses the exchange（ \(10 \ldots\) ．．．ec 2 ），while 10 Qh4？loses the d4 pawn after 10．．．Qb6．

Other continuations：
10 \＆g5：
（a） \(10 \ldots\) h6 11 exf6 ©xf6，and now：
（al） 12 e4，when Black put pressure on the central pawn by 12 ．．． Q 413
 Qe4 \(\boxed{E d} 8\) and gained a good position （Taimanov－Platonov，Moscow 1964）；
（a2）the restrained \(12 \Xi \mathrm{fdl}\) a5 13 e 3 a4 14 對e2 w 515 （d2 2 b 6 led to an
equal game（Seirawan－Portisch，Tilburg 1983）；
（b） \(10 \ldots\) Qe4 11 \＆xe7（11 \＆f4！？） 11．．．Uxe7 12 Efdl \(0 x c 313\) 莦xc3（13 bxc3 e5）13．．．©e4 and Black equalised （M．Gurevich－Kallai，Baku 1986）．
 13 玉acl（Hort－Wiemer，West Germany 1983／4）13．．．⿹xf4 14 gxf4 ©d5 with equal chances．
 axb6 with an equal position（Portisch－ Unzicker，Santa Monica 1966）．

10 \＆f4，and now：

（a） \(10 \ldots\) a5 11 a 4 wb6 12 Qd2（if 12 Qh4 是g4 13 h3 Qd5！）12．．．』fd8 13 e4 \＆g6 with a good game for Black （Vorotnikov－Stolyar，Leningrad 1964）；
（b） \(10 \ldots . \mathrm{b} 6\) is also satisfactory： 11

 wivs with an equal game（Filip－ Tringov，Tel Aviv Olympiad 1964）；
 13 Sh4！，and in Miles－Hubner（Wijk aan Zee 1984）White seized the initia－ tive：13．．．\＆xh4（if 13．．． \(0 x\) x 314 Qxf5， or \(13 .\). 乌d6 14 §xd6 §xd6 15 Qxf5 exf5 16 显h3！with advantage to White
 16 苌f3 Of6 17 e 4 ．The strong centre and two bishops give him the advantage．

10 ．．．De4
Lechtynsky－Kir．Georgiev（Stara Za－ gora 1990）went \(10 \ldots \mathrm{a} 511\) 当e2 Qe4
 15 a3 Df6 16 \＆e3 Wa5 17 \＃fd Efd8 18 \＃acl．White＇s position is slightly the more active．

White also gained the better chances in Lputian－Smyslov（Rostov－on－Don 1993）after 10．．．h6 11 We2 Qe4 12 Q d 2 Qxd2 13 是xd2 e5 14 d 5 Qb6 15
 Qe3．
\[
11 \text { 省 } \mathrm{e} 2
\]


11 d 22 is the alternative：
（a） \(11 \ldots\) ．． xd 212 皿xd2 e5 13 e 4 ，and now：
（ai）13．．．Qb6 14 斯b3（Andersson－ Hübner，Wijk aan Zee 1984）．White＇s position looks promising，but Black was able to defend： \(14 \ldots\) ．．．exd4 15 exf5 dxc3


（a2）13．．．exd4 is sounder： 14 exf5 dxc3 15 是xc3 \＆f6 with equality（Keitling－ haus－J．Janovsky，Dortmund 1991）；
（b） \(11 \ldots .0 \mathrm{~d} 612\) eve2 c5 13 d 5 exd5 14 Qxd5 －f6 15 e4 Qxd5 16 exf5 Qb4 with chances for both sides（Crouch－ Boudre，Cappelle la Grande 1991）；
（c）11．．． Oxc3 12 bxc3 e5 13 e4 昷e6
 equal game（Van der Sterren）． 11 ．．． \(0 \times 1\)
Other continuations：
11．．．劏b6 12 乌d2 Qd6 13 b3（13 e4 \＆g6 14 Qb3 a5 with good counterplay， Vaganian－Shirov，Manila Olympiad 1992）13．．．a5 14 是a3 and Eacl with the better chances for White（Shirov）．

（a） \(13 \ldots\) ．． \(\mathrm{xxc}^{2} \quad 14 \mathrm{bxc} 3\) Qxe5 15 dxe5，then e3－e4，did1 and f2－f4 favours White；
（b）13．．． \(0 x \mathrm{xd} 214\) Qxd7！亚d8 15溇xd2 橎xd7 16 e4 with the better chances for White；
 （15 Qc3 and e3－e4 can also be considered） \(15 \ldots\) ．．．b4 16 ©d2，and with e3－e4 to follow，White stands better （Cvetkovic－Blagojevic，Skopje 1991）．

11．．．\({ }^{\text {eb }} 12\) \＆d2 Qxd2 13 Qxd2e5 14 a 3 ！with the more promising position for White（Salov－Brenninkmeijer，Wijk aan Zee 1992）．

11．．．c5 12 Qd2 Qxd2（or 12．．．Qd6， leading to the 110 d 2 Qd6 variation） 13 \＆xd2 cxd4 14 exd4 Qf6 15 昷e3（15
椤3 9 d3 18 Efc 1 b 6 with an equal game（Schlosser－Tischbierek，Baden Baden 1992）．
\[
12 \text { bxc3 \&e4 }
\]
\(13 \mathrm{c4}\) ，and now：
（a）13．．．c5 14 －d1 皆c7 15 是b2 Qb6 16 Eacl Sf6 with equal chances （Akopian－Shirov，Wijk aan Zee 1993）；
（b）13．．．Wa5 14 a4 臸a6！ 15 a5 c5 with an equal game（Shirov）．
\[
\begin{aligned}
& 13.112 \text { (1 d4 d5 } 2 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 43 \text { Df3 }
\end{aligned}
\]

White fianchettos his bishop， hurrying to complete his kingside development．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
6 & \(\dddot{2}\) & Qbd7 \\
7 & ＠g2 & e6 \\
8 & \(0-0\) &
\end{tabular}

The development of the knight at c3 －now or on the next move－leads to positions from variation 13．111．

H．Gretarsson－Spangenberg（Matin－
嵝 \(x\) b3 10 axb3 合c2（10．．．c5 11 Qbd2； the simplest is \(10 \ldots\) \＆d6 11 Qbd2 \(0-0\) 12 Qc4 ec7 with equality） 11 Qfd2定b4 12 Da3 \＆g6 13 Qdc4 戠e7．After 14 \＆ d 2 the chances are equal．
 consideration：
（a） 100 bd2，and now：
 Qc4 with equal chances（Gheorghiu－ O．Rodriguez，New York 1988）；
 （ 12 e3 is possible，and if \(12 \ldots\) ．．．\({ }^{\mathbf{w}} \mathrm{d} 813\) Qe5 followed by b2－b3，\＆b2 and \({ }^{-1} \mathrm{c} 1\) ， Kurajica－Giorgadze，El Vendrell 1996） 12．．．©e 4 when Black easily solved his opening problems（Goldin－Akopian， St Petersburg 1994）；
（b） 10 wl（this move，avoiding the exchange of queens，is unclear） \(10 \ldots\)
包5 0－0 14 Wive Wa4 15 Efcl with some initiative for the pawn（Lputian－ Smyslov，Moscow 1992）．

\section*{9 Qbd2}

9 蹧b3 is also playable：9．．．Qb6 （9．．．铛b6 10 Qbd2 transposes into the main line） 10 a4 a5 11 Qc3 0－0 12 Oh4 \＆g4 13 e4．

If 9 \＆g5 0－0 10 Qbd2 a5 11 \＆xf6
 hxg6 with equal chances（Kurajica－ Seirawan，Indonesia 1983）．
\[
9 \quad \ldots \quad 0-0
\]

Or 9．．．De4：
（a） 10 Qxe4 学xe4 11 乌e3 0－0 12
 15 Oxg2 with an equal position （Gheorghiu－Suetin，Novi Sad 1982）；
（b） 10 wb3 wb6（Clarke－Alexander， Hastings 1962／3）was thought to ensure Black equal chances，but the idea of 11
 as in Agdestein－L．Hansen given below is worth testing．
\[
10 \text { 然b3 精b6 }
\]


\section*{11 Еel}

With 11 Oc4 White can offer the exchange of queens on his own terms： with the opening of the a－file，ignoring the isolating of his pawns，in order to base his play on the positional threat of Da5．After 11．．．Wa6（avoiding the ex－ change） 12 \＆f4 §e4 13 \＆d6 \＆xd6 14 Qxd6 是xf3（14．．．今d5 15 临 \(\mathrm{C} 2!\) ） 15定xf3 c5（15．．．Qb6 16 e 4 』fd8 17 e 5 De8 is possible－Flear） 16 Qc4！（16 Qxb7 cxd4）16．．．0d5 17 玉fdl 玉ad8 （or 17．．．b5 18 Qa3 b4 19 Wc4 Wb6 20 Qc2） 18 a 4 White had the more active position（Agdestein－L．Hansen，Öster－ sund 1992）．

\section*{11 ．．．\(\Xi_{\text {fd8 }}\)}

\section*{12 党a4}

After 12 e4 Black，before with－ drawing his bishop，exchanges queens－ 12．．．\({ }^{\text {witx }}\) x 13 axb3 \＆g6，and meets 14 Qh4 with 14．．．e5！

\section*{12 \\ a5}

This position was reached in Tai－ manov－Geller（31st USSR Ch．，Lenin－ grad 1963），which continued 13 e4 （White should have exchanged the bish－ op with 13 Qh4）13．．．\＆g6 14 a 3 （here too 14 Qh4 came into consideration） 14．．．\({ }^{W}\) a7，and by threatening ．．．b7－b5 or ．．．c6－c5 Black took the initiative： 15 e5 （now 15 Qh4 is met by \(15 \ldots\). b5！ 16 霛c2寝xd4，and if 17 Oxg6 hxg6 18 演xc6 Qg4 19 玉e2 0 de 5 with a strong attack） 15．．．©d5 16 Qe4 c5．After the opening of the position Black＇s lead in develop－ ment manifests itself．

\[
5 \quad \ldots \quad \text { \&g4 }
\]

A move frequently employed by Smyslov．Black will fianchetto his king＇s bishop，with play similar to the Grunfeld Defence．

5．．．\＆e6 is less sound．After 6 曹c2
 \(100 \mathrm{c} 30-011\) \＆e2 0bd7 120－0－0 b5 13 \＆bl wh8 14 f 4 White＇s position is the more promising（Golz－Zinn，East Germany 1963）．

\section*{6 Qbd2}

White still intends to fianchetto his bishop．The immediate 6 g3 is unfavourable in view of \(6 \ldots\) ．．．\(\times f 37\) exf3 e6（or 7．．．g6）with pressure on the isolated d－pawn．

6 De5 looks promising，but Pytla－ kowski－Smyslov（Helsinki Olympiad 1952）showed that Black can success－ fully solve his opening problems：6．．．

完e6 7 暑d3 Qbd7 8 Qxd7 \＆xd7 9 Qc3 （if 9 e4 e5 10 dxe5 Wa5＋ 11 ＠c3憎xe5；the ．．．e7－e5 counter is the leit－ motif of the variation）9．．．㟶b6（Black＇s plans include castling queenside） 10 © d 2 （preparing Qa4，since it is dangerous to take the b2 pawn in view of 11 Ebl ；if 10 e4 Black again replies
 with a dangerous initiative； 10 e 3 is a possibility，with the idea of completing his kingside development as quickly as possible） \(10 \ldots\) e5 11 dxe 5 Qg4．


12 閯g3？（holding on to the pawn； 12 e3 Qxe5 13 was comparatively best，when Black＇s position is merely somewhat more active） \(12 \ldots 0-0-0 \quad 13\) h3？（another plausible move）13．．．\＆e6！ 14 Edl（if 14 hxg 4 Exd2！ 15 © xd 2
 Black obtained a very strong attack．

After 6 ©c3 0 bd7（6．．．\＆xf3 7 gxf3 g6！？ 8 e4 \＆g7，Krasenkov－Garcia Palermo，Andorra 1991） 7 e4＠xf3 8 gxf3 e5 9 皿e3 exd4（better 9．．．员d6） 10
 13 当e2 0－0 14 कbl 是f4 15 曹c2 mad8 16 \＆xd7！Oxd7 17 Ëhgl g6 18 h4 White gained a promising position in Andersson－Christiansen（London 1982）． Having the two bishops，the opening of the centre is to his advantage．

6 ．．．Qbd7
After 6．．．g6 7 g 3 ㅇg78 \(8 \mathrm{~g} 20-09\) \(0-0\) Da6 10 Qe5（10 b3？！c5 gave Black an excellent position in Benko－ Olafsson，Yugoslav Candidates 1959） 10．．．今e6 11 自a4 White stands better．

We should also mention that Black can offer to exchange queens－6．．． W d 5

\[
7 \mathrm{~g} 3 \quad \text { e6 }
\]

After 7．．．稪a5 8 昷g2 e5 \(90-0\) Black has：
（a） \(9 \ldots\) ．．．d6 10 唒b3！（with the threats of 11 Wb7 and 11 Qc4）10．．．e4 11
 advantage to White（Taimanov－Novo－ pashin，30th USSR Ch．，Yerevan 1962）；
（b）9．．．e4！（recommended by Boles－ lavsky and Suetin） 10 Qe5（10 Qb3

 when the bishop sacrifice 15 exh7 g6 16 \＆xg6 is problematic，and after other moves Black has an equal position．
 White to gain an advantage in the centre，whereas now Black is ready to meet d2－d4 with ．．．e7－e5．
\(90-00-010\) 単c2 臽c7 11 b3 e5 12 \＆b2 \(\Xi \mathrm{e} 8\) with a satisfactory position for Black（Portisch－Polugayevsky， Budapest 1963）．

9 嶿b3 Qb6 10 0－0 0－0 11 Qc4
 equal chances（Andrianov－Kharitonov， Jurmala 1983）．
\[
\begin{aligned}
& 13.13 \text { (1 d4 d5 } 2 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 43 \text { Qf3 Qf6 }
\end{aligned}
\]
\[
5 \text {... g6 }
\]

Another set－up with the development of the bishop at g 7 ，which also resembles the Grünfeld Defence．


\section*{6 Dc3}

In Flohr－Stoltz（Warsaw Olympiad 1935）White fianchettoed his bishop without first determining the position of his queen＇s knight： 6 g3 8 g 77 ©g2
 and it is unfavourable for White to exchange queens，opening the a－file for the opponent）9．．．\(勹\) bd7 \(10 \triangleq \mathrm{D} 3\) Qe4？！ （better \(10 \ldots 0-0\) and if \(110-0 \mathrm{c5}\) ，or 11 Qh4 \＆e6 followed by ．．．Qb6 and ．．．Sc4）11 0－0 Qb6 12 Wrb3 0－0 13 Edl with the better prospects for White．

In Gheorghiu－Bastian（Baden－Baden 1981） 6 Qbd2 獣d5 7 e3 \＆g7 8 b3 0－0 9 定b2 \＆f5 10 日゙cl 0bd7 11 隚b4！ （now Black is forced to sacrifice a pawn）11．．．b5 12 wxe7 日fc8（threaten－

图f8 17 曹d2 a4 18 是d1 c5 \(190-0 \mathrm{axb} 3\) \(20 \mathrm{axb} 3 \Xi \mathrm{a} 21\) §el c4 22 f 3 是a3 led to a sharp，still unclear position．
\[
6
\]
\＆g7
6．．．b5 needs testing．
7 g3
7 e4 leads to the Boleslavsky Variation of the Grünfeld Defence（1 d4 Qf6 2 c 4 g 63 Qc3 d5 4 Qf3 \＆g75

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline 7 & & Se6 \\
\hline 8 & Wd3 & Qa6 \\
\hline 9 & \＆g2 & ¢f5 \\
\hline 10 & 垩d & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Not 10 e4？in view of \(10 \ldots 9 \mathrm{c} 5\) ， winning a pawn．
\[
10
\]

Qe4
\(10 . .0 \mathrm{~b} 4\) is parried by \(110-0\) ，when after 11．．． 2 c 2 ？！ 12 e4！White gains two minor pieces for a rook and two pawns：
 Oxfl 15 监xb7，with advantage．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
11 & \(0-0\) & \(0-0\) \\
12 & if4 & \(0 x c 3\)
\end{tabular}

12．．．c5 also comes into consideration．
13 bxc3 \＆e4
14 営d2
In Pachman－Szabo（Varna Olympiad 1962）after 14．．．c5 White exchanged the ＇Indian＇bishop： 15 \＆h6 cxd4 16 \＆xg7
 Qh4 \＆xg2 20 Qxg2，with the better position

14．．．Ee8 is quite good，preserving the g7 bishop and planning 15．．．＠xf3 followed by ．．．e7－e5 with exchanges．
13.2 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 嘗 \(\mathrm{a}+\)＋）
\begin{tabular}{lll}
4 & \(\ldots\) & Qc6 \\
5 & Qc3
\end{tabular}

White prepares to occupy the centre．
If 5 濐xc4 we can recommend \(5 \ldots\)乌e6，e．g． 6 斯a4 具d5 7 e3 e6 8 Qc3 Qb4 with satisfactory piece play for Black．

Other possibilities for White：
5 e3，and now：
（a） \(5 \ldots\) ．．．d7 6 \＆\(x c 4\) ，when \(6 \ldots\) ．．． 5 ？ fails to 7 Qxe5，since the queen cannot be taken on account of mate；
（b） \(5 . . .9 \mathrm{~d} 76\) 监xc4 e5！ 7 dxe5（7 d5？Qb6）7．．．Ddxe5 8 Qxe5 Qxe5 9

 with an equal game（Andersson－ Timman，Tilburg 1982）；
（c） \(5 \ldots \mathrm{e} 6\) ，when the seemingly active 6 Qe5 does not promise anything after

（c1） 8 婹xc4 e5 9 dxe5（9 d5 Qb6） \(9 . .0 \mathrm{dxe} 510\) 世e4（if 10 宸c2 Qb 4 ） 10．．．挡d7！ 11 全b5 是b4＋12 0c3 f5 13觜c2 峟d5！ 14 \＆xc6＋霊xc6 with the better position for Black（Kotov－Flohr， 19th USSR Ch．，Moscow 1951）；
（c2） 8 \＆xc4 Qb6 9 We2 \(0 \times 410\)当xc4 is the lesser evil for White；
（d） \(5 . .0 \mathrm{~d} 56\) 㥪xc4 9 b 67 wc g 68 \＆b5 \＆d79 9 d 2 \＆g710 © 3 0－0 with an equal position（Radojevic－Kuprei－ chik，Sombor 1970）．

5 g 3 ，and now：

（a）5．．．Qd5 6 嶿xc4 g6 7 e4？！（7 Qc3 is correct）7．．．⿹b6 8 wd3 \＆g4 9 Qbd2 ＠g7 10 d 5 Qb8 11 h 3 是c8 12 ＠c4 \(0-013\) Qxb6 axb6 14 §g2 e6 1500
 black bishops are very strong） 18 g 4 Ea4！with a clear advantage（Seoev－ Kalashian，Moscow 1963）；
（b） \(5 \ldots\) \＆e6，when after 6 \＆g2 \({ }^{(1 / \mathrm{d}} \mathrm{d} 77\) Qc3（Tukmakov－Kozlov，USSR 1984） 7．．． 9 d 5 is strong；
 8 \＆g5 f6 9 \＆e3 Qb4 10 毘d1？！（White
should have played 10 b3） \(10 \ldots\) exd4 11 ＠xd4 c5 and Black obtained an excellent game（Verduga－Yakovich， Bayamo 1990）；
（d） \(5 \ldots . \mathrm{g} 66\) 昷g2 9 d 7 is also worth considering．

5
Qd5
Petrosian＇s manoeuvre，which，as we have seen，is also employed after 5 e3 or 5 g 3 ．

To prevent e2－e4，Black can play 5．．．ig4：


（a1）7．．．\＆e6 8 数b5 a6！ 9 Qxc6 axb5 10 Qxd8 家xd8 11 Qxb5 Exa2 12 Exa2＠xa2（Alekhine－Böök，Warsaw Olympiad 1935），and White＇s attempt to switch his king＇s rook to the queenside did not achieve anything： 13 Oc3 \＆c4 14 e4 \＆xf1 15 Exfl e6 16

 （id8，then 22．．．
（a2）7．．．e6 8 §g5 皿7 9 \＆xf6（9 E゙d1！？－Taimanov）9．．．＠xf6 10 ＠xd7畄xd7 11 e3＠e7 12 a3 0－0 13 \＆e2
 Wxc5，and White did not achieve anything from the opening（Petrosian－ Korchnoi，Curacao Candidates 1962）；
（b） 6 e3 §xf3 7 gxf3 Qd7 8 簤xc4


Sd2 皿e7 with a complicated battle and equal chances（Petrosian－Golz，Copen－ hagen 1960）．

In recent years the modest 5．．．e6 has drawn attention：
挐b3 c5，and now：

（al） 8 e 3 cxd4 9 exd4 \＆e7 10 \＆g5 Oc6 11 घّd1 0－0 12 是d3 b6 13 a3 \＆\({ }^{2} 7\) 14 柾c2 g 6 ．In this typical isolated d－ pawn position Black has harmoniously deployed his forces：chances are equal （Illescas Cordoba－Wolff，Biel 1993）；
（a2） 8 dxc5 \＆ exc 59 a3 Qc6（not

 Da5 11 wiv2（avoiding a little trap： 11
 Qxal and Black wins） \(11 \ldots\) 靼b6 12 e3是e7（another trap：Black loses after
 we2 with the threat of 0 d 2 and b2－b4） 13 b 4 包 614 乌a4 挡d8 15 \＆g2 显d7 160－0（if 16 © 5 Black gains counter－
 18 酉b2（Stohl－Meister，Slovensko 1994），and now 18．．．b5 19 Qc5（or 19 Qc3 wb6）19．．．显xc5 20 bxc5 Qa5 21断 b 4 c 4 would have given roughly equal chances（Stohl）；
（b） 6 a3 is a good reply： \(6 \ldots\) ．．．a 7

＊xf6 10 g 3 ） \(9 \ldots .0-0 \quad 10\) Edl．White＇s position is preferable（Sosonko－Piket， Holland 1995）．

\section*{6 e4}

Klaman－Taimanov（Leningrad 1963） went 6 \＆g5 Qxc3 7 bxc3 复d5！ （threatening 8．．．b5）．White sacrificed a pawn－ 8 e4 监xe4＋ 9 是e3，but after
 \(0-013\) 0－0 e5 14 Efdl exd4 15 cxd4 Qb4 16 De5 \＆e6 Black retained a material advantage．

Interesting complications can arise after 6 単xc4：

（a） \(6 .\). ee6 7 e4，and now：
（al） \(7 \ldots . \mathrm{db} 4\) ？！ \(8 \mathrm{~d} 5 Q \mathrm{c} 2+9\) 家d1 Oxal 10 \＆ d 2 with an extremely sharp position，but probably favourable for White：the knight at al will fall，and he can count on gaining two minor pieces for a rook（Hort－Rivas，Montilla 1978）；


 for both sides；
（b） \(6 \ldots . \mathrm{Ddb}^{7} 7\) 噃3，when：
是e6 10 曹a4＋，and Andersson－Korch－ noi（Johannesburg 1981）ended in a draw by repetition：10．．．id7 11 燔b3 \＆e6 12 䕎a4＋；
（b2） \(7 \ldots\) ．．e5 is a good reply：
（b21） 8 a3？§e6 9 熷dl exd4 10 Qb5 a6 11 Qbxd4 狂d4 12 Qxd4嶒 xd 4 with a material advantage for Black（Botterill－Miles，England 1979）；
（b22） 8 dxe 5 （if 8 d 5 ©d4） \(8 \ldots\) ．．．e6 （or 8．．．
 initiative for the pawn（Lilley－Sadler， Crewe 1992）；
（c） \(6 \ldots . \mathrm{b} 67\) 峟d3 e5！？ 8 〇xe5（8
 Qf3 㟶d6 with equal chances （Conquest－Dlugy，New York 1984）．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
6 & 曾d1 & Qb6 \\
8 & d5 &
\end{tabular}

If 8 \＆e3 Black achieves an excellent game by 8．．．Sxf3 9 gxf3 e6 10 \＆e2曾h4！ \(110-00000\) ！（Cruz－Sanguinetti， Buenos Aires 1963）．


Skembris－Vlahos（Athens 1984） went 9 ＠e2 §xf3 \(10 \mathrm{gxf3}\) e6！（10．．．c6 \(11 \mathrm{f4}\) Qg6 \(12 \mathrm{f5}\) Qe5 13 \＆f4 favours
 cxd3 13 dxe6） 12 dxe6 fxe6（if 12．．．獣xdl＋13 \(13 x d l\) fxe6 White gains the better chances by 14 昷h5） 13 （e3

double－edged position．
9 免d4 \(0 x f 3+10\) gxf3 是xf3 11 玉g1 （Rajkovic）is an interesting sacrifice：
 g6 14 dxe6 fxe6 15 宸xe6＋气e7？（if 15．．． \(\begin{aligned} & \text { We7 } \\ & 16 \\ & \text { exc4 }\end{aligned}\) with a favourable
 Ef7 18 wh8＋and Black came under a very strong attack（Crouch－Sadler， Hastings 1992）；
 e5 and ．．．eh5．


Threatening \(11 \triangleq \mathrm{~b} 5\) ．After 10 \＆e3 e6 Black has a good position（Petrosian－ Botvinnik，match，Moscow 1963）．
```

10
11 dxe6

```

It is unfavourable for White to regain the pawn by 11 \＆xc4 0xc4 12 爱a4＋
 gxf3 h5！
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline 11 & & Qxe6 \\
\hline 12 & Wxd8＋ & Exd8 \\
\hline 13 & 国x \({ }^{\text {c }}\) & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


13．．．エd7 14 是xb6 axb6 15 Og5 \＃d4？！（better \(15 \ldots\) De5，although even then after \(16 \mathrm{f4}\) White＇s position is pre－ ferable） \(16 \Xi \mathrm{dl}\) Exdl +17 Exdl and

Black experienced certain difficulties due to the weakness of his queenside pawns（Rajkovic－Barle，Yugoslavia 1983）．

13．．．äc8 14 \＆g3 a6（14．．．定c5！？－ Alburt） 15 Qd4 \＆c5 16 0－0－0 0－0 17 £e2 \＆d7 18 ©f5！and White gained the advantage（Alburt－Dlugy，USA 1974）．

\section*{13.3 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 乌f3 Qf6 4 畨 \(\mathrm{a} 4+\) ）}

4
Qbd7
This natural move was for a long time considered perfectly satisfactory， but after an analysis by the Hungarian master Negyessy in the late 1950s and the game Taimanov－Polugayevsky（27th USSR Ch．）it was pronounced unsatis－ factory．However，as the reader will see， such an evaluation is too severe．


\section*{5 Oc3}

White intends to occupy the centre． The c4 pawn will not＇run away＇，and the queen，as soon becomes clear，is needed at a4．

If 5 䒼xc4：
（a） 5 ．．．e6 6 g 3 （after 6 桉c2 c5 7 e3是e780c30－0 the game is equal），and
also in other branches when White fianchettos his bishop，play usually transposes into variations of the Catalan Opening；
（b） \(5 . . . Q b 66\) 細c2 \＆g4 7 Qc3 c6 8
 a4 e5 12 a5 and for the sacrificed pawn White gained a significant lead in development（Chistyakov－Kogan，Mos－ cow 1959）．

After 5 e3 e6 6 \＆xc4 \＆d6 70－0 0－0 followed by ．．．e6－e5 chances are equal． 5 ．．．e6
A way for Black to avoid the unpleasant main line is 5．．．c6 6 㥩xc4 Qb6 7 䡒d3 g6 8 e4 \＆g7，as in a variation of the Grünfeld Defence．

After 5．．．a6 6 e4：
（a）it used to be though that Black could not play 6 ．．．b5 on account of 7 Qxb5 Qxe4（7．．．Db6？ 8 Qd6 mate） 8 §xc4，but in Arkell－Speelman（Dublin 1993）Black replied 7．．．eb7．After 8 Qc3 ©xe4 9 昷xc4 e6 10 De5 §d6 11 Qxe4 §xe4 12 0－0 c6 13 Eel（if 13
 15 桎xd8＋\(\Xi x d 8\) the game ended in a draw，although White could have tried for more with 16 Qxc4 \＆d5 17 Qxd6＋ Exd6 18 \＆d2！，despite the opposite－ colour bishops（Flear）；
（b）the position after \(6 \ldots\) ．．． 67 \＆xc4 is considered in the main line on p． 211 ．

\section*{6 e4}

Or 6 Sg h 67 \＆h4（White can also exchange 7 ＠xf6 \({ }^{\boldsymbol{w}} \mathrm{xf} 6\) and then play 8 e4）7．．．民e7 8 䒼xc4（preparing e2－e4； the immediate 8 e4 does not work on account of \(8 . .\). Qxe4 while 8 e3 \(0-09\) \＆xc4 c5 followed by ．．． 2 b 6 leads to a roughly equal position）8．．．0－0 9 \＃dl a6，and now：
（a） 10 a4 b5 11 axb5 axb5 with strong counterplay for Black（both 12黄xb5 Eb8 and 12 Qxb5 \＆a6 13 e3 c6

14 Wex White）；

 （Rozenfeld－Kholmov，USSR 1961）15．．． We6 with a good position for Black；
（c） 10 e 4 ，with somewhat the better prospects for White．

Now Black can reply：
6．．．c5（13．31）
6．．．＠e7（13．32）－p． 211
6．．．a6（13．33）－p． 211
The cautious 6 ．．．c6 concedes White the centre and the freer game after 7兠xc4．

\subsection*{13.31 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 ゆf6} 4 薯a4＋Qbd75 ©c3 e6 6 e4）
\[
\begin{array}{llll}
6 & \ldots & c 5 \\
7 & \mathrm{~d} 5 &
\end{array}
\]

Or 7 \＆xc4（7 \＆f4 a6！）7．．．cxd4 8 Qxd4（8 e5！？－Taimanov）8．．．定c5 9 Qb3（after 9 \＆e3 0－0 Black＇s position is quite satisfactory，Levenfish－Suetin， Minsk 1953）9．．．\＆d6 10 ＠e2 0－0 11 §e3 wive 12 0－0 De5 13 h 3 §d7 14
 Qd4！and things turned out well for Black（Eslon－Tal，Seville 1992）．
\begin{tabular}{llll}
7 & \(\ldots\) & exd5 \\
8 & e5
\end{tabular}

After 8 exd5，compared with the var－ iation 3 乌f3 c5 4 d 5 Qf6 5 Qc3 e6 6 e 4 exd5 7 exd5，the position of the queen at a4 causes White some problems in view of ．．．a7－a6，．．．0－0 and ．．．b7－b5．

Now 8．．． 0 g 49 ©xd5 gives White a clear advantage．We consider：

8．．．b5（13．311）
8．．．d4（13．312）－p． 209
13.311 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 出a4＋Qbd75 5 c 3 e6 6 e4 c5 7 d5 exd5 8 e5）
\[
8 \text {... b5 }
\]

A counter－sacrifice with the aim of driving the queen from its active posi－ tion and bringing the rook into play．

9 Wxb5
Not 9 Oxb5？Qe4 10 \＆f4 定e7，and
 \＆f6 14 E゙bl g5！ 15 §c7 gxf4 16 Qxa8 Wxa8 with advantage to Black（Raud－ P．Schmidt，corr．1936／7）．
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline 9 & \\
\hline 10 & Wa4 \\
\hline 11 & exf6 \\
\hline 12 & 定xc4 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

We must first demonstrate that 12．．．cxb2 13 ＠xf7＋©xf7 loses：

（a） 14 wc4＋家e8 \(15 \mathrm{f7}+\mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{g}} 16\)显xb2（160－0 is worth trying） \(16 \ldots\)曾 \(55+\) ！（as shown by Meyer，16．．．玉xb2 \(170-0-0\) ！favours White） 17 是c3 曾a6 and Black parries the threats；
（b） \(14 \varrho g 5+\)（suggested by the Dutch player de Haas），when a dismal fate awaits the black king，wherever it moves：14．．．\({ }^{\text {side }} \mathrm{e}\)（Black also loses after
 17 龟e4＋，or 14．．．名g6 15 觜e4＋with inevitable mate） \(15 \mathrm{f7}+\) de7 16 监e4＋
解d7 18 \＆xb2 with the threat of 19 ad1＋or \(190-0+\) and a winning attack．

\section*{13 単d1！}

Despite the favourable evaluation of this move，in Miles－Karpov（Biel 1990） White preferred the old continuation 13炭c2．After 13．．．0xf6 14 b3 道e6 15 0－0 是xc4 16 bxc4 是e7 17 De5 （Ftacnik considers that 17 Wxa gives White slightly the better chances） \(17 . .\). \(0-0\) ！ 18 挡xc3（winning the exchange by 18 Qc6 \(\quad\) wc7 19 包xb4 cxb4 is unclear－Black also picks up the c4
 19．．．』b6 \(20 \Xi \mathrm{E}\) l the players agreed a draw．

\section*{13 ．．．gxf6}

In S．Marshall－Schardtner（corr． 1958），which as far as we know is where 12 Widl first occurred，Black took the pawn with the queen，but the game did not last long：13．．．wxf 14

 Exbl＋ 20 De1 De5（if 20．．．fxg5 21 モe6） 21 宣 \(b 5+\) 皃f8 22 モadl Exdl 23䊌xd1 fxg5 24 Qf3 Black resigns．

Other possibilities：
13．．．0xf6（13．．．』xc4？ 14 㟶 \(\mathrm{e} 2+\) ） 14
 with an extra pawn for White．

13．．．cxb2 allows a strong attack： 14
 \(170-0\) ！（threatening 18 el + and mate）．

After 13．．．gxf6 it appears that Black has nothing to fear．．．


He threatens 14．．．Exc4（15 㨘e2＋清 7 ），and the energetic \(140-0\) does not work in view of 14．．．cxb2 15 \＆\(x\) b2 Exb2，and if 16 炭d5 ©e5！

\section*{14 b3！}

Negyessy＇s move．White defends his bishop，shuts the rook out of the game， and＇surrounds＇the c3 pawn．

After 14．．．皆e7＋ 15 是e3 Qe5 16 Qxe5 fxe5 17 憎d3 the position of Black＇s king gives cause for alarm．

Therefore he should think about exchanging queens \(-14 . .0\) e5，but 15
 （ 17 \＆xf7 can also be considered）17．．．国e7 18 0－0－0＋e8（18．．．莤d7 19
 ding，in which after 20 Ehel or 20 Ed5 White has the advantage（Negyessy）．
13.312 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3
Qf6 4 営a4＋Qbd7 5 Qc3 e6 6 e4
c5 7 d 5 exd5 8 e 5 ）

This move allows White to begin a very strong attack．
\begin{tabular}{rlrl}
9 & exf6 & dxc3 \\
10 & \＆xc4 &
\end{tabular}


10 ．．． wiv6
The same position can be reached via the move order 9 是xc4 dxc3 10 exf6憎xf6．If instead \(10 \triangleq g 5\) ，then：
 De6＋，winning the queen（Sajtar－Sliwa， Warsaw 1947）；
（b） \(10 \ldots . \mathrm{g} 4\) ，and White still has to justify his piece sacrifice．Therefore 9 exf6 is sounder and better．

In the diagram position Black can prevent \(\& g 5\) by 10．．．h6，but then，using the tempo granted，White attacks with 11 0－0 㟶xf6 12 Eel＋（Butnoris－ Giorgadze，Volgograd 1963）．

Things are also difficult for Black after 10．．．gxf6 \(110-0\) ：
（a） \(11 \ldots\) ． g 7 （if \(11 \ldots\) 昷e7 very strong is 12 \＆h6） 12 Eel＋\＆ 13 皿f4！De5 14 Qxe5 fxe5 15 是xe5 是xe5 16 Exe5 cxb2 17 Eael（Pachman－Kuijpers，Tel Aviv Olympiad 1964），and White gained an overwhelming advantage；
（b） \(11 \ldots \mathrm{cxb} 212\) \＆xb2 \＆e7 13 घad 1 ！


（Knezevic－Messing，Yugoslavia 1976）， and Black noticed to his horror that White was threatening not only 19 Exe7，but also \(19 \Xi \mathrm{E} 3\) ，trapping the queen．

\section*{11 Sg5！単c6}
 （13 \＆e6！is equally strong） 13 ．．．\＆e7 14 \＆e6 Black did not last long in Lundin－ Ed．Lasker（Venice 1951）．

\[
120-0-0!
\]

A spectacular queen sacrifice，which occurred in a simultaneous game by the Austrian master H．Muller in 1934：


 and White emerged a piece up．

Black was caught in this clearly un－ favourable variation in Taimanov－Polu－ gayevsky（27th USSR Ch．，Leningrad 1960）：12．．．cxb2＋ 13 （ xb 2 （ 13 （ b 1 we4＋14 xb2 is also good） \(13 \ldots\) 宜e7 （Black held out only slightly longer after 13．．．f6 in Krasenkov－A．Mikhal－ chishin，Tallinn 1988） 14 Ehel f6 15





It can be added that 12 ．．．\({ }^{\text {e }} \mathbf{e} 7\) would not have saved Black in view of 13憎xc6！bxc6 14 \＆xe7 cxb2＋（or 14．．．


 \＆d8 17 Qg5） 17 Qe5！etc．
13.32 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 8 f 6


6
\＆e7
The point of this move is to play ．．．c7－c5 after castling and thereby avoid the problems of the previous variation． If now 7 d5 exd5 8 e5，then \(8 \ldots\) ．．． 94
 axb6，when Sajtar－R．Byrne（Helsinki Olympiad 1952）continued 12 誛c2 g6
 Qxcl＋ 16 区axcl 0－0 17 Ehdl wive with a satisfactory position for Black．

However，6．．．\＆e7 is a passive move that allows White to consolidate his advantage in the centre．


7 8xc4 0－0 8 岲c2 c5 9 e5（or 9 dxc5 \(0 x \mathrm{xc} 5100-0 \mathrm{a} 611 \mathrm{e} 5\) ）9．．． \(\mathrm{Dd}^{\mathrm{d} 5}\)（if 9 ．．． 2 e8 White gains an advantage by 10 dxc5，e．g．10．．．晛c7 11 \＆f4 \＆xc5 12 \(0-0\) ，Taimanov－Westerinen，Havana

1967） 10 \＆xd5 exd5 11 Qxd5 cxd4 12営e4！（after this Black has difficulties over the defence of his d 4 pawn） 12．．．Ee8 \(130-0\) ，and now：
（a）13．．．\＆c5 14 b4 \＆b6 15 Qg5！f5 16 wh4 h6 17 Df6＋with a decisive attack（Taimanov－Volovich，Yalta 1962）；
（b）13．．\＆d6 when the the e5 pawn appears to be in danger，but in Bagirov－ Amirkhanov（Baku 1963）after 14 Qg5 Qf8 White built up an irresistible attack with the tactical blow 15 0xf7！\(\$ x 7\)


 mate．

> \begin{tabular}{|l} \(13.33(1 \mathrm{~d} 4 \mathrm{~d} 52 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 43\) \\ 4 f 3 \\ \(4 \mathrm{w} 4+\) Qbd7 5 \\ \hline \end{tabular}

6 ．．．a6
This move also leads to an advantage for White，with his strong centre．

\section*{7 §xc4}

7 \＆f4 is also good，and if 7．．．\＃b8 8 \＆xc4．


7．．．c5（7．．．b5？ 8 Qxb5 Qb6？ 9

 Qxc5 嘗xc5 14 皿e3．For the pawn

White has a lead in development，and
 Black has difficulty in unravelling his queenside（Taimanov－Kots，30th USSR Ch．，Yerevan 1962）．

7．．．\({ }^{\text {mb }} \mathrm{b} 8\) 紧c2 b5，and now：
（a） 9 \＆ d 3 \＆ b 7 （ \(9 \ldots \mathrm{c} 510\) \＆f4 【゙b6） \(100-0 \mathrm{c} 511 \mathrm{~d} 5 \mathrm{c} 4\)（after 11．．．e5 12 a 4 b4 13 Ddl White has the advantage） 12 \＆e2 exd5（here too \(12 \ldots\) ．．e5 is strongly met by 13 a4） 13 exd5，when：
（al）it is dangerous to accept the pawn sacrifice：13．．． Dxd5 \(^{14}\) Qxd5 ＠xd5 15 घd1 Qf6（15．．．ゆb6 16 a 4 ！or 15．．．\＆e6 16 Qg5） 16 \＆g5 囚e7 17憎f5！
（a2）13．．．\＆d6（13．．．皿b4 requires testing） \(14 \mathrm{a} 4!0-0\)（ \(14 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 4\) is strongly met by 15 §e4，so Black prefers to part with his b－pawn） 15 axb5 axb5 16 Qxb5 with advantage to White （Lutikov－Gurgenidze，Moscow 1963）；
（b） 9 \＆b3 c5 10 \＆ f 4 c 411 是 xc 4 bxc4 12 \＆xb8 Qxb8 13 d5 Qbd7！（not 13．．．exd5？ \(140-0-0\) ）with approximate material equality and chances for both sides；
（c） 9 §e2 \＆b7，when：
（cl） 10 e5 Qd5 \(110-0\) c5 with an equal game；
（c2） \(100-0\) b4 11 e5 bxc3 12 exf6 cxb2 13 fxg 7 （13 \＆ \(\mathrm{xb} 2 \mathrm{gxf6}\) ！White＇s compensation for the pawn is insuf－ ficient）13．．．bxal＝Q！ 14 gxh8＝曹（or

 cations favour Black： 15 \＆g5 f6！ 16挡xh7 fxg5 17 Wg6＋\＄e7，and if 18 Qxg5 ©xd4！（analysis by Ivanchuk）．
（c）7．．．c6 8 璌c2（as in the previous variation， 8 \＆d3 can be considered）
 Qg4 12 \＆b3 with the the better chances for White（Knezevic－Romanishin，Kiev 1978）．

\section*{13.4 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 \(勹 \mathrm{f} 6\) 4 学 \(\mathrm{a} 4+\) ）}

4

\section*{歯d7}

The exchange of queens simplifies the position，but leaves White with a slight positional advantage．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
5 & \text { 䒼xc4 } & \text { ex } \\
6 & \text { Qa3 }
\end{array}
\]

6 Qbd2 定e6（6．．．畄xc4 7 Qxc4 leads to the main line）is also played，inviting the opponent to exchange queens：


 Og5！？）14．．．\({ }^{6}\) b5（the queen is out of play，and Black aims to ease his defence by exchanging it） 15 㥩xb5 \(0 \times x 516 \mathrm{a} 4\)
 ©c7 20 Qc4 Qfd5 21 ©a3．White has two bishops and an active position （Smyslov－Alexander，Hastings 1962／3）；
（b） 7 頖xc6＋©xc6 8 a3 0－0－0 9 e3 \＆ d 5 with an equal position（Fedoro－ wicz－Shirazi，USA 1984）．

Other continuations：
 9 Qba3 是f5 10 f3 \＆d3 maintaining equality（Krasnov－Gaspariants，Mos－ cow 1961）．

6 e3 㥪xc4 7 \＆xc4 e6 8 Qc3 a6 and then ．．．c7－c5 with an equal game．
\[
6 \text {... 情xc4 }
\]

But now if 6．．．是e6 7 Wat d3 © White can reply 8 \＆ d 2 ！

7 ©xc4 e6
\(7 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 6\) or \(7 . . \mathrm{g} 6\) can also be tried．
8 a3
White prevents further simplification （after 8．．．＠b4＋），and threatens to cramp the opponent by b2－b4．

8 g 3 leads to a position from the Catalan Opening．

The position after 8 a3 was reached in Alekhine－Fine（Kemeri 1937）．


With the poor move 8．．．c5 Black weakened the d6 square and allowed his opponent to obtain an excellent position： 9 是f4 Qc6（in Alekhine＇s opinion，9．．．⿹bd7 10 0d6＋显xd6 11是xd6 ©e4 12 定c7 b6 and ．．．eb7 was slightly better，although even then the advantage remains with White） 10 dxc 5是xc5 11 b 4 §e7 12 b 5 ！Qb8 13 Qd6＋囚xd6 14 是xd6 乌e4 15 \＆c7！Qd7 16 Qd4．

In his comments to the game Alekhine recommended 8．．．a5，preven－ ting b2－b4．If 9 \＆ f 4 b 5 and then ．．．ed6． Even so，the weakening of Black＇s queenside leaves White with the better chances．

13．5（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 嶒 \(\mathrm{a} 4+\) ）

4 ．．．＠d7
This move is better than its reputation．

\section*{5 曹xc4 e6}

If Black proceeds as in the Catalan

Opening with 5．．．\＆c6 6 Qc3 Qbd7， then 7 igg5 e6（McCambridge－Tarjan， San Jose 1983） 8 e4！\＆e7 9 ＠d3 with the better position for White．

6 Qc3
6 g 3 leads to the Catalan Opening．
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline 6 & & 06 \\
\hline 7 & e4 & c5 \\
\hline 8 & ¢ 2 & cxd4 \\
\hline 9 & Qxd4 & －\({ }^{\text {c }}\) \\
\hline 10 & 棠d3 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


Tartakower－Böők（Kemeri 1937） continued 10．．．Db4 11 世＂tbl e5 12 Qf3 \＆c5 \(130-0\) Oc6 14 \＆g5 and White gained the advantage．

Nowadays 4．．．＠d7 is hardly ever played．The fault for this may lie with the evaluation of the Tartakower－Böbk game．In fact，things are by no means so bad for Black．10．．．\(\triangle \mathrm{b} 4\) ，as played by Böök，is correct，but 11 ．．．e5 cannot be recommended．11．．．＠c6 or 11．．．\＆e7 should be played，after which White can hardly count on an advantage．
\(10 \ldots .05\) also comes into consider－ ation，and if 11 曾e3 \(\triangleq \mathrm{a} 4\)（12 e5 0 xc 3 ）．

\section*{14
}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
1 & d 4 & d 5 \\
2 & \(\mathrm{c4}\) & \(\mathrm{dxc4}\) \\
3 & Qf3 & \(0 \mathrm{f6}\) \\
4 & 0 c 3 &
\end{tabular}


A popular variation．White does not waste time on e2－e3，but intends im－ mediately to advance his pawn to e4． However，the position of the knight at c 3 hinders the regaining of the gambit pawn，although experience shows that White gains an appreciable advantage in the centre along the lines of the Tolush－Geller Gambit in the Slav Defence（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 c 63 Qf3 Qf6 4 Dc3 dxc4 5 e4）．Note that，if he wishes， Black can immediately transpose into the Slav by \(4 . . . c 6\)（the variation 1 d 4 d 5 2 c 4 c 63 Qf3 Qf6 4 Qc3 dxc4），while 4．．．⿹c6 leads to positions from the Chigorin Defence（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 Dc6 3 Qc3 dxc4 4 Qf3 Qf6，or 3 Qf3 Qf6 4 Dc3 dxc4）．

Black＇s main alternatives are：
4．．．e6（14．1）－p． 215
4．．．a6（14．2）－p． 217
Other continuations：

4．．．c5 5 e4（5 d5 e6 6 e4 exd5 7 e5 leads to the variation on p．187）5．．．cxd4 6 㟺xd4 需xd4 7 0xd4．This simplify－ ing continuation occurs in a number of branches．Here Black＇s e－pawn is on its initial square，and there can follow 7．．．e5 8 乌db5 家d8（8．．．乌a6 9 是xc4） 9 \＆e3 \＆e6，when he gives up the a7 pawn but keeps the one at c4：

（a） 10 \＆xa7 Qbd7 11 ＠e3 \＆b4！ 12 f3 a5 \(130-0-0\) e7 with chances for both sides（Pein－Zs．Polgar，New York 1986）；
（b） 10 Qxa7 Qbd7 11 f 3 昷b4 12 Qab5 Еa5 13 㲘2 with roughly equal chances（Winants－ Karolyi，Brussels 1986）；
（c） \(100000+\) Qbd7 11 是xa7，when if 11．．．玉xa7 12 Qxa7 0 g 413 Qd5！ ＠xd5（or 13．．． \(0 x f 214\) \＆xc4 with the better chances） 14 Exd5 \＆c5 15 Qb5 Qxf2 16 \＆e2 Qxh1 17 ＠g4 Qf2 18 Exd7＋© 8 （O．Garcia－Valdes，Cuba
 21 Еxc5 Qxh2 22 玉xe5 with a favourable ending for White；
（d） 10 f 4 （White does not regain the pawn，but aims for rapid development）

10．．．exf4 11 \＆xf4 Qbd7 12 \＆e2 \＆c5 \(130-0-0\) with good compensation （Levitina－Zs．Polgar，Shanghai 1992.

4．．．0d5 5 e4（if 5 e3 Qb6 6 Qe5定e6） \(5 . . .2 \mathrm{~b} 6\) ：
（a） 6 Qe5 解6！ 7 Qxc6 bxc6 8 \＆e2 g6 9 0－0 \＆g7 10 皿e3 \(0-011 \mathrm{f4} 512\) e5 莤e6 13 Qa4 id5（Lalic－Djuric， Yugoslavia 1988） 14 wc2 followed by Qxb6 and \＆xc4 with an equal position： White restores material equality，but repairs the black pawns；
 7．．．c6 8 Uxc4 White＇s has a spatial advantage） 8 憎xc4，when White has a strong and mobile centre．

White＇s game is preferable after 4．．．g6 5 e4 ㅇg4 6 \＆e3 Qc6 7 是xc4
 Plovdiv 1976）．

White also has the better chances after 4．．．\(Q\) bd7 5 e4 Qb6：
（a） 6 a4 a5 7 包 5 c6（7．．．g6 or \(7 \ldots . . e 6\)
 able） \(80 x \mathrm{xc} 4 \mathrm{e} 9\) \＆d3，and in Najdorf－ Reshevsky（match，Buenos Aires 1953） after 9．．．e5？！（9．．．曾xd4？ 10 \＆e3） 10 dxe5 Og4 White gained a promising position by 11 Qd6＋！©xd6 12 exd6

（b） 6 De5 g67 \(7 \mathrm{xc} 4 \AA \mathrm{~g} 7\)（ \(7 . . .0 \mathrm{xc} 4\) 8 \＆xc4 \＆g79e5）8 De50－0 9 \＆e2c6 100－0 Qfd7 11 Qf3 512 §g5 气f6 （12．．．挡e8 \(13 \mathrm{~d} 5!\) ；12．．．f6 13 §e3） 13是xf6 莦xf6 14 Qxe5 Qxe5 15 dxe5 we5 16 f 4 with the better position for White（Farago－Donchev，Prague 1985）；
（c） 6 昷g5 c6 7 \＆e2 g6 8 a 4 a 59
 Eadl again with the better chances （Knaak－Szilagyi，Balasiha 1977）．

If 4．．．今f5 White can play：
（a） 5 De5！（as in the Slav Defence） 5．．．e6（5．．．c5 is strongly met by 6 e4！

 Qbd7？ 7 e4） 7 ⿹xc4 Qc6 8 e4 是g6 9 \＆f4 f6 10 皿e3 with the better position （Sosonko－Hort，Hamburg 1980）；
（b） 5 e 3 e 66 \＆xc4，and now：
（bl）6．．．c6 \(70-0\) Qbd7 8 we2 Qb6 （8．．．\＆e7 9 e4） 9 莤b3 囚e4 10 Qd2 Qxd2 11 气xd2 §g6 \(12 \mathrm{f4}\) \＆e7 13 e 4 ！岩d7 14 d 5 with advantage to White （Simic－Skembris，Vmjacka Banja 1982）；
（b2）6．．．a6 7 De5 包bd7（if 7．．．\＆e7？ 8 w f3！threatening 9 Qxf7） 8 Qxd7
 \(11 . . . c x d 412\) exf5 dxc3 13 fxe6 \({ }^{\boldsymbol{6}} \mathrm{xd} 1+\) 14 ©xd1 \(0-0-0+15\) ©c2 cxb2 16 ©xb2） 12 ＠e3 and White stands better （Kapetanovic－Drasko，Yugoslavia 1991）．

14．1（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6
4 Qc3）
4 ．．．e6


\section*{5 e4}

Other continuations：
5 wa4＋c6 6 Wivc4（note that this position can also arise in the Semi－Slav Defence after 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 c 63 Qf3 Qf6 4 Qc3 e6 5 学b3 dxc4 6 滥xc4） 6．．．b5 7 䒼d3（after 7 当b3 Qbd7 8 \＆g5 Black can take advantage of the queen＇s
position with 8 ．．．c5，since if 9 dxc 5
 lead in development），and now：
（a） \(7 \ldots .{ }^{2}\) bd7 8 a3 b4 9 axb 4 是xb4 10
 \＆xf1 14 xf1 De7！（to defend the kingside）and in Karpov－Lautier（Til－ burg 1996） 15 dl would have restric－ ted Black＇s counterplay（Karpov）；
（b）7．．．＠b7，when：
（b1） 8 a3 a6 9 e3 c5 10 dxc5 \({ }^{\text {exc5 }}\) 11 wxd8＋\({ }^{\mathbf{w}} \mathrm{xd8}\) ，and already Black stood slightly better in the endgame （Karpov－Kasparov，Las Palmas 1996）；
（b2） 8 g 3 a 69 回g2 c5 \(100-0 \mathrm{Dc} 6\) （10．．．\(\triangle b d 7!?\)－Seirawan） 11 Еd1 䒼b6 12 \＆e3 \＃d8 13 dxc5 \＆xc5 14 \＆xc5敩xc5 15 De4！with the better chances for White（Seirawan－Hubner，Skelleftea 1989）；
（b3） 8 e4 b4 9 Qa4 Qbd7 10 \＆g5
 0－0－0 14000 etb8 15 d 5 ！，and White stands better in this sharp position （Karpov－Gelfand，Linares 1993）；

5 凡g5 a6 6 a4（6 e3 b5 7 a4 c6 8
 is an interesting exchange sacrifice）， and now：
（a）6．．．0c6 7 e3 Qa5 8 Qe5 c5 9
 cxd4 11 exd4 with somewhat the better prospects for White（Eingorn－Gelfand， Tallinn 1989）；
 exd4 ©c6 10 0－0 0－0 11 日cl 是e7 12 \(\pm \mathrm{el}\) reaching a position from the Class－ ical Variation with an extra move（ \({ }^{[ } \mathrm{c} 1\) ） for White（Kasparov－Nogueiras，Belfort 1988）．
\[
5 \quad \ldots \quad \text { \&b4 }
\]

Or 5 ．．．c5 6 風xc4（for \(6 \mathrm{~d} 5 \mathrm{cf} . \mathrm{p} .186\) ） \(6 . . . c x d 4\) ，and now：
（a） 7 Wivx4 \(\mathbf{W} \mathrm{wd} 48\) Qxd4 a6 9 e5 Qfd7 10 f 4 皿c5（if \(10 \ldots\) b5 Black has
to reckon with the sacrifice 11 exe6！？ fxe6 12 Qxe6，Rogers－Kallai，Kraljevo 1984） 11 Qb3 with the better position for White；
（b） 7 ©xd4，when：

（b1）7．．．\＆e7 is unfavourable in view of 8 e5 Qd5 9 䨐g4；
（b2）the old game Capablanca－Bog－ oljubow（where this position was reached by a slightly different move order）continued 7．．．今c5 8 \＆e3 Qbd7， and White sacrificed his bishop to launch an offensive： 9 \＆xe6！？fxe6 10 Qxe6 wa5？！（Black could have defen－ ded with 10．．． W b6 11 Qxc5 Qxc5 12 0－0 wiv6－Bogoljubow）110－0！是xe3

（b3）7．．．ゆbd7，when White has a pleasant choice： \(80-0(80 \mathrm{db5}\) is also good）8．．．sc5 9 Qb3 盛e7 10 単e2，and if \(10 \ldots\) e5？！ 11 \＆e3 and Ef fd（Hubner－ Radulov，Leningrad 1973）；
（b4）7．．．a6 8 e5 Qfd7 9 \＆f4 Qb6 10 \＆b3 again with advantage to White （Flohr－Najdorf，Margate 1937）．

\section*{6 e5}

6 \＆g5 leads to the Vienna Variation of the Queen＇s Gambit Declined（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 e 63 Qf3 Df6 4 昷g5 昷b4＋5 ©c3 dxc4 6 e4）．

6 \＆xc4！？is an interesting pawn sacrifice：


6．．． \(0 x 470-0\) 0xc3（it is extremely dangerous to accept the second pawn by 7．．．\＆xc3 8 bxc3 Qxc3 in view of 9䖪d3 ©d5 10 \＆a3） 8 bxc 3 ，and now：
（a） \(8 \ldots\) ．．． xc 3 is strongly met by 9 \＃bl c5（if 9．．．0－0？！ 10 Eb3 是a5 11 Qg5 with an attack） 10 \＆g5 f6 11 wb3；
 11 Ed 1 followed by d3 with compen－ sation for the pawn（Arbakov－Kishnev， Moscow 1989）．

Pr．Nikolic－Hübner（Skelleftea 1989） went 6 Ule2 c5 7 dxc5 Wa5 8 Qd2
这x \(3+12\) bxc3 e5 13 昷g5 定e6 14 ＠xf6 §xc4 15 §xe5 世xe5 16 ＠xc4 \(Q \mathrm{~d} 7\) with equal chances．


6 ．．．Qd5
6．．．De4 is less favourable： 7 䒼c2諧d5 8 ＠e2（or 8 \＆ d 2 \＆xc3 9 bxc 3 b 5 10 a4 c6 11 \＆ e l！，switching the bishop to the a3－f8 diagonal） 8 ．．．b5 \(90-0\) exc3 10 bxc3 \＆b7 11 a4 a6（Kharitonov－ Chekhov，Irkutsk 1983） 12 axb5 axb5 13 Exa8 \＆xa8 14 Qel！and f2－f3， driving the knight from e4，with a com－ plicated game，perhaps more promising for White．

\section*{7 \＆d2 Qb6！}

If 7．．．\＆xc3 8 bxc3 b5 9 Qg5 White has a serious initiative for the pawn．

After 7．．．Oxc3 8 bxc3 \＆e7 9 \＆xc4
 cxd4 13 cxd4 乌b6 14 \＆a5 White stands better（Pr．Nikolic－Panchenko， Sochi 1982）．

\section*{8 a3 §e7}

If now White regains his pawn by 9 \＆xc4（9 \＆e2！？is，of course，bolder）
 11 Uxc4 \＆c6 \(120-00-0\) followed by ．．．Qd7 and ．．．Qb6 Black has a good game（Av．Bykhovsky－Chekhov，Irkutsk 1983）．
14.2 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 صf3 صf6 48 c 3 ）
\[
4 \text {... a6 }
\]

White＇s main continuations are：
5 e4（14．21）－p． 218
5 a4（14．22）－p． 231
5 e3 b5 6 a 4 b4 does not promise him any advantage：
（a） 7 ©a2 e6 8 \＆xc4 \＆e7 \(90-000\) 10 当e2 金b711 玉d1 a5 12 \＆d2 Qbd7
 lent game for Black（Reshevsky－ Smyslov，USA v．USSR 1945）；
（b） 7 Qbl e6 8 exc4 \(2 b 790-0\) Qbd7 10 Qbd2 c5 with an equal position（Kuzmin－Miles，Reykjavik 1978）．

\subsection*{14.21 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 乌f3 Qf6 4 Qc3 a6）}
\[
5 \text { e4 }
\]


This move was made by Bogoljubow in his match with Alekhine（Germany 1934），who made the following com－ ment：＇But this is merely an adventure， which could be selected only by a player who had already but little to lose．＇

Modern players，of course，do not agree with such a categorical opinion．

After sacrificing a pawn，White has good chances of exploiting his spatial advantage in the centre and on the kingside．
\[
5 \text {... b5 }
\]

5．．．＠g4 6 ＠xc4 e6 7 \＆e3 Qc6 800 favours White（Veresov－Lutikov， Moscow 1960）．

5．．．c5 can be met by either 6 ©xc4 cxd4（6．．．b5 7 ＠d3 cxd4 8 Qxd4） 7当xd4 䒼xd48 8 xd4，or 6 d5 e6 7 a4！， and if \(7 \ldots\) ．．exd5 8 e5，reaching a favour－ able position for White（cf．p．232）．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
6 & \text { e5 } & \text { Dd5 } \\
7 & \text { a4 }
\end{array}
\]

Compare this position with that aris－ ing in the gambit variation of the Slav

Defence： 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 Qf3 Qf6 4毋c3 dxc4 5 e4 b5 6 e5 Qd5 7 a 4. Instead of ．．．c7－c6 Black has played ．．．a7－a6．The main difference is that White is threatening to regain his pawn immediately，which denies Black the move ．．．e7－e6 and forces him to ex－ change on c3．

70 g 5 is the main alternative：

（a）7．．．e6，and now：
（al） 8 Uf3 was played by Bogol－ jubow in the afore－mentioned game， which continued 8．．．\({ }^{\text {wid }} \mathrm{d} 79\) xd5 exd5 10 a 3 （ \(10 \ldots\) ．．． \(\mathrm{e} 4+\) was threatened） \(10 \ldots\) Qc6 11 是 \(e 3\) Qd8 12 是e2 菷f5！ 13
 his queen）13．．．h6 14 Qh3（if \(14 \triangleq \mathrm{f} 3\)
 \＆xa3！，and Black gained a great mate－ rial advantage，since the bishop cannot
 19 这d2 c3；
（a2） 8 wh5 was later found to be more accurate：
（a21）8．．．\({ }^{\mathbf{W}} \mathrm{e} 7\)（here Alekhine cut short his commentary，regarding Black＇s position as safe） 9 （ee2，and Black still has much work to do in order to avoid the dangers awaiting him in this seemingly quiet position．The e5 pawn，cramping Black，the e4 square for the knight，the weak dark squares－
these are White＇s trumps as he prepares his offensive．


Korelov－Gufeld（USSR Ch．1／2－Final 1963）continued 9．．．Sc6（if 9．．．\＆b7 10 \(0-0\) ©d7 11 a 4 ！） 10 县e3 \(9 \mathrm{cb} 4110-0\)
 c6 15 Efbl g6 16 楝h3，with sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn；
 B．Vladimirov－Korolev，Leningrad 1963， when 10 Oge4！is strong） 10 exf6 㥩xf6

 \＆h3 with advantage to White（Petur－ sson－Sigurjonsson，Reykjavik 1982）；
（a23）8．．．曾d7（as in the Bogoljubow－ Alekhine game）：


9 皿e2（with the queen at h5， 9 ©xd5 exd5 10 e6 may seem to work，but the
cool 10．．． W e7！parries all the threats） 9．．．eb7 10 ＠f3 g6 11 畄g4 b4 12 صce4 Oc6 13 \＆e3 h6 14 Qh3 0－0－0 15 0－0 with a complicated，double－edged posi－ tion（Petursson－Zaltsman，Reykjavik 1984）．Black is still a pawn up，but White＇s spatial advantage in the centre， strong knight at e4，and advanced en－ emy pawns equalise the chances；
（b） \(7 .\). \＆f5 led to a rapid defeat in Hottes－Bialas（Bad Pyrmont 1961）： 8



 ©f8 18 wh7，and White won；
（c） \(7 . . . f 6\) leads to interesting compli－ cations：


8 ⿹xd5 显xd5 9 定e2 c6 10 §f3 Wiw，and now：
（c1） 11 De4 fxe5 \(120-0\) Wxd4？ （better 12．．．exd4） 13 最e3！㥩xd1 14 Efxdl（despite the exchange of queens and his extra pawns，Black＇s position is difficult） \(14 \ldots\) ．．．e6 15 a 4 （15 Qg 5 ！is even stronger）15．．．ed5 16 axb5 e6 （B．Vladimirov－Zakharov，USSR Ch． \(1 / 2\)－ Final 1963），and now 17 b6 would have confirmed White＇s advantage；
（c2） 11 exf6 exf6 12 We2＋曾e7 13 Qe6 \＆xe6 14 当xe6 监d7 15 娄e2 \(0-0\) ？！（Black should have played

15．．．幣xd4，gaining e5 for his queen－ Rogers） \(160-0\) an 17 a4 with an excellent position for the pawn（Rogers－ Garcia Palermo，Dortmund 1985）；
（d） \(7 . . .0 \times \mathrm{xc} 3\) used to be considered the main reply to Bogoljubow＇s move：
（dl） 8 bxc3 f6 9 （this move， made in Münder－Kuhler，Menden 1974， is an improvement on 9 De4 箵d5！， Buslaev－Gurgenidze，Georgian Ch． 1964）9．．．玉a7 10 Qh3，retaining the initiative in view of the threat of \(\mathrm{D}_{4} 4\)（if

（d2） 8 wf3！This interposition，sug－ gested by Rogers，is perhaps the strongest move．

 with the idea of exploiting the position of the black queen at d 5 and bringing the king＇s bishop into play with gain of tempo．

After 7 a4 Black has several replies：
7．．． Qxc3（14．211）\(^{2}\)
7．．．今b7（14．212）－p． 226
7．．．Db4（14．213）－p． 227
7．．．c6（14．214）－p． 229
7．．．e6（14．215）－p． 230
After 7．．．b4 8 Qe4 White regains the pawn with the better position： \(8 . . \mathrm{c} 3\)（or
 9 bxc 3 bxc 310 \＆a3 \＆f5 11 Og3 皿g 4


15 䒼xf3 Qc6 16 Qe2 Qcb4 17 \＆xd5
 0－0 \＄g7 21 Eacl（Shamkovich－ Kapetanovic，New York 1987）．

7．．．§f5 fails to 8 Qh4！，when after
 fxe6 11 Wh5＋g6 12 we5） 11 exf7＋（d8 12 \＆e2 Black＇s position is unsatisfac－ tory（Miles－Heinbuch，Ostende 1985）．
14.211 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 صf3 Qf6 4 Qc3 a65 e4 b5 6 e5 Qd5 7 a4）
\(\begin{array}{llll}7 & \ldots & \text { Qxc3 } \\ 8 & \text { bxc3 } & \Psi\end{array}\)


If 8．．．\({ }^{\text {b }}\) b，then：
（a） 9 g 5 e6（ \(9 \ldots \mathrm{~h} 610 \mathrm{wh} 5 \mathrm{~g} 6\) is also possible） 10 䒼h5 g6 11 w E 4 血e7
 \(0-0\) d 5 with a favourable position for Black（Johansson－Ardiansyah，Thessa－ loniki Olympiad 1984）；
（b） 9 e6！（a blockading sacrifice）9．．． f6（9．．．fxe6 transposes into variation 14．212），when the e6 pawn，cut off from base，is picked up by Black，but his backward development and，more important，difficulty in manoeuvring， allow White various active possibilities：
（bl） 10 \＆e2，and now：

（b11）10．．．筜d5 \(110-0\) 当xe6 12 el when：
（b111）12．．．敝d7 13 Qh4（13 气d2！？ －Belyavsky）13．．．g6 14 \＆g4 f5 15 道f3 Qc6 16 最g 5 h6（even the more tena－ cious 16 ．．．\(f 7\) would not have helped： 17 d 5 乌d8 18 』a2 h6 19 ㅇf4 \＆g7 20
 シh7 23 Exe7 晋xd5 24 घe8＋，Bel－ yavsky） 17 d5 De5 18 Exe5 hxg5 19 Exg6（Belyavsky－Dlugy，Tunis 1985）， with a difficult position for Black；
（b112）12．．．wb6 is an improvement： 13 Qh4 \(勹 \mathrm{~d} 714\) \＆g4 是d5 \(15 \mathrm{axb5}\)（ 15 Qf5 e6 16 axb5 0－0－0 17 Qe3 is un－ clear）15．．．axb5 16 Еxa8＋©xa8 （W．Schmidt－Schulz，Prague 1987）， when Konikowski gives the interesting variation 17 Qf5 g6 18 Qxe7 \＆xe7 19 \＆a3 Qe5 20 dxe5 f5 21 \＆xf5 \＆xa3（or 21．．．gxf5 22 e6 显c6 23 wh5＋© 24是xe7＋ofe7 25 wg 5 with perpetual



（bl2） \(10 \ldots\) ．．．d5 11 0－0 c6 12 Qh4全xe6 \(13 \mathrm{axb5} \mathrm{cxb5} 14\)＠f3 §d5 15包5 g6 16 乌e3 是xf3 17 世xf3 玉a7 18 Eel \＆g7 19 Qd5 0－0 20 乌a3 with compensation for the pawn（Piket－ Schlosser，Munich 1989）；
（bl3）10．．．g6，a comparatively new continuation，to which White can reply：
（b131） \(110-0\) \＆g7 12 Qh4 \＆d5 13
 （Lobron－Raetsky，Cap d＇Agde 1994） 16 g3！\＆f6 17 Qg2 with a complicated game where White would seem to have sufficient compensation for the pawn；
（bl32） 11 \＆f4（ 11 h 4 and h4－h5 is also interesting－Dreev）11．．．igg 12 h4 0－0（or 12．．．\({ }^{\text {wid }} \mathrm{d} 513 \mathrm{~h} 5\) wxe6 14 h 6 ©f8 15 with with definite compensa－ tion for the pawns） 13 h 5 g 514 h 6 e h 8 15 嘗bl！？ d 5 （ \(15 \ldots \mathrm{gxf4}\) ？ 16 岁f5 and Eh4，winning） 16 Eh5 wive6 17 Oxg5 fxg5 18 Exg5＋安f7 19 \＆e5 家e8 （Raetsky）－the resulting complicated positions require further analysis；
（b2） 10 \＆e3，and now：

（b21）10．．． F d6 11 Qd2 喕xe6 12 Webl with a favourable position for White in view of the threats to capture on b5 and c4（Sosonko－Pachman， Geneva 1977）；
（b22）10．．．ᄋd5 11 Qh4 g6 12 畄bl
 \(0-0\) with a sharp game and chances for both sides（Sosonko－Dlugy，New York 1984）；
 （12 \＆e2 Da5 13 Qh4 学e4 14 絮b4

\(0-0\) Cc2 18 wc5 needs testing） \(12 \ldots\) axb5 13 Exa8＋§xa8 14 \＆e2 Qd8 15
 ＠xg6＋hxg6 18 学xg6＋©f7 19 exf7＋ \＄d7 concludes in perpetual check： 20

 \(0-0\) e5！with chances for both sides （Griego－Hertan，USA 1987）；
（b3） 10 g 3 ：


 White has compensation for the sacri－ ficed material） \(130-0\) e6 14 Qh4 \＆ ex 2

 19 断c6 Qb6 20 \＆f4 \(\frac{w i l}{} \mathrm{~d} 7\) and by giv－ ing back the gambit pawns Black equal－ ised（Vaiser－Korsunsky，USSR 1978）．

9 g3
9 \＆e2 is also possible．
9
Sb7
Other continuations：
9．．．皿e6 10 典g2，and now：
（a） \(10 \ldots\) ．．． W b7（an idea of Simagin） 11 \(0-0\)（or \(11 母\) h4，with the idea after 11 ．．．
 ing 140 g 2 ，intending 9 f 4 and \(\mathrm{d} 4-\mathrm{d} 5\) ；
 exd5 17 axb5 0 d 718 \＆e3 White has the advantage，Chekhova－Mulenko， Sochi 1981）11．．．ed5，when：
（a1） 12 ©a3 Qd7（or 12．．．e6 13 \＆xf8 家xf8 14 Qh4 \＆xg2 15 Qxg2 Qd7 16 f 4 g 617 f5，Varszindi－Navar－ ovszky，Hungary 1982） 13 槽e2 e6 14 \＆xf8 Qxf8（Vakhidov－Vaiser，USSR 1984） 15 fbl！with the idea of 16
 （Vaiser）；
（a2） 12 e6 \＆xe6（12．．．fxe6 is strongly met by 13 Qh4 g6 \(14 \mathrm{\Xi l}\)
 \＆xb7 \({ }^{\text {ga }} 18\) \＆g2），when White has：

 15 axb5，when there can follow：
（a211） \(15 \ldots\) ．．．axb5 16 Exa8 粕xa8 17曹g4！©c6（if 17．．．e6 18 Qxe6 fxe6 19

 and Black is in trouble（Balashov－ Miles，Bugojno 1978）；
（a212）15．．．h6 16 Qh3（the quiet 16 Wf3！can also be considered）16．．．e6 17 Qf4，when after 17．．．寝xb5 White has positional compensation for the sacri－ ficed pawns，while if \(17 \ldots\) ．．． E d7 he con－ tinues the offensive with 18 wif3 （Matanovic）；
（a213）15．．．e6 16 el Qd7？（16．．． ©d6 was essential） 17 W5 g6 18 Qxe6！！Black resigns（Bareev－Yako－ vich，Tallinn 1986）－either capture of the queen is answered by \(19 \| \mathrm{g} 7+\) and

20 Ee8 mate，while after 18．．．fxe6 he loses his queen；
（a22） 13 axb5，and now：
（a221）13．．．axb5 14 Qe5 \＆d5？（the sacrifice of queen for rook and bishop， although interesting，is also insufficient
 Exal 17 世e2 c6 18 最f4 Exf1＋ 19
 and \(\sum\) e3 with a decisive advantage－ Vaganian） 15 完xd5 当xd5 16 Exa8峟xa8 17 莦g4！（Vaganian－Pr．Nikolic， Naestved 1985），and White gained a won position：17．．．e6（if 17．．．㟶a6 18


（a222）13．．．今d5 14 bxa6 Еxa6（not 14．．．©xa6？ 15 崽a4＋c6 16 De5） 15
 Qc6！（neither 17．．．e6 18 自f3，nor \(17 \ldots\) wb7＋18畨h5！g6 20 0xg6 fxg6 21 当e5－ Vaganian） 18 Qxc6 洷xc6＋19 d5 学b5 20 峟d4 c6 21 dxc6 単xc6＋ 22 gl f6 and for the pawn White retains a lead in development，although the position re－ mains unclear；
（a23） 13 De5 定d5（13．．．c6 loses to 14 Wh5！g6 15 Qxg6 fxg6 16 畨e5） 14是xd5 楼xd5 15 axb5 f6（15．．．axb5 leads to an unfavourable position for Black from the variation 13 axb5 axb5 14
 17 Qc6！，and \(15 \ldots\) ．．． Eb 5 loses to 16曾f3） 16 Qg4！㥩xb5（here if \(16 \ldots\) axb5 White wins by 17 De3 陙 718 Exa8

 with a difficult position for Black （Chernin－Mikhalchishin，Lvov 1987）；
（b） \(10 \ldots\) 比e4＋（an unsuccessful at－ tempt to strengthen the defence by
 \＆d5 13 e6 fxe6（13．．．\＆xe6 is no better） 14 Qh4 g6 15 曹g4 Qc6 16 Efel！with
advantage to White（Lalev－Yakovich， Sofia 1988）．

If 9．．．今f5 10 \＆g2，then：
（a） \(10 \ldots\) e 4 ？ \(110-0\) ，and if \(11 \ldots\) e6 \(12 \Xi \mathrm{E} 1\) ！with the threat of \(13 \Xi x \mathrm{E} 4\) ， against which Black has no satisfactory defence；
 13 \＆xe4（or 13 蹧g4，Langeweg－Miles， Amsterdam 1978）13．．． \(\mathrm{W} \times \mathrm{xe} 414 \mathrm{Eel}\)
 14．．．営c6？ 15 axb5 axb5 16 d 5 ！） 15 d 5 ！㟶xd5（15．．．exd5 16 e6） 16 当xd5 exd5 17 axb5 乌d7（17．．．c6 18 b6） 18 bxa6臽c5 19 是e3 是xe3 20 Exe3 0－0 21 Ea5 with advantage to White（Gligoric－ Buljovcic，Novi Sad 1979）．
\[
10 \text { \&g2 要 } \mathrm{d} 7
\]


\section*{11 Sa3}

11 Qh4 comes into consideration：

 Df4，and with the eventual threat of d4－ d5 White has a strong position） \(130-0\) ， with the same plan of \(\Phi \mathrm{f} 4\) and \(\mathrm{d} 4-\mathrm{d} 5\) ， again with the better position；
（b） \(11 \ldots . . c 612\) f4 e6 13 f5！exf5 14 \(0-0\) g6 15 \＆g5 and White gained an attacking position（Kavalek－Miles，Wijk aan Zee 1978）；
（c） \(11 \ldots .0^{c} 612 \mathrm{f4}\) e6 \(130-0\) ，trans－ posing into the variation \(110-0\) e6 12 Qh4 ©c6－see below．
\(110-0\) e6 129 h 4 ，when Black has：
（a） \(12 \ldots\) ．．． exg 2 （ \(12 \ldots \mathrm{c} 6 \mathrm{l} \quad \mathrm{f} 4\) ！） 13 Qxg2 b4 14 Qf4（14 当e2 bxc3 15垍xc4 ©c6 could also be tried）14．．．2c6 15 峟e2 bxc3 16 d5 exd5 17 e6 fxe6 18 Qxe6 舁f7！ 19 Eel \＄g8 20 §f4（20 Qxc7 Ec8 favours Black）20．．．Еe8 21 Qxf8 Exf8 22 ■adl 罾f7（not

 Hort，Lugano 1983），and instead of \(24 . .9 \mathrm{~d} 325\) Exd3 cxd3 26 値xd3，when White gained compensation for his material deficit（strong bishop，rook at h8 shut in），correct was \(24 . .\). a5！，sup－ porting the knight and gaining chances of realising the extra pawns（Hort）；
（b） \(12 . . .0 \mathrm{c} 6\) should also be men－ tioned： 13 f 4 g 614 f 5 ！gxf5 \(15 \AA \mathrm{~g} 5\) Se7（Morgulev－Shumilin，USSR 1991），
 exf5 18 e6！（Shumilin）．

The most recent idea is the original
 13 啙bl！？）13．．．Dd7 14 0－0 Qf6（the amusing variation 14．．．g6 15 ＠d4 ■g8 16 Qg5 h6 17 Qh7！？，suggested by Ivanchuk，requires testing） 15 De5 e6！ 16 dxe6 fxe6 17 最g5，and now：
（a）17．．．\＆d6？ 18 \＆xf6 0－0 19 \＆xg7
鍶xe6 and White gained the better chances（Belyavsky－Illescas Cordoba， Linares 1995）；
（b） \(17 \ldots\) 定xg2！ 18 是xf6（ 18 首xg2数 \(7+\) favours Black）18．．．h5！，with ad－
 gxf6 20 Qg6 Eh6 21 ©xf8 tixf8） 19．．．gxf6（19．．．\＃h6 is also good） 20
 Cordoba）．


This was played in the source game Bronstein－Korchnoi（Moscow 1964）． Other moves were later tried：

11．．．\＆\({ }^{\text {\＆}} 120-0\) © 613 玉el，and now：

（a）13．．．g6（Olafsson suggests 13．．．h6 with the idea of ．．．g7－g5 and ．．．定g7） 14 © c 5 ，when：
（a1） \(14 \ldots \pm 6815\) axb5 axb5 16 Og5 ©xg2（if 16．．．e6 White attacks with 17显xd5 \(\begin{aligned} & \text { Wd5 } 18 \text { De4－Ehlvest）} 17\end{aligned}\)
 200 xf 3 f 621 d 5 and White gained a clear advantage（Ehlvest－Chekhov， 52nd USSR Ch．，1985）；
（a2）14．．． \(\mathrm{md} 815 \mathrm{axb5}\) axb5 16 Qg5定xg2 17 e6（17 ©xg2 \＆h6！）17．．．fxe6
幏xf3 घd5 21 Qxe6 家d7（H．Olafsson－ Hort，Thessaloniki Olympiad 1984）， and now \(22 \Xi \mathrm{E} 4\) 是h6 \(23 \Xi \mathrm{\Xi} 2\) with the idea of advancing the \(g\)－and \(h\)－pawns， would have promised White the advan－ tage（Olafsson）；
（b）13．．．äb8 14 e6（or 14 axb 5 axb 5 15 e6 fxe6 16 e2，and if \(16 \ldots\) h5 17宜h3 巴h6 18 Dg5）14．．．fxe6（14．．． \＆xe6？ 15 Еxe6！fxe6 16 Qg5 g6 17
 20 最xe6 䒼d8 21 炭f3 and wins，Ivkov－ Donchev，Sofia 1984） 15 Qg5＠xg2 16
 White（Veingold－Karpeshov，USSR 1984）；
（c）if \(13 \ldots\) ．．．b4（with the intention of answering \(14 \mathrm{cxb4}\) with 14．．．e6），White himself plays 14 e 6 ！

11．．．g6 has been played several times by Ibragimov：

（a） 12 h 4 显g713 h50－0，and now：
（a1） 14 hxg6 fxg6 15 区xh7？！is clever but in the end unfavourable： \(15 \ldots\)

 axb5 a5，and White＇s compensation for the piece is insufficient（Sakaev）；
（a2） 14 fll？（to free the knight） 14．．．\＆d5 15 hxg 6 fxg 616 Og5 \(\mathrm{elg}^{2} 2+\) （16．．．h6 17 Qe4！） 17 家xg2 䝨d5＋
（17．．．h6 18 Qe4 wive 19 穆g4 favours White） 18 gigl！h6 19 Qh3 Ec6 20 Qf4 Exf4（if 20．．． W f7 21 䒼c2 g5 22 Qg6 Efd8 23 （we4），and although the exchange sacrifice was Black＇s best chance，it did not change the situation：
 axb5 axb5 25 \＆c5 解h 726 崽f1！with advantage to White（Sakaev－Ibragimov， Kherson 1991）；
（b） \(120-0\) \＆g7 13 Еe1 0－0 14 e 6 fxe6 15 De5 楮c8 16 \＆h3（also after 16
 Ee8 19 \＆c5 White has an active posi－ tion for the pawn，but the move played is more energetic） \(16 \ldots\) ．．\({ }^{\text {d }} 5\) ，and now White should consider 17 Wiv2（17 \＆xe7 17．．．巴e8 18 昷g5 c5 gave Black counterplay in Shneider－Ibragimov， USSR 1991）17．．．We8（if 17．．．9d7？ 18 \＆xe6＋！\＆xe6 19 Qc6） 18 פg4 and De3（Ibragimov）．
12 §xf8 ©xf8


For the sacrificed pawn White exerts pressure on the opponent＇s position．

13．．．g6，and now：
（a） 14 Qh4 14．．．c6 15 f 4 we7 16蹧d2 \＄g7，and in the afore－mentioned Bronstein－Korchnoi game White began
an offensive： 17 f5！exf5 18 区xf5 \(\boldsymbol{\ell}\) c8


 19 シacl \(0 x b 4\)（not 19．．． \(0 x d 4+\) ？ 20管g2 Qb3 21 Exc4 \()^{2}\) d2 in view of 22

家xg8 28 घe7－for the knight White has too many pawns） 20 Exc4 ©d5 21

 Eb3＋and the ending should be drawn （Kapetanovic－Grottke，corr．1985／8）．

13．．．\＆d5 14 Qh4 c6（securely de－ fending d5；after 14．．．\＆xg2 15 Qxg2 g6 16 e 3 White has an active position for the sacrificed pawn） 15 wh5 h6 16定xd5 cxd5（if 16．．．\({ }^{\mathbf{W}} \mathrm{Ed}\) x Inkiov sug－ gests 17 f 4 g 618 ©xg6＋！fxg6 19㥩xg6 \({ }^{\text {an }} 720 \mathrm{f} 5\) ，winning） 17 axb5 g6 （after 17．．．\({ }^{\text {U }} \mathrm{xb} 518 \mathrm{f4} \mathrm{~g} 6\) the knight sacrifice is not now so clear： 19 Qxg6＋

 with a promising position for White （Inkiov－Bellon，Rome 1985）．
14.212 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 Qc3 a65 e4 b5 6 e5 Qd5 7 a4）
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
7 & \ldots & \text { \&b7 } \\
8 & \text { e6 }
\end{array}
\]

As already mentioned，the point of such sacrifices is to hinder the normal development of Black＇s kingside．
\[
8 \text {... fxe6 }
\]

If 8．．．f6 White plays 9 Qe4，when：
（a） \(9 \ldots\) ．．．e3？ 10 \＆xe3 \(Q x e 4\) is unfa－ vourable on account of 11 Qd2 \＆d5 12 axb5 axb5 13 Exa8 \＆xa8 14 尚 \(\mathrm{h} 5+\mathrm{g} 6\) 15 wb5＋，when White wins a pawn with a completely won position（Vaiser－ Romanishin，USSR 1973）；
（b） \(9 \ldots\) Qb4 10 Qc5 是xf3 \(11 \mathrm{gxf3}\)

 Id8 again with a difficult position for Black（Chiburdanidze－Sturua，Odessa 1982）．White should have played 17 Qxa6！©xe6 18 axb5 and \＆xc4．


\section*{9 \＆e2}

With this move order（when Black does not exchange first on c3）White has the strong move 9 Qe4 Qb4 10 Qc5（things are no better for Black af－ ter 10 Qeg5 焂d7 11 \＆d2 \(\quad\) D8c6 12
 15 \＆xd3 cxd3 \(160-0\) ，Cooper－Findlay， England 1978）10．．．8xf3 \(11 \mathrm{gxf3}\) Q8c6
 Qxd4 14 昷e3 when，despite Black＇s three extra pawns，White has the advantage） 12 Qxe6 W d6 13 d 5 w e5＋

 18 bxa6＋c6 19 Ecl g6 20 \＆xc4，and Black resigned without managing to develop his kingside（Gufeld－B．Kogan， Ukrainian Ch．1964）．
\begin{tabular}{clll}
9 & \(\ldots\) & Qxc3 \\
10 & bxc3 & wiwd
\end{tabular}

After the 31st USSR Ch．（Leningrad 1963）this position was considered
satisfactory for Black．The game Taimanov－Novopashin went 11 \＆f4， which allowed Black to return the sac－ rificed pawns and complete his devel－ opment： \(11 \ldots\) ．．．d7 12 §xc7 g6 13 0－0
 dxe5 0－0 17 枼xd5＋是xd5 18 包d4 54 19 axb5 axb5 20 区xa8＋\＆xa8 21 \＆f1



But a year had not passed when the evaluation of the variation changed．In Borisenko－Stein（USSR Team Ch．， Moscow 1964）White employed a very promising plan．

\section*{11 ©g5！}

The move order in this game was more accurate：7．．．0xc3 8 bxc3 \＆b7 9 e6 fxe6 \(10 \mathrm{Qg}_{5} \mathrm{~W} \mathrm{~d} 511 \& \mathrm{e} 2\) ．In this way Black avoided the unfavourable variation given in the note to White＇s 9th move．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
11 & \ldots & \text { wxg2 } \\
12 & \text { 玉n } & \text { id5 }
\end{array}
\]

If 12 ．．．\({ }^{\text {U }}\) xh2 there follows 13 Qxe6当d6 14 d 5 ！with a very strong attack．


13 §f4，and now：
（a）in the afore－mentioned game Stein gave up his queen for rook and knight：13．．．g6 14 \＆g4 h6 15 \＆h3（the
queen is trapped；despite the fact that Black gains sufficient material compen－ sation for it，his position is cheerless due to his poor development and pawn
 and White could have gained a great advantage by 17 \＆e5，e．g．17．．．\＃h4 18 axb5 axb5 19 Exa8 \＆\(\times 2820\) wbl with two threats－ 21 畨 \(\mathrm{xg} 6+\) and 21 䒼xb5＋；
（b）13．．．b4 \(14 \Omega g 4\)（if \(14 \mathrm{cxb4}\) Black continues 14 ．．． 0 c 615 Zbl e 5 ！ \(16 \mathrm{dxe5}\)
 rificing his queen for two minor pieces， Black gains counterplay： 16 \＆xg 5 hxg 5 17 ＠g4（Polugayevsky－Szabo，Buda－ pest 1965），and now instead of \(17 \ldots .9 c 6\) the immediate 17．．．e5 came into consideration．

Therefore it is more accurate to con－ tinue the attack with 13 axb5 axb5 （13．．．䒼xh2 14 是g4！） 14 Exa8 \＆xa8， and now：
（a） 15 £f4 g6 16 Øxe6 ©a6 17 䒼al
 Eg8 21 f 4 with a powerful position for White（Bronstein－Lyavdansky，32nd USSR Ch．，Kiev 1964／5）；
（b） 15 \＆ 4 is perhaps even more convincing： 15 ．．．e5（no better is \(15 \ldots\)

 15．．．b4 16 cxb 4 Qc6 17 是f3 当xh2 18

 White won（Knaak－Bönsch，Dresden 1970）．
14.213 （ 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc 43 Df3
Qf64 ©c3 a65 e4 b5 6 e5 Qd5 7
a4）

\section*{7 ．．．勾4}

A comparatively new continuation， leading to extremely complicated posi－ tions．8．．．\＆f5 is threatened．

\section*{8 d5}

Other possibilities：
8 axb5 §f5 9 ＠xc4 Qc2 +10 \＆ ©xal 11 g 4 ！，and now：
（a）11．．．eg6？ 12 e6！fxe6 13 Qe5；
（b） \(11 \ldots\) \＆e6？ 12 \＆xe6 fxe6 13 Qg5


 bxc6 and White wins；
（c）11．．．axb5 leads to quite fantastic complications： 12 \＆xf7＋\＄xf7 13
 16 \＆h6 Qxe5 17 玉gl Qg6 18 d 5 （Padevsky）or 18 wf3（Schwarz）；
（d） \(11 \ldots\) 皿c2 12 是xf7 \(+x 713\) Qg5

（d1）14．．．\({ }^{\boldsymbol{w}} \mathrm{wd4} 15\) g2！（Black was
 Qc2＋ 17 宴d2 \＆e4＋，winning；also in


 18 畄xc6＋©xc6（Kouatly－Radulov， France v．Bulgaria 1984），and White could have gained a decisive advantage by 19 Exal Qxe5 20 0xb5 \(0 x g 421\) ©xc7＋© d7 22 ©ce6（Kouatly）；
（d2）14．．．】a7！（Padevsky），after which White has nothing more than perpetual check at f7 and e6（if 15 e6

 Ebl also comes into consideration，e．g． 10．．．e6 11 axb5 axb5 12 Qxb5 Qb4 13
 Knaak－Donchev，Bratislava 1983，or
 both cases with a lead in development for the sacrificed exchange） \(10 . .0 \mathrm{~b} 4\) （not 10 ．．．b4 in view of 11 \＆xc4 bxc3 12 bxc3 and \＆b3） \(11 \Xi \mathrm{a} 3\) ，and now：
（a） \(11 \ldots \% \mathrm{c} 2\) is not altogether clear after 12 楼d2 e6 13 axb5 \＆d3 14 \＆\(x d 3\)
cxd3 15 Qe4，and now not \(15 \ldots\) ．．．\({ }^{\text {Wr }}\) d5？！
 （Grøun－Hegeler，Gausdal 1991），which would appear to favour White，but 15．．．＠e7；
（b）11．．．e6 12 axb5 isc2 13 W w 2显d3，when：
（b1） 14 b3 \＆xe2 15 Qxe2 Qd5 16 ■a1 cxb3 17 Wive c6 18 bxa6 国xa6 19
 Q4xa6 is preferable） 21 Qf4 ©e7 22 © d 2 0－0 23 砉 c 4 with the better chances for White（Yusupov－Adamski， Sofia 1984）；
（b2） \(14 \AA x d 3\) cxd3 15 霉f4 9 d 516 0xd5 \＆xa3 17 0g5 and for the sacri－ ficed exchange White has a promising position（Sideif－Zade－Lerner，USSR 1983）；
（c） \(11 \ldots\) c 2 ，when：
（c1） 12 axb5 \(0 x a 313\) bxa3 axb5 （13．．．e6 comes into consideration，pre－ venting White＇s next move） 14 d 5 e6 15 Qd4 定c5 16 Qxf5 exf5 17 Qxb5 0－0 18 d6 cxd6 19 exd6 乌d7 20 ＠xc4 Qe5 \(21 \mathrm{Q}_{\mathrm{e} 2}\) and White has sufficient com－ pensation for the exchange；
（c2） 12 Qh4！？实d3（12．．．©xa3？ 13
 axb5） 13 ＠xd3 cxd3 14 e6 fxe6 （14．．．0xa3 15 嶙f3 fxe6 16 当xa8 Qc4 17 axb5 axb5 18 Df3！favours White－ Pr．Nikolic） 15 淠5＋g6（15．．．\({ }^{2} d 7\) is strongly met by 16 Qe4！Qxa3 17 Qc5＋©ic8 18 bxa3 Qc6 19 Qxe6， Krasenkov－Yanovsky，USSR 1985） 16 Qxg6 hxg6 17 当xh8 b4（17．．．0xa3 18 bxa3） 18 wg！（stronger than 18 \＆ l 6 （ d 7 ！－unclear，Sosonko－Pr．Nikolic， Thessaloniki Olympiad 1984）18．．．bxa3


家 725 c3 a5 26 h 4 ！and as a result of the wild complications White gained
the advantage（Zlochevsky－Baryshev， USSR 1986）－analysis by Glek and Zlochevsky．
\[
8 \text {... 䖝f5 }
\]

Not 8．．．皿b7 in view of 9 e6！fxe6 10 dxe6 曹xd1＋11 家xdl c6 12 是f4．
\[
9 \text { Qd4 \&d3 }
\]

9．．．）g6 is weak in view of 10 axb5 Oxd5 11 \＆xc4．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
10 & e6！ & 豊d6 \\
11 & exf7＋ & diff
\end{tabular}

Titorenko－Putyatina（USSR 1984） continued 12 \＆e2？，when Black should have played \(12 \ldots\) ．．e5！ 13 dxe6＋\({ }^{\text {en }} 8\) ，and if \(140-0\) ，then boldly \(14 \ldots\) ．．．\({ }^{\mathbf{W}} \times \mathrm{xd} 415\)


 the threats．

 gxf3 皿e5 18 a4 would have led to an advantage for White．

> 14.214 (1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qf3 Qf6 4 Qc3 a65 e4 b5 6 e5 Qd5 7 a4)

7 ．．．c6


8 axb5 \(0 x{ }^{2} 3\)

9 bxc3 exb5
10 Og5！？
The methodical preparation of the of－ fensive－ 10 g 3 e6 11 \＆g2 \＆b7 \(120-0\)
 Qb6 16 f5 also gives White definite compensation for the pawn（Dam－ janovic－Rivas Pastor，Groningen 1980）．

10 ．．．f6
10．．．e6？loses to 11 ©xf7．
\(10 .\). \＆b7 11 e6，which used to be considered unfavourable for Black，is not altogether clear．S．Ivanov－Tyrtania （Berlin 1992）continued 11．．．f6 12 Qf7 （if \(12 \Omega \times h 7\) wd d ！，but not 12．．．Exh7 13
孁xe6＋．The knight at h8 is doomed， and in the coming complicated battle both sides have chances．

\section*{11 掌f3}

The gambit 11 e6 \({ }^{W} \mathrm{~d} 512\) 莤e2 fxg5
挡f6 16 d5 is unclear（Paehtz－Bernard， Rostock 1984）．
\begin{tabular}{llll}
11 & \(\ldots\) & घa7 \\
12 & e6 & 曹b6
\end{tabular}

Or 12．．．eb7，and now：
（a） 13 d 5 Wivd5（after 13．．．\＆xd5 14
 17 對xe6 \＆xe6 18 \＆e3 日a8 19 h 4 ！ White should be able to realise his ma－ terial advantage） 14 监xd5 ©xd5 15是e3 fxg5（after 15．．．⿷b7？ \(160-00\) ！ Black lost quickly in Vaiser－Vera， Berlin 1982） 16 \＆xa7 Oc6 17 Еxa6 ©xa7 18 Exa7．Material compensation for the exchange is sufficient，but the chances are with White（Vaiser）；
（b） 13 㥩f4，when：
（bl）13．．．We8 14 d 5 ！是xd5 15 是e3 （the complications after 15 W d 4 fxg 5 16 当xa7？！g6！ 17 ＠xg5 世＂xe6＋ 18 \＆e3 ©c6 19 当xa6 \＆g7 20 \＃cl 0－0 21営xb5 De5！favour Black，Kir． Georgiev－Murshed，Novi Sad Olympiad
 with advantage to White（Timosh－ chenko－Kharitonov，USSR 1983）；

 （A．Kuzmin－K．Grigorian，USSR 1965） 18 糋xf8＋Ehxf8 19 \＆xb6 \＆xd5，and Black has three pawns for the piece．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
13 & \text { d5 } & \text { fxg5 } \\
14 & \text { \&e3 } &
\end{array}
\]
 （threatening 16 d 6 or 16 e 2 ）is bril－ liantly parried by the rook sacrifice 15 ．．． Ed7！ 16 exd7 \(0 x d 717\) \＆ E 2 h 618 是e3㻊f6！（Sosonko－Rivas，Amsterdam 1979）．

The consequences of 14 \＆xg5 are unclear．After 14．．．＠xe6 15 \＆e3 W7
 ©f7 18 䉕3 Qd7 and then ．．．e6－e5） 17．．．e6（17．．．显xg2 18 是xg2 \({ }^{W} \times \mathrm{xg} 219\) \(0-0-0\) favours White） 18 \＆xb8 蒌xb8 19 Exa6 b4 Black has a strong passed pawn for the exchange（Miles）．


The bishop at e3 is worth more than the rook．In Langeweg－Witt（Holland 1982）after 15．．．\＃b7 16 g 3 ■b6（16．．．定d7 17 0－0 \＆xg5 also favours White） 17 h 4 ！g4 18
 took the exchange 21 国b6 at the most appropriate moment－the black pieces are paralysed．

In Knaak－Thorman（East Germany 1980）Black preferred to return the piece by 15．．． 0 d7 16 戦f7＋d8 17 exd7 \＆xd7 180－0！（here too the bishop is more important than the rook，al－ though White also has the advantage after 18 是xa7 监xa7 19 0－0，Rein－ Richter，corr．1984）18．．．Ea8 19 是f3漕d6 20 \＆xg5．White intends to switch his bishop to d 4 ；for the pawn he has a very strong position．
14.215 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 Qf64 ©c3 a65 e4 b5 6 e5 0 d 57 a4）
\[
7 \text {... e6 }
\]


A comparatively new idea．By sac－ rificing the b5 pawn，Black gains time．
\[
8 \text { axb5 足b4 }
\]

Miles＇s idea of 8．．． 0 b6 also comes into consideration：
（a） 9 gg 5610 䊐 h 5 g 6 favours Black；
是xe7 \({ }^{W} \mathrm{we} 711\) bxa6 玉xa6 12 玉xa6

 cannot hold the c4 pawn，and the chances are equal（Tukmakov－Miles， Biel 1995）；
（c） 9 是e2 最b7 10 bxa6 Exa6 11 Exa6 ©xa6 120－0 \＆e7 13 ＠a4（White could have considered 13 ＠xc4 Qxc4 14 撆a4＋，Miles）13．．．世罗d5 14 Qel当c6！ 15 最x6 cxb6．By getting rid of his isolated pawns，Black has solved his opening problems（Van Wely－Miles， Matanzas 1995）．

\section*{9 電 2}

9 \＆ \(\mathrm{d}_{2} 2 \mathrm{~b} 6\) is the alternative：
（a） 10 e 4 ，and now：
（a1） \(10 \ldots\) 定xd2＋ 11 包exd2 axb5 12 Exa8 ©xa8 13 是xc4 bxc4 14 显a4＋
 ©d5，with a position where the weak c4 and d 4 pawns balance each other （Lautier－Andersson，Cannes 1989）；
（a2） \(10 . . .{ }^{\prime} \mathrm{d} 5\) ！ \(11 \Omega \mathrm{~g} 3 \Omega \mathrm{xd} 2+12\)
 Qc6 1500 O 616 Dh5 Eg8 17 b 3 橉a5 18 峟c2 b3 19 \＆ d 3 © 0 d 5 ，and White＇s kingside activity was countered by Black＇s successful counterplay on the queenside（Lukacs－Fominykh，Budapest 1990）；
（b） 10 bxa6 is another possibility： 10．．．巴xa6 11 Exa6 \＆xa6 12 \＆e2 Dc6 13 \＆g5 当d7 140－0（V．Shcherbakov－ Fominykh，USSR 1988）．


White can also consider 10 bxa6 Еxa6 11 Еxa6 §xa6 12 §e2，or 10
 axb5 12 Exa8 \(0 x a 813 \mathrm{~W} \mathrm{~W} 1\) he has a strong position－his dark－square bishop has no opponent） 11 bxa6 Еxa6 12 Exa6 and 0－0．

\section*{10}

11 曹g4
録 d 5
axb5

11．．．g6 is dangerous．After 12 \＆d2是xc3 13 bxc3 axb5 14 Exa8 鲎xa8 15昷e2 Black＇s weakened kingside comes under attack．
\[
12 \text { تxa8 溇xa8 }
\]

13 \＆e2
After 13 毘xg7 Black has：
（a）13．．． 5 f8 14 㥒xh \＆ e 7 ，when he can hope to create counterplay；
（b）13．．．睹al！？（a paradoxical idea that needs further testing） 14 憎xh8＋ \＆
 Qa4（Semenov－Fominykh，USSR 1988），and now 20 ＠xc4（．．．Qb4 was threatened） \(20 \ldots\) bxc4 21 畄xc4 Qb6 22
 Despite White＇s considerable material advantage，the position remains unclear．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
13 & \ldots & 0-0 \\
14 & 0-0 &
\end{array}
\]

We have been following I．Khenkin－ G．Gurevich（Israel 1994）．To defend against \＆h6，Black played 14．．． e 8 ？ ， which allowed White to gain an impor－ tant tempo for the attack： 15 Qg5 h6 16
 to decide the game with 18 ＠f6＋！gxf6 19 \＆f3！wa4（19．．．eb7 20 exf6 or 19．．． Qd5 20 §xh6，in both cases with irres－ istible threats） 20 ＠e4 \＆b7 21 exf6．

Black should have played \(14 \ldots\) ．．． Xc 3 15 \＆h6 g6 16 bxc 3 （if 16 \＆xf8 \＆xb2 17 最h6 Q8d7 18 Wh4 \＆b7 19 Qg5鳃8） \(16 \ldots\) ．．． e 8 ，regardless of the weak－ ening of the dark squares，e．g． 17 W h 4 Q8d7 18 Qg5 6 ．

This entire sharp and little－explored variation requires further testing in practice．

> 14.22 (1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 صf3 Qf6 4 Qc3 a6)


Or 5 ．．．c5 6 d 5 ，and now：
（a）6．．．e6（this move leads to an unfavourable position for Black from the \(1 \mathrm{~d} 4 \mathrm{~d} 5 \mathrm{~L}^{\mathrm{c}} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 43\) Qf3 c5 variation with the inclusion of a2－a4 and ．．．a7－a6） 7 e4 exd5 8 e5，when：

（a1） \(8 . . . \mathrm{d} 4\) is not good in view of 9 exf6（or 9 ＠xc4 dxc3 10 主xf7＋ 11 exf6＋gxf6 12 ＠d5）9．．．dxc3 10

 14．．．皿e6 15 Ehel！） 15 是xf6 Eg 816 Qg5；
 Qe6 11 we4 again favours White （B．Vladimirov－Khodos，USSR 1958）；
（a3）8．．．⿹e4 9 Qxd5 Qc6（if 9．．．


 ＠xd5 14 \＆xd5，in both cases with advantage to White） 10 exc4 国e6 11
 14 \＆d2 and White stands better （Sämisch－Bogoljubow，Berlin 1937）；
（b） \(6 \ldots\) ．．．f5 7 g 5 h 68 e 4 ，with in－ teresting complications：

（bl）8．．．\＆g6 9 Qf3（after 9 e5 hxg5 10 exf6 exf6 11 定xc4 宣d6 Black＇s position is preferable）9．．．©xe4 10 Qxe4 \＆xe4 11 \＆xc4，and Black faces difficulties；
（b2）8．．．hxg5（this involves a pawn
 11 最2 Qbd7 12 Wc 2 （the f5 pawn is more important than the one at d 5 ；now after \(12 \ldots .0 \mathrm{xd} 513\) Qxd5 \(\mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{wd}} \mathrm{xd} 14\) §f3 We5＋ 15 \＆e3 the white bishops be－ come very active）12．．．\({ }^{\text {Exh}} \times 13\) 2－0－0 Exg2 14 真h4 g6 15 fxg 6 Еxg6 16 官bl \(0-0-017\) 昷xc4．For the sacrificed pawn White has two strong bishops， and the pawn at d5 cramps Black （Spassky－Smyslov，Moscow v．Lenin－ grad 1960）．
\[
6 \quad e 4
\]

If 6 d5 Black＇s knight occupies a strong post at b 4 ，which ensures him
counterplay：6．．． Q b4 7 e4 e6 8 \＆xc4 exd5 9 exd5 \＆e7 10000011 h 3

 with a good position（if 17 Efel very strong is \(17 \ldots . . \pm x e 2!\) ）．

After 6 \＆g 5 h6！ 7 显xf6（if 7 是h4 g5 8 \＆g3 g4 9 气e5 情xd4 10 Qxc6峟 \(x d 1+11\) Exdl bxc6 12 \＆xc7 \＆e6， holding the pawn）7．．．exf6 8 e3 ©a5 9皿e2 宜e7 10 0－0 0－0 11 丠c2 Black stands better（I．Sokolov－Kramnik， Chalkidiki 1992）．
\begin{tabular}{llll}
6 & \(\cdots\) & \＆g 4 \\
7 & \＆e3
\end{tabular}


7 ＠xc4 \＆xf3（after 7．．．e6 8 是e3定b4 9 莦d3！0－0 10 ©d2 White，with his strong centre，stands better） 8 gxf3 is an interesting pawn sacrifice that oc－ curred in several games played in vari－ ous USSR events in 1963：
（a）8．．．管xd4 9 曾b3 0－0－0 10 是xf7， and now：
（a1） \(10 \ldots\) ．．曾d3 11 \＆e6＋6b8 12 气e3包 513 Wd1 \＃d6（13．．．g5 14 畄xd3

 20 日dl Exdl 21 Qxd1 \＆g5 22 （f）d3
 26 ©e2 favours White，Vladimirov，

Klaman） 14 f4！Wivdl＋ 15 Exdl \(2 d 3+\) 16 ©ie2 Exe6 17 Exd3 Ed6 18 Ehd1 with advantage to White（B．Vlad－ imirov－Lyavdansky）；
 13 \＆xb3 \＆ d 6 （supporting the e5 pawn； after 13．．．乌d4？！ 14 \＆dl exf4 15 是xf4宜e7 16 解 1 De6 17 \＆g3 h5 18 e5 Qd7 19 h 3 g 520 Qd5 \＆c5 21 f 4 gxf 4 22 Qxf4 White had the advantage in Lyavdansky－Kvyatkovsky） 14 fxe5 © \(\mathrm{en}^{2} 15 \mathrm{f} 3\) ，when Black has a choice between 15．．．Ehe8，with a sound， roughly equal position，and the sharper 15．．．\＆xc3 16 bxc3 Ed3，allowing the opponent the two bishops but hoping to exploit his pawn weaknesses（Geller－ Gurgenidze）；
（a3）10．．．Qe5 \(110-0\) ！（or 11 ＠e6＋

 Qc2 17 Qd5 Ed6，Marovic－Golz， Zinnowitz 1966）11．．． \(0 x\) xf（not 11．．． Qxf3＋ 12 ge wid3 in view of 13
要b6（Lutikov－Ivkov，Sukhumi 1966） 15 数xe5 with advantage to White；
（b） \(8 \ldots .0 \mathrm{xd} 4\) is also possible：
but after 9 e 5 h5 White gains the advantage： 10 \＆e3 Qc6 11 e 6 ，or 10．．．c5 11 \＆d5！（Suetin）．

Other moves for White：
7 d5 De5（7．．．Qa5 8 e5 Qd7 is worth testing，when White still has to regain the c4 pawn） 8 \＆e2（also 8 \＆f4！？）8．．．\＆xf3 \(9 \mathrm{gxf3}\) ，and now：
（a） \(9 \ldots\) e6 10 f 4 （after 10 䒼d4 \(Q \mathrm{fd} 7\) 11 昷e3 \＆c5 12 学d2 exd5，Ho－ Adianto，Manila Olympiad 1992，or 10．．． 0 c 611 类xc4 exd5 12 صxd5 \(0 x d 5\) 13 exd5 Qb4 Black has the better chances），when：
（al） \(10 \ldots\) ．．．g6 11 莤xc4 exd5 12


attack）13．．．莤b4＋ 14 新e7 15䊘 \(\times 6700\) ．White＇s king is stuck in the centre，and for the sacrificed pawn Black has attacking chances；
（a2） \(10 \ldots\)＠d3＋ 11 ＠xd3 cxd3 12 dxe6（if 12 㴓xd3 显b4）12．．．fxe6 13
 \(0-0-0\) gives White the advantage） 14崽xb7 Ed8 15 \＆\({ }^{2}\) d2（Nadera－Ye Rongguang，Jakarta 1993），and here，in the opinion of Ye Rongguang，instead of 15 ．．．ee 7 Black should have played 15．．．ec5，with counterplay for the sac－ rificed a6 pawn；
（b） \(9 \ldots \varrho \mathrm{~d} 3+10 \varrho \mathrm{xd} 3 \mathrm{cxd} 311 \mathrm{~Wb} 3\) （if 11 㟶xd3 c6 or 11．．．e6）11．．．览c8 12 \＆g5 ©d7 130000 c 5 ！ 14 dxc 6 （other－ wise \(15 \ldots .4\) ） \(14 \ldots\) ．．． Wc ．For the mo－ ment the d 3 pawn is immune，and Black has a comfortable game（Kuzmin－ Shutrov，USSR Team Ch．1964）．

If 7 e5？！Black replies 7．．．\＆xf3（7．．． Qd7 can be met by 8 e6！？fxe6 9 是xc4 g6 10 \＆e2，with fair compensation for the pawn） 8 gxf3 Qd5 9 exc4 Qb6 with advantage（Ardiansyah－Hort， Surakarta－Denpasar 1982）．
\[
7 \ldots \text { e5 }
\]

7．．．＠a5 comes into consideration （Black does not intend to part with his c4 pawn）：
宜 711 wic2 0－0 12 \＃adl c6 13 d 5 ！ （White has compensation for the pawn） 13．．．exd5 14 exd5 wc7 15 dxc6 bxc6 16 Qe2 Ead8 17 是d2 乌d7 18 气xa5 溇xa5 19 \＆xc6．White has restored material
equality，and after 19．．．©e5 20 se4 g6 the game was equal（Aloni－Van den Berg，Tel Aviv 1958）；
 with a complicated game（Livshitz－ Neishtadt，Leningrad 1964）．
\[
8 \text { dxe5 }
\]

If 8 d 5 Da5．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
8 & \ldots & \text { Qd7 } \\
9 & \text { \&xc4 } & \text { Qdxe5 }
\end{array}
\]


Black has a good position（Euwe）． After 10 §e2 §xf3（10．．．©e6 is also good） 11 gxf 3 包b4 \(120-0\) Wh4 13 f 4 d8 he seizes the initiative（Neikirch， Tsvetkov）．
lt should be mentioned that White can also play 10 Qxe5 Qxe5（10．．． \＆xd1 loses to 11 国xf7＋ 12 气g5＋ did 13 Exdl＋\(x=5\) ，when the knight cannot be taken on account of 14 f 4
 Exdl \＆e6 with roughly equal chances．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
1 & d 4 & d 5 \\
2 & c 4 & dxc 4 \\
3 & e 4 &
\end{tabular}


For a long time it was thought that the immediate occupation of the centre did not create any problems for Black， and that he could easily equalise by \(3 \ldots\) e5 or 3 ．．．c5．Nowadays 3 e4 is played frequently and with success，and it comprises one of the main branches of the Queen＇s Gambit Accepted．

Black＇s main replies are：
3．．．e5（15．1）
3．．．c5（15．2）－p． 246
3．．．2c6（15．3）－p． 254
3．．． 0 f6（15．4）－p． 262
How White should play after 3．．．b5？ was explained to their readers by the authors of the first treatises on reformed chess．However，the variation 4 a4 c6 5 axb5 cxb5 6 b3 cxb3 7 \＆xb5＋\(\& \mathrm{~d} 78\)
 in which White has the advantage，is
not altogether accurate：instead of 6．．． cxb3 Black can play 6．．．ib7，6．．．a5 7 bxc4 b4，or，more important，6．．．e5！ 7
 10 bxc4 bxc4 11 \＆xc4 \＆xe4 12 f 3 Qc6，equalising．These last two vari－ ations are given in Bilguer＇s Handbuch．

This means，firstly，that White should transpose moves－ 5 b 3 ，and only after \(5 . . . \mathrm{cxb} 3\) play \(6 \mathrm{axb5}\) ．And secondly， Black in turn can improve with 4．．．eb7， when after 5 axb5 \＆xe4 6 Qc3 \＆b7 7 Qf3 e6 8 \＆xc4 White stands better，but this is the maximum that Black can achieve in this rejected variation．

3．．．e6 4 \＆xc4 Qf65 Qc3c5 6 d 5 is considered under a different move order in the 3．．．c5 variation（p．250）．

> 15.1 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4)
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
3 & \ldots & e 5 \\
4 & \ddot{q} 3
\end{array}
\]

4 dxe5 \(\mathbf{w} \mathbf{w d 1}+5\) 家xdl does not promise White anything： \(5 . . .0 \mathrm{c} 66 \mathrm{f} 4\) （6 \＆xc4 Qxe5 7 定e2 is absolutely harmless for Black；after 7．．．是c5 8 \＆ e 4 f6 9 \＆g3 是e6 10 乌f3 \(0-0-0+\) it is White who has to try and equalise， Shevelev－Rublevsky，Paris 1993） 6．．．余g4＋（or 6．．．f6） 7 Qf3 \(0-0-0+8\)
 with an excellent game for Black （Polovodin－Ionov，St Petersburg 1992）．

After 4 d 5 in the old game La Bour－ donnais－McDonnell（match，London 1834）there followed 4．．．f5（4．．．⿹f6 5 Qc3 \＆c5 is also good enough to
equalise） 5 Dc3 Qf6 6 －xc4 \＆c5 7 Qf3 当e7 with chances for both sides．

The wild gambit 4 \＆xc4 is unjusti－

 （90－0－0！？）9．．．\＆e7 10 Eadl Kuzmin－ ykh－Somov（Leningrad 1946）a mistake by Black 10．．．e4？led to a crushing de－ feat： 11 Dxe4 憎xe4 12 Qg5．Correct was \(10 . . .0 \mathrm{gf6}\) ，when White is ahead in development，but Black is two pawns up．

Now Black has：
4．．．exd4（15．11）
4．．．官b4＋（15．12）－p． 244
4．．．\(\bigcirc \mathrm{f} 6\)（15．13）－p． 246
15.11 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 e5 4 Qf3）

\section*{4 ．．．exd4 \\ 5 \＆xc4}

After 5 飬xd4 對xd4 6 Qxd4 the game is simplified，and Black maintains the balance：
（a）6．．．\＆c5 7 Qb5 Qa6 8 \＆f4 \＆e6！
 \(0-012\) \＆e2 \＆ 4413 ＠f3 घac8 with a sound position（Nilsson－Ekström， Stockholm 1949）；
（b） \(6 \ldots . \mathrm{Df}^{7} 7 \mathrm{Qc} 3\)（or 7 f 3 ，as played in similar positions） 7 ．．．\＆c5 8 \＆e3（if 8 Qdb5 ©a6 9 \＆f4，then，as in the Nilsson－Ekstrom game，9．．．皿e6！ 10
 13 Qc7 घac8 14 Qxe6 Qxe6 15 f3 Qd4 16 0－0－0 b5 17 Qe2 Qc6，and thanks to his queenside pawn majority， Black＇s chances are even slightly pref－ erable，Zilberman－Bagirov，USSR 1985） 8．．．乌g4 9 Qd5 ©xe3 10 fxe3 ©a6 11是xc4 c6 12 \＆xa6 cxd5 13 §b5＋\＄ 7 14 exd5 \＆xd4 15 exd4．White＇s extra doubled pawn is of no significance，and in Mikhalchishin－Gulko（52nd USSR Ch．，Riga 1985）a draw was agreed．

After 5 Oxd4 Sc5 6 \＆e3 Qf6 7

 Qf6 12 adl Qg4 Black stands better （Yukhtman－Bagirov，Dnepropetrovsk 1970）．

We now consider：
5．．．定b4＋（15．111）
5．．． 0 c6（15．112）－p． 243
After 5．．．c5？6 Qe5！置e6 7 全xe6
 Eg8 11 掌xe6＋White wins a pawn．
15.111 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 e5 4 Qf3 exd4 5 \＆ exc 4 ）
\begin{tabular}{|c|}
\hline \multirow[t]{4}{*}{\begin{tabular}{l}
White in turn has two replies 6 \＆d2（15．1111） \\
6 Obd2（15．1112）－p． 239
\end{tabular}} \\
\hline \\
\hline \\
\hline \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

15．1111（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 e 4 e 5 4 Qf3 exd4 5 显xc4 \＆ \(\mathrm{e} 4+\) ）


7 ．．．Qc6
7．．．c5 leads to a sharp situation，but apparently favourable to White： 8 Qe5


12 Qd3 with a powerful position （Forintos－Radulov，Oberwart 1981.

If 7．．． 0 f6 there can follow 8 es 0 g 4 （8．．．9d5 is weak in view of 9 wb c6 10 宣xd5 cxd5 11 Qxd4 0－0 12 0－0 Qc6 13 Qxc6！bxc6 14 घacl §d7 15粠c3，when White establishes control over c5 and d4，Bagirov－Radulov， Vrnjacka Banja 1974） 9 h3 Qh6 10 0－0 \(0-0\)（or 10．．．ゆf5 11 Qb3 0－0 12 Qbxd4 ⿹xd4 13 Qxd4，Silakov－ Toprover，USSR 1972） 11 Qb3 Qc6 12 Qbxd4 ©xd4，transposing into the main line．

If 7．．．Qh6 \(80-0\) ，then：
（a）8．．．c5 9 Qb3 自e7 10 © cl with pressure on c5；after 10．．．b6 White gains an advantage by force： 11 §d5皿b7 12 Qxc5 bxc5 13 㟶a4＋
 17 国xb7 2d8 18 是d5 Qf5 19 Qe5！ （Partosch－Miles，Biel 1977）；
（b）8．．．0－0 9 Qb3 \({ }^{\mathrm{w}} \mathrm{e} 7\)（if \(9 \ldots . .0 \mathrm{c} 610\)宜b5！Qe7 11 茟c2 and Qbxd4） 10
 Qa5 13 皿e2 b6 14 b4 Qc6 15 Qd3 Ee8 \(16 \Xi \mathrm{fc} 1\) with somewhat the better prospects for White（Zilberstein－ Bagirov，USSR 1973）．

For 7．．．膤f6 \(80-0\) ©c6，cf．the notes to Black＇s 8th move．
\[
8 \quad 0-0
\]

Other continuations：

 （Azmaiparashvili－Kaidanov，Vilnius 1984）13．．． 2 g 6 with chances for both sides．

8 Ob3 d3 9 0－0 Qge7 10 榁xd3紫xd3 11 是xd3 是g4 12 \＆e2 0－000 with equal chances（Szabo－Matulovic， Vrsac 1979）．

\section*{8}

Qf6
Other possibilities：
8．．．當f6，and now：

（a） 9 Qb3 \(2 g 410\) Qbxd4 0－0－0！ （but not 10．．．巴d8 11 e5！Qxe5？ 12 䒼el）；
（b） 9 e5 显g6 10 \＆b5（ 10 wib3 Dge7 11 Efel 0－0 leads to a position from Azmaiparashvili－Kaidanov－cf．the note to White＇s 8th move；Hort＇s idea of \(10 \Xi \mathrm{El}\) Qge7 11 घe4！？is worth studying）10．．．Qge7 11 Qxd4 0－0 （Miles－Dlugy，Tunis 1985），when in－ stead of 12 Qxc6 \(\otimes x \mathrm{x} 6\) ，which led to a roughly equal position，Miles recom－ mended 12 22f3 ©xd4 13 光xd4 with some pressure，but 12．．．\＆h3！？ （R．Schwarz）needs testing；
（c） 9 凹el 0 ge7 10 b4a6（10．．． \(0 x\) xb 11 e5 崮g6 12 Qxd4 0－0 13 e6 favours White－I．Sokolov） 11 e5 㟶g6 12 wb宜e6 13 Qe4（best）13．．．0－0 14 Qc5
 Ed6 18 exf7＋ Qe6，or 18．．．Exf7 19 Qd3！with the threat of Qe5）（Lalic－Howell，Isle of Man 1994），when 19 adl（weaker is 19 Qxa6 ©d5！）would have given White an excellent position；
（d） 9 b4，when：
（d1） \(9 \ldots . .9 \times b 4\) again does not work in view of 10 e 5 Wg 11 wa4＋Qc6 12 Qxd4 \＆d7 13 e6 fxe6 14 \＆xe6；
（d2）9．．．Oge7 10 b5 ©a5 11 党a4
 White somewhat the better chances；
（d3） \(9 \ldots \mathrm{a}\) ． 10 El （also possible is 10 e5 学g6 11 乌b3 §g4 12 是d3， Shirov－Zs．Polgar，Brno 1991，or 10 a4 Qge7 11 b 5 ） \(10 \ldots\) ．．．ge 7 leads to a posi－ tion from the previous variation；
 Qge7 12 e5 \({ }^{\mathbf{w} f 4} 13\) e6！f6（Browne－ Espinosa，Linares 1993），when instead of 14 b5 White should have played 14 Ead1 0－0 15 b5 Qe5 16 Qxd4 with positional pressure（Browne）．

8．．．Oge7？！，and now：
（a） 9 Qb3 0－0 \(10 \triangleq \mathrm{fxd} 4 \triangleq \mathrm{xd} 411\)
 that looks promising for White，but 12．．．Ed8 13 Efdl
 to equalise（Taimanov－Polugayevsky， 31st USSR Ch．，Leningrad 1963）；
（b） \(9 母 \mathrm{~g} 5\) Qe5（9．．．0－0？ 10 w h 5\() 10\) \＆b3 \＆g4（relatively best；if \(10 \ldots\) h6？ 11 f4！） 11 Qxf7 + Qxf7 12 蒋xg4 \(0 x g 513\)当xg5 with the better position for White （Brameyer－Frank，East Germany 1965）；

8．．．当e7 9 \＆b5 今d7 10 \＆xc6 \＆xc6 11 Qxd4 \＆d7 12 wic2 c6（Mititelu－ Fuster，Siegen Olympiad 1970） 13 घfel with the better chances for White，e．g． 13．．．थh6 14 Q2b3 0－0 15 学c5．

8．．．Qh6 9 Qb3（the simple 9 h 3 ！？is also possible） \(9 \ldots 0-0\)（ \(9 \ldots . .1 \mathrm{~g} 410\)＠b5）
 Qxd4 Еd8 13 エadl 是d7 14 घd2，then Efd1，h2－h3，f2－f4 and \(\mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{f}} \mathrm{f}\)－e3 with the better chances（Seirawan）．
\[
9 \text { e5 Qg4 }
\]

After 9．．．\(\triangle\) d5：
（a） 10 w 3 is promising：
（a1） \(10 \ldots\) ．．©ce7 \(11 \quad\) ©xd4 \(0-0 \quad 12\)
 the better game for White（Bagirov－ Petrushin，Leningrad 1977）；
（a2）10．．．Qa5，when in Karpov－ Hubner（Germany 1994）White dem－ onstrated a clear plan for gaining an
advantage： 11 wbs＋！c6 12 wc5 b6（or
 afcl Qd7 16 b 4 ！with an enduring
 ＠d7 15 乌d4 घc8 16 De4；
（a3） \(10 \ldots\) ．．．e6 11 wiv7 Qde7 is weak in view of 12 \＆xe6 fxe6 13 嘗b3斃d7 14 Qg5（Radashkovich－Klovans， USSR 1969）；
（b） \(10 \triangleq\) b3 is less good： \(10 \ldots 0-0\)（if \(10 \ldots\) Qb6 11 ＠b5 \＆d7 12 Qc5 with advantage－Anand） 11 Qbxd4 Dxd4 \(^{2}\) 12 歯xd4（12＠xd4 ©f4）12．．．थb6 13
 \＆xe6 fxe6） 15 ．．．憎e7 16 曾e3 \＆xb3 17 Uxb3 Ead8 White has no advantage （Karpov－Anand，Linares 1992）．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
10 & \mathrm{~h} 3 \\
11 & \text { Qhb }
\end{array}
\]


11．．．Df5 and now：
（a） 12 新d3 12．．．0－0 13 घfe 1 ，when：
 Ed8 15 e6！，D．Gurevich－Dlugy，Estes Park 1984） 15 Dc5（Dalko－Bayer，corr． 1968）leads to an advantage for White；
（a2）13．．． 2 h 4 ！enables Black to




and a draw was agreed（G．Flear－Slipak， Mallorca 1991）；
（b） 12 \＆b5（Taimanov）12．．．愛d5 13

歯d4，C．Flear－Slipak，Mallorca 1991， 17．．．c6 with an equal position）13．．．公fxd4 14 Qxd4 \＆d7！ 15 ＠xc6（15
 with equality．

11．．．0－0 12 Qbxd4（12 Ёl！？－ Gipslis）12．．． \(0 x 44\) ：

 and now the outwardly active move 15 Qb5（simply 15 adl！is more promis－ ing）allowed Black to maintain equality
 Efd8（Forintos－Tringov，Sarajevo 1965）；
 gives White the better chances） 14 Qxf5
 16．．．aab8（Black should play 16 ．．． \(9 x h 3\)
气d5 Eg6 20 挡e3 \＆xh3 21 f 5 Zg 522 e6 fxe6 23 Ef4 White parried the attack and gained a winning position （S．Ivanov－Rublevsky，Chelyabinsk 1991）．
15.1112 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 e4 e5


White avoids the exchange of the dark－square bishops．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
6 & \ldots & 0 c 6 \\
7 & 0-0
\end{array}
\]

If 7 a3 White has to reckon with the opponent holding the pawn：7．．．＠xd2＋
 8．．．是g4．
\[
7 \ldots \text {... Df6 }
\]

Other continuations：
7．．．ᄋe6 8 ＠xe6 fxe6：

（a） \(9 \triangleq\) b3，and now：
（al） \(9 \ldots\) e．．es？is weak in view of 10
 and 13 wb4，when Black also loses the d4 pawn；
（a2）9．．．d3 10 昷e3 Qf6 11 Qbd4 Qxd4 12 Qxd4 clearly favours White （Renet－Schulz，Altensteig 1988）；
（a3）9．．．\({ }^{\mathbf{w}} \mathrm{d} 710\) Qbxd4 \(\mathrm{Qx}^{2} 11\)
 White has restored material equality and obtained a favourable endgame （Taimanov－Peterson，Kiev 1964）；
（a4）9．．．\(\triangle \mathrm{f} 610\) Øfxd4 \(\circlearrowright x d 4\)（not 10．．． \(0 x\) xe4 in view of 11 Wh5tg6 12 Wg4，Miles－Rivas，Montilla 1978） 11 Qxd4 Wivi 12 Qxe6！当xe6 13 当a4＋
霛c2（M．Gurevich－Gurgenidze，Sverd－ lovsk 1984），and now 16．．．c6 17 Edl Ethe8 18 h 3 （or 18 b4 we6 19 \＆b2

名g8）18．．．皆e6 would have enabled Black to maintain the balance；
（b） 9 Qc4 Df6 10 a3 Se7 11 b4 Qxe4 12 b5 鸴d5！ 13 bxc6 寝xc4 14 De5 単d5 15 cxb7 Еb8 16 罗a4＋c6 17 Qxc6 Exb7 with a double－edged position and chances for both sides （Zak－Grechkin，Leningrad 1947）；
（c）the pawn sacrifice 9 bu3 also needs testing：9．．．exd2 10 \＆xd2（10畨xe6＋ 110 g 5 9d8 12 f 4.

7．．．曾f6 and now：

（a） 8 e5 \(\begin{aligned} & \text { wig6，when：}\end{aligned}\)
（a1） 9 Qh4 㮩g4 10 Qdf3 是e6 11 h 3 （11 \＆xe6 fxe6 12 㮰3 Oge7 13 h 3畒e4 is unclear－Yusupov）11．．．We4 12 \＆d3 览d5 13 Og5 \＆e7（declining the gift；after 13．．． Qxe5 \(^{\text {1 }} 14\) \＆e4 or 13．．．
 Sxc6 bxc6 17 Qxe6 fxe6 18 Qxd4， Bönsch－Chekhov，Halle 1987，White gains definite compensation）and in a double－edged struggle White managed to create strong threats： 14 \＆e4 \(\frac{W}{\mathrm{E}} \mathrm{d} 715\)

 19．．．】d5 20 b4 \＆d4 21 2f5 \＆xe5 22 El（Timman－Tal，Montpellier 1987）；
（a2） 9 a3 \＆e7 10 घe1 \＆e6，when：
（a21） 11 b4 a6 12 we2 Oh6 13 显d3 \＆f5 14 Qe4 0 g 4 ，and thanks to the
tactical possibility of ．．．De3（after 15 \＆f4 or 15 \＆b2）Black neutralised the opponent＇s threats（Karpov－Timman， Amsterdam 1988）；
（a22） 11 \＆xe6 喽xe6 12 Qb3 was recommended by Karpov and Zaitsev， but in Flear＇s opinion Black has the sound reply \(12 \ldots 0-0-0 \quad 13\) Qbxd4 Qxd4 14 Qxd4 wiv7 15 昷e3 崖c5，and
 Exd4 19 \＆xd4 ©e7．

 Qd7 13 dl and，thanks to his two bishops，White＇s chances are somewhat preferable（Belyavsky－Chekhov，52nd USSR Ch．，1984）；
 \＆b5 \＆d7 10 b 3 ！）8．．．实e6 9 国xe6 fxe6 10 媍b3 装d7 11 Eac1 with good compensation for the pawn（Miles－ Ullrich，West Germany 1983／4）．

7．．．哣e7，and now：

是b5 \＆d7 10 是x6 \＆xc6 11 Qxd4 §d7 12 Oc4 \＆b6 13 Df5！對f6 14 §f4 with a clear advantage to White （Gipslis－Remert，Riga 1970）；
（b） 8 Qb3 \＆g4 9 Qbxd4，when：
（bl）9．．．乌e5？ 10 Qxe5！§xd1 11



Qb3 Qf6 17 Qxh8 Exh8 18 f3 （Tukmakov－Avner，Örebro 1966），with a decisive advantage to White；
（b2） \(9 . . .0 \mathrm{xd} 410 \mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{wd}} \mathrm{x} 4\) with some－ what the better prospects for White；
（c） \(8 \% \mathrm{~d} 5\) \＆d7 9 Qc4 Qf6 10 是g 5 h6 11 \＆h4 g5 12 ＠g3 Oxe4 13 a 3 Oxg3 14 hxg 3 定c5 15 b4 是b6 16 El定e6 17 是xe6 fxe6 18 b5！with strong pressure on d 4 and e6（Ftacnik－ Speelman，Moscow 1985）．

7．．．ゆh6？ 8 乌b3 昷g4 9 \＆d5 with advantage to White（Korchnoi－Mestro－ vic，Sarajevo 1968）．


8 e5 Qd5
8．．． 2 g 4 can be met by 9 h 3 Qh6 10 g4！？

\section*{9 Qb3}

9 a3 comes into consideration 9．．．
 Qde7 12 b 4 with advantage to White， Arensibia－Barua，Calcutta 1988） 10

 with the more active position for White （Murshed－Prasad，Calcutta 1988）．
\[
9 \ldots \text { 分b6 }
\]

Or 9．．．0－0 10 ©bxd4 with some in－ itiative for White（Dorfman－Barua， Delhi 1982）．

\section*{10 \＆b5}

10 \＆g5 \＆e7 11 \＆xe7 is the alterna－ tive：
（a） \(11 \ldots\) ．．xe7 12 §d3（or 12 \＆e2
 c6 16 \＆f1＠e6 17 Qbd4 \＆d5 with chances for both sides，Bareev－ Rublevsky，Oviedo 1992），and now：
（al）12．．．\＆f5 13 Qfxd4 显xd3 14
 when：

（all）16．．．声c4？ 17 㥩xc4 Qxc4 18 Ecl Qxe5 19 Exc7 Qd5 20 Exb7 with a won ending for White（Belyavsky－ Tal，Reykjavik 1988）；
（a12）16．．．Ead8 17 Df5！We6 18
 winning position（Flear）；
（a13）16．．．Dc6 17 Qxc6 Wxc6 18
 Hübner，Barcelona 1989），and 20 \＃d4 Effe8 21 Ёcl Eac8 22 f 4 would have retained White＇s initiative；
（a2）12．．．ig4 13 Qbxd4 Qed5！ （13．．．Qg6 14 h 3 \＆xf3 15 ©xf3 0－0） 14 h3 气h5 15 䒼b3 0－0；
（a3） \(12 \ldots\) ．．．g6 13 Qfxd4 Qf4（not
 16 Qf3；after 13．．．0－0 White gains the better chances by 14 f 4 Qd5 15 䊦d2） 14 \＆b5＋c6 15 曹ff！（15 Qxc6 bxc6 16

is unclear），when White＇s position looks the more promising（Ftacnik－Cu．Hansen （Yerevan Olympiad 1996）；
（b）11．．．


12 昷b5 气d7 13 是xc6 显xc6 14 Qfxd4 \＆d5（if 14．．．是d7 15 షcl c6 16 Qc5 with advantage to White） 15 W W 4 ， and now：
（bl）15．．．g6？！ 16 Efel \(0-0\)（if \(16 \ldots\) Se6 White has the promising 17 Qxe6 fxe6 18 玉acl 0 d 519 Dc5 \＆if7 20
 Qf5 with advantage to White（Kaspar－ ov－Hubner，Skelleftea 1989）；
 \＆xg7 17 Qf5＋\＄8 18 ©xe7，since 18．．．\＆xb3 19 axb 3 efe8 leads to an equal position） \(16 \mathrm{f4}\)（ 16 fel can be met by \(16 \ldots\) ．．．e6 17 分xe6 fxe6 18 玉ac Qd5 19 Qc5 \(\Xi \mathrm{fe} 820\) Qxb7 玉ab8 and ．．．モxb2 with a double－edged position； compared with Kasparov－Hubner Black＇s king and king＇s rook are much better placed）16．．．g6 17 Qf5 wivi 18
 21 Qf5＋\＆h8 22 Qe7 Qd5 23 Qxd5㥩xd5（I．Sokolov－Hubner，Haifa 1989）． Black was able to parry the threats to his king（the advance of the h－pawn or the switching of a rook）and the game ended in a draw．

Other continuations：
 and in view of the threat of e5－e6 Black is in some difficulties：

（a） \(12 \ldots\) ．\(\times\) b5（if \(12 \ldots 0-0\) the simple 13 §d3 is good） 13 0xb5 a6（13．．．喓xd1？ 14 Exd1 or 13．．．c6 14 豈g4！） 14
 winning a pawn（Yusupov）；
㥪xdl（14．．．0－0 is weak in view of 15誛xd8 Exxd8 16 Qxc7 Eac8 17 \＆f4 or 15．．．巴axd8 16 \＆e3） 15 Exd1 0－0 16 Qxc7 Eac8 17 \＆f4 with advantage to White（Yusupov－Ruefenacht，Mexico 1980）．

10．．．0－0 11 \＆xc6 bxc6 12 Qbxd4
出xb5 16 axb4 cxb4 17 Qg5 g6 18
 led to an equal position in Speelman－ Hubner（Munich 1992）．

\section*{11 Qbxd4}

Other continuations：
 Qxb4 \({ }^{\mathbf{w}} \mathrm{wb4}\) with an equal game （Portisch－Hubner，Tilburg 1988）．

11 \＆xc6＋喽xc6 12 \＆d2！？（Black has no problems after 12 Qbxd4 13 We2 \＆g4！and ．．．0－0－0）12．．．皿e7 （12．．．＠xd2 13 监xd2 gives White the

（Matulovic recommends 14．．．d3 15 Del
 double－edged position） 15 ■c4 d3 16 Ed4，and now instead of \(16 \ldots\) ．．． 6 ？（the bishop was needed to defend the d3 pawn） 17 Qel 0－0 18 Qxd3 when White gained a material advantage （Dokhoian－Kristensen，Copenhagen 1991） Black should have considered 16．．．9b6．

 We5 14 Qxb4 㥩xb4 with an equal game（Pr．Nikolic－Matulovic，Yugo－ slavia 1984）．

After 11．．．0－0 12 Qxc6（12 是xc6 bxc6 13 骎c2 c5 transposes into a posi－ tion from Speelman－Hubner，p．242）
 Black has no problems（Solozhenkin－ Rublevsky，Paris 1993）．

15．112（1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 e5 4 （2f3 exd4 5 道xc4）
\begin{tabular}{lll}
5 & \(\ldots\) & Qc6 \\
6 & \(0-0\) & ＠e6
\end{tabular}

After 6．．．显c5（Stein－Kvyatkovsky， Ukrainian Ch．1959）White conducted the offensive in the spirit of an open gambit： 7 Qg5 ©h6 8 ©xf7 \(0 x f 79\)


We7 12 㥩c2 \＆e6 13 f 4 with good attacking chances．

6．．．Oh6 was played in Shamkovich－ Alatortsev（Leningrad 1951），which

 （after 11．．．cxd5 12 Qxd5 White devel－ ops a strong attack） 12 Qe4 Qf5 13 wa4．White stands better．

6．．．\({ }^{2} \mathrm{~g} 4\)（Pytel－Castro，Dortmund 1977）is not good：after 7 Wb3 \begin{tabular}{l} 
wid \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
 ㅇd7 11 㟶a6 White won a pawn．

6．．．g6 was refuted in Lehmann－ Bellon（Malaga 1970）： 7 e5！©g7 8
 10 ©xf7 \(0 \times f 711 \mathrm{e}\) ．

From modern games we should mention Notkin－Nenashev（Cappelle la Grande 1995），in which Black tried to hold the d 4 pawn by \(6 \ldots .\). ¢f6 7 e5 De4
 Qe6）10．．．De6（ \(10 \ldots . x b 4\) fails to 11 e6！fxe6 12 乌e5，or \(11 \ldots\) Qxe6 12 乌e5
 Wh5＋） 11 b5（or 11 a3！？）11．．．©cd8 12 Qbd2 and White has the initiative for the sacrificed pawn（Notkin）．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
7 & \& x e 6 & \text { fxe6 } \\
8 & \text { bu } & \text { dive } 7
\end{array}
\]


This variation occurred in three games from the Romania－Georgia match（Bucharest 1961）：

（a）10．．．⿹f6 11 Qbd2 看e7 12 a 300 （Mititelu－Giorgadze），when with 13 b4！ followed by \＆b2 and 玉ac1 White could have counted on an advantage；
（b） \(10 \ldots\) \＆d6 11 a 3 Qf6 12 ⓐl e5 （Ghitescu－Buslaev），when White should have played 13 b4，e．g． \(13 \ldots 0-014\)
 advantage．

In Gheorghiu－Djindjihashvili White picked up a different pawn－ 9 gg5 0－0－0 10 ⿹xe6，but \(10 \ldots\) ．．．e8 11 Qxf8 Exf8 12 乌d2 g5 gave Black equal chances．

> \begin{tabular}{|l|} \hline \(15.12(1 \mathrm{~d} 4 \mathrm{~d} 52 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 43 \mathrm{e} 4 \mathrm{e} 54\) \\ \(0 \mathrm{f} 3)\) \end{tabular}

4 ．．．\＆b4＋
This can transpose into variations considered earlier．Here we will exam－ ine other alternatives．

5 Dc3


5 Qbd2 invites 5．．．c3，when after 6 bxc3＠xc3 7 Ebl Black plays 7．．．De7！ 8 皿40－0 \(90-0\) ？（an incorrect piece
sacrifice； 9 dxe5 was essential） \(9 . .\). exd4
 and White＇s attack came to a halt （Westerinen－Fahnenschmidt，Bad Mon－ dorf 1972）．
 Qbxd2 exd4 leads to variation 15．11） 6．．．exd4 White has：
（a） 7 WIXd4，and now：
 Qc6 10 保6 是xc6 11 Qc3 Ed8 12 \＆e2 ©f6 13 f 3 with slightly the better chances（Karpov－Seirawan，Skelleftea 1989）；
（a2） \(7 .\). Qf6（Black invites the oppo－ nent himself to exchange queens） 8
 Qe5 is soundly met by \(10 \ldots\) ．．．c6 11 Qxc6＋bxc6，as was confirmed by Timman－Salov，Sanghi Nagar 1994，or 11 Qxc4 ©e7）10．．．Dbd7（or 10．．．فe7 11 Qxe6 fxe6 12 \＆xc4 घ゙d8 13 f 3 Qc6 14 Еdl \(\Xi x d 1+15\) xd1 \(\Xi \mathrm{d} 8+16\) 家 cl g5，Karpov－Ivanchuk，Roquerbrune 1992） 11 Qxe6＋fxe6 12 苗xc4 e5 13 f3 c6 14 § 2 \＆ 7 （Miles－Rachels，USA 1989），in each case with an equal posi－ tion；
 （or 9．．．皿e6 10 Qxe6 学xe6 11 业d4 Qc6 12 Wex4） 10 \＆xc4 c5 11 Qde2 Ed8 12 w e3 and White＇s position is preferable（Andersson－Seirawan，Til－ burg 1990）．
\[
5 \text {... exd4 }
\]

5．．．〇f6 leads to a complicated game： 6 Qxe5（the tactical justification of Black＇s move is that after 6 罗a4＋© 6 7 d 5 he has the strong reply \(7 \ldots\) ．．． 9 xe 4 ！ 8

 obvious advantage－Bareev）6．．．b5 7
 Qxe4 10 \＆f3 \(0-0\) needs testing） 9 \＆g5．For the pawn White has a very
active position（Bareev－Ivanchuk， Linares 1992）．

\section*{6 当xd4}

Or \(60 x d 4\) ，and now：
（a）6．．．皆e7 7 \＆xc4！，when：

（a1）7．．．\({ }^{\text {bue4 }} 4+\) is extremely danger－ ous：
（a11） 8 家f1 气xc3（8．．． testing） 9 bxc3 ©e6（if 9．．．De7 10
 Ele with strong threats） 10 w b3（or 10

 f6 16 【h3 and wins，Shirov－Hubner， Dortmund 1992）10．．．定xc4＋ 11 临x4 Qc6 12 \＆g5 wiv6 \(13 \mathrm{Ee} 1+\) with a powerful attack（Alburt－Romanishin， Kiev 1978）；
（a12） 8 §e3 §xc3＋ 9 bxc3 Qe7？！（if
 or \(9 \ldots .9 \mathrm{f} 610\) 㟶 \(4+\) ） 100000011 El Og 6 （ \(11 \ldots \mathrm{w} 4\) is more tenacious） 12 ecl！峟g4 13 显a3．Black is seri－ ously behind in development（Dreev－ R．Scherbakov，Borzhomi 1988）；
（a2） \(7 .\). ． ff 6 （it is more sensible to decline the pawn sacrifice） \(80-00-09\)是g5 定xc3 10 是xf6（the piece sacrifice
 gxf6 13 Wh6 Qc6 14 Eae1 Qxd4 15 cxd4 and \(\pm\) also needs testing， Hertneck－Westerinen，Manila Olympiad
隚x6 with an equal position（Alburt－ Zaltsman，New York 1983）；
（b）6．．． De 7 （more restrained） 7 \＆xc4 （Epishin－Godena，Reggio Emilia 1995／6 saw the interesting positional pawn sacrifice 7 \＆f4 Og6 8 ＠g3 党e7

 idea of h2－h4）7．．．Qbc6，when：

 \(10 \mathrm{f3}\)（or 10 宫c2 乌a5）10．．．0－0－0＋11飠2 \＆e6 12 ＠xe6＋fxe6 13 §e3 a6 does not promise White any advantage （Alburt－Rachels，USA 1989）；
（b2） 8 \＆ e 3 0－0 9 Qdb5！？，when Black has：
（b21） \(9 \ldots\) ．．．d7（ \(9 \ldots\) \＆ e 5 is also pos－
 axb6 \(13 \mathrm{f4}\) Qa7（otherwise he has to reckon with White＇s pressure on c7） 14 Qxa7 Exa7 150－0 \＄h8 16 W＇tb3．White stands better（Vyzhmanavin－Bagirov， Podolsk 1992）；
（b22）9．．．＠e6 10 气xe6 fxe6 11賞xd8（11 0－0 a6）11．．．玉axd8 12 Qxc7敋7 13 Q7b5（forced，since if 15 a 3 \＆xc3＋ 16 bxc3 a6，cutting off the knight＇s retreat）13．．．a6 14 Qa3 b5 15
 18 0－0－0 Еc8 19 Ehel（19 \＆el！？－ Nogueiras）19．．．©e5 \(20 \Xi \mathrm{e} 307 \mathrm{~g} 6\) ，and

White has compensation for the pawn （Azmaiparashvili－Nogueiras，Yerevan Olympiad 1996）．


Now after 7．．．＠f6 8 f 3 there can follow：
（a）8．．．丹d7 9 \＆xc4 Qc6 10 Qxc6 \＆xc6 11 是f4 Qd7（or 11．．．0－0 12 \(0-0-0\) ，Keres－Khalilbeili，Moscow 1960） 12 Ecl（after \(120-0-0\) \＆xc3 13 bxc3 0－0－0 14 §g3 Еhf8 15 e5 Еde8 16 Ehel White＇s chances，despite his two bishops，are minimal，Karpov－ Radulov，Leningrad 1977）12．．．f6 13 a3 ＠xc3＋14 Exc3 Qe5 15 \＆e2 0－0－0 16 b4 \＆a4 17 安f2 Ehe8 18 Ehc1 Ee7 19 h 4 with the more promising position for White（Bagirov－Barua，Frunze 1984）；
（b）8．．．a6 9 \＆xc4 b5 10 §e2 c5， when：
（b1） 110 c 2 皿 a 5 ：

（bl1） 12 \＆d2 \＆e6 13 e5 Qfd7 14 f 4 Qc6 15 \＆f3 घc8 16 Qe4 \＆xd2＋ （16．．．＠c7 17 Qg5！） 17 ©xd2 0－0 （Rashkovsky－Lerner，Lvov 1981） 18 Ehd1！with the initiative for White；
（b12） 12 dif2 品e6 13 \＆e3 Qbd7 14 Ehdl \(0-015 \mathrm{~g} 4\) Efd8 16 g 5 Qe8 17 Qd5 with the more active position for White（Azmaiparashvili－Lerner，USSR 1981）；
（b2）from recent games we should mention the plan of pressure on c 5 ， employed in Karpov－Zs．Polgar（Roque－ brune 1993）： 11 Qb3 是e6 12 ＠e3 Qbd7 13 家f2 Eacl 登e7 16 g 4 h 617 h 4 Dc4 18 \＆xc4 \＆xc4 19 e5 ©d7 20 Qd5＋是xd5 21 Exd5 c4 22 ©d4 g6 23 a3 \＆a5 24 Edl．White has the initiative．

\subsection*{15.13 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 e5 4 Qf3）}
\(\begin{array}{lll}4 & \cdots & 9 \\ 5 & 0\end{array}\)
5 \＆xc4
The alternative is \(50 x e 5\) ，as played in Portisch－Pr．Nikolic（Amsterdam
 Qc3！0－0（if 7．．． \(9 x \mathrm{xc} 3\) ？ 8 ＠xf7＋©f8 9 bxc3 \(\mathrm{exc}^{2}+10\) 敋f1 with the threat of \＆a3＋） \(80-0\) Qd6（not \(8 \ldots . .2 x \mathrm{x} 39 \mathrm{bxc} 3\) \＆xc3？in view of 10 Qxf7 Exf7 11
 wins；after the comparatively best 9．．．\({ }^{\text {\＆}}\) d6 White stands better－Portisch） 9 \＆b3 Ec6 10 Qd5！\＆a5 11 黆5！ White gained the advantage．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
5 & \cdots & \text { xe4 } \\
6 & 0-0
\end{array}
\]

6 Qc3 0d6 7 dxe5 also comes into consideration．
\[
6 \ldots \text { 㿾e7 }
\]

After 6．．．0d6 7 \＆b3 e4 8 包 5 皿e7 9 Qc3 White has the advantage：9．．． Qd7 10 Qxe4！Qxe5 11 dxe5 Qxe4 12

 （Gutman－J．Adamski，Giessen 1992）．

Now after 7 Qxe5 0 d 68 \＆ Q 3 White has the initiative（Bagirov－Mukhin， USSR 1975）．
15.2 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4）
\(3 \ldots\) c5

White has：
4 － 0 （ 15.21 ）
4 d5（15．22）－p． 249

\subsection*{15.21 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 e 4 c 5 ）}

\section*{4 Df3 exd4}
 \(W_{x d 4}\) is considered under other vari－ ations．

\section*{5 細xd4}

50 xd 4 is weak in view of \(5 \ldots\) ．．．5．
The gambit idea 5 §xc4 Qc6 600 is worth considering：

（a） \(6 \ldots\) e5 is very dangerous；after 7 Qg5 ©h6 8 f4 \＆e7 9 㥩550－0 10 f5挡d6 11 乌a3 a6 12 日f3 今d7 13 乌d2 and \(\pm\) afl White built up a decisive at－ tack（Piskov－Dragomaretsky，Moscow 1989）；
（b） \(6 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 67 \mathrm{e} 5\) 是g78 8 el e 69 回f4 Qge7 10 Qbd2 0－0 11 Qe4 with good compensation for the pawn（Haik－ Radulov，Smederevska Palanka 1982）；
（c）6．．．e6，when：
（c1） 7 e5 Qge7 8 Qbd2 \(Q \mathrm{~g} 69\) 日el \＆e7 10 a3 0－0 11 b4 b6（Black does better to play 11．．．f6，e．g． 12 exf6 \(\mathrm{exf6}^{2}\) 13 Qe4 ©ce5！ 14 Qxe5 ©xe5 15 \＆b3
 \＆h4，Shneider－Kaidanov，USSR 1987）

compensation for the pawn（Dokhoian－ Yakovich，USSR 1986）；
（c2） 7 a 3 ，when \(7 \ldots\) isd6 is a sound reply： 8 b4 Qf6 9 b5（Shirov－Kramnik， Oakham 1992）9．．．Qe5 10 Qxe5 \＆xe5 \(11 \mathrm{f4}\) \＆c7 12 e5 0 d 5 with a comfor－ table game for Black．
\[
5 \ldots \text { 当xd4 }
\]

If Black avoids the exchange of queens－5．．．\＆d7 6 Qc3 e6，White gains the freer game by 7 De5！Qf6 8 Qxc4（Miles－Korchnoi，Tilburg 1985）．

\section*{6 Qxd4}

Despite the early exchange of queens and the symmetrical pawns，White＇s lead in development and centralised pieces give him the better chances．Black still has work to do in order to equalise．

6 ．．．\＆ \(\mathrm{d}_{7}\)
Or 6．．．a6 7 \＆xc4 e6 8 \＆e3，and now：
（a） \(8 \ldots\) ．．． f 69 f 3 ，when：

（al）Taimanov－Nei（Moscow 1964） showed that Black＇s position is not without its dangers： \(9 \ldots \mathrm{~b} 610\) 0d2 气b7 11 ゆf2 Qbd7 12 是e2 \＆c5 13 a3 e5？ （even without this poor move Black would have faced a difficult defence） 14 Qf5 g6 15 \＆xc5 gxf5 16 \＆d6 fxe4 17 玉acl \＃g8 18 Oc4 \＃g6 19 Ehdl exf3 20 gxf3 2 d 5 （otherwise 21 \＆b4） 21 ＠d3 Eh6 22 \＆e4 日c8（after

22．．．Exh2＋ 23 g3 two black pieces are attacked） 23 \＆b4 Qxb4 24 \＆xb7 Ec7 25 axb 4 b 526 Øe3 \(\mathbf{E x h} 2+27\) \＄g Excl 28 Excl and White won；
（a2） \(9 \ldots\) ．．．b4＋ 10 Qd2 Qbd7 would seem to be relatively best： 11 a3 \＆d6 12 Ecl De5 13 会e2 气d7 14 Q4b3 0－0 15 \＆d4 \(\Xi \mathrm{fc} 8\)（Mascarinas－Murshed， Cebu 1992）；
（b）8．．．©c5 9 Qd2 Qc6，when the tactical operation 10 Qxe6！\＆xe3 11 Qc7＋© d8 12 ©xa8 brought White a material advantage，since he was able to free his knight：12．．．\＆ 713 \＆d5 Qge7 14 \＆xc6 bxc6 15 Qc4 皿e6 16 b3是xc4 17 bxc4 \＄c8 18 \＃bl（Ornstein－ Radulov，Pamporovo 1981）．

After 6．．．Qf6 the sharp continuation 7 e5 Qfd7 8 e6！？is interesting．In Speelman－Seirawan（Roquebrune 1992） after some interesting tactics－8．．． 2 e5 9 Qa3 乌d3＋ 10 \＆e2 \＆xe6 11 Qxe6 Qxcl＋ 12 Excl fxe6 13 Db5！White achieved an excellent position．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
7 & \text { §xc4 } & \text { Qc6 } \\
8 & \text { Qxc6 }
\end{array}
\]

The alternative is to maintain the tension by 8 \＆e3 \(0 f 69 \mathrm{f} 3 \mathrm{e} 610\) Øb3：
（a） \(10 \ldots\). b4 11 Фa3 \＆e7 12 ゆf2 0－0 13 Qc5 日fc8！（M．Gurevich－ Yakovich，53rd USSR Ch．1986，went 13．．．\＆ l 6 14 Qd3 日fd8 15 Qxb4 \＆ eb 4 16 Ehdl with some initiative for White） 14 Qxd7（not 14 Qxb7？玉ab8 15 立5
 14．．． \(0 x\) xd 15 Ehdl Qb6 16 \＆b3 \＆c5 with an equal game（M．Gurevich）；
 13 dif2 b5 14 Ehdl Se7 15 g 4 e5 with an equal position（Chernin－Seirawan， Wijk aan Zee 1991）．
\[
\begin{array}{ll}
8 & \\
9 & \text { f3 }
\end{array}
\]

White delays the development of his knight，in order after \＆e 3 to develop it
at d 2 ，and by \(\otimes \mathrm{c} 4\) or \(\Theta \mathrm{b} 3-\mathrm{c} 5(\mathrm{a} 5)\) to put pressure on the opponent＇s queenside．

He can also play 9 ©c3 e6（as al－ ready mentioned，in such positions 9．．． e5 is normally unfavourable for Black：
 \＆e7 13 昷g5＋Qf6 14 \＆c4 and then \＆d5 with advantage to White，Szabo－ Rukavina，Sochi 1973），and now：
（a） 10 Qb5 \({ }^{2} b 4+11\) §d2 \(\& x d 2+12\)
 with an equal ending（Spasov－Osnos， Plovdiv 1982）；
（b） 10 \＆e3 \＆b4 11 f 3 Qf6 12 たe2 （Tisdall－Shvidler，Haifa 1989）and in－ stead of exchanging on c3 Black should play 12．．．\(\$ 7\) followed by ．．． 0 d 7 and ．．．Ehc8，equalising（Shvidler）；
（c） 10 回b5 日c8 11 国xc6＋Еxc6 12 \＆e3 a6 13 a 3 Qf6 14 家e2 显d6 15 f 4 e5 16 f 5 Qg4 17 \＆d2 \＆c5 18 h 3 Qf6 19 g 4 §d4 followed by ．．．＠d7－c5 with equal chances（Nalbandian－Lputian， Protvino 1993）．

\begin{tabular}{lll}
9 & \(\cdots\) & \(e 6\) \\
10 & \＆e3 & Qf6 \\
11 & Qd2！ & Qd7
\end{tabular}

Or 11．．．\＆d6 12 \＆e2 ©d7 13 曹f2 ©e7 14 Ehcl Ëhc8 15 Qc4 是c7 16 \(\Xi \mathrm{c} 2\) and \({ }_{\mathrm{mal}}\) with the initiative for

White（Portisch－Seirawan，Reykjavik 1991）．

Chernin－A．Greenfeld（Pardubice 1993）now continued \(12 \Xi c 1\) Qe5 13皿e2 \＆e7 14 Qb3 0－0 \(150-0\) ．White＇s position is preferable．
15.22 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 c5）
\[
4 \quad \text { d5 }
\]

We consider：
4．．．e6（15．221）
4．．． 9 f 65 Qc3 b5！？（15．222）－p． 251
15.221 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 e4 c5 4 d5）
\[
4 \ldots \text { e6 }
\]

4．．．b5 5 a4 Qf6 6 Qd2（or 6 企c2 Qa6！，and if 7 axb5 0 b 48 曾xc4 e6！） 6．．．b4 7 是xc4 g6，and now：
（a）an extremely sharp situation arises after 8 e5 0 fd 7 （ \(8 . . .0 \mathrm{xd5} 9\) Qe4！） 9 e6 fxe6 10 dxe6 Qe5 11 \＆b5＋ Qbc6 12 挡e2 \＆\({ }^{2} 7\)（Yashvili－Efimov， USSR 1989）．If White wins a piece by


 followed by ．．．\({ }^{\text {gch } 7 ~ a n d ~ . . . m a d 8 ~ h e ~}\) comes under a strong attack；
（b）it is therefore better to prepare the advance of the central pawn，e．g．by 8学b3 \＆g7 9 a5 0－0 10 e5 乌fd7 \(11 \mathrm{f4}\) ， when the play is in his favour（Plaskett－ Ray，London 1990）．
\[
5 \text { \&xc4 }
\]

Or 5 ©c3 exd5，when：
（a） 6 exd5 6．．．⿹f6 7 \＆xc4 a6，and now：
（a1） 8 a 4 §d6（8．．．wel w 7 followed by ．．．是e7 needs testing） 9 畄e2＋，when：
（all）on the basis of Kuuskmaa－ Schrancz（corr．1981）the variation used to be evaluated in favour of White：after
 ＠f4！） 11 ＠g5 §f5 12 Qge2 followed by 0 g 3 －e 4 he achieved an excellent position；
（a12）9．．．\＆e7（9．．．df8 also comes into consideration，with the idea of completing the development of the kingside by ．．．h7－h6，．．．g7－g5 and ．．．\({ }^{\circ} \mathrm{g} 7\) ） 10 w c 2 （White prevents ．．．ef5 and moves the queen off the e－file） \(10 \ldots\)
 Qge2 \＆xg3 14 hxg 3 Qbd7 15 Edl De5 16 ＠a2 c4 \(170-0\) b5 and Black seized the initiative（Kakageldyev－ Lima，Biel 1993）；
（a2） 8 \＆f4，allowing ．．．b7－b5，is interesting：

 （or 10 d 6 粠xe2＋ 11 \＆xe2 \＆b7 12 \＆f3， R．Scherbakov－Lazarev，Katowice 1992） 10．．．bxc4 11 営d2 did8 12 صf3，with a dangerous attack for the sacrificed piece （Alterman－Afek，Israel 1992）；
（a22）Black should not be in a hurry to play ．．．b7－b5：8．．．sd6 9 紧 \(\mathrm{e} 2+\mathrm{f} 8\) leads to a complicated game with chances for both sides；
（b） 6 Qxd5 Qc6（6．．．Qe7 7 \＆xc4 Qxd5 8 \＆xd5 transposes into a position considered later） 7 ＠xc4 气d6 8 Qf3
 Qxb4 12 ©f6＋！gxf6 13 滥xd6，and

White，disregarding the double check， gained a very strong attack（Dautov－ Donchenko，USSR Team Ch．，Podolsky 1990）．
\[
5 \ldots \text {. } 0 \text { f6 }
\]

Here the seemingly natural exchange 5．．．exd5 can have unfortunate conse－ quences after 6 \＆xd5！（threatening 7气xf7＋）：
（a） 6 ．．． d 6 is met by 7 e5！©xe5 8 \＆xf7＋© 9 （Vf3（Veresov－Neishtadt， Moscow 1965）；
（b）6．．．憎c7 avoids the immediate danger，but the advantage remains with White，e．g． 7 Qc3 Qf6 8 Qge2 \({ }^{\circ} \mathrm{d} 6\) ？ （8．．．皿e7） 9 \＆c4 a6 10 f 4 b5 11 e5！ bxc4 12 exf6当d8 15 Qg3 Exg7 16 0－0（Rash－ kovsky－A．Petrosian，USSR 1971）．

\section*{6 － c 3}

Nothing is promised by 6 dxe6


6 娄a4＋是d7 7 畄b looks tempting， but then \(7 \ldots\) ．．exd5，and：
（a） 8 㟶xb7？dxc4！（but not 8．．．sc6？ 9 \＆b5！） 9 䒼xa8 霛c7，and the white queen may regret its bold raid（ 10 Qe2

（b） 8 exd5，but now too Black can disregard the b7 pawn and continue 8．．．
学b6），when he threatens \(10 \ldots\) ．．．D 4 and has excellent development for the sac－ rificed pawn（analysis）．
\begin{tabular}{llll}
6 & \(\dddot{Q}\) & exd5
\end{tabular}

7 exd5 a6 8 a4（or 8 典4）leads to a position examined in the notes to White＇s 5th move．
\[
7 \ldots \quad \text {... } 0 x d 5
\]
断b3 is good（Petrosian）．
\[
8 \text { \&xd5 \&e7 }
\]
 Qf3 览g6 comes into consideration，
although the chances remain with

 gained the advantage in Petrosian－ Radulov（Plovdiv 1983）．

\section*{9 Qf3}

Also possible is 9 Qe2 0－0 1000
 （after 13 \＆d6 \(0 x d 514\) 単xd5 \＆e6 15溇xc5 \＆ ec 316 bxc 3 b 6 White is a pawn up with opposite－colour bishops）， and now：
（a）13．．． \(\mathrm{Dx}_{\mathrm{xd}} 14\) Qxd5 \＆e7（or 14．．．\＆g5 15 \＆xg5 畄xg5 16 f4） 15 e6！ with advantage to White（Khalifman）；
（b）13．．．昷e7 14 最e4 桉xd1 15 Efxdl and White stands better（Khalifman－ Vulfson，St Petersburg 1995）．

White gains no advantage by 9 h5

㳻xb2 is dangerous in view of 15 Eabl

 Gleizerov） 15 Ead1 b6（after 15 ．．．\({ }^{(1)} \mathrm{xb} 2\)

 \(\pm\) dl White has the more active posi－
 Salov，match，Sanghi Nagar 1994）．

The double attack 9 wb3 is not dan－ gerous： \(9 . . .0-0\) ！ 10 \＆xb7？（10 0 f 3 is
 \＆ \(\mathrm{e} 4+\) ．
\begin{tabular}{rll}
9 & \(\cdots\) & \(0-0\) \\
10 & \(0-0\) & wiv6
\end{tabular}

Or 10．．．ゆa6（10．．．Уd7 and ．．．ゆf6 is also possible，with the same idea of ex－ changing the bishop at d5） 11 金f4（11 We 2 comes into consideration，and if \(11 \ldots\) ．．．c7 12 皿c4 \＆e6 13 皿e3 薯c8 14 シacl－Vyzhmanavin）11．．．＠c7 12 El （again White can avoid the exchange by 12 §c4 Se6 13 ＠e2，retaining some initiative，Varga－Afek，Budapest 1991）

12．．． \(0 x \mathrm{xd} 5 \quad 13\) exd5 \＆d6 14 §xd6精xd6 15 De5 b5（15．．．b6 is probably simpler，Milov－Afek，Tel Aviv 1993） 16 a4 \＆b7 17 axb5 临xd5（17．．．定xd5？ 18 Qc6！） 18 甾xd5 ©xd5 19 Qd7 （Belyavsky－Ehlvest，Reykjavik 1988）， and here Black could have equalised by

\[
11 \text { 皿e3 }
\]

We should also mention 11 De5 ie6
 15 Efel \＆f6 with chances for both sides（Goldin－Kallai，France 1993）．
\[
11 \ldots \text {... ©c6 }
\]
\(11 . . .{ }^{W} \times \mathbf{x b 2}\) is unfavourable： \(12 \Xi \mathrm{~m} 1\)


11．．．）\({ }^{\text {e } 6}\) is strongly met by 12 b4！：
 シabl 挡a4 15 Exb7 Qc6 16 Qe5 Qxe5 17 Exe 7 with advantage to White；
（b） \(12 . . . \pm \mathrm{d} 8\)（Yusupov－Ehlvest，Bel－ fort 1988）when White could have gained a won position by giving up his queen for two rooks： 13 bxc5！\＆xc5 14
 Qd7 17 \＆xa8（Yusupov）．

11．．．乌a6 is a possible improvement： 12 Qe5 Qc7（the b－pawn cannot be taken in view of 13 皿xf7＋Exf7 14
 Qd7！） 14 畄c2 是e6 15 Qc4 暗b5（the queen is in danger；after \(15 \ldots\) ．．．xc4 16 \＆xc4 b5 17 \＆e2 Qe6 18 a3 Wa5 19 a4！White has the advantage） 16 f 4 （Milov－Afek，Budapest 1993）16．．．\({ }^{W}\) c6 （relatively best） 17 De5 when White still has a slight initiative（Milov）．
\[
12 \Xi c 1
\]

If now 12．．．䀂 4 White drives back the bishop by 13 h 3 ，forcing it to go to e6，since if \(13 \ldots\) ．．．h5 there can follow 14 g 4 §g6 15 Dd2！，while if \(13 \ldots\) ．．．xf3 14 崖xf3 Qd4 15 显xd4 cxd4 16 e5，and in this situation the opposite－colour bishops favour White（Flear）．


Therefore Black can choose between 12．．．\＆e6 13 是xe6 fxe6 14 㥩c2（14
 12．．．Qb4 13 畨a4 ©xd5 14 exd5 \(\Xi d 8\) and ．．．ᄋf5 with roughly equal chances （Guseinov－Ibragimov，USSR 1991）．
15.222 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 e 4 c 54 d5）
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
4 & 0 & \text { Qf }
\end{array}
\]
 exd5 8 exd5 \＆d6 with complicated play．

5 ．．．b5！？


5．．．e6 is considered in section 12．112．
The source game of this currently fashionable variation was Furman－ Birkan（Kiev 1967），in which after 6
 §f4 乌d7 \(100-0-0\) Ëb8 11 \＆xd6 exd6
定f6 15 监c2 ©b6 16 ©d2 Black should have played 16．．．g6 with chances for both sides．

White＇s main continuations are：
6 e5（15．2221）
6 \＆ f 4 （15．2222）
15．2221（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 e 4 c 5 4 d 5 Qf6 5 Qc3 b5！？）
\begin{tabular}{lll}
6 & e5 & b4 \\
7 & exf6 & bxc3 \\
8 & bxc3 & Qd7
\end{tabular}

After 8．．．exf6（or 8．．．gxf6 9 这x4） 9
 dxe7 12 Qf3 White has the superior pawn formation（M．Gurevich－E．Vlad－ imirov，Moscow 1992）．

Gerard－Peric（Parthenay 1993）went
 Qf3 毋b6 12 是 2 c 413 2d4 \＆b7 14 \(0-0\) ．Black won the d－pawn but after ©f3 and \(\Xi \mathrm{E}\) l White had a serious in－ itiative．

\section*{}

9 fxe7 \＆xe7 10 \＆xc4 Qb6 11 \＆b5＋ （Shirov－Oll，Tilburg 1992）11．．．\＆d7 does not promise White any advantage －Black restores material equality．

Complicated play results from 9 \＆xc4 Qb6 10 Qe2（or 10 Qf3 gxf6 11


 iexd5 20 㟶xh7 \({ }^{\mathbf{w}} \mathrm{g} 4\)－Black has com－ pensation for the pawn，Frias－Ehlvest， Saint John 1988）10．．．exf6 11 0－0 \＆d6


15 \＆c2 h5 16 a 4 with chances for both sides（Lautier－Ehlvest，Terrassa 1991）．

\section*{9 ．．．exf6}

After 9．．．gxf6 10 \＆f4 学b6 11 是xc4 ＠g7 12 ＠b5！White stands better V．Zilberstein－Anikaev（Kislovodsk 1972）．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
10 & \text { \&f4 } \\
11 & \text { \&xc4 }
\end{array}
\]


11．．．\＆d6（accepting the pawn sacri－
 \＄f1 is rather dangerous） \(12 \triangleq \mathrm{e} 20-0\) \(130-0\) ，and now：
（a）13．．．（2e5？！ 14 是xe5 定xe5 15
 better prospects for White，Granda Zuniga－E．Vladimirov，Tilburg 1992）；
（b）13．．．＠xf4 14 Qxf4 要d6 and ．．．थb6 is preferable，as in the earlier game Rashkovsky－K．Grigorian（41st USSR Ch．，Moscow 1973）．
> 15.2222 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 e 4 c 5 4 d 5 Qf6 5 Qc3 b5！？）

\section*{6 \＆ 44}

A fashionable and even sharper continuation，many variations of which are difficult to evaluate．
\[
6 \quad \ldots \quad \text { 断a5 }
\]

6．．．a6 7 e5 b4 8 exf6 bxc3 9 bxc3
leads to a favourable version for White of variation 15．221．
\[
7 \quad \varrho d 2
\]

Other continuations：
7 e5 Qe4 8 Qge2 Øa6！ 9 f 3 ，when play can develop as follows：

㲣b6 15 §e3 g6（Belyavsky－Anand， Linares 1993），and now 16 with the threat of 断xb4 would have given White the advantage（Belyavsky）；
（b） \(9 . . .0 \mathrm{~b} 4\) ！？（one imagines that such a paradoxical sacrifice would not have interested even Alekhine，to say nothing of Capablanca or Botvinnik．．．） 10 fxe4 Qd3＋ 11 gisd 2 g 6 ．We are following Gelfand－Anand from the same tour－ nament．This and many other positions from this variation reflect modern open－ ing trends．It is hardly possible to give a precise evaluation of the sacrifice．In Anand＇s opinion，White＇s best was 12 \％e3（the game went 12 b 3 Sg 713 bxc4 Qxf4 14 Qxf4 ©xe5，and Black created strong threats）．

7 a4 \(0 x 4\)（an essential reply；bad is 7．．．b4？ 8 乌b5 乌a6 9 \＆xc4，when the e4 pawn cannot be taken in view of 10 we2） 8 Qge2（as shown by Kamsky， 8 axb5 \(0 x \mathrm{x} 39\) Exa5 Qxd1 10 敋xd1 Qd7 11 \＆xc4 Qb6 12 b3 \＆b7 and ．．． \(0 x d 5\) is unfavourable for White） 8．．．9d6 9 axb5 \({ }^{\text {wib6 }}\) ，and now：
（a） 10 \＆ \(\operatorname{sd6}\) exd6（10．．． \(\mathrm{W} \times \mathrm{xd6} 11\) Qg 3 followed by \(\sum_{\text {xc4 }}\) and \(Q \mathrm{ge} 4\) is good for White） \(11 \triangleq \mathrm{~g} 3\) \＆e7 12 ＠xc4 \(0-0130-0\) \＆f6 14 当c2．White＇s posi－ tion is preferable（Belyavsky－Kamsky， Linares 1993）；
（b） 10 Qg3 0 d 711 是xd6 溇xd6 12
 d6（Azmaiparashvili－Granda Zuniga， Groningen 1993）15．．．0－0 16 §f3 㿾b7 17 Qf6＋©xf6 18 \＆xb7 Еad8 19 dxe 7
 ＠c6 घc7 23 घadl with fair compen－ sation for the pawn（Azmaiparashvili）．
\(7 \mathrm{f3}\) ．This simple move was played in Vyzhmanavin－Azmaiparashvili（Burgas 1994）．After 7．．． 2 h 5 （7．．．b4 8 営a4＋is good for White） 8 气d2（ 8 是e3 Qd7） 8．．．乌d7 9 f 4 g 610 \＆e2（Vyzhmanavin recommends 10 e5 宜h6 11 Dge2 with the threat of \(\mathrm{g} 2-\mathrm{g} 4\) ） \(10 \ldots\) ．．．g7 11 e5 b4 12 黄a4 畄xa4 13 Qxa4 §a6 14 g 4 the enforced sacrifice of a piece for three pawns－14．．．Oxf4 15 \＆xf4 \＆b5 16 b3 led to a sharp situation with the chances on White＇s side．


7．．．b4 8 e5 bxc3（if \(8 . . . ⿹ f d 79\) e6！） 9
 \＆xc4 요6 12 䒼e2＋） 10 exf6 exf6 11
 \(0-0\) f5 15 el！with an excellent position for White（Shirov－Kramnik， Linares 1993）．

7．．．e5，and now：
（a） 8 f 4 Qbd7 9 Qf3 是d6，when Black maintains his position in the cen－ tre： 10 a 4 b 411 Qb5 \＆b8 12 \＆ ec 4 a 6 is in his favour；
（b） 8 dxe6 fxe6（but not \(8 \ldots\) ．．． \(\mathrm{se6} 9\)
 （10 ©d5 wivild 11 Qf4 should also be
noted）．Shirov thinks that White has compensation for the pawn，but Gelfand considers Black＇s position to be sound：


7．．．\({ }^{\mathrm{W}} \mathrm{d} 8\) ．An amusing retreat．The difference compared with the position after Black＇s 6th move is that White＇s queen＇s bishop is not at c ，but d2．But this means that he does not have 8 e5， since the d 5 pawn is undefended．And after 8 \＆f4 he can invite his opponent to repeat moves with 8 ．．．was and share the point．．．
15.3 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 e 4 ）

3
．．．Qc6
Black does not directly attack the centre，but puts pressure on it，provok－ ing the advance of the d－pawn．

White can continue：
4 d5（15．31）
4 是e3（15．32）－p． 255
4 © 1 （15．33）－p． 259

\subsection*{15.31 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 e 4 Dc 6 ）}

\section*{4 d5}

White aims to exploit his spatial advantage．
5 ㅇ．Qe5

If 5 f4 Black replies \(5 . . \unrhd \mathrm{d} 3+\) ，and after 6 \＆xd3 cxd3 he attacks the d5 pawn by ．．．e7－e6 and ．．．\(\triangle\) f6．

But after 5 曾 d 4 it is better to retreat the knight to 66 ：
（a） \(5 . . .9 \mathrm{~d} 3+6\) \＆ xd 3 cxd 37 － 3 c 3 8 Qf3 Qf6 9 0－0 and White has a spatial advantage（Baburin－Ibragimov， USSR 1988）；
（b）5．．．Qg6 6 Qf3 e5！ 7 罾xc4（not 7 Qxe5 \＆b4＋ 8 \＆d2 c5，and if 9 Qxf7 cxd4 10 Qxd8 c3！winning material） \(7 . . . \unrhd f 68\) Øc3 a6 with equal chances．
\(5 \ldots\) ．．． \(\mathrm{Vg}_{6}\)
6 ig3
Or 6 \＆e3 Qf6（ \(6 \ldots \mathrm{~h} 57 \mathrm{~h} 4\) can also be included） 7 c 3 ，and now：
（a）7．．．e5（Tomson－Platonov，Riga 1964），reaching a position from vari－ ation 15.32 where White has lost a tempo（§f4 and \＆e3）；
（b） 7 ．．．e6 is also quite acceptable for Black： 8 \＆xc4 exd5 9 臽xd5 Qxd5 10
 00 （V．Zilberstein－Platonov，USSR 1973）．
\[
6
\]

Qf6
6．．．h5 7 h4 can be included．
\[
7 \text { Dc3 e6 }
\]

7．．．e5 comes into consideration．
8 exc4 exd5
9 exd5


9．．．§d6，and now：
（a） 10 昷b5＋安f8（after 10．．．\＆d7 11
 White＇s position is preferable） 11 Qf3 a6 12 昷e2 b5（this weakens the c6 square； 12 ．．．h5 came into consideration） 13 Qd4（this leads to complications， since White sacrifices his central pawn； \(130-0\) is sound） \(13 \ldots\) ．．b4 14 Qc6 wd7 15 Qa4（Tukmakov－Kupreichik，Kislo－ vodsk 1982），when Black should have played \(15 \ldots . .0 x d 5\) ，and if 16 \＆f3（16
 18 部 E b8 with a complicated，un－ clear position（Tukmakov）
 Qge2 h5 13 h4 b5 14 \＆b3 b4，again with chances for both sides（Barlov－ Marjanovic，Bor 1985）．

9．．．a6 10 乌f3 Sd6 11 粃e2＋⿹e7？ （11．．．df8 would have transposed into the previous variation） 12 ＠h4！0－0 13 Exf6 gxf6 1400 f 515 畄d2 Og6 16
 Eacl with advantage to White （R．Scherbakov－Sulava，St Martin 1992）．
15.32 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 ©c6）

\section*{4 \＆e3}

Not hurrying to cross the demar－ cation line，White reinforces his centre．
\[
4 \ldots \text {... }
\]

The line where Black delays the development of his king＇s knight by 4．．．e5 5 d 5 Qce7 6 显xc4 0 g 6 is of great interest：

（a）White can count on some advan－ tage by delaying the opponent＇s queen－ side development with 7 畄b3，when \(7 . . .2 \mathrm{f} 6\) fails to 8 d 6 ！，while if \(7 . .\). \＆d6

 two moves White has created direct
threats on the queenside） 8 ．．．\(D \mathrm{f} 6\)（the defence of the pawn by 8 ．．．b6 9 ＠xd7＋溇xd7 10 Qe2 and 11 Qbc3 would have weakened the light squares） 9 exd7＋
 （11．．．⿷xb2 12 ⿹f3 §b4＋ 13 乌bd2 favours White） 12 \＄fl \＆c5 13 \＆xc5
 launched a clever，but ultimately unsuccessful counterattack（Shirov－ Murshed，Brno 1991）．

\section*{5 Qc3}

5 f 3 e 56 d 5 is also played：
（a） \(6 \ldots\) ．． 077 iexc4 0 g 6 （the posi－ tion after 7．．．a6 is considered later under a slightly different move order） 8 \＆\({ }^{\text {b }} 5+\) （as in the Shirov－Murshed game）：


Lalic－Miles（Hastings 1995／6）con－ tinued 8．．．乌d79 Øe2 a6 10 \＆d3＠d6



 now instead of the exchange on c5， 17 Enc1！\＆xe3 18 当xe3 would have given White good chances with his spatial ad－ vantage（Lalic）；
（b） \(6 \ldots\). dd4 7 ＠xd4 exd4 8 䒼xd4 c6 9 ＠c3（after 9 \＆xc4＠b4＋10 ©c3 0－0 11 Oge2 监a5 Black has definite com－ pensation for the pawn）9．．．＠b4（if 9．．． cxd5 10 e5！？；9．．．b5 fails to \(100-0-0\)

显b7 11 d6！） 10 㥩e5＋，when Karpov－ Piket（Groningen 1995）continued 10．．．
 （12．．．b5 13 a4 \＆a6 14 ge2 is unfa－ vourable；after 12 ．．．是e6 13 cxb7 【ab8 14 Qge2，as in the game，White has the superior pawn formation） 13 \＆xc4 Qd7 14 0－0－0 乌e5 15 宜e2 g5 16 h 4 gxh4 17 Exh4 \＆e6（or 17．．．h5 18 g 4 Qg6 19 Exh5 Exh5 20 gxh5 Qf4 21定c4 Oxh5 22 Oge2） 18 Eh5！，and White gained the advantage（Karpov）．
\[
5 \quad \ldots \quad \text { e5 }
\]

Or 5．．．Qg4 6 \＆xc4，and now：
（a） \(6 . .0 \mathrm{xe} 37\) fxe3 e5（7．．．e6 8 Qf3 \＆e7 is passive；by continuing 900 and e4－e5 White takes the initiative， Bagirov－Dobrovolsky，Stary Smokovec
 Kovacevic，Hastings 1982／3），when in－ stead of 10 Dge2 White could have considered：
（a1） \(10 \triangle \mathrm{~d} 5\)（more energetic），then \(0-0-0\) and h2－h4 with a sharp，not un－ favourable position；
（a2） \(1000-0\) ，and if \(10 \ldots\) exd4 11 exd4 \(0 x d 412\) 門 1 ！，when his initiative more than compensates for the sacri－ ficed pawn；
（b） \(6 \ldots \mathrm{e} 5\) ，when Black does not hurry to exchange on e3：



Qf3 \＆c5（or 9．．．乌a5 10 wbs Qxe3 11
慆 xc 4 c 512 h 3 ） 10 Wb，when：
（bl1）10．．．\＆b6 11 h 3 （or 11 Qxd4易xd4 12 是xd4 c6 13 学a4！是xd4 14 Exd4 \({ }^{W} \mathrm{w} 715\) Dd5 W e5，after which the splendid move 16 wa3！！confirmed White＇s advantage，Milov－Degerman， Budapest 1993）11．．．乌xe3 12 fxe3 and then 13 exd4；
（b12） 10 ．．．sd6 11 显xd4 0－0（11．．． Oxd4 12 Exd4 览xb5 13 是xb5＋


 White－Vyzhmanavin） 12 h3 Dxd4 13
宜6 16 \＆xe6 fxe6 17 Exf2 요 18 Efd2 \＆xd4 19 Qxd4（Vyzhmanavin－ Baburin，Gorky 1989）．The ending fa－ vours White，who has two knights for a rook and pawn；
（b2） 7 d5 \(0 x e 38\) fxe3 Qb8 9 㟶f3
 a6 \(130-0-0\) wh5 14 h 3 f 615 g 4 単f7 16 Ëhfl．White stands better（Bönsch－ K．Müller，Germany 1991）．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
6 & \mathrm{~d} 5 & \text { Q } 7
\end{array}
\]

If 6．．．Dd4，then：
（a） 7 最xd4 exd4 8 娄xd4，and White， compared with the 5 f 3 e 56 d 5 Od 4 variation，is more favourably placed： instead of \(\mathrm{f} 2-\mathrm{f} 3\) he has made the active move Qc3．If 8．．．c6，apart from 9 \＆xc4， \(90-0-0\) cxd5 10 e5 is possible；
（b） 7 国xc4 c5 8 dxc6 bxc6 9 Qf3 Qxf3＋（9．．．定g4？ 10 是xf7＋） 10 览xf3 \＆b4 11 0－0 0－0 12 h 3 （Dautov－ Chekhov，Dresden 1989），and White gained the better prospects，since the c6 pawn is weak，and the exchange on c3 concedes the advantage of the two bishops．

Now let us analyse the bold move 6．．．Oa5：

（a） 7 蒌a4＋ 66 ，when：
（al）the direct 8 b4？is met by 8．．．cxb3 9 axb3 b5 10 宸a2（ 10 枼xa5？曹xa5 11 玉xa5 国b4）10．．．eb4 11 显d2 \(0-0\) with advantage to Black；
（a2） 8 dxc6 Qxc6 9 是xc4 §b4 10
 13 \＆xf7＋Exf7 14 曾xe4 \＆f5 led to a roughly equal game in Vyzhmanavin－ Sadler（Paris 1994）；
（b） 7 Qf3，and now：
（bl）7．．．定d6，when：
（b11） 8 㟶a4＋，and：
（blll）8．．． ed \(^{2} 9\) was was played in the amusing miniature Illescas－ Cordoba－Sadler（Linares 1995）：9．．．a6 （threatening to win the queen by \(10 \ldots\) b6） \(10 Q \mathrm{~b} 1\) ？？（vacating d2 for the queen；White had a choice of two good moves： 10 §a4！and 10 b4） \(10 \ldots\) ．．．xe4 11 di（vacating el）11．．．c3！（inter－ ference－after either capture of the pawn the queen is lost），and in his confusion the Spanish grandmaster resigned，not wishing to check the variation 12 b4 b6 13 wa3 a5 14 鉴cl axb4 15 \＆d3，since Black already has three pawns for the piece，White＇s queenside is in a dismal state，and his king is unable to castle；
（bl12）thus the knight sacrifice is in－ correct and 8．．．c6 must be played，when
after 9 dxc6 0xc6 both sides have chances，e．g． 10 Ed1 0－0 11 \＆．c5 Qd4；
（b12） 8 Qd2，when after \(8 \ldots 0-0\) （8．．．Dg4 9 蹧a4＋c6 10 dxc 6 Qxc6 is also possible） 9 Qxc4 \(\mathrm{Qxc}_{1} 10\) \＆xc4
 ©d7 Black achieved a good game （Candela－Baltar，Madrid 1995）；
（b2）7．．． 9 g 48 皿g5 f6，and now：

（b21） 9 皿h4？！審d7！ 10 Qd2 b5 11 a4 a6 12 axb5 axb5 13 \＆e2 \＆b4 14 h 3
 Qxb5＠xg4 18 hxg 4 0－0 19 Qc3 Qb3 （Belyavsky－Miles，Groningen 1994）， and here a draw was agreed，although after 20 Exa8 Еxa8 \(210-0\)＠xd2 22㥩xd2 \＆c5 Black＇s position is prefer－ able：the bishop at h4 is out of play，and the b2 pawn is weak；
（b22） 9 ¢d2 is stronger，and if 9．．．ic5 10 wa4＋c6 11 Ddl with ad－ vantage（Ftacnik）；
（b3） \(7 . . . \mathrm{a} 68\) xe5（in contrast to the Illescas Cordoba－Sadler game，here 8 wa4＋does not work，since after 8．．．id7 9 愊xa5？b6 the queen has no retreat）8．．．b5（White has won the e－ pawn，in return Black has solidly defended his c4 pawn） 9 \＆e2 \＆b4 10雨d4 0－0 1100 （the sharper \(110-0-0\) is also possible） \(11 \ldots\) ．．．b7 12 Qg 4 （if 12 \＆g5 Black replies \(12 \ldots\) ．．． w 6 ，intending
 Ead1 Ead8 15 昷f4（Kamsky－Salov， Sanghi Nagar 1995）and now Black should play 15．．． 0 c6！ 16 we3（the un－ usual variation 16 dxc Exd4 17 cxb 7 Exd1 18 Exd1 \＆xc3 19 \＆c8 \＆xb2！is unfavourable for White）16．．．（De5 17 \＆e2 0 g 618 \＆g3 \(\mathrm{me}_{\mathrm{f}}\) 8 with chances for both sides（Matanovic）．

\section*{7 \＆xc4 0g6}

Giorgadze－Skomorokhin（St Peters－ burg 1996）went 7．．．a6 8 （cc5！？©g6 9
 12 是d3 0 g 613 ©f3（with the idea of playing the knight to b3）13．．．s．g4（or 13．．．\({ }^{\text {We }}\) e \(14 \mathrm{a3}\) ，and if \(14 . . . \mathrm{a}\) a 15
 0xe4 18 Ecl and \(0-0\) with the better chances for White） 14 （d2 9 f4 15 \＆f1
 White＇s position is the more promising．


A problematic position．The general impression is that White＇s chances are better，but let us turn to some practical examples．
 and now：
（a） 11 \＆b3 b5（11．．．0－0 is premature in view of 12 h 4 ） 12 a4 0－0 1300寝e714 Eacl Qh5 15 g 3 h 6 with
chances for both sides（Ivanchuk－Wolff， Biel 1993）；
（b） 110 g 3 h 5 （here too \(11 \ldots 0-012\) h4 is good for White） \(120-0-0!\) h4 13 Qf5 ©xf5 14 exf5 Qe7 15 g 4 hxg 316 hxg3 Exh1 17 Exh1 Qxf5 18 \＆g5 监d7 19 是f1 with excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn（Belyavsky－Lautier， Linares 1994）．

8 皿b5＋，when：
（a）8．．．显d7 9 wh3 b6 weakens Black＇s queenside，and after 10 f 3 \＆d6
 14 Qg3 De7（Shirov－Pr．Nikolic， Groningen 1993）White gains the better chances by 15 ac and fd 1 ；
（b） \(8 . .\). Qd 79 ge2（another plan aimed at restricting the knight at g6－9 g3 \＆d6 10 h 4 is demonstrated by Petursson－Sadler，Andorra 1991：10．．．h6 11 Df3 a6 12 皿e2 乌f6 13 Qd2 0－0 14 a3 घe8 15 घ゙ cl §d7 16 ＠c4）9．．．\＆d6
 now：
（a）12．．．Qf6 13 h 4 （the quiet 13000 comes into consideration）13．．．Qh5 （ \(13 \ldots . . \mathrm{h} 5\) ？！ 14 g 3 ） \(140-0-0\)（or 14 g 3 \＆d7 with a double－edged position） 14．．．今d7 15 bl（if 15 g 4 hf4 16 h 5 Qh4！－Lautier）15．．．b5 16 g 4 ？！（the restrained 16 \＆c2 would have given White good prospects－Flear） 16．．． Qhf 417 h 5 Qh 4 ！with fair coun－ terplay for Black（Timman－Lautier， match，Wijk aan Zee 1994）；
（b）12．．．b5 was played in another game from the same match，（where there was a slightly different move or－
 We7 \(12 \mathrm{f3}\) ），and Timman preferred the plan with kingside castling： \(130-000\) 14 Eacl Qc5 15 ＠c2 §d7 16 Og3 シfc8（16．．．b4 17 Qce2） 17 Qf5 监f8 18 8 xd 6 cxd 619 b 4 ．White has the initia－ tive．
 11 会g5 f6 12 ＠d2 \＆c5 13 Qh3 h5 with a complicated game and chances for both sides（Wilder－Ye Rongguang， Belgrade 1988）．

8 ＠f3，and now：

（a）8．．．a6 9 气e2 \(\mathrm{e} \mathrm{d} 6100-00011\) Ecl §d7 12 气e1 甾e7 13 安h1 h6 14 g3 c6 15 dxc6 \＆xc6 16 是f3 \(\Xi f d 817\)亚e2 b5 and ．．．学b7，with a good game for Black（A．Greenfeld－Ye Rongguang， Novi Sad 1990）；
（b） \(8 \ldots\) ．．．d6 9 显 \(\mathrm{b} 5+\mathrm{d} 7\)（as in simi－ lar situations，9．．．शd7 10 wb3 is good for White） \(100-00-011 \mathrm{Eel}\) a6 12 \＆f1 Qf6 13 h 3 b 5 （13．．．sd7！？） 14 乌d2 Qe7（after 14．．．\＆b7 15 a 4 ！b4 16 De2 c6 17 dxc6 ©xc6 18 Qg3！White has the advantage－Khalifman） 15 a4 b4 16 Qe2 c6 17 dxc6 分xc6 18 －c1 ©a5 19 Qg3 显e6 20 ©f5 \＆ \(\mathrm{e} f 521\) exf5．White stands better（Khalifman－Mascarinas， Manila Olympiad 1992）．
\[
15.33(1 \mathrm{~d} 4 \mathrm{~d} 52 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 43 \mathrm{e} 40 \mathrm{c} 6)
\]
\[
4 \text { Qf3 \&g4 }
\]

4．．．Df6 5 d 5 used to be considered totally unacceptable for Black（after 5．．．凹a5 6 罗a4＋c6 White plays 7 \＆ d 2 ！），but after \(5 \ldots\) ．．． xe 4 ！？interesting complications arise：
（a） \(6 \mathrm{dxc} 6 \mathrm{Wxdl}+7\) xdl \(Q x f 2+8\)定el \(0 x h 1\) is not fully clear：the knight is lost，but Black will have a rook and a couple of pawns for two knights；
（b） 6 ※xc4 Qb8 7 0－0 g6 8 Dc3
 We2 ©bd7 11 d6！（a tactical solution to the problem；the simple 11 if4 is also possible，with excellent development） 11．．．cxd6 12 是xf7＋（the bishop cannot be taken because of 13 Qg5＋
 and here，instead of 15 Qxd5 \(0 x d 516\)
 ©f8 19 w 7 监d7，when Black man－ aged to parry the attack and save the game（Herndl－Varga，Werfen 1991）， 15 \＆e3！followed by Efl came seriously into consideration（Flear）．


Now White has：
5 \＆e3（15．331）
5 £xc4（15．332）－p． 260 5 d5（15．333）－p． 261
15.331 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 e 4 Qc6 4 － f 3 （2g4）
\[
\begin{array}{llll}
5 & \text { \& } \mathrm{e} 3 & \text { e6 }
\end{array}
\]

5．．．Qf6 6 Qc3 leads to a position from the Chigorin Defence（1 d4 d5 2
c4 Dc6 3 Qc3 dxc4 4 Qf3 Df6 5 e4皿g46迬e3）

5．．．＠xf3 6 gxf3 e5 7 d5 Qce7 8曹a4＋（8 \＆xc4 a6 9 f 4 deserves testing）
 eh3＋and \(\sum \mathrm{c} 3\) White stands better） 9
 12 dxc6（after \(12 \mathrm{~d} 6 \mathrm{~d} 6-\mathrm{d} 7+\) ，昷h3＋and \＆xc8 Black will have two pawns for the exchange）12．．． \(0 x\) x6 13 ©xb5
 has the advantage（D．Gurevich－Djin－ djihashvili，USA 1989）．

Defending the pawn by 5 ．．．b5？！is rather risky．After 6 a4 a6 7 axb5 axb5
 White has a strong centre and the better development．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
6 & ＠xc4 & \＆xf3 \\
7 & gxf3 & 曹f6 \\
8 & ＠b5 &
\end{tabular}

To 8 Dc3 Black replies \(8 . . .0-0-0\) ， and if 9 d 5 \＆b4． 8 e 5 is possible，and if 8．．．慧h4 9 f4（Sosonko）．
\[
8 \quad \ldots \quad \text { Qge7 }
\]

Black should consider 8．．．只b4＋， inviting the knight to occupy a less fa－ vourable position at c3（cf．the note to the next move），and only then \(9 \ldots . .0 g e 7\) ．
\[
9 \text { Od2! }
\]

An idea of Taimanov－White sup－ ports his d4 pawn．In Gutman－ Kupreichik（Hastings 1984／5） 9 Oc3
 an advantage for Black．

Now after 9．．．0－0－0 10 Qb3 White stands better．
\(15.332(1 \mathrm{~d} 4 \mathrm{~d} 52 \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{dxc} 43 \mathrm{e} 4 乌 \mathrm{c} 6\)
4 Qf3 \(\& \mathrm{~g} 4)\)

5 \＆xc4 e6
5．．．\＆xf3 6 烸xf3 e6 7 d5 Qe5
 9 富g3 favours White），and now：

 Wiv5＋（the simple 10 exd5 should also be considered）10．．．c6 11 Wxb7 寝c8 12皆xc8＋日xc8 13 exd5 \＆b4＋ 14 \＆d2 \＆xd2 +15 Qxd2 cxd5 with an equal game（Inkiov－Kupreichik，Minsk 1982）；
（b） 8 显b5＋！c6 9 薮c3 cxb5（after
 12 諧xc6＋（tif8 13 Qc3 Black does not have compensation for the pawn）9．．． cxb5 10 寝xe5 with the better chances for White．

5．．．\(Q \mathrm{f} 6\) ？is bad in view of 6 w b3，
 when White is close to a win．


6 d 5 exd5 7 \＆xd5 Qf6（defending c6 by \(7 . . . \dot{\rho} \mathrm{b} 4+8\) Qc3 0 ge 7 fails to 9
 for White） \(80-0\) \＆e7 9 \＆xc6 bxc6 10糬c2 and Black is in difficulties （Speelman－Sadler，Hastings 1992／3）．

6 \＆ e 5 ，and now：
 9 \＆e3 0－0（Petran－Baburin，Hungary 1991） 10 崰b3 with the better chances for White（Flear）；
（b） \(6 \ldots\) ．．．xf3 7 ＠xc6＋bxc6 8 gxf3
 0－0 12 0－0－0 Qg6 13 Qe2 畄d6 14 Ed3 f5 with chances for both sides （Mozetic－Drasko，Jagodina 1994）；
（c） \(6 \ldots\) ．．． 2 ge 77 Qbd2 a6（7．．．\({ }^{\text {widd }} 88\)

 bxc6 14 是xf6！gxf6 15 Exdl gave White a favourable ending in Salov－ Magem Badals，Madrid 1992） 8 臽e2 Qg6 9 h3 §xf3 10 Qxf3 \＆b4＋ 11 \＆d2这x2＋12 wivd2 with the better posi－ tion（Begovac－Ibragimov，Bern 1992）．
定b4＋9 Dc3 De7 10 a 3 ？（a poor move， allowing Black to intensify the pressure on d4；Lautier suggests 10 h 4 ）10．．．\({ }^{\text {Sa5 }}\)
崽d2？宜b6）13．．．a6 14 是xc6 Qxc6 15 \(0-0-0\) exc3 16 bxc3 g5！ 17 fxg 5 包e5 with advantage to Black（Inkiov－ Lautier，France 1996）．
15.333 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 e 4 Qc6 4 ©f3 \＆ 8 4）
\begin{tabular}{lll}
5 & d 5 \\
6 & 暑d4
\end{tabular}

This leads to great complications．
Other continuations：
6 §f4 乌g6，and now：
 （after 9 䐗b3 Qf6 10 气b5＋ 11 ©fd2 Qh5 12 Qc3 Qhf4 both sides have chances，Mikhalchishin－Vorotni－
kov，Lvov 1983）9．．．ed7（here too 9．．．

 Odl．White stands better（Timman－ Lautier，match，Wijk aan Zee 1994）；
（b） 7 ＠e3，when：
 h4 h6 11 h5 Df8 12 Qh4 De7 13 g 4 b 5 14 \＆b3 with advantage to White （Smyslov－Semkov，Rome 1990）；
（b2）7．．．⿹f6 8 Qc3 e6 9 畨a4＋䊓d7 （9．．．Qd7！？ 10 ＠d4 exd5 11 h 3 c 512 Qdb5 d4 with a very complicated game） 10 溇xd7＋\(x d 7\)（ \(10 \ldots . .0 x d 7!?\) ，and if 11 Qd4 exd5 12 h 3 c 513 Qdb5 d4 14 hxg4 0－0－0） 11 §xc4 exd5 12 exd5

 De5 18 菑e2 favours White） 15 0xf6＋ gxf6 16 0－0－0 \＆d6 17 h 4 and White， with the two bishops，has the better chances（M．Gurevich－Ivanchuk，Reggio Emilia 1991）－analysis by Gurevich．

6 De3 was played by Kasparov against the computer＇Deep Thought＇ （New York 1989）．After 6．．．c6（6．．．a6！ was best） 7 \＆f4 0g6 8 \＆e3 cxd5 9 exd5 Black was cramped．

\(\begin{array}{lll}6 & \ldots & \text { Qxf3＋} \\ 7 & \text { gxf3 } & \text { \＆xf3 }\end{array}\)

\section*{8 \＆xc4}

The tactical justification of the sacri－ fice is 8．．．exh1？ 9 \＆ \(\mathrm{e} 5+\mathrm{c} 610 \mathrm{dxc} 6\) ， and White wins．However，according to the latest analysis，Black has excellent chances for counterplay．
\[
8 \ldots \text { e5 }
\]

8．．．f5！？also comes into consideration （threatening to take the rook），and if 9 Eg1 \＆xe4 10 Exg7 ©f6（Nunn）．

8．．．a6 9 Bg 1 e5（Black offers to re－ turn the pawn in order to exchange
宜h5 11 Eg5 是b4＋ 12 ©c3 是g6 13 Exe5＋．White has regained the pawn while retaining the queens，but after 13．．．De7 14 Eg5 h6 15 Еg3 c6 16 \＆d2 Ec8！（Manninen－Ye Rongguang， Manila 1992）his position in the centre proves insecure（ 17 a 3 cxd5！）．

\section*{9 \＆b5＋}

 favours Black．

If 9 曹c3 Black retains his extra pawn by \(9 . .\). Wive 10 Eg 1 （ 10 \＆b5＋？c6 11 dxc6 0－0－0！）10．．．\({ }^{\text {exe4 }}\)（Rajkovic－ Djuric，Cetinje 1993）



The evaluation of this position is based on analysis by Flear：

10．．．De7 11 Qd2 f6（11．．．\＆xh1？ 12

 Wex with equal chances．

10．．．©e7 11 Zg 1 （if \(11 \mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{d} 2} \mathrm{Q}_{\mathrm{xh}} 1\) 12 dxc6 bxc6 13 ＠xc6＋宴f8 14 ＠xa8
 \＆xf3 18 Oxf3 Qxe4 and Black is a
 Qc3 cxb5 13 d 6 Ed8 or 13 世xg7 金f6） \(12 . . . c x b 513 \mathrm{~d} 6\)（the exchange of the queen for two rooks by 13 wg7 if6 14 紧xh8 \＆xh8 15 Exg8＋ 16 Exa8 is unclear）13．．．f6 14 敩e6 g6 15 dxe7 \(0 \times \mathrm{xe} 7\) with approximate equality．



 and ．．．』d8 with advantage to Black．

The given variations have shaken the reputation of the aggressive 6 W d 4 ．
\[
15.4 \text { (1 d4 d5 } 2 \text { c4 dxc4 } 3 \text { e4) }
\]
\[
3 \quad \ldots \quad \text { Qf6 }
\]

As in variation 15．3，Black invites the opponent to advance one of his central pawns with gain of tempo．
\[
4 \quad \text { e5 }
\]

If 40 c 3 the simplest is \(4 \ldots \mathrm{e} 5\) ，when 5 乌f3 exd4 6 监xd4 leads to a position from the variation 3 e4 e5 4 Df3 exd4 （p．236），if 5 d 5 b 5 ，while White does not achieve anything by 5 dxe 5 雷xd1＋ 6 家xdl 0 g 4 ．
\[
\begin{array}{ll}
4 & \ldots \\
5 & \text { \&xc4 }
\end{array}
\]

015
Now we consider：
5．．．Qc6（15．41）－p． 263
5．．．Qb6（15．42）－p． 264
After 5．．．e6 6 Qf3 c5（or 6．．．．e7 7 \(0-00-08\) Qbd2 b6 9 署e2 定b7 10

De4 Qd7 11 定d3，Gheorghiu－Pfleger， Vrnjacka Banja 1961，or 8 Dc3 b6 9㟊2 Oxc3 10 bxc3 \＆b7 11 Ed1， Kiercz－Keene，Dortmund 1978） 7 0－0
 White stands better（Gipslis－Schulte， USSR 1971）．

\subsection*{15.41 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 e4 0 ff 4} e5 ©d5 5（x．44）

\section*{\(5 \ldots\) 包 6 6 De3}

6 Qe2 or \(6 母 \mathrm{f} 3\) usually transposes after 6 ．．．\(毋 \mathrm{~b} 6\) into variation 15.42 ．

In Yusupov－Chandler（Leningrad 1987）Black answered 6 Q13 with \(6 .\). \＆g4，and defended the e5 square： 7 Qc3 e6 8 0－0 © e 4 ．After 9 Qxd5 exd5 10 宣b5 0－0 11 是xc6 bxc6 12 垍d3 White stood better．

6
．．．

> Qb6

6．．．） 6 ？！has not proved its worth． Seirawan－Hort（Zurich 1984）continued 7 䙾b3 Da5 8 皿a4＋！c6 9 Oge2 Qc4
 g4！g6 14 多 3 fxg4 15 Qce4 with ad－ vantage to White．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
7 & \text { \&b5 } \\
8 & 乌 \mathrm{f} 3 & \text { \&d7 }
\end{array}
\]

Groszpeter－Horvath（Hungary 1992） went 8 \＆e3 e6 9 a3 Qe7 10 \＆d3 \＆c6 11 Qf3 ©f5 12 0－0 Qd5 13 粕e2 \＆e7 14 acl wiv7 15 Qe4 0－0 with chances for both sides．The arrangement of the black pieces，controlling the light squares，is typical of the modern han－ dling of this variation．
\[
8 \text {... e6 }
\]

If 8．．．a6 9 ㅇd3 ㅇg4 10 乌e4 e6， then：
（a） 11 h 3 皿h5 12 是e3 罾d7 13 d 5 ！？令xf3 14 曹xf3 \(0 x d 515\) 0xd5 exd5 16


 sides（Kir．Georgiev－Drasko，Sarajevo 1985）；
（b） \(110-0\) §e7 12 \＆e3 C 55 ，when 13 d5！gains in strength：13．．．Qxe5 （13．．．exd5 14 Qxd5 Qxe5 15 Qxb6 Qxf3＋ 16 gxf3 嗗xdl 17 Exxdl cxb6 18 \＆xb6 is clearly to White＇s ad－ vantage） 14 dxe6 \({ }^{W} \mathrm{Fxdl} 15 \quad \Xi \mathrm{fxdl}\) Qxf3 +16 gxf3 fxe6 17 §xb7 玉b8 18 \＆c6＋dif 19 b 3 ．White＇s pieces are more actively placed（Glek－Kozlov， Frunze 1988）．
\[
90-0
\]

The alternative is 9 歯e2 Qb4 10 a3
 \(0-0\) Øe7 14 घacl a6 15 畨e2 乌ed5 16
 Qc5！White has the initiative（Seira－ wan－Barlov，Zagreb 1987）．

\section*{9 ．．．©b4}

The most accurate．The other route with the same aim begins \(9 . . . \triangle \mathrm{e} 7\) ：

（a） 10 \＆d 3 ＠c6，and White，exploit－ ing the delay in Black＇s kingside devel－ opment，begins an attack： 11 Qg5 h6
 12 颉h5，and now：
（al）12．．．g6 13 Qge4！\＆g7（13．．． gxh5？ 14 Qf6 mate； \(13 . .\). ． Wxd 4 is more than dangerous in view of 14 Df6＋，

©e3 Qd5（of course，Black cannot take twice on d 4 on account of the loss of his
 シfdl Ed8 19 Eacl（Belyavsky－ Portisch，Thessaloniki Olympiad 1984）， and now Black should have defended with 19．．．\({ }^{\boldsymbol{6}} \mathrm{e} \mathrm{e}\) ，intending ．．．Ed7 and ．．．挡d8 with chances for both sides；
（a2） \(12 \ldots \mathrm{hxg} 5\) ！？（an attempt to seize the initiative by an exchange sacrifice） 13 蓸xh8 怕xd4，intending 14 md畠g4！ 15 宸h3 㥩xh3 16 gxh3 f6！and ．．． although after 15 臽e4（Belyavsky）the situation is far from clear；
（b） 10 a4 §xb5 11 axb5 \(Q \mathrm{~g} 612\)

 with chances for both sides（Gulko－ Chandler，Biel 1987）．
\[
10 \text { \&e2 }
\]

With the knight at b4（rather than e7） the light－square bishop has to retire to a less active position．

Petursson－Anand（Wijk aan Zee 1990）continued 10．．．\＆c6 11 a3 ©4d5



Now 14 ＠g5 \＆e7 15 Qc5 we8 16 §xe7 乌xe7 17 凹el 乌a4 led to a roughly equal position．
15.42 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 ©f6 4 e5 ©d5 5 \＆xc4）

5 ．．．Qb6
The bishop has two possible retreats： 6 ）d3（15．421）
6 §b3（15．422）－p． 268
15.421 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 e 4 Qf6 4 e5 Qd5 5 国xc4 Qb6）

6 \＆ d 3 Qc6


The d4 pawn can be defended by： 7 \＆ e （ 15.4211 ）
7 ©e2（15．4212）－p． 266
15.4211 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 Qf64 e5 Qd5 5 \＆xc4 Qb6 6 定d3 Qc6）
\[
7 \text { §e3 Qb4 }
\]

The Grünfeld set－up 7．．．g6 8 Qc3 \＆g79 9 ge 2 is more rarely employed：
（a） \(9 \ldots 0\) ，and now：
（al） 10 h 4 Qb4 11 皿e4 c5（11．．． Q4d5 is strongly met by 12 h 5 ！\＆e6 13学c1 Qxe3 14 昔xe3 with good attack－ ing chances，Portisch－Spraggett，Wijk aan Zee 1985） 12 dxc5（if 12 d5 Black replies \(12 \ldots\) ．．．f5 13 §xf5 gxf5 14 ＠xc5

Q6xd5 with equal chances）12．．．Qc4

 and in this sharp position Black has compensation for the sacrificed pawn；
（a2）if 10 a3（preventing ．．．\(\triangle\) b4）， then 10 ．．．f6 promises Black counter－
 d5 De5；
（b） \(9 \ldots .0\) b4 10 \＆e4，and \(10 \ldots .5\) fails to 11 dxc 5 飠xdl\(+12 \triangleq \mathrm{xdl}\) ！（Ftacnik）．

7．．．\＆e6 has been seen in recent years：

（a） \(8 \triangleq \mathrm{c} 3\) ，when：
（al） \(8 \ldots .0 \mathrm{c} 4\) is frankly weak in view of 9 \＆e4，and if 9．．．sc8 10 e6！ （B．Furman－Noskov，Moscow 1991）；
（a2）White has good prospects after
 10．．．鼻e7 11 Qxd5 Qxd5 12 a3） 11是xc4 \(\sum x \mathrm{x} 412 \mathrm{~W} \mathrm{~d} 3\)（the pawn sacrifice 12 d 5 ！？is also good）12．．．Q6a5 13 当c2 （Salov－Hübner，Haifa 1989）；
（a3） \(8 \ldots\) ．．． 94 是e4 \(⿹ 4 \mathrm{~d} 510\) Qf3 Wiv7 \(11 Q g 5\) is worth studying：
 f5，although after 14 \＆f3 \(Q x=315 \mathrm{fxe} 3\)
 White has the more promising position （M．Gurevich－Hubner，Munich 1993）；
（a32）11．．．ef5 12 Qxd5 Qxd5 13

 \(0-0\) with the better chances for White （Gurevich）；
（a4）8．．． e bd7 9 Qf3 0－0－0 1000 （or 10 h3 乌b4 11 \＆e2 f5 12 0－0 h6 13 a 3 Q4d5 14 Qel \(0 x \mathrm{x} 315 \mathrm{bxc} 3\) Sc4 16 Qd3 e6 17 a 4 g 518 䒼c2 \(\quad\) 䒼c6 with chances for both sides，Karpov－Ivan－ chuk，Reggio Emilia 1991／2）10．．．Db4 （10．．．8g4 11 a3） 11 \＆e2 f5 12 a3 Q4d5 13 a4！Qxc3（if 13．．．Qxe3 14 fxe3 Qd5 strong is 15 e4 Qe3 16 当cl Qxfl 17 d5 with an attack，or \(15 \ldots\) Qxc3 16 bxc3 fxe4 17 Qg5 with advantage－Gurevich） 14 bxc3 h6 15 a5 Oc4 16 \＆c1 a6 17 畄 c 2 intending Del－d3．White stands better（M．Gure－ vich－A．Greenfeld，Burgas 1994）；
（b） 8 De2 Qb4 9 皿e4 \＆d5 10 Qbc3是xe4 11 Qxe4 e6 12 0－0 紫d7 13 Q2c3 乌4d5 14 凿 2 followed by Eacl， \(\mathrm{a} 2-\mathrm{a} 3\) and b2－b4 with somewhat the better prospects for White（Georgadze－ Lputian，Simferopol 1988）．


\section*{8 \＆e4 f5}

An original idea of Short，before which \(8 . . . c 6\) was played：
（a） 9 Qc3 \＆e6 10 乌ge2 Q4d5 11 \(0-0\) 䒼d7 12 Qg3（12 Wivill should be considered，or 12 Qc ，and if \(12 \ldots\) ．．f5 13
exf6 exf6 14 Qd3 0－0－0 15 當e2－ Belyavsky，Mikhalchishin）12．．．f5 13 exf6 exf6 14 घel 0－0－0（Belyavsky－ Yakovich，Sochi 1986），when 15 wc2 would have given some initiative；
（b） 9 Qd2 \＆e6 10 a 3 乌4d5 11 Qgf3鮆d7 12 Qb3 Qxe3 13 fxe 3 \＆xb3 14谏xb3 e6 150－0 \＆e7 16 ■ad1 ©d5 17人 bl ，and White＇s position is somewhat more active（Dydyshko－V．Zhuravlev，St Petersburg 1992）．

\section*{9 exf6}

9 \＆f3 does not promise anything in
 Qc2＋and ．．． \(0 x \mathrm{xd} 4\) ．
\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
9 & \ldots & \text { exf6 } \\
10 & \ddot{c} 3 &
\end{array}
\]

10 a 3 is interesting，and if \(10 \ldots \mathrm{f} 5\) the pawn sacrifice 11 axb4 \({ }^{\text {P xb4 }}+12\) Qc3
 both sides have chances）12．．．fxe4 13鄀5 \(5+140\) ge2，and now：
（a）14．．．乌d5 \(150-0\) Qf6 16 Wh4 \＆g4？（16．．．ef5 17 Qg3 ig6 is more tenacious－Tregubov） 17 ＠g3 \＆e7 18 Ogxe4 with a strong attack（Tregubov－ Zryagintsev，Russian Ch．1992）；
 160－0 \＆xc3 17 0xc3 0c4 is weaker；

 attack，Tregubov－Stajcic，Harkany 1992） 160－0 \＆f5 17 Qg3 \＆g6 18 Sgxe4 h 6 19 Qc5 曾f7！ 20 Qxb7 ゆh 21 Qc5？！ （Adams considers 21 Da5 preferable， with the idea of playing the knight to
 White has not only regained the pawn， but even acquired another one，but Black has good compensation（A．Green－ feld－Adams，Moscow Olympiad 1994）．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
10 & \cdots & f 5 \\
11 & \text { \&f3 }
\end{array}
\]

Timman－Salov（match，Sanghi Nagar 1994）went 11 \＆b1 ©4d5 12 〇f3 \＆d6
（if 12．．．Oxe3 13 fxe 3 皿d6 \(140-000\)
 attacking chances） 13 是g5 W 14

 White＇s position is more promising．
\(11 \ldots\) ．．． 4 d 5

\section*{12 \＆\({ }^{2} 2\)}

12 Oge2 Qxe3 13 fxe3 \＆d6 leads to a roughly equal game．

The match game Karpov－Short （Linares 1992）now continued 12．．．皿e6 13 Oge2 潘d7140－00000：

 Qf4 ©xf4 18 是xf4 g5 19 定e5 是g7 Black had a satisfactory position．

In Short＇s opinion， 15 a4 was more promising for White．
15.4212 （ 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 Qf6 4 e5 Qd5 5 国xc4 Qb6 6 定d3 Qc6）

\section*{7 Qe2}

Compared with variation 15．4211， the queen＇s bishop can occupy a more active post than e3．
\[
7
\]

Sg4
The old（for this variation）game Korchnoi－Suetin（Budva 1967）went

7．．．员e6 8 Qbc3 曾d7（8．．．g6 is strongly met by 9 空e4！，Lautier－Adianto，Novi Sad Olympiad 1990） 9 Qe4 包b4 10
 13 寝xe2 显xe2 14 皃xe2 0－0－0 15 e6！ Dc6（15．．．シxd4 16 exf7） 16 定e3 f6 17 Se4 with advantage to White．

In the modern game A．Greenfeld－ Shvidler（Israel 1992）Black acted as in variation 15.4211 －7．．．0b4 8 \＆e4 f5． After 9 exf6 exf6 10 包4！临e711000 White had an undisputed advantage．

\section*{8 f3}

Or 8 \＆e3 \＆xe2 9 \＆xe2 単d7 10 Qc3（after the passive defence of d 4 by \(10 \sum \mathrm{a} 3\) and \(\sum \mathrm{c} 2\) Black＇s position is slightly the more active） \(10 \ldots 0-0-011\) a4 a6（if \(11 \ldots \triangleq x d 412\) a5！） 12 a5 \(0 d 5\) ， and now：
（a） 13 显f3？！Qdb4（Black attacks the d4 pawn；13．．．e6？fails to 14 Qxd5 exd5 15 \＆g4，but \(13 \ldots .0 \mathrm{cb4}\) is possi－ ble） 14 e6（forced combinational play， since after 14 0－0 \(\quad 0 x d 4 \quad 15 \quad\) \＆xd4
娄e7 White does not have sufficient compensation for the pawn）14．．．簤xe6 15 d 5 ，and now instead of \(15 \ldots\) ．．．\({ }^{\text {We5 }} 16\) \(0-0 \mathrm{e} 617 \mathrm{dxc} 6\) Exdl \(18 \mathrm{cxb} 7+\) b8 19 Efxdl（Karpov－Timman，Brussels 1988）， which however also favours White after 19．．．定d6 20 g 3 龟f6，the other queen move 15．．． 18 鄀b3 exd5 19 Qxd5 勾x5 20 是xd5 c6 21 シacl 宣d6 \(22 \mathrm{f4}\) 宜c7！would have enabled Black comfortably to maintain his extra pawn（Timman）；
（b）13 0－0 e6（now if 13．．．9db4

 is preferable（I．Sokolov－Seirawan，Bel－ grade 1991）．
\[
8 \text {... §e6 }
\]

8．．．ᄋh5 is strongly met by 9 e6！
9 Qbc3


9．．．〇b4 10 \＆b1 c6 11 a3 乌4d5 12 Qe4 临c8 13 0－0 f5 14 Qg5 h6 15
 © \({ }^{6} h 1 \mathrm{f} 419\) De4．White＇s position is the more active（Shabalov－A．Greenfeld， Pula 1989）．

9．．．当d7 10 Qe4 显d5 11 Qc5 兠c8， and now：
（a） 12 a3 e6 13 we2（if 13 b 4 a 5 ，and White cannot play 14 b5？©xe5，while after \(14 \Xi \mathrm{E} 1 \mathrm{axb} 415 \mathrm{axb4}\)＠e7 Black has a solid position，Miles－Seirawan，
 15 0－0 a6（in Bukic－Petrosian，Banja Luka 1979，Black equalised after 15．．．

 21 Qg3 \＆xd3 22 当xd3 0－0） 16 当c3 f5 17 exf6 gxf6 18 ef4 \(0-0\) with a sharp game and chances for both sides－after ．．． pieces on the g －file（Gulko－Chandler， Amsterdam 1987）；
（b）the plan of developing the queen－ side should be considered－ 12 \＆e3 e6 13 Ecl！？Qb4（13．．．\＆xa2 is dangerous in view of 14 b3 a5 15 若b5） 14 a3 ©xd3＋15 世xd3 ©d7 16 Qe4．White has the better position（Meulders－Van der Sterren，Lyon 1990）．

9．．．\({ }^{2} d 5100-0\) e6 11 a3 §e7（if
賃c2 莤c4 14 皿e4 f5 15 exf6 \＆xf6 16 Efdl（16 \＆ \(\mathrm{exh} 70-0-0!?\) ）16．．．⿹d5 17 Qxd5 exd5 18 \＆d3 \＆xd3 19 敌xd3 \(0-0\) ．Black stands better（Ruzell－ Mikhalchishin，Manila Olympiad 1992）．

9．．．\＆c4 and：
 11．．．\({ }^{\text {en }} 12\) a3 0－0－0 13 §e3 and b2－ b4） 12 ©xe2 0－0－0 13 \＆xc6 比xc6 with chances for both sides；
 e6（a blockading pawn sacrifice；the quiet 12 \＆e3 e6 leads to a roughly equal game） \(12 \ldots\) ．．．fxe6 13 \＆e3 溇d7 14 Qf4 ©d5 15 Qcxd5（complications fa－ vourable to Black arise after 15 Qxe6 Qxe3 16 Qb5 \(\triangleq c 2+\) or \(16 \ldots \mathrm{xg} 2+\) ， Van der Wiel）15．．．exd5 16 番xb7（if 16眥xd5 䒼xd5 17 Qxd5 0－0－0 with ad－ vantage to Black）16．．．巴b8 17 Wa6 Exb2 18 0－0 e6 19 Eael（19 Zabl シb6！）19．．．Eb6 20 畄a4 是b4．Black has parried the threats and retained his extra pawn（Van der Wiel－Van Wely， Brussels 1993）．
> 15.422 （ 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc 43 e 4 Qf6 4 e 5 Qd5 5 ＠xc4 Qb6）

\section*{6 \＆b3 包 6}

Other replies：
6．．．c5，as played by Short in his match with Karpov（Linares 1992）：
（a） 7 dxc5 管xd1＋ 8 xdl（8 \＆xd1！？）8．．． 96 d 79 e6 fxe6 10 \＆xe6 Da6，and here instead of returning the pawn－ 11 c6 bxc6 12 \＆e3（or 12 Qf3〇ac5）12．．．⿹c7 13 §b3 Qd5 14 乌f3 0xe3＋15 fxe3 g6，which led to a com－ fortable position for Short，preferable was 11 \＆e3 Qdxc5 12 是xc8 堅x8 13 Qc3 when the e－pawn is isolated and White has the better chances；
（b）later the sharp 7 d 5 was tried： 7．．．c4 8 \＆a4＋\＆d7 9 － c 2 （after 9是xd7＋\(\sum^{2 x d 7}\) White has to reckon with ．．．⿹c5－d3）9．．．e6 10 d 6 \＆c6，and：
（b1） 11 Qf3 98 d 712 Qbd2 g6 with a complicated game and chances for both sides（Notkin－Suetin，Russia 1994）；
（b2） 11 h 4 ！？\＆ ex 2 （ \(11 \ldots\) ．．． 8 d 712
 ＠g5 wive 14 h 5 乌8d7 15 f 4 with com－ pensation for the pawn（Notkin）．

6．．． .1 f5 and now：
（a） 7 Qc3 e6 8 Qge2 㿾e7（8．．．Qc6 leads to the main line） 90000010是e3．Black has delayed developing his queen＇s knight so as now to play 10．．．Da6．Notkin－Kharlov（Russian Ch． 1994）continued 11 Qg3 \＆g6 12 Qce4 Qb4（12．．．Qd7，with the idea of ．．．c7－ c5，is well met by 13 会c4！－Kharlov） 13 a 3 Q4d5 \(14 \underset{=}{\mathrm{cl}}\)（14 气d2 Qd7） 14．．．Oxe3 15 fxe3 Qd7 16 \＆a4 c6 17㟶 e 2 and by continuing \(17 . . . \mathrm{a} 5\) ，with the idea of ．．．b7－b5，．．．\({ }^{W} \mathrm{~b} 6\) and ．．．c6－c5， Black would have retained roughly equal chances；
（b） 7 乌f3 0 c 68 ©c3 e6（compared with the later variation 15.4222 ，Black＇s queen＇s bishop is already developed and ．．．ig 4 will involve a loss of time） 9



 f4 g6．Black has a sound position （Manninen－Kharlov，Helsinki 1992）．

Now White＇s main choices are：
7 ©e2（15．4221）－p． 269
7 © 3 （15．4222）－p． 271
7 \＆e3 \＆f5 is the other alternative：
（a） 8 De2 e6 90－0（compared with the main line，White delays playing ©c3） \(9 \ldots . \mathrm{a} 5\)（the other plan is \(9 \ldots . \mathrm{b} 4\) ， with control over d5） 10 ＠a4＋（or 10


13 \＆e4 0－0 14 甾e2 c5 15 Eadl with somewhat the more active position for White，Adianto－Anand，Kuala Lumpur
 and \(11 \ldots \mathrm{c} 6\) fails to 12 \＆d2，while after 11．．．©c6 12 Qbc3 a6 13 Qg3 今d3 14 Efel White has a slight advantage） 11
 14 \＆xg6 hxg6（14．．．fxg6 15 b3 \(0 x=3\) 16 fxe3 favours White） 15 De4．Now Black＇s slight activity－15．．． En 4 （after 15．．． Qxe3 \(^{16 \text { fxe3 0－0 } 17 \text { घf3 or 15．．．}}\) 0－0 16 \＆g5 White stands better） 16 Q2g3 㱠d5 17 単c2 \(0-0-0 \quad 18\) \＆g5是xg5 19 ©xg5 Ed7？！（not 19．．．Exd4 \(205 \times f 7\) and \(\mathbf{W g} 6\) ，but 19．．． \(\mathbf{m d h} 20\)
 －the e5 pawn is attacked，and both sides have chances） \(20 \triangleq \mathrm{f} 3 \mathrm{~g} 4\)（ \(20 . .\). Eth8 would have been met by 21 b3 and De4） 21 Eadl g5 22 赏cl！concluded with the practically forced \(22 \ldots \pm x f 323\) gxf3 Wxf3（Karpov－Speelman）．After 24 fel Black has no compensation for the exchange（Karpov，l．Zaitsev）；
（b） 8 e 6 must also be mentioned：
（b1）8．．．exe6 9 是xe6 fxe6 10 Qc3 g6（or 10．．．崌d7 11 Qf3 0－0－0 \(120-0\) ， Bronstein－Lukin，USSR 1982，one of the first games with this variation） 11
 14 Qg5 घ゙de8 15 a 4 Qd5 16 घfdl（here Black would have answered 16 Qxe6誛xe6 17 Qxd5 with 17．．． Db 4 ！） 16．．．8b817 Oce4＠a5 18 粕d3（Karsa－ Schrancz，Hungary 1985），and in both cases the pawn sacrifice justified itself；
（b2）according to analysis by Kuzminykh，with 8．．．fxe6 Black obtains a satisfactory position： 9 Qf3（9 Dc3包 510 Qf3 Qxc3 11 bxc3 Qa5 12
 \＆e4）9．．e5！ 10 Qg5（10 Qh4 嘗d711 d5 ©a5，or 10 d5 ©a5 11 ©c3 e6） 10．．．e6 11 g 4 h 612 昷xe6 0 xd 4 ．
15.4221 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 Qf6 4 e5 Qd5 5 \＆xc4 Qb6 6 \＆b3 Qc6）
\begin{tabular}{lll}
7 & Qe2 & \＆f5 \\
8 & Qbc3 & e6
\end{tabular}


\section*{\(9 \quad\) a3}

This move can also be made later， with the same position often being reached．Transpositions in the preced－ ing moves are also possible．

Other continuations：
\(90-00\) b4（with the intention of in－ vading at d3；9．．．e7 1000 would transpose into the next variation） 10 f 4 c5 11 a3 \(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{d}} 12 \mathrm{~g} 4\) ！ \(0 \mathrm{xcl} 13 \mathrm{gxf5}\) Qxb3 14 娄xb3 exf5 15 d 5 with advan－ tage to White（Brilla－Banfalvi－Smith， corr．1985）．

9 \＆e3，and now：
（a）9．．．\＆e7 1000 ，when：
（a1）10．．．0－0 11 Qg3＠g6 12 f 4 ＠a5 （12．．．Qb4 \(13 \mathrm{~d} 5!\) ） 13 d 5 Qxb3，when White can choose：
（all） 14 axb3 \(\&\) \＆ 615 最xb6 axb6 16
 Yakovich，Tyumen 1987）．Both sides have chances： 18 f5 ec5＋ 19 h1 exf5 20 ©xf5＠xf5 21 モxf5 g6 22 玉f4寝xg4 23 モxg4 玉a8；
（a12） 14 梼 \(x b 3\) §d3 15 d 6 （15 dxe6宣c4！） 15 ．．．cxd6 16 afd dxe5 17 Qce4 exf4 18 ■xd3 缕b8 19 ミxb6 axb6 （preferable to \(19 \ldots\) ．．fxg 320 \＆e3 gxh2＋

 knight proved stronger than the pawns， Sergienko－Kharlov，Podolsk 1992） 20 Df1 Ed8，and again Black has three pawns for the knight，but the position remains unclear（Sergienko，Raetsky）；
（a2）10．．．皆d7（Black is not in a hurry to castle）：
（a21） 11 \＆c2 Qb4 12 这xf5 exf5 13
 position is preferable（Polovodin－ Yakovich，St Petersburg 1993）；
（a22） 11 Dg3＠g6 12 f 4 E 513 d 5 Qxb3 14 axb3（compared with Shirov－ Yakovich and Sergienko－Kharlov ex－ amined earlier，Black＇s queen is at d7，
 dxe6 he plays 16 ．．．\({ }^{\text {U1xe6）}} 14 \ldots 0-0 \quad 15\) dxe6 凿xd1 16 exf7＋是xf7 17 Eaxdl \＆xb3 18 Edel 0 d 519 Qxd5 \＆xd5 20 f5 \＆b4 21 dl c6．Black＇s two bishops and queenside majority，with the possibility of ．．．a5－a4，give him a good game；
（b）9．．． priority to the development of his queenside）：


11 Qg3 定g6（11．．．Qxd4 12 \＆xd4数xd4 is unfavourable in view of 13需f3！，with the threats of 14 2xf5 and


 \＆b6（the forcing variation 17．．． \(\mathrm{W} \times \mathrm{Wg} 3\) 18 Exd7！是xf2 +19 玉xf2 Exd7 20 处4
 Black has three pawns for a piece， favours White） 18 Exd7 Exd7 19 Edl
 bxc3 cxb6 23 Exa7 \({ }^{\text {Ec8 }}\) ，and in Shirov－ Anand（Dortmund 1992）the adventures concluded in an equal ending： 24 c 4 h 5 25 घd7 घ゙c5 26 f 4 b 5 （Shirov）．
\[
9 \ldots \text { 最 } 7
\]

 \(\pm \mathrm{cl}\) h4 15 显b3 \(\mathrm{f6}\) with chances for both sides，Petursson－Speelman，Lon－ don 1994； \(12 \Xi \mathrm{El}\) and Q 4 comes into consideration－Petursson） 12 Ecl ，and：
（a） \(12 \ldots . .0513\) d5 exd5 14 是xb6 axb6 15 ＠xd5（if 15 Qxd5 Black defends by 15．．．0c6 16 Dec3 气e6） 15．．．丹e6 16 将c2 68 ！（if 16．．．c6 White gains the advantage by \(17 \Omega \mathrm{a} 4\) © 718

 W W7 with chances for both sides （Epishin－Magem Badals，Manresa 1995）－analysis by Magem Badals；
（b） 12 ．．．f6 13 exf6 gxf6 14 Qa4 Qd5 16 \＆c4 乌a5 16 \＆a2 \＆g4 17 乌ac3
今h5 21 Qc5 \＆xc5 22 Exc5 \＆f7 23 \(\pm f c 1\) e5 with roughly equal chances （Epishin－Salov，Madrid 1995）．

The new continuation 9．．．f6 is worth testing，e．g． 10 \＆f4（after 10 exf6 \(\mathrm{Wf6}\) 11 最e3 0－0－0 the black pieces are ac－ tive） 10 ．．．fxe5（risky is \(10 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 5\) ？！ 11宜e3 fxe5 12 0－0 苗e7 13 d5 乌a5 14 §xb6 axb6 15 \＆ 2 exd5 16 Qxd5 0 c 6
 White has a strong position for the pawn，Epishin－Kharlov，Russian Ch． 1995） 11 \＆xe5 \＆\({ }^{2}\) d6．
宣xc2 13 㴗xc2 気4：

（a） 14 \＃adl Dxe3 15 fxe3 c6（after 15．．．\(勹 \mathrm{~d} 516\) 匂d5 exd5 17 喽b3，in－ tending \(\sum \mathrm{f} 4\) ，White stands slightly bet－ ter） 16 Ef3 Qd5 17 Qe4 \＆g5（or 17．．．f6 18 exf6 ©xf6 19 Eth3 with slightly the better chances for White） 18
 19．．．घad8 200 h5 White has the advan－
構d8 23 当f2（Karpov－Short，match， Linares 1992）．White＇s position is the more promising（Karpov）；
（b） 14 \＆f4 Qd5 15 Qxd5 觜xd5 （15．．．exd5 16 a 4 a 517 b 3 Qb6 18 \＆g3 f5 19 Df4 or 18．．．f6 19 e6，and in both cases White＇s position is preferable－
 Ed3．White stands better（Pr．Nikolic－ Van Wely，Groningen 1993）．
\[
11 \text { \& } \mathrm{a} 2 \quad 0-0
\]

In Kamsky－Magem Badals（Madrid 1994）Black（in analogy with previous variations；cf．the note to 9 ．．．\＆e7）chose 11．．．0－0－0，and after 12 宜e3 f6 13 exf6

\＆xd4 室xd4 17 \＆xe6＋\＆xe6 18
 21 霄c2 雷d3 White took play into a fa－ vourable ending： 22 Od5 㥪xc2 23 Qxb6＋cxb6 24 モxc2＋\＄b8 25 f 4 ．

12 \＆e3 छfd8 13 h 3
Threatening to advance the g－and f－ pawns．

\section*{13 ．．．h6}

Van Wely－Adianto（Amsterdam 1996）went 13．．．\({ }^{\text {Sg }} 14\) 畨el（intending \(\pm \mathrm{dl}\) ，f2－f4 and g2－g4；the set－up 14 Wel and dl is also quite possible－ Van Wely）14．．．a5（with the idea of ．．．Ob4！？） 15 \＆b3 a4 16 道a2 ©a5 17 Qf4，and here Black could have consid－
 ＠c4，planning ．．．乌b3 and ．．．乌d5 with counterplay．

\section*{14 零c1}

White does not hurry，but prepares the above－mentioned plan．The imme－ diate 14 g 4 e h 715 f 4 is also possible：
（a） \(15 \ldots \mathrm{~h} 4\)（preventing 咱e1），as in Goldin－Kharlov（St Petersburg 1993） \(16 \Xi f 3\) and \(\begin{aligned} & \text { Wifl } \\ & \mathrm{fl} \\ & \text { with the initiative；}\end{aligned}\)
（b） \(15 \ldots\) ．． a 516 b 3 ！，and if \(16 \ldots\) ．\(\times \mathrm{xa} 3\)
 good attacking chances．

\section*{14 \\ \＆18}

Instead of 15 d1（Epishin－Kharlov， Moscow 1992），which allowed Black to prepare for defence with \(15 \ldots\) §e7（fol－ lowed by ．．．c7－c6，．．．\({ }^{\text {eh }} 7\) 7 and ．．． \(2 b \mathrm{bd} 5\) ）， 15 g 4 ＠h7 16 f 4 was good，and if 16．．． Q a \(17 \mathrm{f5}\) ！（here 17 b 3 can be met
 the better position for White（Epishin）．
15.4222 （l d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4
 Qc6）

\[
7 \quad \ldots \quad \text { ig } 4
\]

The alternative is 7．．．8f58 9c3 e69
 c6 13 Qg5 h6 14 Qge4 Qed5 15 憎f3 with somewhat the better chances for White（Maksimovic－Nutiu，Thessaloniki Olympiad 1984）．In pinning the knight， Black provokes a typical sacrifice．
\[
8 \text { 令xf7+ }
\]
 leads to a draw（Yusupov－Belyavsky， Tunis 1985）．
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline 8 & & ¢xf7 \\
\hline 9 & Qg5 & ¢is8 \\
\hline 10 & Wxg4 & W \({ }_{\text {Wd }}{ }^{\text {d }}\) \\
\hline 11 & 喆2 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

11 宏xd4 Qxd4 12 Qa3 e6 13 宣e3
 \＆e7！led to an equal game in Ftacnik－ Spraggett（Wijk aan Zee 1985）．
11
装xe5

12 \＆e3
Does White＇s initiative compensate for the sacrificed pawn？
\begin{tabular}{lll}
12 & 0 & Qd5 \\
13 & Qr3 & wf5 \\
14 & \(0-0\) & e6 \\
15 & Qc3 &
\end{tabular}

In Azmaiparashvili－Balashov（53rd USSR Ch．，Kiev 1986）White played 15

Qd4，and after 15．．＠xd4 16 Qxd4定d6 17 © 3 喕 7 （probably simpler is 17．．．觜f4 18 貲xe6＋De7 19 日fd1

 Black castled artificially and retained the pawn．

\section*{15}
－\({ }^{2} 8\)
15．．．\({ }^{\circ} \mathrm{d} 6\) is weaker．After 16 0xd5
 \＆xd4 White has the initiative （M．Gurevich－Drasko，Vrsac 1985）．

\section*{16 Ifel}

16 玉ac1 needs testing，e．g．16．．．
 White has compensation for the pawn．
16
是 7

17 \＆\({ }^{\circ} 2\)
Stronger than 17 Qb5 \(0 x=318\) fxe3 （Yusupov－Portisch，Tunis 1985）18．．． \＆d6！，when the chances are with Black．


Alburt－Gulko（Somerset 1986）con－ tinued 17．．． 0 xc3 18 \＆xc3（18 bxc3 घd6！ 19 モabl b6 20 モb3 proved good enough only to restore material
 Exe6 \({ }^{6} \mathrm{~d} 723 \mathrm{E}\) 3，Seirawan－Speelman， match，Saint John 1988）18．．．\＆f7 19
 on e 6 and has the initiative．

\section*{3 e3， 3 c3}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
1 & d 4 & \(\mathrm{d5}\) \\
2 & c 4 & dxc 4
\end{tabular}

In this chapter we will consider：
3 e3（16．1）
3 ©c3（16．2）－p． 280
3 wa4＋usually transposes into other variations，e．g．3．．．c6 4 Uex 9f6，or 3．．． 0 c 64 Qf3 Qf6．The following lines are of independent significance：
（a） \(3 . . .0 \mathrm{c} 64\) Qf3 a6 5 Wxc 4 昷e6 （after 5．．． 8 ng 4 d 5 \＆xf3 \(7 \mathrm{gxf3}\) Qe5 8鹪b3 White stands better，Euwe－Van Scheltinga，Amsterdam 1953） 6 览d3 Qb4 7 业d1 Df6 8 Dc3 Qbd5 with equal chances；
（b） \(3 . . .0 \mathrm{~d} 74\) e 4 gives White an ad－ vantage in the centre；
 play for simplification is not the best way to equalise，as demonstrated by Reshevsky－Dake（New York 1936）： 5 e3 e6 6 Dc3 wxc4 7 显xc4 Qf6（7．．．a6 is better） 8 Qb5 Qa6 9 a3 b6 10 De2 ＠b7 11 f 3 ＠e7 12 e 4 c6 13 Qbc3 with advantage to White．

\section*{16．1（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 4 ）}

\section*{3 e3}

Until quite recently White＇s last move was thought to be inaccurate， allowing Black to equalise without dif－ ficulty by 3 ．．．e5．Now the evaluation of the variation has changed：after 3．．．e5 Black also faces a battle for equality， and one that is no less difficult than in the approved variations．
\(\begin{array}{ccc}3 \\ \text { Naturally，} & \text { with } & \text { e5．．．} \triangle \mathrm{f6} 6 \text { Black can }\end{array}\) invite his opponent to transpose into other variations．After 4 \＆xc4 e6 the
play can take an original direction if White develops his king＇s knight at e2：
（a） 5 Qe2 a6 6 a 4 c 57 毋bc3 ©c6 8 \(0-0\) cxd4 9 exd4 \＆e7．This typical iso－ lated d－pawn position with the knight at e2 does not give White any advantage （Anderson－Pr．Nikolic，Brussels 1988）；
（b） 5 Dc3 a6，and now：
（b1） 6 Oge2 c5 \(70-0\) b5 8 \＆d3（8 eb3 needs to be tested in practice） 8．．．Obd7 9 Øg3 \＆b7 10 Qce4 cxd4 11 exd4 \＆e7，and Black has no difficulties （Sveshnikov－Petrosian，USSR 1982）；
（b2） 6 f 3 is an interesting move： 6．．．Dc6 7 a3（7 Oge2 saves a tempo） 7．．．今d6 8 Qge2 0－0（the immediate 8．．． e5 is also possible，and if 9 Qd5 \(Q x d 5\) 10 \＆xd5 0－0，sacrificing a pawn for the initiative after 11 \＆xc6 bxc6 12 細xc6 Eb8） 9 h 3 e5 10 d 5 e 4 ！ 11 Qxe4 De5

 and Black has the advantage in view of the threat of a check at d3 after the bishop moves，while if 16 b3 b5 （Andruet－Semkov，Sofia 1990）；
（b22） 14 f 4 Qxc4 15 wxc4 \(\begin{aligned} & \text { Wg6 } \\ & 16\end{aligned}\)
 Ehel c6，and Black would appear to have sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn（Semkov）．

After 3．．．c5 4 \＆xc4 cxd4 5 exd4 the unusual 5．．． \(\begin{aligned} & \text { wic7 } \\ & \text { was }\end{aligned}\) played in two games from Horgen（1994）： 6 \＆b3 \＆g4 7 f 3 合d7 8 乌e2（or 8 Qc3 e6 9 Qge2 \＆d6 10 De4 with the better chances for White，Gelfand－Leko）8．．．
 Wd8（Yusupov－Miles），and now 12 d 5 （not allowing the knight to go to c6） would have given White a good game．

A trap for beginners goes 3．．．b5？ 4 a4，and if 4．．．c6 5 axb5 cxb5 6 粪f3， winning material．


4 \＆xc4
If he captures on e5，White can no longer regain the \(\mathbf{c} 4\) pawn： 4 dxe5質xdl＋5 © （6 f4 f6！）6．．．＠e6 7 Qbd2 0－0－0．Black has a good position．
 fectly satisfactory position for Black．

4 Qc3 exd4 5 exd4 Qf6 6 \＆xc4 transposes into the main line．
\[
4 \text {... exd4 }
\]

Or 4．．．Qc6 5 d5！（recommended by Keres；after，e．g． 5 Qf3 e4 6 Qfd2 \({ }^{\text {Ulg }} 5\)
 d5 乌e5 11 ＠xd7＋Dexd7 12 畨a4 \＆d6 13 Qdxe4 0－0 Black has compensation for the pawn，Sliwa－Stahlberg，Gothen－ burg 1955）5．．．Da5（5．．．Dce7 6 Qc3） 6
 （8．．．乌a5？ 9 \＆xf7＋and 10 䊦d5） 9 \＆d2 with the better chances for White．

After 4．．．Qh6 5 Qc3 \＆d6 6 dxe5
 bxc3 \＆e6 10 §xe6 fxe6 11 c4 Qf7 12 \＆a3 White has some initiative in this simplified position（M．Gurevich－Gur－ genidze（52nd USSR Ch．，Lvov 1985）．

4．．．\＆b4＋5 ©c3 exd4 6 exd4 Qf6 is analysed in the main line．

\section*{5 exd4}

（a） 6 a3 Qd7 7 Qf3 Qb6 8 Qxd4
 Qxc4 Df6（Billinger－E．Grunfeld， Austria 1941）with an equal game；
（b） 6 d 2 is interesting，offering a pawn to gain time for development （Novikov－Lobanov（Moscow 1985）．

5 Df3 is not dangerous for Black：5．．． \＆b4＋（not 5．．．dxe3？ 6 \＆xf7＋；after 5．．．
 Qg4 9 0－0 ©xe3，Sokolsky－Mikenas， USSR 1950， 10 Eel White stands better） 6 §d2（if 6 f1 䒼 7 defending
 8 exd4 0－0 9 0－0 \＆f5 10 Qc3 Qbd7． The chances are roughly equal．

Now Black＇s main continuations are：
5．．．官b4＋（16．11）
5．．．Qf6（16．12）－p． 277
5．．．§d6（16．13）－p． 280
If \(5 . .\). Qc 6 Qf3，then：
（a） \(6 \ldots\) \＆g \(70-0\) ，when the pseudo－ active 7．．． il f6（Ahues－Holzhausen，Ber－ lin 1926）failed to 8 \＆g5！ g 6 （ \(8 \ldots\)


（b）6．．．＠b4＋ 7 Qc3 Qf6 8 d5！？ We7＋9 宜e3 Qa5 10 是e2，when the knight at a5 looks to be in danger，but in V．Ivanov－Bebchuk（Leningrad 1991） White was unable to exploit this： \(10 .\).
 c6 14 光a4 Exd5 15 c4 Ec5 16 昷e3 Ef5 17 \＆d3 Eh5 18 c5．Here a draw was agreed．After 18．．．\({ }^{\underline{1}} \mathrm{~d} 819\) gfdl Id5 the position remains unclear．

> \begin{tabular}{|l} 16.11 (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e3 e5 4 \\ exc4 exd4 5 exd4) \\ \hline \end{tabular}

\section*{6 OMC3 © 06}

White gains a slight advantage after

 © ex 3 （ \(12 \ldots \mathrm{~g}\) ？is refuted by 13 0f5！最xf5 14 溇xf5 gxh4 15 玉ael Ee4！with a decisive attack） 13 bxc3显xc4 14 比xc4（Johannessen－Jauregui， Moscow Olympiad 1956）．

\section*{7 D}

7 粦 b 3 should be considered：
 0c6 10000 显xc3（10．．．0a5 is bad in view of 11 寊xf6 gxf6 12 当c2 0 0xc4 13 （dd5） 11 要xc3，and now：
（al） \(11 \ldots\) h6 12 定h 4 when White stands better：

（al1）12．．．g5 13 定g3 Qe4 14 we3 Qxg3 15 Qxg3（Plachetka－Matulovic， Vmjacka Banja 1985）；
（a12）12．．．\＆g 413 f 3 昷e6（13．．．\＆h5？ 14 ©f4；13．．．是f5 14 Efel） 14 d 5 ！ \＆xd5（giving up the exchange in another way offers a tougher resistance：

 Pekarek） 15 ixd5（Black was counting

 Q a 3 Ee 820 g 1！and White won the exchange for a pawn（Plachetka－ Pekarek，Czechoslovakia 1986）；
（a2）11．．．Qe6．Now in Pekarek＇s variation the white pawn is not at f 3 but f2，which favours Black，but White is not bound to play 12 d 5 ．Instead 12 Eael！maintains the tension in a fa－ vourable situation（Christiansen）；
（b） \(7 \ldots .\). c 6 ！？is more promising：
（bl） 8 ＠xf7＋©f8 9 \＆c4（the point is that 9 gge ？？is refuted by \(9 \ldots .\). e 710
 Wlyl Qxe2 and Black＇s position is even slightly more pleasant；
（b2） 8 Sge2 0－0 900 \＆e7 10 \＃d1 with a roughly equal game（Paunovic－ Karolyi，Kecskemet 1986）．

7
0－0
After 7．．．嘗e7t 8 Qe5 0－0 900 Qbd7（Haag－Lutikov，Hamburg 1965） 10 Ell White stands better．
\[
8 \quad 0-0 \quad \text { 最g4 }
\]

White＇s main continuations are：
9 a 3 （16．111）
9 \＆g5（16．112）－p． 276

 equal（W．Schmidt－Matanovic，Nis 1984）．

Malanyuk－Pekarek（Tbilisi 1986） went 9 h3 ih5？！（Black should have
 ©g6 11 Qe5 Qfd7 12 f 4 W W 413 mh 2 Qxe5 14 dxe5 Qc6 15 定e3 Mad8 16 We2 Qd4 17 Vg 2 with advantage to White．

The old move 9 \＆e3 Qc6 10 定e2 Qd5 does not promise White any ad－ vantage（Burn－Duras，Karlsbad 1911）．

16．111（1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e3 e5 4定xc4 exd4 5 exd4 2b4＋ 6 Qc3 Qf6 7 Qf300 000 Og4）

9 a3 \＆xc3
If 9．．．Sd6 10 h 3 定h5 11 g 4 皿g6 12 Qe5，when the attempt to attack the
pawn -12 ．．．c5？！is strongly met by 13 2b5 ©c6 14 \＆f4

9．．．\＆e7 was recommended in his time by Taimanov．The development of the bishop on this square（without first checking on b4）is currently topical－ cf．variation 16.121 （p．277）．

10 bxc3 c5
11 h 3


11．．．in5 and now：
（a） 12 g 4 国 613 ＠e5 cxd4 14 cxd 4 Qc6 15 Qxg6 hxg6 16 d 5 De5 17 \＆b3 \＃c8 with an equal game；
（b） 12 ㅇg5 Qbd7 13 g 4 回g6 14 Qe5 敩a5（after 14．．．Qb6 15 皿a2 cxd4 16 cxd4 White has the advantage， Eingorn－Lukin，Kiev 1984） 15 Qxd7 Qxd7 16 \＆e7 \({ }^{(f f} 817\) \＆ 15 with the initiative for White（Eingorn）．

11．．．9xf3 12 當xf3，when：
（a） \(12 \ldots \mathrm{cxd} 413\) 监xb7 9 bd 714 cxd 4 Qb6 15 乌a2！Wexd4 16 \＆e3 㥩e4

 19 \＆b3！the chances are with White， who has the two bishops（Korchnoi－ Matulovic，Belgrade 1984）；
（b） \(12 \ldots . \mathrm{D}^{2} 13 \mathrm{dl}\)（a simple move， maintaining the tension and retaining the initiative；after 13 dxc 5 Qe5 14
 counterplay for the pawn）13．．．cxd4 14 cxd4 \＃c8 15 \＆e3 Qe7 16 ■ac1 Ded5 17 显g5 畨d7 18 Eel ，and White＇s two active bishops give him the advantage （Lukacs－Kriszany，Kecskemet 1991）．
16．112（1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e3 e5 4
\＆xc4 exd4 5 exd4 皿b4＋6 0 c3
Qf6 7 Qf3 0－0 \(80-0\) \＆ e 4 ）

\section*{9 \＆g5 0．06}
\(9 .\). \＆e7 is possible，preventing 9 d 5 ， but after 10 h 3 是xf3（ \(10 \ldots\) ．．．h5 is strongly met by 11 g 4 昷g6 12 De5， and if \(12 \ldots .0 \mathrm{c} 613 \mathrm{f} 4) 11\) Wxf3 Qc6 12 Eadl White has the more active position．
 White＇s position is preferable．
\[
\begin{aligned}
& 10 \text { Od5 全e7 } \\
& 11 \text { Qxe7+ 對xe7 }
\end{aligned}
\]


（a） \(12 \ldots\) ．．．fd8 13 玉el （Marshall－Janowski，New York 1924）

 chances（Alekhine）；


§f5 17 Eel） 16 Oxc6 bxc6 17 §xf6皿e2 18 Efel \＆c4 with a drawn ending （Rajkovic－Matulovic，Yugoslavia 1983）．

12 h 3 \＆xf3（after 12．．．\＆ h 513 d 5 De5 14 ＠e2 §xf3 15 §xf3 h6 16
全xd5＝ab8 20 Eacl in this simplitied position White has a great positional advantage） 13 㥩xf3，and now：
 after the recommended 14．．．\({ }^{\boldsymbol{W}} \mathrm{E}\) c5 15是xf6 we4 White gains an advantage
 Qxb5 18 \＆ L 2 －Simagin） 15 ＠xf6
 White gained a clear advantage （Stahlberg－Gligoric，Belgrade 1949）；
（b） \(13 \ldots\) 省e4，offering the exchange of queens，when 14 we4 Qxe4 15 \＆e3 is favourable for White（Lputian－ Romanishin（Manila 1992）．
16.12 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e3 e5 4国xc4 exd4 5 exd4）
\[
5 \ldots \text { Df6 }
\]


Now White has：
6 9f3（16．121）
6 Wiv3（16．122）－p． 279
16.121 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 e 3 e5 4 －xc4 exd4 5 exd4 2 ） 6 ）

\section*{6 Q13 \＆e7}

6．．．＠b4＋leads to variation 16.11 ．
7 － 0 3 \(0-1\)
only nor＂．．．edorti，wime luose ar ter 8 是xf7＋\(\$ \mathrm{xf} 79 \mathrm{~g} 5+\mathrm{g} 610\) with in 11 h 3 Black resigns （Shmatkov－Edlin，Moscow 1968）．

8 0－0
By 8 h 3 White can prevent the pin on his knight：
（a）amusingly， \(8 .\). ．0c6 now leads to a position from．．．the Petroff Defence！ （le4e5 2 Qf3 Df6 3 Qxe5 d6 4 Qf 3 Qxe45d4d56 今d3 昷e770－0 9c68 c4 Df6 9 Dc3 0－0 10 h 3 dxc 411 （1xc4）．Vaiser－Zs．Polgar（Oviedo Rapid 1993）continued \(90-0\) \＆f5（dubious is 9．．．乌a5？！，after which 10 \＆ 3 \＆e6 11 Eel Ec6 12 a3 监d6 13 \＆e3 0d5 14 낟2 gave White an excellent position， Gelfand－Adams，Wijk aan Zee 1994） 10 Ee1 a6 11 a3 b5 12 \＆ 2 b3 b4 13 axb4 Qxb4 14 Qe5 c5 15 d5 \＆d6 16 Qc6
 with the better position for White；
（b）8．．． Qbd 79000 b 610 － b 3 is more usual：

（bl）10．．．c6，when：

a3显c2 with a promising position for White：if 16．．．f6 17 削h5！（the simple 17 Qd3 is also good） \(17 \ldots\) fxe5 18 Qd6
 Exe5 g6 22 £g5（I．Sokolov－Piket， Corfu 1991）；
（b12） 11 షel Dfd5 12 Qe4 §f5 （after 12．．．玉e8 13 \＆d2 \＆f5 14 Qg3 Qe6 15 \＆c2 White stands better， Timman－Panno，Mar del Plata 1982） 13
 （ 15 ．．．\＆e6 is preferable） 16 \＆f4 with the better position for White（Karpov－ Timman，Amsterdam 1991）；
（b2） \(10 \ldots\) Qbd5 11 Eel ©e6 12 Qg5 Qxc3 13 bxc3 \＆ eb 314 Wxb3 and White stands better（Vaganian－Tal， Moscow 1982）．
\[
8 \ldots \quad \text { ig4 }
\]

Or 8．．．⿹bd7 9 Еel Qb6 10 乌b3 c6 （we have already met this set－up after 8 h3－thus here White has an extra tempo；10．．．\＆g4 is well met by 11 h 3
 11．．．Dbd5 12 Qxd5 cxd5 13 Qe5 \＆e6 14 Dd3 with positional pressure， Browne－Petrosian，Las Palmas 1982） 12 Qh4 \＆ i 4 ？（ \(12 \ldots \mathrm{i} \mathrm{g} 6\) was better） 13 \＆xf6 \＆xf6（13．．．\＆xdl 14 \＆xe7 and Eaxdl favours White－he has three pieces for the queen with excellent de－ velopment） 14 渻xg4 \＆xh4 15 Ead1 \＆f6 16 De4！是e7 17 Dc5．White has a clear positional advantage（Nikoloff－ Hebert，Toronto 1990）．

\section*{9 h3 \＆xf3}

9．．．\＆h5 10 g 4 ＠g6 11 Qe5 c5 （ \(11 . . . \mathrm{c} 6\) is strongly met by \(12 \mathrm{f4}\) ，and if 12．．．b5 13 e．b3 b4 14 f5！bxc3 15 fxg6 hxg6 16 bxc3 ©d5 17 誛f §f6 18 \＆a3 Ee8 19 Eael with a clear plus，Henley－ Dlugy，New York 1983） 12 d5（12 dxc5 contains an interesting trap：12．．．exc5 13 0xg6 and if 13．．．hxg6？ 14 exf7＋！

Exf7 15 （v3＋；cf．also Ulybin－ Erikalov（p．280）where the same position is reached） \(12 \ldots\) ．．．d6 13 f 4 a 6 14 a4 and in this sharp position White has the better chances（Christiansen－ Grupe，USA 1983）．
\[
10 \text { Wxf Sc6 }
\]
 \＆d \(613 Q \mathrm{~b} 5\) is better for White．
\[
11 \text { \&e3 Qxd4 }
\]

After the slow 11．．．a6 White has the interesting plan of advancing his g －and f－pawns，e．g． 12 madl h6 13 敋1 憎d7 14 g 4 Qh7 15 䒼g2 Ead8 16 f 4 b 517 ＠d5 Qb4 18 ＠f3 with the better chances．

\section*{12 世 \(\times \mathbf{x b} 7\)}


White has the better position：


 21 h4 with advantage（Zaichik－ Karpeshov，Volgodonsk 1983）．
 モaxb8 15 \＆xa7（Arencibia－Espinosa， Gali 1990）．Instead of \(15 . . \pm b 7\) ？，which after 16 \＆d3！led to a clear advantage for White，correct was \(15 . . \pm \times b 2\) ，al－ though even in this case he has the bet－ ter chances．
16.122 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 e3 e5 4 ©xc4 exd4 5 exd4 0 f6）

6 䒼b3 类 \(\mathrm{e} 7+\)


\section*{7 Qe2}

Vaganian－Klovans（36th USSR Ch．， Alma Ata 1968／9）went 7 gfl g6
 now the routine move \(11 \Xi \mathrm{El}\)（after 11譄f3 Qbd7 and 12．．c6 White does not achieve anything） 11 ．．．莤e6！led to an advantage for Black．

7 \＆e3 is possible，and if 7．．．g6 （Black prefers not to exchange queens and continues developing；if \(7 . . . \mathrm{w}\) b4＋8 Qc3 杽xb3 9 显xb3－Plaskett） 8 Qf3宜g790000010 Еel Dc6 11 \＆d2！ W W 812 d 5 with an excellent game for White（Plaskett－Lukin，Plovdiv 1984）．

Plaskett＇s paradoxical suggestion of 7 di can be met by \(7 \ldots\) e．． 9 ，and if 8 \＆e3 Dd6．
\[
7 \text {... 粆4+ }
\]

Compared with Vaganian－Klovans （cf．the note to White＇s 7th move）here 7．．．g6 favours White．His king has not lost the right to castle，and he has a marked lead in development： 8 Dbc3 ＠g79 \＆g5 0－0 10000 bd7 11 Od5並d8 12 玉ad1 Qb6 13 ＠xb6 axb6 14

Qc3 \＆f5 15 d5（Polovodin－Vorotni－ kov，Moscow 1983）．

7．．．Qbd7 was played in Granda Zuniga－Pr．Nikolic（Zagreb 1987）．After \(80-0\) Qb6 White tried to exploit his lead in development by 9 คf4 \(\triangle\) xc4 10罳xc4 曹d711 Qc3 是e712 Qcd5，but
 15 d5 0－0！（15．．．cxd5 16 W＇bs＋监d7 17 Eel＋） 16 dxc 6 昷e6 17 We4 bxc6 18㿥xc6 Eac8 19 畨e4 Ec4 allowed Black to gain an active position for the sacrificed pawn．

\section*{8 Qbc3 晋xb3 \\ 9 §xb3}

9 axb3 is also good，e．g．9．．．c6 10 \(0-0\) \＆b4 11 \＆g5（11 \＆f4 0－0，and if 12 是xb8 \(\mathbf{E x b 8} 13 \boldsymbol{E x a} 7 \mathrm{~b} 5\) with coun－ terplay－Pekarek）11．．．Qbd7 12 d5 cxd5 13 Qxd5 Qxd5 14 \＆xd5 with some initiative for White（Arkhipov－ Pekarek，Czechoslovakia 1985）．
\[
9 \ldots \text {. . } \mathrm{d} 6
\]

White gains the better chances after
 0－000 ©a6 13 Ehel 0－0－0 14 Qg3 Ehe8 15 Qh5！（Gorelov－Lukin，Telavi 1982）．


10 Ob5，and now：
（a） \(10 \ldots\)＠ \(\mathrm{b} 4+11\)＠d2 \(\mathrm{exd}^{2}+12\)

家xd2 Qa6，and with accurate play Black can equalise：
（a1） 13 घacl \(d 8\) ！，and if 14 \＆xf7 \(\pm f 8\) and then 15．．．＠e4＋，picking up the f2 pawn；
（a2） 13 f 3 这d7 14 Qec3 0－0 15 Eadl \(\Xi \mathrm{fd} 816\) 家 \(\mathrm{e} 3 \mathrm{exb5} 17\) Qxb5 c6 18 Dc3 ©b4（Stoltz－O＇Kelly，Bever－ wijk 1946）；
（b） 10 ．．．＠e6 11 §f4 £xf4 12 §xe6， when the original move \(12 \ldots\) ．．．a6！（three minor pieces are en prise）secures Black equal chances（Janosevic－Matulovic， Birmingham 1975）．

White＇s other two moves look more natural：

10 §g5 Qbd7 11 0－0 0－0 12 Bacl a6 \(13 \Xi \mathrm{fel}\) and Black is in difficulties （Hamovic－Poppel，Austria 1951）．

10 0－0 a6 11 Og3 \(0 c 6\)（11．．．0－0 12 ○g5） 12 Еel + \＆f8 13 Qge4 Qxe4 14 Qxe4 \＆b4（14．．． \(0 x \mathrm{xd} 415\) Qxd6 cxd6 16 \＆f4 is unfavourable for Black） 15 \(\pm \mathrm{d}\) ．White＇s position is more promis－ ing（Wirthensohn－Miles，Biel 1977）．
16.13 （1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e3 e5 4这xc4 exd4 5 exd4）
\(5 \ldots\) §d6
6 Di3 Df6

6．．．We7？would be a blunder in view of \(70 \mathrm{~g} 50-08 \mathrm{~W}\) h5．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
7 & 0-0 & 0-0 \\
8 & 0 \mathrm{c} 3 &
\end{array}
\]

8 h 3 is worth considering，e．g．8．．．c6 9 Qc3 \＆f5 10 Qh4 显g611 定g5 Qbd7 12 f4！b5（Horvath－Lengyel，Budapest 1993）．After 13 ＠b3 b4 14 乌e2 \＆e4 150 g 3 the play favours White．
 leads to a position from variation 16.112 （p．276），where the bishop has retreated to e7 not from b4，but from d6．


9 Sg5 Qbd7 10 h3 \＆h5 11 Qe4皿e7 12 Qg3 崖g6 13 De5（Goglidze－ Kmoch，Tbilisi 1934）．The white pieces have taken up active positions，but by 13．．．©xe5 14 dxe5 ©e4 it would seem that Black could have equalised： 15紫xd8 \＆xd8 16 公xe4 是xe4 17 定e3皿e7 \(18 \mathrm{f4} \mathrm{ff} 8\) ，and if 19 f 5 \＆ i d3．

9 h 3 苃h5 10 g 4 \＆g6 11 Qe5 c5． After this plausible move White launched an offensive with the vigorous 12 Exg6 hxg6 13 dxc5 \＆xc5 14 \＆xf7＋！（Ulybin－Erikalov，USSR 1986）．
 12 Qg3 Qb6 13 \＆b3 Qbd5 14 h 3 \＆e6
 are with White（Sjodell－Ernst，Gausdal 1991）．

\section*{16.2 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 4 ）}

\section*{30 c 3}

This move，like 3 e4 and 3 e3，allows the counter 3．．．e5．There are also sev－ eral transpositional possibilities．

We consider：
3．．．e5（16．21）
3．．．a6（16．22）－p． 281
3．．．c6 leads to a variation of the Slav Defence（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 c 63 ©c3 dxc4）．

3．．．e6 4 e4 c5 5 d5 or \(3 . . . c 54\) d5 e6 5 e 4 is examined in the line 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc4 3 e4 c5 4 d5 e6 5 Qc3（p．249）．

3．．．c5 can also lead to positions from the variation 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc 43 Df3 c5 4 d5，examined on p．184．Here we will mention only Whitehead－Zs．．Polgar （San Francisco 1986），in which White did not play \(0 \mathrm{f} 3: 3\) 3．．．c5 4 d 5 e6 5 e4 Qe7 6 \＆g5！？h6 7 \＆h4 exd5 8 exd5 g5

 \(120-0-0 \mathrm{~d} 4\) ．Here，instead of 13
 Black，correct was 13 畒d2 d 5 with chances for both sides（Polgar）．

For 3．．．⿹d74 乌f3 Qb6，cf．p． 193.
3．．．Oc6 leads to a variation of the Chigorin Defence（1 d4 d5 2 c4 ©c6 3 Qc3 dxc4）．
\(\square\)
16.21 （1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 ＠c3）
\[
3 \quad \ldots \quad e 5
\]


\section*{4 d5}
宣e6 \(6 \mathrm{f} 4 \mathrm{f6}\) ！ 7 Qf3 Qc6 and Black stands better，Gurgenidze－Suetin，USSR 1960）5．．．Dc6 6 e4 分xe5 7 \＆f4 \＆d6 8宜xe5 \＆xe5 9 完xc4 Qe7．The ending
is slightly more pleasant for Black．
4 e3 exd4 5 exd4 \(Q\) f6 leads to posi－ tions from the variation 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 dxc4 3 e3 e5（p．274）．

White gains no advantage by 4 Qr exd4 5 wivd4（after 5 Qxd4 c5 6 Qdb5
 ©b7 Black holds on to the pawn，Orel－ Fochtler，Eger 1992；5．．． 16 comes into


\section*{4 ．．．c6}

Golombek－Alekhine（Margate 1935） went 4．．．a6 5 e4 b5 6 a4 b4 7 Qa2 f5 8 exf5＠xf5 9 气xc4 Qf6 10 乌e2 with chances for both sides．In Taimanov＇s opinion， 10 §g5 promises White slightly better prospects．
\[
\begin{array}{lll}
5 & \text { e4 } & 0 f 6 \\
6 & \& g 5 &
\end{array}
\]
 ＠xc3＋ 9 bxc3（Terterian－Savon，Pod－ olsk 1991）9．．．0－0 with roughly equal chances．
\[
6 \quad \ldots \quad \text { \&b4 }
\]

Benitez－Szilagyi（Moscow Olympiad 1956）continued 7 ＠xf6 监xf6 8 ＠xc4
 \＆d7 with roughly equal chances．

16．22（1 d4 d5 2 c 4 dxc 43 Qc3）
\(\begin{array}{llll}3 & \ldots & \text { a6 } \\ 4 & \text { e4 } & \end{array}\)
4 e3 乌f6（after 4．．．b5 5a4b4 6 Da2 White＇s position is preferable） 5 ＠xc4 b5（Black can transpose into the Classical Variation by 5．．．e6） 6 \＆d3 Qb7 7 Qf3（after 7 f3 e6 8 Oge2 c5 Black has a comfortable game）7．．．e6 8 Wiv2 Qbd7 9 a4 b4 10 Qe4 c5 11
 with a promising position for Black） 11．．． \(0 x f 612\) b3（Timman－Pr．Nikolic， Wijk aan Zee 1982，went 12 dxc 5 当c7 13 e4 \＆ \(2 x 5140-0\)＠d7 15 b3 0－0 16
\＆b2 \＆d6 with equal chances） 12 ．．．cxd4 （if \(12 \ldots\) ． exf 313 gxf 3 cxd 414 §b2！ with an excellent game－Nikolic） 13
 15 \＆xa6） 15 \＆b2．White＇s initiative compensates for the sacrificed pawn．

If 4 a4 e5，when after 5 dxe5？！（ 5 d5 Qf6 gives equal chances） 5 ．．．\({ }^{W} \mathrm{xdl}+6\) dxdl \＆e6 Black＇s position is slightly preferable（Capablanca－I．Rabinovich， Moscow 1935）．
\begin{tabular}{lll}
4 & \(\ldots\) & \(b 5\) \\
5 & a4 & b4
\end{tabular}

After 5．．．\＆b7 6 axb5 axb5 7 Exa8 \＆xa8 8 Qxb5 是xe4 White has：
（a） 9 Qc3 or 9 \＆f4（9．．．e5 10 ©xe5 \(\& b 4+11 \triangleq c 3\) ）with the better position．
\[
6 \text { a2 }
\]

If 6 Qb1 \＆b7 7 f 3 e 58 d 5 c 6 ！with slightly the better prospects for Black （Korchnoi－Hübner，TV game 1984）．


6．．．e6 7 ＠xc4＠b7（or 7．．．Qf6 8 f c5 9 De2 0 c 610 是e3 cxd4 11 合xd4 Qa5 12 皿e2 \＆e7 13 Qc1 0－0 14 Qcb3 \＆．b7 \(150-0\) with the more promising position，I．Sokolov－Sadler，Oviedo

1992） 8 f3 c5 9 Qe2 cxd4 10 Qxd4

 g 5 is unclear） 13 \＃cl ©bc6，and Black maintains the balance（Marjanovic）．

6．．．e5 7 \＆xc4 exd4（7．．．管xd4 8

 dl is more than dangerous for Black） 10 \＆g5 Qf6！ 11 0－0（11 e5 h6 12 ©xf6 gxf6 1300 is unfavourable for White in view of \(13 . . .0 \mathrm{~d} 7\) ！ 14 exf6 Wxf6 15 Eael＋\＆e7－Kharlov）11．．．h6 12 （d5，and now：
（a）in Eingorn－Kharlov（USSR Ch． 1991）Black sacrificed the exchange－ 12．．．hxg5！？ 13 ＠xa8 g4 14 ©d2（14 0 g 5 is strongly met by \(14 \ldots\) ．．． H 515 f 4



（b）12．．．\＆e6，when Alterman－ Raetsky（Rostov 1993），which reached this position by a quieter move order
 continued 13 \＆h4 g5 14 ＠g3 \(\AA \mathrm{g} 715\)

 20 Qf5） 16 Qxb4（16 \＆xa8 b3！） 16．．．\＆xd5（16．．．cxb4 17 是xa8） 17 ©xd5 \(0 x \mathrm{xd} 518\) exd5 \(\mathrm{D}^{2} 7\) with chances for both sides．

6．．．\＆b7 7 f3 ©c6！（a new and inter－ esting idea） 8 d 5 （if 8 \＆e3 e5） \(8 \ldots .\). （a5 9 §d2（9 ©xb4 e6 favours Black）9．．． e6！（winning the exchange by \(9 \ldots . . \mathrm{b} 3\) 10 \＆xc4 Qxal 11 Qxb4 gives White compensation－Alterman） 10 dxe6 fxe6 11 £xb4 \＆xb4＋ 12 Qxb4 倠h4＋13g3䂞e7．Black＇s position is preferable （Alterman－Av．Bykhovsky，Israel 1994）．

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